00026385

THE
ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BOMBAY
Town Hall, Bombay.

00026385

Digitized with financial assistance from

HT Parekh
FOUNDATION

An Initiative by
HDFC
WITH YOU, RIGHT THROUGH

on 28 December, 2018



THE

# LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL

# SIR HENRY MARION DURAND,

K.C.S.I., C.B.,

OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.

B 439

26385

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

BY

H. M. DURAND, C.S.I.,

OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

B 1228

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

Y Y M 1

LONDON:

W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE,

PALL MALL, S.W.

1883.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER,
MILFORD LANE, STRAND, W.C.

# PREFACE.

—o—

More than twelve years have elapsed between my father's death and the publication of this Memoir. In the meanwhile many of those who knew him, or who knew something of him by reputation, have also died; and for others probably the lapse of time will have lessened the interest which the book might have possessed if published earlier. Various reasons have combined to cause the delay. When I went out to India two years after my father's death I did not feel competent to take up immediately the story of an Indian career; while, on the other hand, I believed that my father's wishes in the matter had been clearly indicated, and that the writing of his life was a duty which I had no right to make over to others. I therefore put the matter off, being further actuated by the feeling, which my father had also entertained, that for some reasons a certain amount of delay in the publication of his papers might not be altogether undesirable. After I had gained a little experience of India, and had begun to think that I could properly undertake the task, the constant pressure of Secretariat duties, interrupted only by a period of service in Afghanistan, left me very scanty leisure; and it was not until last year that I was able to set to work in earnest.

Now that the book is finished I am very sensible of the fact that after all it has been roughly and imperfectly put together. The whole of the manuscript had to be written, and almost all the previous reading and abstracting had to be done, during a short period of leave in India, and the very fullness of the material

at my disposal presented in this respect a further difficulty. For the last thirty years of his life my father kept every letter he received, and a copy of almost *every letter he wrote*. His own journals, letter books, and volumes of notes are several score in number; and the letters from others which he preserved number some thousands. Such a record is invaluable to a biographer: but labour and time are required for a really thorough examination and sifting of so great a mass of papers, and my time was short. Since the book was sent to England I have had an unexpected opportunity of revising it to some extent, but being at a distance from the bulk of my papers I have been unable to make any material alterations.

I publish the Memoir, therefore, with the consciousness that it has been both long delayed and hastily written, and with the further sense that in some respects the story of a man's life can hardly fail to suffer from being told by his son. For various reasons it is impossible in such a case to write with freedom; and, of course, however hard a writer may try to be truthful and temperate, he cannot expect any one to regard him as impartial. I can only hope that in spite of all shortcomings on my part, those who read the book may be able to find in it sufficient material for forming a just estimate of my father's character and services.

His career was the career of an Indian officer, and his name was therefore little known in England; but possibly even in England there may be some who will find interest in his life and work; and in India, where he was well known and honoured, I cannot but believe that this will be the case.

(Signed) H. M. DURAND.

LONDON:
*8th October*, 1883.

# CONTENTS.

—o—

## CHAPTER I.

1812—1830.

PAGE

Parentage—Childhood—Education—Addiscombe—First Commission—Voyage to India—Shipwreck—Arrival in Calcutta—Bishop Turner—Alexander Duff. . . . . 1

## CHAPTER II.

1830—1838.

India in 1830—Appointment to the North-West Provinces—Journey to Cawnpore—Attached to the Public Works Department—Sanataria for European troops in the Himalayas—Transfer to the Canal Department—Colvin—Proby Cautley—Robert Napier—William Baker—Study of Languages, &c.—Canal work—Colonel Skinner—Camel ride to Bhawalpore—Application for service in Persia—Trips in the Himalayas—The Sewalik fossils—Work on the Nujjufgurh swamp—Lord Auckland—Offer of Appointment as Deputy Surveyor-General—Offer of Appointment as Secretary to the Sudder Board of Revenue—Assembling of the Army of the Indus—Selected for Service—Sir Henry Fane. . . . . .

## CHAPTER III.

1838—1840.

Plan of the Afghan Campaign—March to Sukkur—Alexander Burnes—Bridging the Indus—March to Quetta—Captain George Thomson—Geology and Botany—Dr. Griffith—Candahar—Expedition to Girishk—Proposed appointment to Herat—Advance upon Ghazni—Storm of the Fortress—March to Cabul—Political schemes—Macnaghten and Sir John Keane—Appointed Engineer to the Cabul Mission—Efforts to secure the occupation of the Bala Hissar—Site of the British Cantonment—Shah Shooja—Resigns appointment—Return to India—Avitabile at Peshawur—Eldred Pottinger—Review of the Sikh army at Lahore—Recrosses the Sutlej. . . . . 40

## CHAPTER IV.

### 1840—1844.

Preparation of Plans and Reports connected with the Afghan Campaign—Course of Events beyond the Indus during 1840—Surrender of Dost Mahomed—Application for Furlough—Vincent Eyre—General Elphinstone—Voyage to England—Proposed Retirement from the Company's service and Preparation for the Ministry—Appointed Aide-de-Camp to Lord Ellenborough—Return to India—Disasters in Afghanistan—Appointed Private Secretary—Wars in China and Afghanistan—Lord Ellenborough and Sir John Kaye—Simla—Return of the British force from Afghanistan—Marriage—Troubles in Sind and Gwalior—Battle of Maharajpore—Disaffection in the Native army—Recall of Lord Ellenborough—Administration of Lord Ellenborough—His Character. . . . . .

## CHAPTER V.

### 1844—1849.

Appointed Commissioner of Tenasserim — George Broadfoot — Work on Tenasserim Coast—Sir Herbert Maddock—Difficulties of position in Moulmein—War with the Sikhs—Troubles in connection with the Burmese Teak forests and conduct of the Moulmein Assistants—Proceedings disapproved by Bengal Government—Removed from Commissionership—Attacks of the Press—Dr. Duff—Vincent Eyre—Lord Hardinge—Offered the post of Chief Engineer at Lahore—Sails for England—Regret in Moulmein at his Departure—Judson and the American Missionaries—Appeal to the Court of Directors—Sir John Hobhouse—Begins to write a History of the Afghan War—Disturbances in the Punjab—Returns to India—Ordered to join the Army on the Chenab. . . . . .

## CHAPTER VI.

### 1849—1853.

Position of Lord Gough—Advance against the Sikhs—Battle of Chillianwala—Dawes of the Artillery—Lord Gough—Battle of Goojerat—Sir Colin Campbell—Annexation of the Punjab—Offer of a Deputy Commissionership in the Punjab—Appointed Political Assistant at Gwalior—Offered the command of the Sappers and Miners—Appointed Political Agent in Bhopal—Sir Charles Napier—Depression at his position—Failure of applications for promotion and Brevet rank—Sir Robert Hamilton—The Secunder Begum—Essays contributed to the Calcutta Review—Death of the Duke of Wellington—Employment of natives and spread of Education—Appointed to officiate as Resident at Nagpore—Resigns Bhopal appointment and sails for England. . . . . .

## CHAPTER VII.

### 1854—1857.

PAGE

Efforts to obtain Employment in England—Lord Raglan—Outbreak of the Crimean War—Correspondence regarding the Plan and Conduct of the Campaign and the possibility of utilizing the Indian Armies—Residence at Charlton Kings—Correspondence about Brevet Rank—Mr. Henry Drummond—Switzerland—Return to India—Grant of Brevet Rank—Appointed Superintending Engineer in Calcutta—Prospect of War with Persia—Correspondence with Lord Canning regarding Military Operations in Persia and Afghanistan—Appointed Resident at Indore. . . . 155

## CHAPTER VIII.

### 1857—1858.

The Central India Agency—Disaffection in the Native Army—Outbreak at Meerut—Position of Central India—Military force at the Resident's disposal—Importance of securing the Bombay road and the line of the Nerbudda—Alarm at Mhow and Indore—Outbreaks at Nusseerabad and Neemuch—Massacre at Jhansi—Rise of the Gwalior Contingent—Attack upon the Residency at Indore by Holkar's troops—Retreat to Sehore—Maintenance of the line of the Nerbudda—Arrival of Bombay column—Holkar's explanations favourably received—Hungerford at Mhow—Position during the rainy season—Rising at Mundesore—Tantia Topee—Risings at Dhar and Amjhera—My mother's death—Advance of the British force from Mhow—Capture of Dhar—Fall of Mehidpore—Cavalry action at Rawul—Fighting at Mundesore—Holkar's troops disarmed—Sir Robert Hamilton resumes charge of the Agency—Lord Canning's Minute—Companionship of the Bath. . . . . 197

## CHAPTER IX.

### 1858—1861.

Return to Calcutta—Letters to his Daughter—Appointed to collect Opinions and prepare Reports on the question of Army Reorganization in India—With Lord Canning at Allahabad—Correspondence regarding Reorganization—Sent to England as Special Commissioner from the Government of India—Feeling in England against Lord Canning's proposals—Appointment to the Secretary of State's Council—Efforts to prevent Amalgamation and protect the Rights of the Indian Armies—Second Marriage—Residence at East Sheen—Formation of the Indian Staff Corps—Offer of the Foreign Secretaryship—Return to India. . . . . 238

## CHAPTER X.

### 1861—1865.

The Indian Foreign Office—Durbar at Allahabad—Cawnpore and Lucknow—Offer of Chief Commissionership in Mysore—Offer of Hyderabad Residency—Lady Canning—The Adoption Sunnuds—Native Members in the Legislative Council—Lord Canning leaves India—Lord Elgin—Affairs in Afghanistan—Income Tax in India—Our relations with the Native Chiefs—Fayrer—Mayne—Durbars at Benares and Agra—Proposed change of the Seat of Government—Social relations with the Natives of India—Illness and Death of Lord Elgin—Sir John Lawrence appointed Governor-General—Correspondence with Lady Durand—Differences with Sir John Lawrence—Bhutan War—Visit to Burmah—Appointment to Council. . . 28

## CHAPTER XI.

### 1865—1870.

The Indian Council—Correspondence regarding Military Reorganization and other Matters—Proposed Establishment of an Indian Moniteur—Oudh Talukdars—Voting in the Legislative Council—Necessity for an Indian Navy—Bishop Cotton—Futtehpore Sikri—Proposed Advance to Quetta—Russia and England in Central Asia—The K.C.S.I.—Abyssinia—Sir John Lawrence and the Press—Income-Tax—Correspondence with Lady Durand—Deafness—Visit to England—Lord Mayo—Reception of Ameer Shere Ali Khan at Umballa—Barrack Expenditure—Punjab Tenancy Act—Horse Artillery—Railways in India—The Secretary of State and his Council—Visit of the Duke of Edinburgh—Offer of Amalgamated Agencies of Central India and Rajputana—Appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. . . . . 33

## CHAPTER XII.

The Punjab—Uneasiness on the Frontier—Relations with Native Chiefs—Visit to Cashmere—Colonel Gardener—The Franco-German War—Railway Gauges—Correspondence with Lady Durand—Donald Macnabb—Tour on the Frontier—Agrore Valley — Peshawur — Kohat — Bunnoo—Tank—Accident and Death—Character. . . . . 4

---

## APPENDIX I.

Lord Ellenborough and Sir John Kaye . . . . . .

## APPENDIX II.

The Mutiny in Central India . . . . . .

# ERRATA.

*Page* 46, *line* 2. "it" omitted from beginning of line.

„ 50, *note, line* 2. *For* "it was not," *read* "he was not."

„ 114, *note, line* 2. *For* "quartermaster-general of the force," *read* "quartermaster-general of Queen's troops."

„ 214, *line* 23. *For* "were soon disabled," *read* "was soon disabled."

„ 229, *last line*. *For* "was the first to be put down," *read* "was first to be put down."

„ 264, *line* 28. *For* "for" *read* "of."

„ 314, *line* 9 *from bottom*. *For* "who he converted" *read* "who be converted."

„ 370, *line* 9. *For* "letter" *read* "letters."

„ 389, *line* 27. *Omit* "by Sir John Lawrence."

„ 413, *line* 25. *For* "lieutenant-governship" *read* "lieutenant-governorship."

„ 414, *line* 8 *from bottom*. *For* "her father" *read* "the father."

„ 472, *line* 21. *For* "choose" *read* "chose."

# SIR HENRY DURAND.

## CHAPTER I.

### 1812—1830.

Parentage—Childhood—Education—Addiscombe—First Commission—Voyage to India—Shipwreck—Arrival in Calcutta—Bishop Turner—Alexander Duff.

HENRY MARION DURAND was born on the 6th of November, 1812.

His father, an officer of cavalry, who had served with credit in the Peninsula, and afterwards at Waterloo, died while he was still a boy; and having also lost his mother he was left under the sole charge of a Mr. Deans, who had been a friend of the family. He had one younger brother, long since dead, whom he never saw after he left England in 1829; but with this exception he was practically alone in the world, and until he entered the army his home was with the Deans household in London. Here he was treated with unvarying kindness, and seems to have been thoroughly happy. Both his guardian and Mrs. Deans, a good tender-hearted woman, did their best to make up to him for the loss of his parents, and they certainly succeeded in winning his entire confidence and love. To the end of his life he used to speak of them with the warmest gratitude, and his early letters from India, some of which have been courteously placed at my disposal by a nephew of his guardian, now a clergyman in Derbyshire, show that he always looked back to his quiet English home with keen affection and regret.

Of his parents my father remembered little. He kept to the end of his life a Bible which his mother had given him as a child, and he had some dim recollection of her; but this was all. My grandfather was remarkable for his powerful build and great personal daring, and his son used to speak with pride in after years

of the acts of coolness and courage by which the young soldier had distinguished himself during the wars of Napoleon. An old miniature, almost the only thing remaining from among his personal effects, represents him as a singularly handsome man, with a face well suited to the character he bore. His career was full of striking incident; and though the return of peace, and his early death, prevented him from gaining any high position in the service, his name was remembered with honour by many of the survivors of those stirring times. One of these in particular, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, afterwards Lord Raglan, had known him well as a young man, and was in later years a good friend to my father for his sake. The Duke of Wellington had also known him, and one of my father's earliest recollections was of being taken to see the Duke in Paris soon after the close of the Waterloo Campaign. He was then only three years of age, but he was treated with much kindness, and the visit always remained fresh in his memory from the fact that while running about the great man's room he tripped and fell, cutting his forehead to the bone against a projecting corner of the chimney-piece. He carried the mark with him to the end of his life. My grandfather had an even greater admiration for Sir John Moore, on whose staff he had served, and whom he helped to bury, than for the Duke. To the former he was deeply attached, and he always wore a lock of his old chief's hair, which he had cut off after the fight at Corunna.

With such antecedents it was natural that my father's inclination should turn to a military career; and though I believe he received little encouragement from his guardian, who would have preferred seeing him enter the ministry, he was resolved from the first to follow his own bent. The wish, if not encouraged, was not balked; and having been offered, through the unsolicited kindness of a friend, a nomination to an Indian Cadetship,* he determined, when little more than a child, to enter the military service of the Company, which at that time held out stirring prospects of work and advancement. With this object, after some years spent at Leicester School, to which he had been sent when only eight years of age, he entered a special training establishment at Putney.† Here he first made acquaintance with several of those whom he was afterwards to meet in India, among them his future chief Lord Canning, and Donald Macleod of the Civil

* He was also offered, and declined, a nomination to the Training College for the Indian Civil Service at Haileybury.

† Mr. Carmalt's.

Service, who preceded him in the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab.

According to one of his schoolfellows, who was good enough to write down a short time ago his recollection of my father's school days, his progress in his work was rapid and uniform; but I have been unable to ascertain whether he showed special aptitude in any one line. In after life he was an excellent mathematical scholar, and particularly fond of astronomy; but his love for classical literature was at least equally great. Probably at school as elsewhere he held his own "all round."

In 1825 my father joined the Company's College at Addiscombe, and from this time his success was remarkable. Before he was fifteen he had distanced all his fellows, many of them considerably senior to himself, and was eager to enter upon his career as a soldier. For a time his patience was sorely tried, the grant of a Cadetship being withheld on account of his youth; but a few months later this objection was overlooked, and in June, 1828, he was permitted to leave the College as a Cadet of Engineers, carrying with him seven out of eight possible prizes, and the sword for good conduct. His commission as a second lieutenant bore date from the 12th June of this year. It was, I believe, contrary to rule that a cadet should enter the service before sixteen years of age, but an exception was made in his favour. Among his companions at Addiscombe were Robert Napier, Vincent Eyre, Eldred Pottinger, and several others who have made a name for themselves in Indian history.

After leaving Addiscombe my father spent a year at Chatham, going through the course usual for Engineer officers; and the following letter, written at the end of that time by his immediate superior, Colonel Pasley, to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who had made some inquiries about him, shows that he continued unflagging in his efforts to fit himself for his profession :—

"CHATHAM,
"*6th September*, 1829.

"MY DEAR LORD FITZROY,—

"I received your note respecting Mr. Durand, an East India Engineer Cadet, who has just quitted me, having completed the usual course.

"He was one of a party of seven who joined at the same time. By superior diligence he finished before the others; and he is one of the most distinguished young Engineers whom I have

ever had under me, both in respect to diligence, ability, and conduct. He was in all my monthly reports of progress, &c., returned exemplary as to conduct, and generally extremely diligent, or very diligent, not only in quantity but in quality of work performed. . . . . I never had occasion to find fault with him.

"If your Lordship can procure or give him any recommendation to the authorities in India you will not only serve a young man of great merit but do good to the service there, by bringing forward a young officer whose principles I believe are equally good with his abilities. I myself take a great interest in him, though I know nothing of his family.

"I remain, &c., &c.,
"C. W. PASLEY.

"P.S.—I omitted to mention that Mr. Durand is going to Bengal."

What was the result of this letter I do not know. My father always believed that he landed in India without a friend, or a line of recommendation from any one; but he found more than once in after life that the kindly old soldier, who at that time possessed considerable influence, had been working unsolicited to interest others in his favour; and it is possible that at the outset he was not so entirely friendless and unknown as he imagined himself to be.

I have not been able to get much information regarding my father's early life outside the class-room. He was described long afterwards by his old schoolfellow, Sir Donald Macleod, as a "very quiet gentle boy," and I believe he never distinguished himself as a cricketer, or at games of any kind, though he rowed bow of the Engineers' boat at Chatham, and was in after years a good horseman and shot. When young he certainly gave no promise of growing into the tall and powerful man he afterwards became. Until he left Addiscombe he was, in fact, unusually small for his age; and I remember his telling me during his last visit to England, in 1868, when I was envying him his great breadth of shoulder and length of limb, that at College his short stature, coupled perhaps with his enthusiastic admiration for the military genius of Napoleon, had gained for him the nickname of "Le Petit Caporal." And when he was first appointed an under officer the appointment caused something like a mutiny among the

Cadets, who were indignant at being commanded by a boy of his age and inches. After leaving Addiscombe he shot up rapidly, and in middle age he was a man of remarkable size, considerably over six feet in height, with a massive frame and great bodily strength.

In October, 1829, my father sailed for India in the *Lady Holland*. He went out of course by the Cape, and in comparison with our rapid and prosaic journeys by the overland route, the voyage was not altogether uneventful. As far as Madeira all went fairly well, but while lying off Funchal the vessel was struck by a sudden storm which forced her to put out to sea; and my father, who had gone on board for the night, not caring to stay for a ball given by the Company's agent to the captain and passengers, had a rough and dangerous cruise of more than a fortnight's duration before the *Lady Holland* could get back to port. She was at best a bad sailer, and at the time was undermanned, a portion of her crew being on shore when the storm came on. During this cruise my father was the only passenger. Some further delay then occurred, as the southern seas were at the time not free from pirates, and it was thought desirable to wait for the escort of the *Undaunted*, a frigate whose station was the line. Finally, owing to a dispute with the Portuguese authorities, who wished to muster and examine the passengers, the *Lady Holland* was near being called upon to prove her capacities as a fighting vessel. The demand was stoutly resisted, and she sailed out of the bay with guns shotted, and decks cleared for action. A long and tedious voyage followed by way of Sal and St. Iago, the only excitement being caused by unsuccessful attempts on the part of the *Undaunted* to chase suspicious-looking craft; and it was not until the middle of February, 1830, that the *Lady Holland* reached the neighbourhood of the Cape. Here her course came to a sudden end. On the night of the 13th February she was going along with a good steady breeze on her bow, and my father had just walked down to his cabin after a cheery good night from the officer on duty, when he heard a cry of "Land ahead!" followed immediately by the order for the helm to be put hard down. Springing up on deck he saw at once that there was no chance of escape. "The moon was just rising above the horizon," he writes in a letter to Mrs. Deans, "and showed a dark streak cutting off its lower part, and plainly distinguishable as land. The first long beams struck on a heavier denser black streak, and glanced from the foam and breakers dashing upon it. I looked over the gang-

way; the ship was surrounded with sands." A moment afterwards the crash came. "Being a bad sailer she did not answer her helm quickly enough, and the order was given to put everything aback. It was too late; a loud grating along her bottom told her situation, and the next wave gave us one of those beats against the rock which none can imagine until they experience them." Within an hour she was a complete wreck, her masts were gone, and her decks "covered with cordage, spars, blocks, and all other nautical appurtenances, presented in the moonlight one of the most beautiful ruins that can be imagined." Fortunately, though there was a considerable sea on at the time, it was found possible, after the first panic had subsided, to lower the boats. One after another they were nearly swamped, but eventually the whole of the passengers and crew were got off, and before the *Lady Holland* went down they were safely landed on Dassan Island, a small strip of rock and sand some forty miles from Table Bay. There they remained four days, until relieved by a ship from the Cape; their food in the meantime consisting chiefly of penguins' eggs, which were found in large quantities all over the island.

In the *Lady Holland* my father lost almost everything he possessed. When the vessel struck there was at first some difficulty in preventing the crew from deserting her. She seemed to be going down; and the men, calling to each other that there was nothing to be done, began to strip for a swim. After this had been stopped there was much panic and confusion among the passengers; and my father, exerting himself to save the lives and property of others, was unable to do much for himself. He used to laugh over the story in after days, telling us how he had to find clothing for the ladies, who had run up on deck at the first shock, many of them in their night-dresses. Their cabins were soon full of water, the vessel settling rapidly, and two young girls who were among the last to be provided for had to be content with a pair of dreadnought jackets. In these and their night-dresses they were taken on shore.

Talking long afterwards to one of his children about this shipwreck, and the odd traits of character which it brought out, my father mentioned two incidents which seem worthy of notice here as showing, what certainly was little in his thoughts when he was telling the story, his own unselfish courage in a time of confusion and danger. When the passengers had been assembled, and the ladies were being lowered into the boats, my father missed an

officer of the Madras army, who, though a gallant soldier, was known to be given to drink. He went down at once to the old man's cabin, which fortunately was not yet under water; found him asleep: and woke him up, telling him the ship was a wreck. The only answer was, "Why don't they pump the ship?" coupled with a stubborn refusal to move. My father returned to the cabin twice, each time at greater risk to himself, and finally, finding words useless, pulled the old man on to his feet. Even then he could not be induced to leave his berth, and my father went back to where the passengers were gathered, hoping to get help. In the hurry and confusion he could find no one to return with him, and he was going down again alone when one of the ladies, a brave sensible woman who had kept her head throughout, said to him, [redacted] I want him to come and take care of me." My [redacted] and delivered the message, and the old gentleman [redacted] his lethargy and followed. Another passenger [redacted] French lady of the name of Duval, who was going [redacted] Like the rest she had left her cabin when the [redacted] my father found her on deck, terribly frightened, [redacted] actedly for "Monsieur Pitt," a little Italian grey- [redacted] s always with her. Hoping to calm her my father [redacted] f "Monsieur Pitt," no pleasant task, for the main- [redacted] cut away, and the rigging and spars were falling [redacted] Eventually he found the little creature curled [redacted] berth, and the first sight that met his eyes when [redacted] ssan Island a few hours later was Madame Duval [redacted] tt happily engaged in chasing rabbits.

[redacted] I have said, my father had lost almost all his [redacted] was put on shore with nothing but a few papers, [redacted] le, and the clothes he was wearing when the *Lady* [redacted] In very much the same condition he reached [redacted] nths later, after a stay of some weeks, waiting for a [redacted] tle cottage near Cape Town. His letters give an [redacted] of his companions during this time, and of his [redacted] and her daughter. His description of the latter [redacted] a certain sense of familiarity. She was "rather [redacted] bad figure," he writes, "and she seemed pretty [redacted] that she merited some degree of admiration, and [redacted] to receive it. . . . . Her accomplishments [redacted] rous or extensive of their kind. Music she de- [redacted] lancing rendered earth a paradise."

[redacted] which he sailed from the Cape anchored at the

mouth of the Hooghly about the 20th of May, and the tides rendering it improbable that she could get to Calcutta for some days longer, he pushed up the river with four companions in one of the Company's row boats. The heat was "overpowering," and the food put up by the ship's steward proving uneatable, the travellers had to fall back upon the boatmen's curry and rice; but they consoled themselves and warded off fever, after the English fashion, by the aid of "cigars, beer, and brandy," and my father landed in Calcutta none the worse for the exposure, escaping a second shipwreck which overtook the unlucky passengers of the *Lady Holland* off the Island of Saugor.

The following extract from a letter written by him to his good friend Mrs. Deans gives in a few words his earliest impressions of the Indian capital:—

"The first view of Calcutta is certainly beaut
studded with shipping; the buildings, mostly of
ance; the straight and even lines of the gree
fort, rising one above the other and brea
elegance of foliage and water; Governm
covered with busy multitudes; everythi
landing is not so troublesome with
debashes, &c., as Madras, although eve
crowd of umbrella carriers, coolies, an
pounce upon fresh arrivers. The town o
appoint me, though places much spoken of g
descriptions given to them. It may be tha
Madras I formed a comparison between the t
clean, well kept, and in some places watered.
is a respectable and well managed house, but i
own words, it is after the English mode excessiv

My father was not left long to Mr. Spence's ten
chance introduction procured him soon after his a
tion to the Palace from Bishop Turner, and unde
hospitable roof he spent his first month in India.
in a sketch of his career which was published by o
newspapers some years ago, that having landed wh
baggage he was "temporarily supplied with clo
Episcopal wardrobe, and became first known as th
sahib.'" Ten years later he was very near exch
coat permanently for the clergyman's gown.

It is worth noting that one of my father's fello
the *Lady Holland* was Alexander Duff, the first

the Kirk of Scotland, whose name has now become a household word.* The two had much in common, and they afterwards became staunch friends. A few months before the close of his life my father wrote, in reply to a letter congratulating him upon his appointment to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, that when he looked back upon his career and contrasted it with Dr Duff's he felt it had been "a mere flash in the pan." The remark was no empty figure of speech. From the first his sympathy with the work of the missionaries in India was deep and active, and he always rated his friend's devoted efforts in the cause of Christ far higher than his own services. Writing of my father after his death, in no friendly spirit, the historian Kaye described him as looking at everything through the pure crystal of Christianity; and the description was as true when he first set foot in India as it was forty years later. From the very beginning his conduct was controlled by a firm belief in the truth of the Bible, and notwithstanding his later love for metaphysical and scientific reading, that belief remained practically unshaken to the end. A long experience of life, he told his children, and much acquaintance as a student with so-called knowledge, had led him to trust in and believe nothing save the one truth of Christ's words—all else shook beneath one's feet while they alone stood firm. No record of his career would be other than thoroughly false if it failed to bring prominently forward the fact that a steadfast faith in the teaching of Christ, free from the slightest admixture of cant or bigotry, was the very foundation of his character. For honest doubt or honest disbelief he always had the gentlest tolerance, and nothing roused his anger more than any show of uncharitableness or spiritual pride; but for his own part he felt perfectly confident that he had been shown the truth, and his single aim in life was to act up to it. Humbly and fearlessly serving one Master, and relying upon a strength not his own, he strove from beginning to end to do his duty; and though his uncompromising rectitude of purpose, and equally uncompromising plainness of speech, made him many enemies, he found in the all-pervading reality of his religion that increasing comfort and support which such a faith cannot fail to afford to those who are privileged to possess it; and he was able at the last to close by a calm and happy death, a life which even his enemies acknowledged to have been rarely honest and upright.

* A full account of their voyage in the *Lady Holland* and of the shipwreck, is given in Dr. George Smith's "Life of Duff."

## CHAPTER II.

### 1830—1838.

India in 1830—Appointment to the North-West Provinces—Journey to Cawnpore—Attached to the Public Works Department—Sanataria for European troops in the Himalayas—Transfer to the Canal Department—Colvin—Proby Cautley—Robert Napier—William Baker—Study of Languages, &c.—Canal work—Colonel Skinner—Camel ride to Bhawalpore—Application for service in Persia—Trips in the Himalayas—The Sewalik fossils—Work on the Nujjufgurh swamp—Lord Auckland—Offer of Appointment as Deputy Surveyor-General—Offer of Appointment as Secretary to the Sudder Board of Revenue—Assembling of the Army of the Indus—Selected for Service—Sir Henry Fane.

It requires an effort to realize at the present day the extent of the change which has taken place in the condition of India, and especially in the position of its English rulers, since my father landed at Calcutta fifty years ago. Then, as now, we were the foremost power in the country. Our strength had steadily increased through a long period of incessant and often doubtful war, the inevitable consequence of our first territorial acquisition, until at last every enemy who crossed our path had been beaten down and for the time we stood out unquestionably supreme. But though the foremost power we were not the only one, and much remained to be done before our supremacy could be regarded as assured. A Mogul Emperor still reigned in Delhi, and his name was still mentioned with reverence and awe by many millions of men. The English Company had not yet ventured to remove it from the coins he had permitted them to strike; and for years to come he continued to receive from the English Governor-General the "nuzzur" which constituted the offering of an inferior. Oudh was an independent State, with a large and turbulent population, lying on the direct line of communication between Calcutta and our northern provinces. Bhurtpore had fallen in 1826, and the power of the Jats was broken, but we had found them stubborn foes, and they were likely enough to give more trouble. The great Mahratta Chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, once the scourge and

terror of India, had been humbled by defeat; but their strength was still formidable, and they afforded cause for constant watchfulness. It was not until the time of Lord Ellenborough that the military prestige of Sindia's army received its death blow on the field of Maharajpore. Throughout the broad belt of native territory which stretched across India from Sind to the Bengal coast, large and powerful States were then intriguing and quarrelling among themselves. Full of armed men, and little under our control, these States were an incessant source of anxiety. Even when they did not directly threaten us, a disputed succession or the revolt of a few unruly nobles might at any moment call for our forcible interference; and not many years had elapsed since the hordes of the Pindari freebooters, issuing from this tract of rough and disturbed country, had swept India "from Deccan to the Himalay." Outside our borders Burmah and Nepal were both smarting from defeat and thoroughly hostile in feeling, while to the north-west of our possessions lay the great Sikh kingdom founded by the genius of Runjeet Sing. It was from this point that trouble was specially to be apprehended. The old Lion of Lahore was shrewd enough to recognize the danger of a conflict with the Anglo-Indian army, and strong enough to control for the time the martial ardour of his chiefs and followers; but his life was drawing to a close, and the soldiery of the Khalsa were a standing menace to our power. More than fifty thousand men, thoroughly equipped, provided with a numerous artillery, and carefully trained and commanded by French officers, lay within four marches of the Sutlej fords. Flushed by continued success, eager for fresh conquests, and full of an enthusiastic belief in the future of their race, the Sikhs were certain sooner or later to challenge a trial of strength with the only power which seemed to bar their way to the dominion of Hindustan. Finally, to the south of the Khalsa kingdom, lay the territory of the Ameers of Sind. The State was divided, and weak for purposes of offence; but when the time came the fiery energy of the Belooch swords-men more than once tried to the utmost the courage and endurance of our invading armies.

Such was the condition of the native powers half a century ago; and it required no great foresight to perceive that the complete establishment of British supremacy was still uncertain, and not likely to be effected in the end except at the cost of severe and protracted warfare. For the time, however, everything was quiet, and promised so to remain. The stormy administration of Lord

Amherst had come to an end three years before, and with it apparently had ended the age of conquest. Awed by the sanguinary victories of Campbell and Combermere, the chiefs of India within and without our borders shrank from a conflict with the formidable battalions of the Company; and the new Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, secure from aggression on all sides, and resolutely opposed to a policy of encroachment, was able to concentrate his energies on the moral and physical advancement of the empire. In order to lighten the financial burthen bequeathed to him by his predecessor, he entered upon a course of unsparing retrenchment, and almost every department of the Government service came under the pruning knife. The army in particular offered a wide field for the exercise of economy. Though very weak in European troops, we had at one time, during our arduous contests with Burmah and Bhurtpore, not much less than three hundred thousand men under arms. For a ruler who entertained no fears of foreign invasion, or dreams of foreign conquest, such a force was manifestly excessive, and it was now rapidly reduced to a strength little more than sufficient for the preservation of internal order. As usual, the first strain showed that the reduction had been too sweeping, but in 1830 there was special justification for cutting down our armaments. They were the outcome of a period of hard and doubtful war, and everything now seemed to promise that an enduring peace was before us.

Under these circumstances there was little immediate prospect that my father would obtain what he ardently coveted, the chance of active military service. But, however this might be, the most promising field for a man of soldierly aspirations was then, as ever, the line of our north-west frontier. Although there were no signs of immediate trouble there or elsewhere, this was evidently the point at which trouble was most likely to arise, and accordingly the bulk of our Bengal troops were cantoned on the lines of the Ganges and Jumna from Allahabad westward. It was true that the bugbear of European invasion had been laid for the time; and our Indian statesmen, recognizing the impossibility of an attack on the part of Russia under existing conditions, could with difficulty be roused to take interest in the politics of Persia or Afghanistan. Nevertheless, far beyond our frontier lay various countries of which we knew but little, and from which invading armies had more than once descended upon the plains of India. Only thirty years earlier the very existence of our power had been threatened by the advance of Shah Zeman, which had

aroused the enthusiasm of all Indian Mahomedans, and troubled even the indomitable spirit of Wellesley. And whether our next conflict was to be with the descendants of Shah Zeman's swordsmen, or with enemies nearer home, Sikhs or Beloochees, Mahrattas or Jats, it was almost certain that the troops on our north-western frontier would bear the brunt of the shock. It was to this point, therefore, that my father's eyes naturally turned when, full of enthusiasm for his profession, he landed as a boy of seventeen on the banks of the Hooghly. His wishes were almost immediately gratified, for on the 18th of June, in answer to a formal application to the Military authorities, he was ordered to report himself to Colonel Auburey, then Chief Engineer at Cawnpore, and three days later he started for the northern provinces.

The journey from Calcutta to Cawnpore was a very different affair fifty years ago from what it is in these days of railroads. The broad waters of the Ganges were then the ordinary highway between the coast and the interior; and during the rainy season in particular the traveller had to make up his mind to a tedious journey of several weeks before reaching his destination. It was not until the 7th of September that my father arrived in Cawnpore. The voyage, however, was not altogether an unpleasant [illegible]e. To begin with, the whole thing was perfectly new to him, [illegible]d therefore interesting, and the mode of travelling was easy [illegible]l agreeable enough. The "budgerows" then in use were large [illegible]l roomy, with plenty of space for a store of books and a writing-[illegible]le; and when their attendant cook-boats did not happen to be [illegible]wn on shore or out of sight by "north-westers," which seems [illegible] have been a common incident, there was no discomfort to [illegible]mplain of. The days, perhaps, passed rather slowly; but to-[illegible]rds evening the boats were moored to the bank, and their [illegible]upants were able to go on shore for an hour or two before [illegible]ner. My father found much enjoyment in these evening [illegible]ables, which gave him an opportunity of seeing something of [illegible]e country and the people, and also of filling his sketch-[illegible]ook. He drew well and rapidly, in a bold, free style, and the [illegible]cenery of the Ganges cannot fail to strike any one who has an [illegible]artist's eye. The broad river reaches have always a calm beauty [illegible] of their own; and when the waters are rolling down in flood [illegible]under the glorious sunsets of the rainy season, it is difficult to [illegible]magine any sight more grand and impressive, or to avoid sharing [illegible] some extent in the wonder and awe with which the Hindoo [illegible]gards his sacred river.

My father was fortunate also in his companions. It so happened that when he received his orders Archdeacon Corrie and his good host the Bishop, to whom he had become strongly attached, were at the time starting for the northern provinces, and he travelled in their company as far as Mirzapore. The incidents of the journey, such as they were, I find recorded in detail in the pages of his earliest journal, and it is a temptation to extract some passages from this little volume, which to his children must always have a peculiar charm. But, as he felt himself, almost everything that could be said about a voyage up the Ganges had been said by Heber; and in all probability my father's journal would have no more interest for the general reader than the first impressions of any other clever and warm-hearted boy of seventeen just starting on an Indian career. In order, therefore, to avoid unduly lengthening the earlier chapters of this memoir, all such extracts have been reluctantly omitted. The following passages are from a couple of letters written at this time to his old friend and schoolfellow Deans, who had then lately taken orders:—

"*August 5th*, 1830.

"DEAR JOE,—Our fleet has just left that most holy of all h
cities Benares.* I have been trying first a military book, the
Hindustani one, then my pencil,—nothing would do. The
membrance of happy days has gradually taken hold of me,
my only resource is to give vent to my home longings and feeli
by the assistance of pen, ink, and a large sheet of paper . . .
The letters you have already received contained groans of
flatness of Bengal, that warm vapour bath country. I can
describe the pleasure that the sight of the Rajmehal Hills g
me, there was something English in the very look of them,
that is the greatest of all recommendations. We anchored o
site Rajmehal, or rather tied our rope to a post; for the latte
the real mode of doing the thing, the former being a figurati
expression. Unfortunately, it was in the middle of the day a
the sun very powerful, so that not even my love for ruins and t
picturesque could tempt me out of the boat. . . . . Sicligully

* While at Benares he attended his first evening party in an Indian station. Manners have changed since then, and the entry in his journal reads oddly. Afte some exclamations of wonder at the appearance of the guests, he writes: "T conversazione was held in the theatre. Dancing, cards, hookahs, brandy pawn &c., &c., and two shillings a head."

Peer Pointee, and Putter Gottah were all places of rest for the night, and you may be sure neither my sketch-book nor my legs were unemployed. There was also, in addition to the beauty of these three places, the feeling that I was retracing the haunts of Heber. The latter spot especially was very pretty and interesting. . . . . Two islands, turning the course of the Ganges, gave a beautiful winding to its rapid stream, whilst the rich banks, the splendid foliage, mixture of plain and hill, water and wood, made it look, in my eyes, very English. . . . . At Bhaugulpore we were very kindly received by the European gentry, both civil and military. This was the first station we had come to, so that the quantity of white faces was something novel, but delightful. . . . . Patna we passed in half a gale of wind, the consequence was that I could make no sketches from the river. . . . . A boat passed us bottom upwards, with five or six natives upon its keel sitting in their usual attitude, and seemingly not caring at all about their situation, but taking it as a matter of frequent occurrence. So little do the natives sympathize with each others' misfortunes that my 'manji' never told me of it, and passed them with the greatest coolness. Happening to go on the top of my boat afterwards, I saw them. [illegible]one of the numberless boats on the banks of the river put off [illegible] their assistance. . . . . The European houses are at some [illegible]tance from the city, and their place is called Bankipore. Here [illegible]usual through the Bishop I got good quarters and pleasant [illegible]iety. At one dinner party was an old Italian Franciscan, by [illegible]me Julius Cæsar. He has been a long time in the country, but [illegible]oks well and hearty. He boasts of having had an interview [illegible]ith Buonaparte at Milan, where his living formerly was, but he [illegible]led from the tyrant.' . . . . . His flock consists of about [illegible]40 Portuguese and Native Christians of his persuasion. His [illegible]stem of keeping them in order is a summary one—if he catches [illegible]y of his sheep looking and amusing themselves at Hindoo [illegible]stivals, they receive a sound beating. . . . . Dead bodies [illegible]ith crows upon them floating down the river, men brought down [illegible] die on the banks of the Ganges, are not at all uncommon sights. Servants . . . . . are an enormous source of trouble. Instead of six, which is the very least you can do with, I have at present *one*. Such a thing was scarcely ever heard of in Bengal, but then I actually take the trouble of washing and dressing myself, which few people do. I wish he would agree to become my [illegible]ctotum, but I should not like to expose him to the taunts of his

companions. When an opportunity offers I must lay in a fresh batch of servants, and not have my work half so well or willingly done as at present.

"The holy city of Benares is a curious, interesting place, unlike to anything I have as yet seen, narrow crowded streets—so narrow that a gig cannot enter them—plenty of temples, beggars, devotees, brahminee bulls running about loose, now thumping you nearly out of your palanquin, now butting slap into a house without any kind of ceremony. It is not altogether a pleasant place to go into. The men seem to know they could murder you, and no one be a morsel the wiser, or ever discover where and when it happened.

"We have received late news from England from which I am afraid our poor old King is nearly off the hooks. This expedition to Algiers is a curious one. The accounts make out that the French Government are really setting about the business as it should be done. By the time this reaches you the siege will be over. Send me any military work, French or English, that you can obtain which may be published concerning it.

"*August* 19*th*.

". . . . . Mirzapore was my last halting place, and I sh
always look back to it with a mixture of pain and pleasu
There I parted from the good kind Bishop. He in some man
attaches every one to him. . . . . He was to have confirn
me, but in the night preceding the confirmation I was unw
which prevented me. He, however, allowed me to take t
sacrament at Mirzapore. . . . . It seems lonely at prese
when we come to of an evening—Mouat's boat and my own wi
our cook-boats instead of pinnaces, cook-boats, baggage-boa
&c.—but what I miss most of all are the pleasant evenings
the Bishop's pinnace. . . . . Send me all the magazines, &
India is a bad place for obtaining books. Give me all the ne
you can—political, commercial, clerical, everything. . . .
With regard to books, if you should find out some very sele
good, and new work on architecture, containing designs f
churches, theatres, houses, mills, bridges, in fact everything,
should be much obliged to you to purchase it. Any very clever
work on machinery, containing drawings and plans of modern
machinery, I should wish you to send me. Of course keep
bill, and put down all magazines, &c., &c., to my account. I
this country, there is no possibility of obtaining books worth t

having. So few are scientific in their pursuits that it would be a very losing speculation to booksellers. If with the books you can stow a few colours, pencils, &c., all well."

"*September 7th.*

"DEAR JOE,—I have waited to try the Cawnpore Post Office, but alas! not a single letter that I cared about, and none from England. At Allahabad the time passed very pleasantly away. . . Our own corps, wherever we met, have come up to that feeling towards each other in the way of hospitality which a profession-loving subject like myself enjoys. Once more adieu. My love to all. The bad month of the year has just commenced. I hope fevers will avoid me as much as I shall them."

On arriving at Cawnpore my father was ordered to go on to Meerut, and was there attached to the Department of Public [redacted]rks, the destination of almost all Engineer officers in India. [redacted] first duty savoured little of the military, for he was set to [redacted]k to prepare designs for a church, the funds for which had [redacted]n supplied by the well-known Begum Sumroo. It was, I [redacted]lieve, in this church that he was married thirteen years later. [redacted] had hardly begun when his services were applied for by the [redacted]rveyor-General of India, Captain Everest, who wished to [redacted]ploy him on the Great Trigonometrical Survey. Shortly [redacted]fore leaving England my father had made Captain Everest's [redacted]quaintance at Greenwich, where the young Engineer officers of [redacted]s year were sent from Chatham to learn the use of various [redacted]struments. Captain Everest now reported that out of the [redacted]hole party Lieutenants Durand and Western alone had appeared [redacted]sposed to profit by the opportunity, and in both of them, as [redacted]e rather quaintly put it, he had remarked "decided indication [redacted]f mathematical genius." The application was favourably re-[redacted]eived by the authorities concerned, but my father preferred [redacted]emaining in the Public Works Branch, and he was informed [redacted]hat he would not be transferred against his wishes. During the [redacted]next fifteen months he was accordingly employed in the Building [redacted]Department, principally in surveying stations for European troops [redacted]pon the outer spurs of the Himalayas, and in constructing [redacted]rracks and other buildings for the sanitarium at Landour. [redacted]om that place he wrote to his friend Deans on the 26th of June, [redacted]31:—

"My Dear Joe,—I have been waiting long for your promised sketch of Chillaston Church. . . . . I almost envy the quiet literary life you must be enjoying, and quite envy your being in England. My life of late has been very irksome, on the staff of a whimsical, foolish General, for the satisfaction of whose constant and nonsensical fancies I have to labour like a horse. . . . . The depôt from which I write is situated about ten miles north of Deyrah, in the first range of the Himalayas, and has been established for the recovery of such sick European soldiers and officers as the climate is considered to benefit. From its proximity and easy communication with the plains it is become a place of general resort during the hot season for all the officers in our Upper Indian provinces who can obtain sick certificates. Such as cannot obtain leave, send their wives and children. The months of March, April, May, and June are delightful; at the end of June the rains commence. They have now just set in, and of course we are always in the clouds. I have seen nothing to equal the views in these mountains. The snowy range is bey all description. Everything from the effect of the rain acquired splendid verdure, and the sun's breaking through clouds and lighting up a part of the mountains has one of most rich, beautiful, and, I am sorry to say, inimitable effects.

"In my various trips in the mountains I have found some amu ment from the peculiar stage of society of the natives. They a more honest, good-humoured people than those of the plai Their villages are generally pretty, but dirty. Five husbands one wife is not at all uncommon, if the lady has pretensions beauty. In that part of the country now under our Governme this is commencing to grow out of repute. Formerly they mu dered most of their female children, but from the measures tak to prevent this crime, and from their now seeing and being brough more into contact with the men of the plains, I am afraid the ladie will soon not have so many strings to their bow . . . . . I can assure you that, although so distant from the dear old land, the greatest interest is produced by the political changes and revolu tions that have taken place in Europe. That England may escap the horrors of a civil commotion, I pray and trust; but the Frenc have risen in my estimation for their last revoluion. The 'jade' has at last 'winced' under her yoke, and shown a noble exampl to the rest of the continental nations. I hope no news may arri of their having tarnished their well-earned glory. May they less French than they formerly always have been . . . . . Anot

of our old officers has just died. He is, however, no loss, having laboured for the last twelve years from a hydrophobic antipathy to water, for the which he substituted brandy.

"The packet which brought your letter also brought me one from —and—and—so you may imagine how happy it made me. You can scarcely picture to yourself the pleasure that an English letter gives me. Immediately on their receipt they are torn open with the velocity, force, and impatience, of a gourmand over a good dinner. The first perusal leaves but a vague idea of the contents of the letter; it is not until I have read it two or three times over, and cooled my imagination, that I commence really to digest and bring in review the contents. Give my love to Mr. and Mrs. Deans. My kindest regards to your good lady. May you both have every blessing and joy, and never forget

"Your very affectionate,

"HENRY."

Towards the close of 1831 my father determined to resign his pointment in the Public Works Branch. Notwithstanding the whimsical foolish General" he had on the whole enjoyed his life irly well; but the nature of his work involved constant travelg; and as the allowances granted on this account were then far om liberal, he found he could not live on his pay. It is possible at he was also influenced to some extent by the fact that his ealth had suffered from the sudden changes of climate to which e was exposed in his frequent journeys to and from the foot of he hills. Always abstemious in his habits, and blest with a strong onstitution, he soon shook off the effects of this illness, and during he rest of his forty years' service he had little cause to complain f the much abused Indian climate; but for the time he was roubled by fever and threatened with severer ailments.

His request for a transfer to other duty was still under consideration when an opening was presented to him in a new and interesting field. Major Colvin, Superintendent of Canals in the North-Western Provinces, applied about this time for another assistant, and specially mentioned my father's name as that of a most promising officer from whom he expected efficient aid. The system of canal irrigation in India was then being largely developed, and extensive works were in process of execution. An appointment to the Canal Department seemed therefore to hold out a good prospect of gaining valuable experience, and after some hesitation,

seeing no chance of military service, my father accepted it. He took up his new duties in the beginning of 1832.

It would not have been easy to find a better, or pleasanter, school for a young engineer than that into which my father now entered. Colvin bore a high reputation for character and ability, and every member of the canal staff was a picked man. When my father joined it his three companions were Proby Cautley, Robert Napier, and William Baker, every one of whom afterwards made a name for himself in the Indian service.

My father's duties lay in the district west of the Jumna; and consisted chiefly in superintending the construction of canal works and surveying for new lines of irrigation. He lived little in cantonments, passing his time chiefly in camp, or in Colvin's "cottage" near the head of the main canal at Dadoopore. During the hot weather and rains, when out-door work was necessarily at a standstill, he had of course ample opportunities for study, and as he was from the first an untiring reader, "a strange mixture of the soldier and the student," to use the words of one of his earli[illegible] friends, these opportunities were not wasted. At the same ti[illegible] his work threw him into constant contact with the people, a[illegible] under peculiarly favourable circumstances. Regarding a ca[illegible] officer as their benefactor, one who had nothing to do with tryi[illegible] or taxing them, they behaved towards him with an openness wh[illegible] natives of India rarely show to an English official, and his rea[illegible] good nature increased their confidence. He always said that [illegible] had gained more insight into the customs and character of t[illegible] agricultural classes during this time than at any subsequent perio[illegible] of his career, and knowledge brought with it a kindly feelin[illegible] which he never lost.

A few months after his appointment to the canals a friend in[illegible] duced him to resume his interrupted journal. "It remains to b[illegible] seen," he wrote, "whether it will have a longer existence tha[illegible] former ones, commenced with the same intention of continuing[illegible] them." Fortunately for me, whose pleasant task it is to tell the[illegible] story of a well-spent life, it did have a longer existence. From[illegible] this time until the end of his long and varied career his own pen[illegible] has kept an almost uninterrupted record of his actions; and during[illegible] the earlier years of his Indian service, before the pressure o[illegible] official work and private correspondence became heavy, the record[illegible] is full and minute.

His journal in 1832 is to a great extent taken up with noti[illegible] of books. His favourite study at this time, and perhaps alw[illegible]

was military history; but other branches of professional literature, and of learning in general, were by no means neglected. It was at this period of his life, before he was twenty years of age, that he began to impose upon himself a course of systematic and conscientious study which made him in after years so emphatically what is called a "well read man." Suspicious of a tendency to slur over what was not specially interesting, and not to think enough of what he read, he made it a rule after finishing a book to write out a short but careful review of its contents, giving the plan of the work, and his opinion as to its merits and defects and the information to be got from it. He found this enabled him to seize the real scope and object of a work, and to fix what he read in his memory. There was no good, he said, in "Mahratta-like dashes" into a book and out again. Languages he studied in the same careful manner, and with much success. He soon became familiar with Persian and Hindustani, and he could afterwards read and write Italian, which he took up at this time, with fluency and correctness. I find at the end of each month in this portion of his journal a searching review of his progress, in which his shortcomings are mercilessly exposed, and plans made for their correction. Besides the tendency to "slur" his work, he complains of his indolence about getting up in the morning, and of an inclination to read too widely. "In fact," he writes on the 1st of September, after an examination of his progress in Persian, French, Italian, History, and professional literature, "in fact, so various are the subjects which I am desirous to read, that I am in danger of frittering away my time by attempting to grasp at too great a number . . . . . My object is not sufficiently defined, and I do not adhere to one subject with that attention which is requisite to gain a good knowledge of anything." Against this tendency he set himself resolutely to fight; and before long he had succeeded also in acquiring the questionable Indian habit, now less prevalent than it used to be, of getting up before sunrise.

I should, however, be giving a wrong impression if I allowed it to be inferred that he was in any sense a bookworm. Few men were more capable of enjoying the outdoor life of an Indian camping season. Though he was never an enthusiastic sportsman, rather inclined indeed to speak of himself with scorn for "murdering hares and partridges," he was yet unusually good both in the saddle and with the gun; and wherever he went he sketched incessantly. Nor did he allow his books to take away his interest from his duty. By the close of 1832 he had acquired considerable

insight into the Indian canal system, and was pressing for permission to study the subject in Italy, where canal irrigation had been carried to the highest pitch of perfection. To show that he meant work and not play he offered, if granted leave, to surrender the whole of his allowances. The project however fell through.

I extract the following passages from letters written to his friend Deans during 1832:—

"*April 26th*, 1832.

"MY DEAR JOE,—You must not imagine that I have forgotten my promise to write on foolscap sheets, because this letter is not according to rule. The truth is that at present I have none of the above description of paper, and cannot, as in England, send over to a shop for it. I am now on the western side of the Jumna, not far from where it issues from the lower range of mountains into the plains; am quite alone; and for the last two days, contrary to custom, have had comparatively little to do—a circumstance which experience teaches me is no improvement to solitude. However, it is one of which I seldom can complain. For the last two months I have been attached to the Canal Department, and my mode of living, companions, etc., all changed. I prefer my present employment much, but cannot say I enjoy the total want of society. Reading is of course the grand resource and amusement when the fag of the day is over, though this is only changing from one kind of reading or writing to another . . . . . The canal, or rather canals, to which I am attached, are to the west of the Jumna, from which they are supplied. The canal head is under the lower range of hills, from thence it takes a sweep westward and rejoins the Jumna at Delhi. Two other branches strike off from the main canal, which also are of a very considerable extent. The main use of the whole is irrigation, though in the course of time, when the natives become a little more aware of the advantages they may derive from water transport, and have more of the spirit of industry and speculation, a considerable traffic will, no doubt, be carried on. At present rafts of timber are the only floats. To you, who have seen the Italian canals, irrigation from canals is no novelty. I think, however, ours would astonish you, not so much by the beauty or neatness of the works as by their nature, and the difficulties that have to be surmounted. For instance, I am now superintending the construction of a dam across a river which crosses the canal at right angles. Hitherto an earthen one has been constructed yearly,

which, as a matter of course, is swept away every rainy season. The present masonry one is intended to let pass the torrents of the rains, and retain the water necessary for the canal at other periods. Works of this extent are highly interesting from the constant anxiety, difficulties, etc., that occur. Were it not for such excitement our life would be most stupidly monotonous. I am trying also to coax the west branch of the Jumna more to the eastward, for it has attained a most ugly propinquity to the canal; so that you may judge our amusements with Dame Nature and her rivers are not wanting in interest. As for military duties, unless a war occurs the prospect of my having any is very remote . . . . . I am in *mauvaise odeur* with the Military Board from having desired to be removed from the Department of Public Works; and when they called for my reasons, I gave them so plainly and intelligibly that they were not relished . . . . . That which made the matter worse was my being the only officer who did kick—who told them it was too much to expect young men to involve themselves in pecuniary difficulties through their illiberality . . . . . It was time for me to leave Meerut, for my senior, with whom I lived, and who is a great friend of mine, fell in love and is now married. He always said, however, that my leaving him would be his signal for marriage. I was a sort of Benedict to him. I now intend turning over quite a new leaf, for fear of having to pay for my sins some day or other. No more boasting of defying the little gentleman. I intend showing the better part of valour and never again saying:—

> " 'I've wrapped him up in a hair skin rug,
> And packed him off to Olymp.'

I begin to think that it is an end we must mostly arrive at, and must be submitted to with a good grace. . . . . I quite envy you your snug parsonage and residence in England. If ever I return what a change will have taken place in people and things, and you will say what a change has taken place in myself. Only imagine how old I must be looking: my moustache is actually growing dark; my beard requires weekly shavings; and my whiskers, if I patronized them with the help of the razor, would soon be formidable. . . . . How are you passing your existence? Happily I am sure. You must think of me sometimes, for my life is a solitary one, making no acquaintance which is not almost immediately broken, having no one that I can really call an old friend. A part of my happiness consists in thinking that I shall not be

quite forgotten at home. You would laugh at times to see me in a hard gallop for no other earthly reason but that the music of my horse's hoofs may drive away thought and break the silence of my lonely ride. I sometimes wish I could forget the happy hours I have enjoyed, for the contrast tries a man's philosophy. I have every reason however to be contented; better off as far as pecuniary circumstances are concerned than many of my seniors, I can live very comfortably. My health also is good, and as long as it continues so I cannot and ought not to complain."

"*July 24th*, 1832.

"My dear Joe,—Since my last letter I have received yours of the 10th January, so that you must not be astonished at my giving you another epistle so shortly after my former one. . . . . Leicester news always interests me much, and your letter afforded me great pleasure. . . . . I can easily imagine that the old town is changing much, though I hope some of my old pet buildings are in *statu quo*. I think I could give a tolerable sketch of King Dick's house, could find my way in the dark about the old school, and go to sleep as soundly as ever under the soporific effect of one of the 'Black Man's' sermons, or one of Jemson's long orations, always supposing —— was not there, for then I never slept. I wonder much whether I should still think her pretty. I find my mind, taste, views, in short the whole animal, so much altered within two years that I begin to suspect the old Greek to be near the truth in marking out the knowledge of oneself as a subject of difficulty. I hope you remembered me kindly to old Davies, and particularly to Jemson, for he was always very kind to me, and I liked him, and am very sorry that a 'new light' has seared his vision. I do not admire these religious Quixotes—it always has the same effect upon me that it appears to have had upon you—to make me mistrustful of the sincerity of purpose displayed. I am, however, an uncharitable person, from the most unsuspicious having become the contrary. In fact, contact with the natives of India cannot do anything else but inculcate suspicion. I am with them reduced to the painful necessity of believing every man a rascal until I find him out to be otherwise; and as yet I am sorry to say devil an honest man have I seen among them. . . . . Here I am on a peninsula, one side only open to me, and that so cut up by the heavy rains which are setting in that a gallop will be tempting one's fate. No news,—nothing to see, to hear, but the same objects and people. My books and work carry me

through it all. I am reading Persian, and what do you imagine I have hit upon to translate? Paley's 'Moral and Political Philosophy.' My moonshee, I suspect, thinks me mad. However experience has shown me that nothing but what is difficult rouses me, and then my natural obstinacy comes into play. I am thinking of commencing Italian; but books, books—there's the difficulty, and also a teacher. I am anxiously looking for news. We have just heard of the French being at Ancona, but we have not heard what their object is. Russia, the big bully of the north, has not signed the treaty. I almost wish for a war with her; if it would not fall so heavily on England, I would pray for it. Their gazettes talk of signing the next treaty with England in Calcutta. I only hope they may try it. At present we have nothing to look forward to in the shape of service except the Maharaja* dies. His son may then give us an opportunity of gaining what I look upon as the natural frontier to our Indian possessions, *viz.*, the Punjab."

"*Christmas Eve*, 1832.

"My dear Joe,—After a day of hard work from sunrise to sunset, and after having gobbled down my solitary dinner, I have plunged my goosequill valiantly into the inkstand, and with proper military decision broached a sheet of paper. You will, no doubt, wish to know how valour or decision could here be requisite—nevertheless they are so—very much so. Lucy Ashton's song is no doubt philosophically correct, but very difficult would it be to follow the maxim laid down. If I recollect rightly, she says that—

"'Vacant heart and hand and eye
Easy live and quiet die.'

Now I can boast of as much poverty as most lieutenants, but my heart is not as yet quite 'to let,' being tenanted by sundry frequent recollections of you all, the which occasionally cause me to disobey the other item of the maxim by filling my eyes instead of keeping them empty. Yes, Joe, although I am turned of twenty, I am as much a child, certainly as great an one, as when I rammed my thumbs into my ears to avoid Hal's speech hitting upon my artesian fountain, the which requires anything but 'boring' to bring it into play, so that my simile does not altogether hold good. However, gush it does occasionally, especially now that I am quite alone, fear not witnesses, and can give my

* Runjeet Sing.

feelings, moods, and humours free bridle without danger of interruption. This at any rate is one of the pleasures of the jungles, and only requires me to keep the bridle in hand; for I find a considerable resemblance between my horse and myself in that respect—once turn his head homewards, and if you let him, he will be off at score. However, I do not exactly know why I should make you my confessor to-night more than any other, or plague you with Lucy Ashton or her song.

"Tell me, Joe, whether you are fond of 'Ravenswood.' It is a problem to me which I cannot demonstrate, but that novel has laid a deeper hold of my mind than any of the others of Scott's, and Lucy Ashton haunts me. My taste must, I fear, be false, for I have heard many people criticise 'Ravenswood' severely. . . . . There is another curious feature in the case. 'Ravenswood' generally recalls Hamlet, Hamlet 'Ravenswood.' Now what the connection can be between the two is to me also problematical.

"It is my intention, some time or other, to sit down methodically to work, and analyse the whole affair if I can. Can you solve the equation of this catenary curve of mind? As I am on the subject of reading, I may as well add that I am taking up some of my old acquaintances. Cæsar, who at school was read without pleasure or amusement, and on account of his ease, was, if the expression may be used, disrespected, I now enjoy vastly. Many of his descriptions now strike me as interesting in the extreme, and make my blood tingle much in the same manner that some parts of Napier's 'Peninsular War' effect. The latter work, I think I before told you, I rank as the first of English military works. Sallust, Virgil, and Horace are also in camp; but as I am now fagging at the 'soft bastard Latin,' in case I should by any great and unexpected good luck obtain permission to go to Italy to visit the canals of that country, I have very little time for my old friends. In fact my duty is so eternal and never-ending that I have to steal a few hours from night to enable me to get through a little Italian,* that too when I often would much sooner sit and idle in consequence of fatigue. Of course I have no news to tell you, excepting that Mr. Wolff, the famous hunter after the lost tribes, lately set out for Cashmere, but was thrown out by the snow. After giving lectures at Meerut, he intends proceeding to Calcutta, and thence heaven only knows

* This was written during the camping season, when the canal work was in full swing.

where else. He must be the wandering Jew. From all accounts he is an extraordinary man, but as to the millenium theory he gives out, he seems to allow but a short time for the completion and harmonisation of the social system of the globe, which, just at present, appears to be in anything but a promising state, for 'my basnet to a 'prentice cap' that we have a war—a general raging war. All Europe seems to be in that happy state of preparation which is the usual forerunner of Bellona, and if peace come of it, then all probabilities will have been violated. . . . . Now, having said all the nonsense that I have to say, I find my chronometers hinting that it is time to go to bed, the said chronometers being my candles, for I measure the time of day by the sun, the time of night by the length of my candles. A merry Christmas to your honour, and many of them. Mine will not be merry unless the hope that some of you will think a little of me in your merriment be a consolation, though this is but a melancholy pleasure, to think that you may damp the happiness of others. At any rate it is a selfish one. Addio."

The beginning of 1833 found my father busy levelling for a branch canal near Jheend, a good deal exercised by occasional mutinies on the part of his jungle cutters, and by the tricks of the neighbouring zemindars, who showed intense interest in the work. Failing to derive any advantage from such simple artifices as the surreptitious alteration of his survey flags, and the like, the villagers used to surround him in large numbers, begging almost with threats for the water to be brought near their lands. He never would treat them harshly, and his journal contains good-humoured complaints of the hours wasted in "jaw, jaw, jaw, with the zemindars," in the effort to make them see reason. He afterwards related how on one occasion he was so mobbed, that he had to climb on to a friendly bough, whence, as he laughingly said, mounted "like a possum up a gum tree," he harangued the excited crowd until they at last permitted the work to go on. The patience and tact with which he overcame his difficulties and got his task pushed through, gained him much credit from his chief.

During this camping season my father made the acquaintance of the famous Eurasian soldier, Colonel Skinner, the father of our irregular cavalry system, and spent many hours listening to the old man's stories of Sindia's service and the days of Lord Lake. One of these anecdotes he used to quote in later years as an amusing example of military eloquence. Colonel Skinner told him, that at a critical moment during a hard fought action with

the Mahrattas, when the British force was completely surrounded, a body of our Europeans faltered, and began to turn. Lord Lake saw the danger, and rode up with the exclamation, "Now men, were the devil have you got to run to?" The regiment was steadied at once, and continued its advance. I find the story among my father's papers, side by side with another about one of our cavalry officers in the Peninsula, which was told him many years afterwards by Lord Elgin. Coming suddenly upon a party of French dragoons, and seeing his men hesitate, he turned to them, and said quietly,—"Come along, I dare say they are in as great a funk of us as we are of them, so let's go at them." Skinner was of course an Indian of the old school, and objected strongly to the way in which our Government was beginning to treat natives. He could see nothing but danger in "making gentlemen of these damned Baboos," and letting them feel their own strength. But he was a brave and capable soldier, and full of knowledge of the country and the people. It is worthy of remembrance in the present day, when the tendency is to despise Eurasians, and to regard them as useless for military purposes, that the founder of our Indian cavalry system was a man of mixed blood. It can hardly be doubted that many more of the same temper are now spending their lives in the work of Government offices or other sedentary labour; and though there undoubtedly are many difficulties in the way, it is possible that they might be utilised under certain conditions as soldiers.*

Towards the end of February, 1833, "after memorable preparations, some of a warlike nature, such as the turning of a pair of old boots into pistol holsters, examining fire-arms, &c.," my father started with his friend Baker for a camel ride of 300 miles across the north of Rajputana to Bhawalpore. Their primary object was to explore the upper course of the Ghuggur river with a view to future canal operations, but they also wished to make acquaintance with the Native States in this neighbourhood. Owing to the shortness of their leave, and to want of aid on the part of the Bhawalpore Chief, who like a true oriental proportioned his attentions to the retinue of his visitors, they were not very successful; but the trip through the sandy desert of Bikaneer, little known even now, and at that time not known at all, was interesting, and they greatly enjoyed the excitement and risk. My father's journal

* It should however be added that Skinner came of fighting blood on both sides. He was the son of a Scotch officer and a Rajputni girl.

written at this time, records an instance of the not unnatural suspicion with which our intentions were then regarded in the countries beyond our border. At one of their halting places the travellers met an intelligent Mahomedan, who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and was much inclined to discuss politics. When told the object of their journey, he "shook his head with an air of deep-sighted wisdom," and remarked that he had seen a good deal of the "Feringi logue" and knew them well. My father assured him that he was mistaken, and asked what our Government could want with such a desert as they were in. "Ah, Sahib," was the answer, "the Punjab is not forty miles from here."

Shortly after his return from Bhawalpore my father writes again:—

"*May 6th*, 1833.

"My dear Joe,—Many, many thanks for your neat little sketch of Melbourne Church, it is what I have long desired to possess. Often shall I look at it, and as often wish myself seated in one of its old-fashioned pews, listening to one of your discourses, or loitering about the margin of the pool in company with you, sketch books in hand, minds free from care, feelings as calm and unruffled as your wood-enveloped sheet of water. . . . . The arrival of your supper of roasted potatoes reminded you, you tell me, that you wish to know what we get to eat in India. This of course depends a good deal on your place of residence; if in a cantonment, a dinner-table resembles very much an English one, excepting that Indians, or rather our servants, have an idea that a solitary square inch of table-cloth peeping between dishes, uncovered by plate or viands, is *bonâ fide* indecent, and accordingly one is generally haunted during dinner with the thoughts of the dreadful massacre which must have taken place to furnish the overloaded groaning board. If in camp the case is different. For the last six months lambs, and occasionally a kid, have been my animal food—in fact my only food. Fish, fowl, beef, I am quite innocent of having tasted excepting during a few days that I was at Delhi. No bread, no butter. There is this to be said, however, that being utterly careless about my food, I do not choose to undergo the trouble attendant on paying attention to one's kitchen; moreover, I have not time to do so even if I were inclined, and consequently do not live so well as by management I might. In the cold weather constant exercise gives one an appetite that would not hesitate to attack a saddle. In the hot months it's a problem

how one exists. A glass of cold water is frequently the chief part, and always the most grateful, of dinner. You may infer that the 'luxuries of the East' have certainly never obtruded themselves on my organs of sight. The glorious days and doings of Haroun-al-Rashid are no more. . . . . You enjoy more luxury, incomparably more comfort, in your vicarage parlour than would be found in any spot of India.

"I shall fill this sheet gradually as time and opportunity occur. You must, therefore, not be surprised at seeing different dates, and a 'solution of the continuity' of the matter. Your churchwarden's qualifications to the title of a gentleman, viz., 'a horse and a gig, a cow and a pig,' approximate singularly enough to Nahur Singh's idea of the *sine qua non* to entitle one to being a 'Sahib.' You must know that Nahur Singh is a Sikh soldier of fortune whom I met in my ramble across the desert, and with whom, entering rather freely into conversation, something of the following description took place:—'Where, sir, have you come from?' 'Hissar.' 'Where are you going?' 'To Bhawalpore.' 'What takes you there?' 'A fancy to see the city.' A short pause here intervened, which was broken by 'Are you married?' 'No.' 'Why so?' 'I cannot afford it.' This amused him, and I saw he did not believe me. 'But do you not wish to be married?' 'Heaven forbid,' quoth I. He opened his eyes. 'How old are you?' 'Twenty.' 'And have you no beard?' 'No more than you see.' That's devilish little, his eyes answered, for he was too polite to say so. 'But why do you not travel in a buggy—*i.e.*, gig—all the *Sahib logue* have them.' 'Because we are making longer marches than horses could undergo.' This satisfied him; that we had a buggy was evident, ergo, we were gentlemen; and straightway he offered his services. 'But,' said we, 'you are in the service of the Bikaneer Rajah.' 'Very true, but I have little pay and hard work, and *we soldiers* (the wretch) serve those who best fill our bellies.' My companion and myself laughed heartily at our Sikh Dalgetty's military creed, and I often think of him. There was a dry humour and a brazen demeanour about the man not easy to be described.* . . . . . To-day I quitted the heavenly

* In the lately published Memoir of Sir William Baker, my father's companion in his ride, I find another anecdote of these days which is worth quoting:—"The troops of the Bikaneer Raja were besieging a recusant village near the western extremity of the canal. Baker and Durand went to visit the trenches; whereupon, to their intense entertainment, one of the besieging force jumped upon the parapet of the battery, and, waving his hand, called out to the hostile garrison: 'Ho bhai!

Dadoopore, and marched to this place (Kanjnoor). My animals of servants, although they have been tramping for the last six months, and ought, by this time, to be quite *au fait* at the business, managed with so much prudence and foresight that tea and milk without sugar and a number of the *Edinburgh Review* were the standing dishes of my breakfast. It is only this moment, 3 P.M., that the remainder of the good people have come up and added pen, ink, and paper to my comforts. I have been reading away at the *Edinburgh*, hurried along thirty miles an hour on the Manchester and Liverpool railroad; then smoothed down with a little lyric poetry; after that plunged into the musty abyss of the Tower records; then engulphed in an article on Church Reform, deep in the, to you no doubt, highly interesting account of the revenues of parochial clergy, bishops and chapters, tithes, gifts, advowsons, incumbents, non-residents, vicars, rectors, and curates. Lord Henleigh's intentions towards the chapters of the Church ought to be carried into execution against many other kind of chapters which would not be the worse for a little docking, *par exemple* 'Chambers' Political Economy,' which brought me up with a round twist, and made me look at the blue cover and yellow back of the *Edinburgh*, and its advertisements, in utter despair. Political economy and metaphysics are my two bugbears. I have made a slight attempt at both, thinking that one ought to be somewhat acquainted with sciences, the names of which are, I am sure, so often taken in vain. In political economy some clear-headed man's description, definition, or whatever he was pleased to call it, of value sent me flying from the subject. If a person were now to ask me 'What is value?' it would be ten to one in favour of my knocking him on the head. Metaphysics are just as bad. A well-meaning goose of a man lends me Locke, devil take me if I could undertake to unlock two sentences. Tom Cringle's metaphysics for me. . . . . .

"Much do I wish that you, Joe, who are a poet, could spend a month with me in this neighbourhood. You would word what I cannot. Oh for the pen of the 'Shepherd' to give these noble mountains their due! This morning when I started from Dadoopore the mountains seemed to be mustering the heavy squadrons

mariye nahin; Sahiblog á gayá' ('Hullo brothers! please don't fire; the gentlemen have come to see')." It is quite possible to imagine the same thing happening at the present day. The people of Rajputana still retain much of the chivalrous simplicity of former times, and in no part of India perhaps is an Englishman so highly regarded.

of clouds; bank upon bank closed round them; and one might have taken the low distant rumble of the thunder for the commands of the spirit of the Himalayas to his forming and marshalled host. About two o'clock he seems to have sounded the charge. On they rushed, sweeping over the flat plains, roaring and muttering all the time, as if they despised the monotonous flats and longed to return to their mountain home, again to envelop the lofty throne of their ruling spirit. They made quick work of it. A north-wester in this country is an hour's squall, sufficient to blow half your teeth down your throat, as Haji Baba would tell you. It has, however, cooled the air, a great blessing and cause of thankfulness on my part, for I have three or four days surveying, &c.

"And, now, Joe, I must do that which when writing home, I am always grieved at being forced to do. So long as a letter is unfinished I can almost imagine myself holding a kind of dreamy conversation with the person for whom it is intended, but once finished and closed my heart goes with it, and I would fain hide myself in the seal, and take my chance of bad usage at the post offices. But not being a sovereign as yet, I cannot have my own way and enjoy that neat and royal mode of transport. Six more years, Joe, and if I am alive, I shall be on the point of packing up my traps and steering homewards. I must not, however, build castles or anticipate . . . . . Oh dear me what would I not do to find myself at Portsmouth just about to start per coach, steam or not quite immaterial, for London? . . . . . What changes will have taken place. McAdam will have made all the ways of this world more smooth and easy to be travelled over, will have done more real good to mankind than the writings of any philosopher. Where is the philosophy that would stand the ordeal of a rough pavement and a springless hackney? As for steam it will be the grand first mover of all things; and men, they will be improved also, I hope. John, however, is not an intellectual animal, it will take a good deal of rubbing to give him polish. But what am I, a jungle fowl, using the word polish for? I, who before six years are elapsed, shall be so perfect a bear that Smug's explanation will be quite requisite. 'No, I am no such thing, but a man as other men are.'"

Just before his trip through the desert it had come to my father's knowledge that a detachment of officers were about to be sent to Persia for the purpose of drilling and organizing the army of the Shah. Some of these were likely to be Engineers, and see-

ing a chance of military service in a new field, he at once applied to his chief, Colvin, in the hope that he might be one of the favoured few. If successful in his application, he intended to go to Persia overland through Afghanistan. Colvin sent up his name to the Governor-General's Military Secretary in a letter from which the following is an extract. After stating my father's reasons for wishing to go, Colvin wrote:—

"As to ability, Durand came to this country enjoying the full reputation among his contemporaries of being possessed of very great ability. Since he has been under me, I have seen in him a facility for doing anything I put him to do, although a novelty to him at the time, which was only equalled by his assiduous endeavours to do it well. The combination of these could only lead to success, which will make me regret the loss of such a man to the department, but at the same time prevents me throwing any impediment in the way of the attainment of his wishes to enter on a line of life for which he has, in my opinion, every qualification that is likely to lead him to distinction; and he begs through me that if His Lordship do not consider his age a disqualification, he may be the, or one of the, Engineer officers appointed for this duty under Major Passmore. I think I may venture to say that the Governor-General will not have any reason to regret acceding to Durand's wishes."

With a true eye for the reading of character, Colvin added:—"If you want an artillery officer of the same stamp for general knowledge, and a general wish to acquire knowledge, look to H. M. Lawrence of the Horse Artillery."

For some months my father heard nothing of the fate of this application, and when at last the answer came it was unfavourable. Lord William Bentinck had told him a year before that the Canal Department was the most promising field open to an Engineer; and now, opposed as he was to the policy of sending our officers to Persia, the Governor-General adhered to his former opinion. Colvin's application was refused with the assurance that the decision "proceeded from His Lordship's best consideration for Lieutenant Durand's real interests." This answer, my father wrote to his friend Deans, "of course precluded complaint," but it was nevertheless a disappointment.* His letter went on as follows:—

"I must await some other opportunity for a little field practice.

* Sir Henry Rawlinson, then a young lieutenant, was one of the officers selected to accompany Passmore, and the experience was of much use to him in after life.

News I of course have not, and can give you no better reason for commencing this letter than that I have a spare hour. An astronomical work is on one side of me, and my writing materials on the other. My heart seems to be in its Peri—Joe, so I have dismissed the eccentric anomaly to contravene itself, and have taken up one of Mr. Deans' steel pens, for which by-the-bye I cannot sufficiently thank him, for they serve as an excuse for never mending a quill. Homewards I should write if possessed of no other implement but a pickaxe; to others the hardness of a steel pen is a good excuse. You who know me to be rather sanguine, will scarce credit me when I tell you that I have borne my Persian disappointment with much philosophy; it is the case, however. I will not conceal from you that I occasionally allowed myself to build sundry castles, but who on even a distant prospect of visiting the dominions of the Great King would not have done so? The ground is classic, and it would have been my own fault if I had not visited the Tigris and Euphrates. Who could tell but what the course of events might have brought me to fight on *Xenophontine* ground? These hopes are now crushed. The next time that I read the translation of Xenophon I shall do so with different feelings. Much do I wish that I could read him in Greek, for even in the translation I admire the soldier philosopher's style.* . . . . . A man to be a good soldier should see service when young. I am somewhat afraid I have a chance of being an old man but a young soldier. My father was a young man but an old soldier, and I should wish to be the same."

The castle building over, my father returned to his books with undiminished ardour, and his journal during the hot weather and rains of 1833 shows a formidable list of works read and re-read. He had not overcome his first distaste for metaphysical reading, in which he afterwards became much interested; but the long hot days were given up, when there was no canal work, to history, fortification, astronomy, and other subjects, and he regularly returned from his evening gallop to some hours of Latin, French, or Italian. At the close of the rains he started with some more of the canal staff for their annual trip to the hills. The points where the canals were drawn from the Jumna being among the outer ranges of the Himalayas, the young officers could easily get away for a short mountain excursion before settling down to

* Want of the book, and not want of Greek scholarship, prevented him. He was especially fond of the language, and to the end of his life took a keen delight in Greek poetry.

their season in camp, and the chance was never neglected. It was delightful to escape from the steam of the rain-sodden plains and to revel for a few days in the enjoyment of pure air, and of what is perhaps the finest scenery in the world. A rough march in the early morning, and a bathe in the nearest stream, rapidly dammed up for the occasion, would be followed by a hearty breakfast and a long day in the woods with gun and paint-box. The latter was my father's favourite. If he could find a spot to his heart's content among the ferns and wild flowers, with the huge trunks of the deodars rising around him, and the glorious line of the snowy range cutting up into the northern sky, he would leave the pheasants and jungle-fowl in peace, and sit for hours sketching untiringly, until the fading of the sunset flush upon the peaks warned him that it was time to rise. A large number of sketches taken at this time are now amongst his well-filled portfolios.

When the short holiday came to an end my father returned to his canal work in camp, and, on the setting in of the hot weather of 1834, to Dadoopore, where he remained busy with his books until the autumn. During the rainy season a second attempt to see active service, this time in the Rajput State of Jodhpore, had proved unsuccessful, and his letters show that he was in low spirits, fretting at the monotony of his life, and the apparent hopelessness of gaining military experience early in his career. Better, he said, have been a civilian at once than "a soldier merely in name and coat." But the pardonable vexation soon passed over; and towards the close of the year his thoughts were turned in a new direction, and his enthusiasm aroused, by a remarkable piece of good fortune which fell to the lot of the canal staff. For some time past Captain Cautley and Dr. Falconer, afterwards well known to men of science, had devoted considerable attention to the Sewalik hills, a low range lying at the foot of, and parallel to, the Himalayas. In 1831 Falconer had proved beyond a doubt that these hills belonged to the tertiary age, and since then he had been searching, with little success, for animal remains. He was convinced that they would be found, and his belief was strengthened by a passage of Ferishta's history, translated by Dow, according to which skeletons of elephants, and of a gigantic human form, had been found in this neighbourhood during the reign of Feroze-shah the Third. Both Falconer and Cautley did in fact succeed in unearthing a few fossils, but until 1834 their labour was scantily rewarded, and my father and Lieutenant Baker, who had joined in the search, were not more successful. In October of that year

all their doubts were cleared up by the sudden discovery of some extraordinarily rich deposits, a discovery which startled the scientific world, and in the course of a few years contributed very materially to the development of the study of palæontology. This "find" came about by chance. The engineers had, for some days, been hammering at the rocks near Nahun, the capital of the little Native State of Sirmoor, and in reply to a question from the Rajah regarding the object of their search, they had been able to display a few crocodiles' teeth. With a smile at this insignificant result of their labours, the Rajah sent for what he called the tooth of a Deo. It weighed nearly twelve pounds, and was afterwards determined to be a molar of the Mastodon latidens. At the same time he told the engineers where such relics were to be found in abundance, and searching parties were immediately sent out. They reaped a splendid harvest, and from this time Cautley, Baker, and my father were enthusiastic palæontologists. During the next two or three years they collected many tons of fossil remains, the best of which now enrich the museums of India and Great Britain. The value of these collections is attested by Dr. Murchison in his Palæontological memoirs of Falconer. "By the joint labours of Cautley, Falconer, Baker, and Durand," he writes, a "sub-tropical mammalian fossil fauna was bought to light unexampled for richness and extent in any other region then known." It included the earliest discovered fossil quadrumana, and numberless extinct species of colossal animals which had peopled the world in days gone by. All the mammalian remains belonged to these extinct species, but some of the reptilia and freshwater shells were identical with existing forms, and from this fact Dr. Falconer was led to draw important inferences as to the antiquity of the human race.

For the identification of these remains some knowledge of comparative osteology was necessary, and it was not an easy matter, fifty years ago, to acquire such knowledge on the north-west frontier of India. But by dint of hard work the difficulty was overcome. Cuvier's "Recherches sur les ossements fossiles" supplied the foundation; and the surrounding forests, rivers, and swamps were drawn upon for the rest. A large collection of skeletons was prepared; the extinct forms were compared with existing types; and after a short time the young officers were able to send papers descriptive of the most interesting specimens to the journal of the Asiatic Society, then under the management of its talented and energetic founder James Prinsep. These papers will be found in the third, fourth, and fifth volumes of the journal, and

I learn from information supplied by Lieutenant, afterwards Sir William, Baker, that the plates illustrating the articles, whether lithographed or engraved on copper, were for the most part furnished by the contributors. "Lieutenant Durand," he writes, "was an accomplished draughtsman, and though accustomed to the use only of the pen and pencil, he soon found he could wield the graver with considerable effect."

I have dwelt upon this part of my father's early life because the taste for geology and its kindred studies which he first acquired among the Sewalik fossils always remained with him. From this time forward he took a strong scientific interest in the subject; and wherever he was employed, from Burmah to Afghanistan, he found some leisure to follow it up. Long after the canal staff of 1834 and their fossil collections had been scattered, I find him deep in correspondence with Dr. Buist upon the geological features of India; and in 1851 an article from his pen, which shows no small acquaintance with the researches of others, appeared in the *Calcutta Review*. Ten years later, when he was in the Secretary of State's Council, and living at East Sheen, the old interest was revived and strengthened by conversations with Professor Owen, who happened to be a near neighbour.

My father's connection with the canals closed in 1837. In the middle of that year he was placed by Lord Auckland on special duty in connection with a project for draining and reclaiming the Nujjufgurh swamp near Delhi; and the survey of this tract of country kept him employed throughout the following cold weather. It was at this time that he made the acquaintance of the new Governor-General. When the head-quarters camp arrived at Delhi, Lord Auckland sent for him, and discussed with him a variety of points regarding irrigation canals generally, and the special duty on which he was engaged. Apparently he created a favourable impression, for his report upon the Nujjufgurh jheel had hardly been sent in before he was again selected for promotion. The Surveyor-General, Colonel Everest, finding himself overworked, had applied for a deputy to assist him in the management of the Great Trigonometrical Survey, and Lord Auckland at once named my father as the best man for the duty. Colonel Everest agreed, and he was informed of the proposal in a letter from his friend Proby Cautley, who wrote: "Rely upon it, Durand, here is an opening. The idea of your value is universal in the Lord's camp, and Everest would be delighted at your approval of

the measure. Bus.* Write quick, or rather after giving the matter due consideration." My father was inclined to accept the offer, but there was some delay in completing the arrangement, and before he could join the Survey Department, another and more promising opportunity presented itself. The detailed knowledge of the people and their land tenures which he had acquired during his connection with the canals had struck Lord Auckland's distinguished Secretary, Thomason, and in the summer of 1838 he was told that the Governor-General proposed to appoint him Secretary to the Sudder Board of Revenue. The offer of this appointment, a very singular one for a young lieutenant of Engineers, he rightly regarded as a high compliment; and he was about to signify his acceptance when all idea of civil employ was suddenly driven out of his mind by the news that there was at last a prospect of his obtaining what he had so long and ardently desired—the chance of active service. Blinded by the fears and aspirations of others, rather than his own, to all considerations of justice and wisdom, Lord Auckland had resolved upon the unprovoked invasion of Afghanistan in behalf of Shah Shooja; and in August 1838 the tidings that a force was to be assembled for service beyond the Indus spread like wildfire through all the cantonments where our officers were passing away the long hot weather. The prospect of joining in an expedition to the unknown countries beyond our northern frontier was enough to arouse the enthusiasm of the least romantic, and to my father it was irresistible. The first note of preparation stirred his blood like a trumpet call; and at once throwing up the proffered secretaryship he applied for permission to join the army in the field. Thomason's answer was as follows:—

"I mentioned to Lord Auckland your wish for military employment, and was told that of course if the Commander-in-Chief applied for your services they would not be refused. At the same time his Lordship is very desirous to appoint you Secretary to the Sudder Board of Revenue, and perhaps this will be done even if you go on service, so that the appointment may be open for you on your return. . . . . I do hope we may be able to keep you, for I think you will find the field of exertion a useful and pleasant one."

Lord Auckland was better than his word, for he mentioned my father's name to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Fane; and as

* Enough.

his services were at the same time specially applied for by Captain Thomson, who had been appointed Chief Engineer to the army of the Indus, no difficulty was made. At the end of September my father heard that he was to be attached to the advancing force as one of two Engineer officers charged, in addition to their ordinary duties, with the work of the Topographical Department, surveys of fortresses, and the like; and immediately afterwards he was ordered to Delhi to superintend the preparation of the Engineer Park. From that place he wrote on the 5th of October to a friend in England:—

"Your last letter reached me at a time when I was in great uncertainty, and coming when it did the information it contained with respect to your having done me the favour to write to Lord Auckland was very acceptable, and has I suspect proved well-timed. I was then doing all I could to be one of those ordered for service, and have had the satisfaction of at last seeing my name in orders. Lord Auckland . . . . . has let pass no opportunity of doing me service, and I can only attribute his kindness to the good offices of my friends both in England and in this country, who have done that for me which I am no hand in performing for myself—interesting those whom it is important to influence favourably."

It may fairly be doubted whether my father's work had not done more for him than his friends in this instance, as it certainly did in after life; but the closing words of his letter were true, and they indicate one of the causes which afterwards seriously impeded his rise. Naturally proud and reserved, he shrank with an almost morbid dislike from anything which could savour of forwardness; and at times, I think, the punctilious and rather haughty deference with which he treated his superiors repelled some of those who were most willing to be his friends. Among others Sir Henry Fane, who had known his father's family, was at first hurt and offended at something of the kind. He got over the feeling, but it very nearly cost my father his chance of active service; and with others a similar attitude more than once did him harm.

However, for the present he had gained what he desired; and the next year of his life was to be spent amidst circumstances where the qualities of a soldier were more required than the adroitness which enables a man to make for himself friends in high places.

## CHAPTER III.

### 1838—1840.

Plan of the Afghan Campaign—March to Sukkur—Alexander Burnes—Bridging the Indus—March to Quetta—Captain George Thomson—Geology and Botany—Dr. Griffith—Candahar—Expedition to Girishk—Proposed appointment to Herat—Advance upon Ghazni—Storm of the Fortress—March to Cabul—Political schemes—Macnaghten and Sir John Keane—Appointed Engineer to the Cabul Mission—Efforts to secure the occupation of the Bala Hissar—Site of the British Cantonment—Shah Shooja—Resigns appointment—Return to India—Avitabile at Peshawur—Eldred Pottinger—Review of the Sikh army at Lahore—Recrosses the Sutlej.

My father's views regarding the origin and plan of the famous campaign in which he was now to bear a part are fully stated in his published "History of the First Afghan War"; and it would be superfluous here to enter at any length upon a consideration of this well-worn subject. In order to repel the shadow of Russian aggression, we had resolved to force a weak and worthless exile upon the Afghan people, till then well disposed towards us; and this great and unprovoked injustice, the cause of all our subsequent troubles in Afghanistan, was to be effected by military measures of which the rashness and folly seem at the present day almost inconceivable. The objects of the expedition were twofold: first, the overthrow of the Barukzai dynasty and the restoration of Shah Shooja to the throne of his fathers; secondly, the relief or recapture of Herat, then besieged by the Persians with Russian countenance and aid. To secure these objects we had put in the field altogether 19,000 British troops, all that Lord William Bentinck's reductions enabled us to spare, but a wholly insufficient number. The force was not even united. Of the 19,000 men 5,000 were landed at Kurrachee, without transport or supplies, and the remainder, together with the Shah's contingent of 6,000 irregulars, were assembled at Ferozepore on the Sutlej, more than 700 miles distant. The two bodies were to effect a junction at Sukkur, in the territories of the Ameers of Sind, who




The red line indicates the external frontier of the Indian Empire at the present day, including the Native States. The blue line gives the North-Western frontier in 1839, when Sind, Bhawulpore, and the Punjab lay between British India and the seat of war. It is to be remembered that the Western part of Rajputana was, for military purposes, an impassable desert. The double-dotted lines show the route of the forces. Of course all these lines are only approximately correct, and intended to give a general idea of the position.

SKETCH MAP
OF
INDIA
SHEWING THE ROUTE OF
SIR JOHN KEANE'S
FORCES IN 1839 AND 1840.

Henry, F. Brion. Del.

were known to be hostile to the occupation of their country, and who had the Kurrachee force completely at their mercy; and crossing the Indus at this point were to march on Candahar, 400 miles farther, and thence on Herat, nearly 400 miles farther again. From its base at Ferozepore the force would then be distant fully 1,200 miles, with Sind and the powerful Sikh kingdom intervening, and no possibility of support in case of reverse. Indeed, Ferozepore itself was practically in the hands of the Khalsa army. Four marches would have brought the Sikhs to the Sutlej, and no appreciable reserve of British troops existed or could have been drawn together, within 250 miles of the same point. "Thus," my father writes in his history of the war, "after leaving his original base, Ferozepore, at the mercy of a powerful but doubtful ally, Runjeet Sing; and what may be termed his new base, Upper Sind, but too much at the mercy of the injured Ameers; it is evident that Fane could have brought to Herat but a small force with which to repulse the Persian army, or to besiege and storm the fortress.

"Throughout this long series of operations, extending over 1,200 miles of country, a single serious check was almost inevitable ruin and nearly tantamount to destruction. The British commander could look for no supports, no reinforcements; for his reserves, whether the troops on the Ganges and Jumna or those in the Bombay Presidency be regarded as such, were at least 1,400 miles to his rear, and the intervening powers were sure to be disaffected in case of reverse. Everything in the expedition was matter of the utmost uncertainty, even to the feeding of the troops, for Afghanistan merited the character given to Spain by the fourth Henry of France: 'Invade with a large force and you are destroyed by starvation; invade with a small one and you are overwhelmed by a hostile people.' And as if to superadd ridicule to the dangers of the enterprise, which was avowedly undertaken to relieve or recapture a fortress famed for its strength, and possibly defended by a large Persian artillery and Russian engineers, the complement of battering guns taken with the force was four eighteen-pounders."

It is no wonder that my father should afterwards have characterized the expedition as the most "wild, ill-considered, and adventurous" ever undertaken by the British in the East, or that even amid the excitement and pleasure caused by the prospect of his first campaign, he should have realized the daring nature of the movement, and have looked round with something of appre-

hension upon the attitude of the native powers. Nepal was arming and assuming an arrogant tone; Burmah and other States showed signs of stirring; and the storm, he wrote to a friend in England, seemed likely to prove a heavy one.

Such considerations, however, were little likely to damp the ardour of a soldier, if they did not increase it. On the 20th of October, all preparations being complete, Thomson's two companies of sappers marched out of the Lahore Gate of Delhi in high spirits, the natives raising their old invocation and fighting cry—"Hur, Hur Mahadeo," and their English officers eager for a chance of adventure and distinction. Letters from Simla received about this time spoke of the Persians having retired from Herat, and prophesied that there would be no fighting; but the report was generally discredited, and the advancing force pushed on in sanguine expectation of seeing some real work. Of the officers and men who marched from Delhi under Thomson's command, very few lived to recross the British frontier.

A month's march brought the Engineers to Ferozepore. Here they were kept for some days without orders, chafing at their enforced idleness, while the Governor-General and Runjeet Sing exchanged their memorable visits across the Sutlej; and when orders issued they brought something of disappointment. It was notified that the siege of Herat had been raised, and that a portion of the army of the Indus would stand fast in British territory.* Sir Henry Fane, in ill-health, and smarting from what he looked upon as the improper interference of the civil authorities, was to resign the command; and the Bengal Division was to be handed over to Sir Willoughby Cotton. However, the expedition was not to be abandoned; and, as Thomson's detachment was to form part of it, the sappers marched again after the great review of the 1st of December.

The first important duty before the Engineers was the construction of a bridge of boats at Sukkur, where it had been decided that the army should cross the Indus. In a country where wood and materials of every kind were scarce, this was an operation of some difficulty, and requiring preparation in advance; and my father's journal contains some rather indignant comments upon the indifference or obstructiveness shown by Sir Alexander Burnes

* A corps of observation, 4,500 strong, was thus formed at Ferozepore, but it was far too small to act as a real check upon the Sikh army at Lahore, which was ten times as numerous, while it reduced the British force destined for Afghanistan to 14,500 men, of whom 5,000 were at Kurrachee, and 9,500 on the Sutlej.

and the other "political" officers,* who, with their hands doubtless full of other work, did little to help the Engineers. However, the latter persevered; and, by the middle of January, they had arrived at Sukkur and begun the bridging of the river.

Of Burnes himself my father at first formed a favourable impression. He writes on the 4th of January:—"Burnes is a fine intelligent-looking man, of middle age. He has a good eye, a fine forehead, and an open manner. His accent is Scotch, but not unpleasantly so." The agent had brought news of importance regarding the hostility of the Ameers of Sind, and the designs of the Russians, who, according to his account, were on the point of declaring war against us. "The whole business," my father wrote, "seems a curious one, but Burnes' information can scarce be doubted." Afterwards, having seen a good deal of Burnes personally, and having had many opportunities of testing the value of his information, my father came to regard him in a different light. He describes Burnes in his published history as "a man of inordinate ambition, but of average ability and shallow acquirements, sanguine in temperament, and wanting in self-control." Perhaps his doubts were first raised by the traveller Masson, whom he met about this time. His journal of the 31st January contains the following entry:—"Mr. Masson . . . . . gave us a very amusing account of Burnes's rencontre with Captain Vicovitch at Cabul. This Russian officer reached Cabul 'with a pair of black kid-gloves, a French translation of Burnes's travels, and a long Persian epistle, well-powdered with gold leaf, purporting to be from the Emperor of Russia.' The Afghans, of whom Mr. Masson speaks highly, laughed at the soi-disant envoy, and discredited him *in toto*. Had Burnes had the sense to laugh too, all would have gone well, but he took the thing seriously, lost head, and was himself the person who induced the Afghans to consider Captain Vicovitch in the light of an accredited envoy. Mr. Masson seemed to deem Burnes' conduct thoroughly ridiculous throughout, and laughed a good deal when giving us a sketch of the events."

"However," my father adds, "when one thinks of the storm

* The "political" service is the Indian diplomatic service, and the officers belonging to it conduct our relations with Native Princes and States. Some of them are always attached to an army in the field, and their duties at such times are numerous and varied. They assist the Military Commander in his dealings with the people of the country, in the collection of supplies, the procuring of information, and the like.

consequent on this affair, whether correctly related by him or not, Burnes' squabble must be considered as an accident which developed a little more early than Russia wished plans which were in embryo."

On the 3rd of February the bridge was completed. The work had been one of considerable difficulty, owing to the force of the current, here narrowed to a breadth of 500 yards, and to the rocky nature of the bed, which gave a bad holding ground to the anchors. Moreover, there was a deficiency of every kind of material, and the work had to be hurried on in anticipation of a rise in the waters of the Indus, which as a fact occurred almost immediately after the troops had crossed. All difficulties were, however, rapidly and successfully overcome, and the Bengal column, with its guns, carts, camels, and elephants, was enabled to effect the passage of the great river in ease and safety. Thomson and his subordinate officers received much credit for their exertions, and with justice.*

After the passage of the Indus the Engineers and sappers marched on in advance of the main body with a detachment of infantry and native cavalry. Although the army had been some time in the neighbourhood, no attempt had been made to ascertain the supply of water, or to collect forage or other supplies beyond the Indus; and the cavalry were so crippled in the first two or three days by the march through the "Pat," or salt desert, that a retrograde movement was contemplated. The Chief Engineer earnestly protested against this step as tantamount to the ruin of the expedition, intimating that he would march on, whatever the course pursued by the cavalry, and the protest was effectual; but all suffered severely before they reached the mouth of the Bolan Pass, and in the further advance to Quetta. The condition in which Cotton's force arrived at the latter place was deplorable. Large numbers of camels had perished, or had been carried off by

* The bridging of the Indus greatly impressed the people of the neighbouring countries, and the following entry in my father's journal gives an amusing instance of the manner in which our engineering capacities were accounted for:—

"The Beloochees, according to my Moonshee or Mirza, have an idea that we English are disciples of Plato, and hence our 'hikmatee' or science. They have a queer kind of legend in which Plato and Aristotle cut a conspicuous figure. The finale is extraordinary, inasmuch as it makes Noah's flood sweep away every vestige of the works of these two worthies except one leaf of Plato's, the which a good-natured puff of wind carries up into the air, and on the subsidence of the waters it finds its way into an Englishman's hands. Hence they say our superior knowledge and civilization is easily accounted for."

marauders; the camp-followers were on half rations; and only ten days' supplies remained in camp; while the prospect of obtaining food either in the neighbourhood of Quetta or further in advance was very doubtful. Cotton was overwhelmed with apprehension, and the gloomiest anticipations had begun to prevail. The historian Kaye says that Cotton acted on this occasion with becoming promptitude. Such was not the opinion of many under his command. He proposed to economise the store of grain by issuing meat rations to the sepoys in lieu of a portion of their allowance of flour, but the offer was refused by all except the sappers and miners; and after this attempt Cotton shrank from the only course which could prevent disaster, namely, an immediate reduction of rations. It was again in consequence of the representations of the Chief Engineer that the proper action was at last taken. Thomson insisted on the necessity for decision, and pressed the matter until Cotton yielded. The native soldiers, always patient and uncomplaining, received without a murmur the order which reduced their allowance of food to a pound of flour a day, and for a time actual famine was averted, though much suffering and sickness was the inevitable result.

Throughout this campaign the Chief Engineer appears to have exerted a powerful and salutary influence on the issue of events. Some allowance may perhaps be made, in accepting my father's estimate of his services, for the fact that the two belonged to the same corps and were fast friends; but the entries in my father's journals are too circumstantial to leave room for doubt as to Thomson's action on more than one occasion of difficulty and danger. An enthusiastic and scientific soldier, and a man of commanding will and great force of character, Thomson was from the first a power in the camp; and it is to be regretted that he was no longer with the army when two years later the want of men of his stamp was so bitterly felt by our ill-led and disorganized soldiery.

During the march to Quetta my father had found time for some geological work, and his journal contains numerous notes on the geological features of the country. The collection of information on this subject had been specially undertaken on behalf of the Engineers by Thomson, to whom Lord Auckland had written advocating the appointment of a committee of scientific observation; and my father being the one of the party who had devoted most attention to this branch of science, the duty fell mainly to his share. He was particularly struck with the geological con-

formation about Sukkur, and had thought of writing a paper upon at the time, but being hard at work on the Indus bridge all day, and often "at astronomical observations all night," he found this impossible. While marching up the Bolan the chance discovery of some English plants and wild flowers led him to take an interest in botany as well. Dr. Griffith, the well-known botanist, had been allowed to accompany the force; and the two soon became firm friends, and mutually helped each other. Years afterwards my father wrote of Griffith in the *Calcutta Review*:—

"We remember his being styled by his comrades the bravest man in Keane's army of Afghanistan. They used to relate of him that nothing ever stopped Griffith, who seemed to bear a charmed life; that when it was tempting death to proceed alone beyond the pickets, he might every day be seen walking quietly off into the country to search for plants, always accompanied by a large bright shining tin box, which carried on a man's head or shoulder shot off the sunbeams like one of Colonel Waugh's reflectors, and could be seen for miles. On these occasions it was always a question whether Griffith, who was a great favourite, would ever come back; however, the sun was no sooner dropping towards the horizon than the botanist's day beacon hove into sight, and in due course of time in came Griffith, moaning over the poverty of the Afghan flora. It was a country to make a man a geologist, for if he could not find sermons in stones, assuredly there was not much else to converse with; and accordingly even Griffith, the hope and pride of botanical science, as he could not fill his lighthouse to his heart's content, nibbled freely at geology."

Thus lessening the tedium of a toilsome march by many pleasant excursions in search of geological and botanical treasures, my father arrived on the 27th of April at Candahar, where Sir John Keane, who had relieved Cotton of the command of the force, had resolved to halt for some weeks. I extract the following passages from his journal written at this time:—

"Six months work such as we have experienced seems a severe trial of the soldierly endurance of individuals. You cannot make the present operations the topic of conversation with any one, whether a Queen's or a Company's officer, without finding out that the feeling of weariness and anxiety to return to the provinces is the universal feeling. It would be difficult, unless the bribe of enormous pay were held out, to find a volunteer for Herat. How different this from the feeling with which most men started from Hindustan. The sepoys are not a whit more anxious to return to

their own country than their officers, and the Europeans, to turn their heads towards the land of hot winds and monotony. True it is that many causes have combined to render this sentiment of disgust so universal as it is. The nature of the country, the want of supplies, and the conduct of the leaders of the enterprise, have combined to make the feeling prevalent. In spite of these circumstances, however, which to a certain extent excuse its existence, the feeling originates in a deeper source. Few men are naturally, that is by temperament, by habits of thought and study, soldiers. The first burst of zeal and anxiety to proceed on service soon wears out under the friction of the daily matter-of-fact duties and annoyances of camp-life. A soldier's life in Europe, where if he wars, he is still in the midst of civilization, is a very different existence from that of the soldier in the East. The latter has no *délassements*. The former cannot fail of frequently living not only well, but pleasantly."

"*May 3rd.*—It must be a novel sight to the Candaharees to find European soldiers strolling through their streets and marketing. I overheard some of the European regiment discussing the bazaar rates—'Why, everything is as dear here as when we were where there was nothing but stones.' The same man said—'By God, a soldier's pay is like a needle in a bottle of hay—very hard to find.' The simile was a curious one to adduce in exemplification of the inadequacy of his pay to his many wants. It was a Sancho-like venting of a proverb. . . . . .

"In the unburnt brick buildings of this country may be traced the origin of the style of architecture introduced into Hindustan by its western conquerors. . . . . In India the Pathans obtained better and more abundant materials with which to work, yet such is the strength of habit that they modified but little the manner of building. We may trace the narrow arches, the small domes, and groined roofs, to the habit induced by the use of unburnt brick. The experience of the dimensions best adapted to the stability of the one material were almost blindly applied when the other came to be used. Of course it is not meant that the buildings of the modern Candahar are anterior to the stone buildings to be found in Hindustan, but that the present style of the buildings in Candahar is necessarily that which must have existed from the earlier ages, and that thus those in Hindustan are of analogous form and dimensions."

On the 8th of May our puppet Shah Shooja was formally enthroned, and my father had an opportunity of judging of the extent

of His Majesty's popularity, so strangely over-estimated by our unfortunate envoy Macnaghten. He writes in his journal:—"The concourse of Afghans was much less than I had anticipated, and no symptom of loyal enthusiasm was to be discovered." Similar testimony was given by Havelock and other impartial observers.

On the following day the Chief Engineer received intimation that a force was to march to Girishk under the command of Brigadier Sale, and my father was selected to accompany it. The country between Candahar and the Helmund is now only too well known as the scene of one of the most disastrous reverses ever suffered by the British arms in the East; and there is little in my father's journal of the march which would be of interest in the present day. Sale was back at Candahar before the end of May, having met with no opposition. The Helmund was at the time a formidable obstacle, for the current was swift, and the depth of water such that elephants could hardly cross it; but no attempt was made to dispute the passage of our troops. Shortly after his return my father was offered, and accepted, the chance of going to Herat with Major Todd, then about to take up his appointment as Political Agent with Shah Kamran. He was to have been entrusted with the preparation of reports upon the condition of the fortress and surrounding country; and intended after finishing this work to strike across the Hazara highlands to Cabul, or, if opportunity favoured, to go on in disguise towards the northern Khanates. A journey into Central Asia had long been one of his dreams; and he had at this time attached to himself an Afghan tribesman, who afterwards served him with devoted courage and fidelity, and was now prepared to accompany him on the sole condition that he would learn the Mahomedan genuflexions. It did not matter, he said, what a man spoke in Central Asia if only he knew the forms of prayer. Fortunately for my father perhaps, this project fell through. Captain Sanders of the Engineers,* his senior officer, who had at first declined the trip to Herat, now asked to be allowed to withdraw his refusal, and my father with characteristic unselfishness at once agreed to waive his own claims.

During the next month he remained in Candahar. After surveying and reporting upon the fort and city, he had plenty of time on his hands, and he spent it in excursions about the neighbourhood, sketching and working at geology and botany. The transport of the force was fast disappearing by death and the attacks

* Afterwards killed at Maharajpore.

of thieves, and food was very scarce and dear. But the political officers were confident that there would be no fighting, and my father wrote regretfully to a friend in England that "the campaign promised to be more severe on the Company's purse than on anything else." The same view was apparently held by the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Henry Fane, for in a letter sent to England shortly before, in which he spoke of my father as "a very intelligent and active officer," he wrote:—

"I regretted *very much* its not having been my destiny to conduct him and his brother officers to Cabul, for I had proposed . . . . . to have signed the Treaty of Peace in the Bala Hissar of that city, where Alexander had been, and from whence the Emperor Baber started for his conquest of India. I should have been proud of so rolling back the tide of war.

"As it is, I am doubtful whether Dost Mahomed Khan will afford the Engineers any opportunity for distinguishing themselves."

The opportunity, however, was to come, and with little delay. On the 27th of June, still very short of provisions, the British force marched northwards from Candahar. Its commander Keane had not been long in recognizing the soldierly qualities of the Chief Engineer, and once more it was owing to Thomson's energetic protest that a serious mistake was avoided. The envoy Macnaghten had proposed to leave behind the whole of the Bombay Division, offering to stake his credit that not a shot would be fired in opposition to Shah Shooja; and Keane at first allowed himself to be persuaded. Thomson, when he heard of the proposal, did not hesitate to remind the General that England would hold him alone responsible for any failure and disgrace that might ensue; and Keane, taking the speech well, changed his mind and brought on all his European infantry. Thomson could not, however, succeed in dissuading Keane from leaving behind his small siege train, a grievous error, and wholly unnecessary, for there was nothing to prevent the guns from going on, and the arguments which applied to the one case applied equally to the other.*

* Kaye is not altogether fair to Sir John Keane in this matter. He writes:—"He was nearing the strongest fortress in the country; he knew that it was garrisoned by the enemy, and that if he advanced upon it, it would be vigorously defended." As a matter of fact, Keane's political advisers assured him that Ghazni would not be vigorously defended, or defended at all; and even when the force arrived within sight of the fortress, no one knew whether it was occupied, while Todd and Leech, of the Artillery and Engineers respectively, who had seen the place, reported that it was weak and would give no trouble. Keane ought, no

The march to Ghazni was effected with little difficulty or molestation, though not without some trouble from deficiency of supplies and the attacks of marauders. On the 10th of July my father notes:—"Burnes with his usual soundness of thinking wrote to Mr. Macnaghten after we had made two or three marches from Candahar that we had entered so fertile a country, and that supplies were so abundant, that he thought the Commissariat might be dispensed with. The next and following days Burnes was forced to indent on the Commissariat for food for his own servants." During this time and throughout the advance from Quetta the Engineers, marching in advance of the main body, were a good deal harassed by small parties of the enemy, who were constantly on the watch to cut up stragglers or camp-followers, and to make a dash at the baggage. By dint of care and vigilance Thomson succeeded in reaching Ghazni without the loss of a single camel, except by death; but he was forced to employ his two surveyors on alternate days to cover the rear and flanks of the advanced column, and my father had some exciting work in carrying out this part of his duties. On one occasion his eagerness to give the marauders a lesson nearly brought him into contact with them under disagreeable circumstances. He had moved out before daybreak with a small detachment of irregular cavalry to search the ground, and had given strict orders to his men, who were too fond of using their carbines, that there was to be no firing. As they moved quietly forward in the grey dawn, some fresh hoof-prints on the crisp hardened sand gave them a clue, and in a few minutes they were galloping hard after a party of horsemen who, surprised and nearly ridden into, turned and made for the neighbouring hills. Being unusually well mounted, my father had got ahead of his men, and was gaining fast upon the enemy when they reached broken ground into which it was undesirable for cavalry to follow them. Seeing that further pursuit was useless he pulled up, and reformed his detachment to return to the column, when the native officer in command asked him with a smile what had become of his sword. He looked down and found that the blade had parted from the hilt, owing to the jerking and vibration of the gallop, and that if he had come up with the enemy he would have been helpless.

This native officer, Azeem Khan, who greatly distinguished him-

doubt, to have distrusted both politicals and soldiers on a matter of such importance, and neglected no precautions; but it was not quite so "infatuated" as Kaye represents him to have been.

THE CABUL GATE OF GHUZNEE.

FROM A SKETCH MADE ON THE SPOT BY SIR HENRY DURAND

self during the campaign, was a gentleman of good family; and my father used to say that the two or three natives he had known who were really equal to good English officers were all well born. With the highest opinion of the Indian soldier, he thought that from one cause or another native officers were rarely to be depended upon in a position of trust and responsibility; and he attributed the subsequent defeat of the Khalsa armies, and the failure of the sepoy mutiny, mainly to this cause. He had before the end of his life much experience of Indian warfare, and his deliberate opinion was that the Indian sepoy, well led, was as good a soldier as one could wish to see. This opinion extended not only to the stalwart Sikhs and Pathans of the north, but to the old-fashioned Poorbeah, whom it is now too much the fashion to despise. But he thought that in the present day few natives could lead, and that those who could would generally be found among the better born.

On the 21st of July Keane arrived near the famous fortress of Ghazni, still uncertain whether it would be held or not. It proved to be occupied in force, and the English General was then confronted by the great difficulty of the campaign.

Pushing into the vineyards and gardens in front of the walls, the Engineers soon discovered that the reports which had been accepted in Candahar regarding the weakness of the place were fallacious. Against a good siege train it could not have made a long resistance; but Keane's battering guns were in Candahar, more than two hundred miles away, and against a force provided only with field-artillery Ghazni was, if properly defended, impregnable; for the walls rising thirty feet or more from a scarped rock or mound of the same height, with a wet ditch in its front, precluded the possibility of an attack by mining or escalade. The only possible chance appeared to lie in an attempt to blow open the Cabul Gate, and so to carry the fortress by a *coup de main*. It was known from the reports of eye-witnesses that up to a late date this gate had not been built up like the other entrances, and in the course of the reconnaissance the Engineers had seen a horseman ride into it, which left little doubt of its condition. Moreover the road up to the gate was clear, and the bridge over the ditch unbroken, while the ground within four hundred yards of the walls afforded good positions for our artillery. Under these circumstances the Chief Engineer recommended an attack upon this point as affording the best chance of success, and Keane accepted his opinion. The operation was full of risk, and

Thomson pointed this out, adding that the loss would probably be severe, and that the surer course appeared to be to mask the place by a corps of observation, and to advance against Dost Mahomed, who was said to be only five or six marches distant. Keane replied that this was out of his power, as the force had only two, or at the utmost three, days' provisions; and orders were accordingly issued for the assault.

While reconnoitring on the 21st and 22nd my father had two narrow escapes. On the first day a matchlock ball passed through the sleeve of his coat, just grazing the skin and leaving a bruise on his arm. He was with the Chief Engineer at the time, and in after years he spoke warmly of Thomson's unselfish courage. The two had moved on together towards the works as far as a low wall behind which they stood up to reconnoitre. The enemy's skirmishers, who were close by, at once opened a heavy fire; and Thomson seeing my father stand up exclaimed, "Down, down, Durand, you'll be shot," he himself remaining bolt upright. There was no ostentation about the thing, my father said, Thomson was thinking of his friend, not of himself. On the second day my father was very nearly cut off by the enemy's skirmishers, who showed much jealousy of the movements of the Engineers and pressed them close. Being weak from a bad attack of jaundice, he was unable to keep up over the rough ground when our people retired, and thus got separated from the rest of the party. When so completely exhausted that he had been forced to lie down, he was joined by two privates of the 13th, who had lost their way among some broken buildings and came upon him by chance. It is a pleasure to record the fact that these brave men, though ordered to leave him and save their own lives, refused to do so. With their aid he effected his escape from his dangerous position. After he had regained some strength the little party made their way cautiously through vineyards and broken ground towards the British camp; and though for a time completely surrounded by the enemy, and eventually discovered and fired upon, they succeeded in extricating themselves without loss.

Keane having decided upon an assault, the Chief Engineer set about his preparations, and my father was selected for the command of the party which was to blow in the Cabul Gate. The offer was a tempting one, for the command was a certain opening to distinction, and to be specially selected for such a duty was in itself no small honour. Nevertheless, as the arrangement had not been notified the offer was declined. Knowing that Captain

Peat of the Bombay Engineers, an excellent officer, and his senior expected the command, my father requested that it might be given to him, asking only to be entrusted with the perilous duty of placing the powder, and firing the train. Thomson agreed, though with some reluctance, and Peat was put in orders. Years afterwards Lord Clyde, then Sir Colin Campbell, ascertained from my father the truth of this story, of which he had heard. His comment was a characteristic one: "By God, Durand," he exclaimed after a moment's silence, bringing his hand down with an emphatic slap upon his knee, "By God, Durand, I would not have done that for my own father."

Every one who has read the history of our Afghan wars knows how Keane's daring blow succeeded. The operation was a fearfully hazardous one. The explosion party had to advance up to and across the ditch without any sort of cover, over a bridge swept at a distance of a few yards by the fire of some low outer works, and then along a narrow and winding roadway lying between loopholed walls, which led to the gate itself. There was small chance of surprise, for the enemy were known to be watchful, and taking all things into consideration it seemed barely possible that the party could escape destruction. For my father, hardly able to walk from weakness, the chance was even less than for the rest, and as he afterwards told his children he had that night fully made up his mind to death. Just before the assault he called up the two sergeants, Vivian and Robertson, whom he had selected to accompany him, and gave them careful directions for their guidance in case of his fall; and his last words before moving forward were, "Now remember, if I am dropped you pass on and do your duty. Never mind me." Robertson,* a plucky little fellow, touched his cap and said, "I understand you, sir."

Our artillery had left camp about midnight, and had gradually been put into position about four hundred yards from the ramparts; while the advance under Colonel Dennie, consisting of four companies of Europeans, and the main body under Brigadier Sale, comprising all Keane's European infantry, had assembled near Mahmoud's pillars. These movements, however, took some

* Robertson, like a good many more of the men who then enlisted in the Bengal Engineers and Artillery, was a gentleman by birth, who had got into some trouble at home, and had thought it desirable to change his name and turn to an Indian career. He afterwards served in the Public Works Department in the Punjab. Vivian after getting his discharge kept a shop in Simla, where my father used often to see him. He died in 1865.

time, and the first streak of dawn was in the sky as the explosion party advanced, in perfect silence, my father leading. Six men of the 13th Light Infantry were placed in front of the powder, which was carried by twelve native sappers, six more sappers following to take up the bags in case of casualties. Sergeant Robertson carried the hose. They had arrived within 150 yards of the works when "a challenge from the walls, a shot, and a shout, told that the party was discovered. Instantly the garrison were on the alert; their musketry rang free and quick from the ramparts, and blue lights suddenly glared on the battlements, brilliantly illuminating the approach to the gate." Fortunately, however, the fire was ill-directed, the aim of the enemy's marksmen being disturbed by the fusillade which our supporting infantry now opened, and by the fire of our artillery, who found the blue lights a good mark. Fortunately, also the outer works were at the time unoccupied. Pushing briskly across the bridge, therefore, and up the roadway, my father and his men reached the gate and succeeded in depositing their dangerous load, he himself laying the first bag containing the end of the hose. The sappers then retired along the wall, while he and his sergeant uncoiled the hose, laying it close to the foot of the scarp. In doing this they were both struck by stones and clods of earth flung from above, but neither was seriously injured, and the train was successfully laid. The end of the hose just reached a sallyport on the right of the gateway, into which they stepped, and this probably saved them, for at first the portfire would not light, and my father was some time blowing at the slow match and portfire together before the latter caught and blazed. Even then when laid down on the ground it went out, and meanwhile the garrison, knowing that something was going on in the gateway, were pouring down a heavy fire from their loopholes and the top of the parapet. Feeling that further delay would be fatal, my father then told his sergeant to run, and drew his pistol to flash the train. This was almost certain death to himself, and Robertson flatly refused, begging him to give the portfire one more trial. He did so, and this time it fairly caught. Having watched it burn steadily for some moments, he and his sergeant then retired to cover, out of reach of the explosion, and lay down in a position from which almost immediately afterwards they saw the flame run up the roadway. A column of fire and smoke rising from the gate, followed by a dull heavy report, showed that the charge was sprung; and the way was open to our expectant troops.

The moment must have been one of intense pleasure; but an incident now took place which very nearly neutralized the success of the explosion, and turned triumph into failure. The signal for the advance companies under Dennie, and the main column under Sale, to move forward was not the sound of the explosion itself, which might have been unsuccessful, but the sound of a bugle from Peat's covering party, which had taken post at the sallyport of the lower works in order to repel any sudden rush of swordsmen. Unhappily Peat's bugler had been shot through the head, and the signal was not given. My father, who had sent back his sergeant to give the word, awaited it anxiously for a minute or two; and then, concluding that something had gone wrong with Peat's people, and knowing that every moment was precious, he made for a party of infantry in his immediate rear, hoping to obtain help from them. He was again disappointed. The fire from the battlements was at the time heavy; and his urgent demands for a bugler were met by a volley of curses from the men, who, excited by their danger, told him to keep quiet, and ordered the bugler not to sound. The subaltern in charge was equally unmanageable, refusing to sound without orders from the field officer; and at last, in despair, my father turned and endeavoured to get back to the head of the column. He was, as I have said, enfeebled by illness; and attempting to push into a run, he tripped in the darkness over a low Mussulman tomb and fell heavily on his face. So weak was he, and so much shaken by the fall, that his first effort to rise was ineffectual; and just at this moment, as he lay helpless on the ground, he heard through the rattle of the musketry a bugle from Sale's column peal out the retreat. The bugles of the column in rapid succession caught up the fatal sound; and the forward movement, upon the rapidity of which everything depended, was checked at the critical moment.

How this unfortunate mistake occurred my father describes in his published History of the war. The incident is also mentioned by Kaye, but his account of the whole affair is short and not altogether accurate. Peat, who commanded the explosion party, had missed my father in the darkness, and had been led to believe the operation a failure. Disquieted by the delay which occurred in firing the train, he had come up into the gateway just as the powder caught, and had been thrown to the ground and much hurt by the explosion. Nevertheless, being "a calm, brave soldier" he had gone on and examined the gate itself; but the entrance turn-

ing short to the right, and the gate being backed at a short distance by a dead wall, he had failed to see daylight through it, and had so reported to the Chief Engineer. Sale was standing close by when Peat made his report, and his bugler, whether by his orders or not, sounded the retreat.

Happily the mistake was soon rectified. With a desperate effort my father had regained his feet, and, though unable again to muster a run, was walking back towards the head of the column, shouting to attract attention, when he met Broadfoot of the Engineers, who had been sent on by Thomson to ascertain the cause of the delay. My father knew the explosion must have succeeded; for while he was placing the powder bags, the enemy's guard behind the gate had shown a light, and looking through the chinks of the woodwork he had satisfied himself that the entrance was unblocked. He was, therefore, able to assure Broadfoot that all would be right if only the advance were sounded at once. Broadfoot turned and ran back at full speed, and in a few moments more the long delayed signal was given. Dennie pressed eagerly forward with his four companies, and after him Sale with the main column. A brief struggle ensued in the gateway, where Sale and Thomson were both cut down by a party of swordsmen, who dashed boldly in among the bayonets, but our men pushed them back with loud cheers, and all was soon over. The garrison of the citadel fled panic-stricken and Ghazni was won.

The chance had been very nearly missed, and the issue of that morning's work was one the importance of which it would be difficult to exaggerate. If the garrison, over 3,000 strong, had been given time to recover from the effects of the explosion and to occupy the works in force, it would have been almost impossible for the head of the column to effect its passage through the narrow gateway, choked with fallen rubbish, and exposed to a converging fire from all sides. And if Ghazni had not fallen then, in all probability it would never have fallen; for the Cabul Gate would have been rapidly built up, and no second opportunity would have been afforded of carrying the place by a *coup de main*. As it was Ghazni fell, and with it the fortunes of Dost Mahomed, who in common with all his countrymen believed the fortress to be impregnable. Our force found ample supplies in the town; the advance upon Cabul, otherwise impossible, was resumed and completed without further opposition; and Shah Shooja was enthroned in the Bala Hissar.

I would not wish to arrogate to my father too large a share of

the credit of this success, the first military exploit in the reign of Queen Victoria, which laid Afghanistan at our feet and threw a fitful gleam of glory upon our arms, so soon to be tarnished by disaster and disgrace. He did his duty under the direction of others, and the chief merit of the capture of Ghazni undoubtedly belongs to Thomson, who conceived and planned the assault. But my father's share in the exploit was not small, for he was doubly instrumental to the success of the operation, first by carrying out Thomson's orders with coolness and intrepidity, and secondly by correcting the mistake which nearly robbed the army of its triumph. He received no reward except a brief mention in despatches and the consciousness of having done his duty. There was then no cross "for valour," and his rank in the army was too low to admit of his getting a brevet or other distinction. Keane, who was created a G.C.B. and Baron Keane of Ghazni, afterwards did ample justice to the gallantry and presence of mind of the young subaltern. "Had it rested with me," he said, "I would have handed over to you my Cross of the Bath as the rightful owner of it." And forty years later the "Ghazni" medal was founded by some of the officers of my father's corps in remembrance of him. But during his lifetime he received no honour or reward, and after his death Sir John Kaye, who as historian of the Afghan war had told the story of the Ghazni storm, was not ashamed when writing the history of the sepoy mutiny to indulge in something like a sneer at his personal courage.

When the storm of Ghazni had been almost forgotten in England, my father was closely questioned about it by a French officer, who at last extracted from him what he was always slow to give, an account of his own part in the affair.* "What did they do for you?" was the final question. "Nothing, I was only a lieutenant." "That could never have happened in our army." The remark was doubtless true, and it pointed to a defect in our military system—the want of a distinction which could be gained by any soldier, however low his rank. But my father always said that the paucity of rewards and decorations which used to be given to our officers was the best safeguard for the maintenance of a pure spirit of soldierly duty, and that any increase of liberality in regard to them was likely to prove demoralising. He used to point to his own corps as models of what a soldier should be in this respect. The engineers of his day were trained

* His letters to England written from Afghanistan do not even mention that he was one of the engineer officers attached to the explosion party.

by Peninsular officers, who taught them that in anything like tough work one engineer in five was the average of survivors. They therefore knew what they had to expect, and did their duty for duty's sake. There was little thought of medal hunting or mere personal glory among men trained in so stern a school.

The plunder taken in Ghazni was considerable and proved a severe temptation to our troops, many of whom were killed by the enemy's swordsmen when scattered about in search of "loot." My father afterwards spoke with pride of the conduct of his sappers on this occasion. They had been kept well in hand during the storm and had lost little. After the resistance was at an end, they offered to secure for him some of the loose horses which were rushing about in all directions. His answer was—"Fall in, I did not bring you here to disgrace your uniforms;" and they fell in at once and marched out without touching a rupee's worth of property. Immediately after the storm my father was forced to take to his bed, where he remained for some days.

On the 30th of July Keane's force marched towards Cabul. Their route lay through the country which has since become so well known as the scene of the fighting in 1879, by way of Maidan, Urgundeh, and Killa Kazi; and my father, who had now got over his attack, was able to do the march on horseback. They reached the city on the 7th of August, and he wrote to a friend: "Shah Shooja enters his capital to-day, and certainly has the satisfaction of ruling over the most unprincipled, treacherous race that can well be imagined."

The political authorities were at this time much troubled by the supposed designs of Russia, and some very unwise measures were contemplated by Macnaghten and those about him. My father's journal of the 12th of August contains the following entry:—

"Pottinger writes from Herat that a Russian force is assembling at Orenburg destined for Khiva. Stoddart is still prisoner at Bokhara, and anticipates remaining so until relieved by an English army!! Pottinger actually writes recommending that the army, or at least one brigade, should immediately move on Balkh. One brigade, he says, would be quite sufficient, as there are no forts to cause delay or give trouble, and no troops that could oppose its progress!!! The politicals are now bothering their brains about the Russian schemes to obtain the navigation of the Oxus. Mr. Macnaghten wrote to Sir John Keane on the subject, who answered that the only banks he now thought of were the banks of the Thames."

On the 19th of August he writes:—

"Thomson, who has been dining with the Commander-in-Chief, brings the astounding news that Mr. Macnaghten had actually sent a letter to Sir John Keane for his approval and sanction, the tenor of which was to acquaint Lord Auckland that a force had moved against Bokhara, the Bombay troops returning *viâ* Kelat, and one brigade being left here from the Bengal army; that to take immediate advantage of the remainder of the season was so important that the subject did not admit of being delayed until Lord Auckland's approval should arrive. In short, Mr. Macnaghten wanted to push on a small force into the heart of countries of which we know little or nothing . . . . . far from all support, and against a State which has formed an offensive and defensive treaty with Russia. Sir John Keane was so much surprised with the letter that he could not trust himself with answering anything in writing, but sent back Mr. Macnaghten's letter by one of his aides-de-camp with a verbal message that he could not in any way join Mr. Macnaghten in forwarding such a letter to Lord Auckland. The insanity of the scheme appears to have struck the Commander-in-Chief vividly, and he was afraid of committing himself if he discussed the merits of the proposed operations on paper."

A few days later my father received from Macnaghten the offer of an appointment as Engineer to the Shah, or, if he preferred the title, as "Engineer to the Cabul Mission." The pay was good, £1,200 a-year, and as the appointment held out a prospect of useful and responsible work, the offer was accepted. The intention was that he should be employed in exploring the northern and western parts of Afghanistan, then little known, and in collecting all available information regarding the geography and people of these and the neighbouring provinces. His first attempt at exploration was, however, nipped in the bud, for he had hardly reached Urgundeh on a projected excursion to Bameean when he was recalled, and set to work to select sites for the winter quarters of our troops. A very short examination was sufficient to show him that the position which ought to be held was the Bala Hissar or citadel of Cabul, which completely commanded the city, and might have been easily rendered impregnable against all Afghanistan. His history of the war gives an account of the repeated representations by which he endeavoured to effect this object, and of the way in which he was eventually baffled. Opposed by the Shah, who, like a thorough Afghan, objected to having "the

troops above and the king below," and ill-supported by Macnaghten, who showed some annoyance at his persistency, he failed to carry his views, and early in September he was informed that the cantonment must be built on a low and unsuitable site, selected by Sale. Every one knows the result of this fatal step, which, humanly speaking, led to the destruction of our unhappy force. The remains of the old cantonment are still clearly traceable by a portion of the ditch and rampart, and no one who has seen Cabul can have failed to be struck by the miserable weakness of the position; though, at the same time, it may fairly be doubted whether our troops would not, if well led, have found the defences sufficient to keep out any Asiatic force unprovided with an overwhelming artillery. The present cantonment of Sherpur, in which General Roberts and his troops passed the winter of 1879–80, touches the old position; but for a force large enough to occupy it properly, Sherpur is, both naturally and artificially, a place of much greater strength.

On the 27th of August my father writes in his journal:—

"After breakfast I was presented to the Shah, who received us standing, leaning on a carved stick. He is a healthy-looking man with but little of the majestic about him. He is exceedingly anxious about his palace, the which has suffered at the hands of Dost Mahomed. On the latter he was very severe, calling him a dog as often he had occasion to point out the ravages committed on the splendours of the mansion." Subsequently my father had many conversations with the Shah, and came to know him well. He regarded the unfortunate Prince as a man of some ability, but weak and timorous, and quite unfit for the task of resuscitating the Durani empire.

My father's tenure of his appointment in Cabul was not of long duration, and I extract from a letter to a friend in England his account of the reasons which induced him to resign it.

"I accepted it," he wrote, "telling Sir William Macnaghten that I did so because it offered me an opportunity of endeavouring to carry into effect Lord Auckland's views, which he had by letter made known to the Chief Engineer . . . . . that is, the collection of topographical, geographical, and statistical information with respect to Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries. I was rather surprised at two military expeditions being despatched without my being sent with either. A third one destined for Khulm and Kunduz, and therefore both in consequence of the country to be traversed and the service which might occur likely

to be interesting, was on the tapis, and it being in every way my right, I fully expected an order to accompany it. The Chief Engineer was sent for by Sir John Keane in order to receive his instructions for the expedition. Sir A. Burnes was there on the part of Sir W. Macnaghten. The Chief Engineer was rather surprised at Sir A. Burnes taking upon himself to nominate the officer of Engineers that he wished to be sent, a friend of his own, the junior officer in our camp. Sir J. Keane replied that Mr. Durand was present and he should go, to which Sir A. Burnes' answer was that it was the Shah's particular request that I should be left *to look after the comforts of the troops at Cabul.* Sir J Keane said that such being the case another officer should be sent, and the Chief Engineer mentioned the one whose turn it was, at the same time telling Sir John Keane he thought it probable I should resign my appointment. When Major Thomson returned into camp he told me all that had taken place, excepting that he had told the General that it was probable I should resign. As I was walking out of his tent rather suddenly after this piece of information, he asked me what I was going to do, and I said to send in my resignation. Thomson then added what he had mentioned to Sir John Keane, and that he thought me right, but recommended, as the appointment was a good one, that I should think of it until morning before carrying my resolution into effect. I did so, and then forwarded my resignation . . . . . Two days afterwards Sir John Keane . . . . . read me a paragraph of a letter from Lord Auckland, in which I was mentioned for the appointment and . . . . . offered to make up the business between Sir W. Macnaghten and myself. I said that if the General wished it I should be happy to remain in the country, but after what had passed not with the Shah, that is, not where I might be exposed to insult from Sir A. Burnes. Sir John Keane was very kind to me. Thomson told the General that Macnaghten was so violent and angry that he thought it would be studying my interest if I did not remain in Afghanistan."

He adds in his diary:—

"Mr. Macnaghten in discussing my resignation was much excited, and threatened to do what he could to injure me with Lord Auckland, saying that he must do so in self-defence."

Under these circumstances Sir John Keane agreed that my father had better return to India, and the words in which he closed the interview were strangely prophetic. "I asked you," he said, "to remain in Afghanistan for the good of the public ser-

vice, but since circumstances have rendered that impossible, I cannot but congratulate you on quitting the country, for, mark my words, it will not be long before there is here some signal catastrophe."

Soon afterwards my father left Cabul for Peshawur. The incident which led to his resignation was most fortunate for himself. He thereby escaped participating in the disasters which attended the latter part of our occupation of Afghanistan, and in all probability he escaped also the fate of his successor Sturt, who fell in the retreat of Elphinstone's division. Marching by way of the Khoord Cabul and Pari Durrah Passes, afterwards destined to acquire so terrible a notoriety, he reached Jellalabad on the 21st of October; and halting there until the arrival of Sir John Keane, who was returning to India with a portion of the Cabul force, he accompanied the General through the Khyber to Jamrud. Shortly before passing Jellalabad he writes in his journal:—"Burnes is appointed Kotwal of Cabul, an extraordinary appointment whether viewed with reference to his situation as a high political functionary, an agent of the British Government, or with respect to the assertions of Government that the civil executive should be in the hands of the Shah. The measure is one which will tend to render the Shah more unpopular than anything else that could well be conceived, for if the Afghans are to be excluded from the civil administration as well as from the military, their discontent will be much increased. Who among them will believe us when we tell them that we have not taken the country for ourselves, if every post of trust and importance, even to that of head of the police of the capital, be in the hands of Europeans? Shah Shooja himself will soon grow tired of our incessant interference, and will feel that he is a mock monarch."

The Khyber Pass is now so well known that my father's account of it would be of little interest. It may, however, be remarked that he examined it with great care, minutely studying the conformation of the surrounding hills, and acquainting himself as far as possible with the alternative routes by which the pass might be turned. He came to the conclusion that the proper disposition would be in three columns, care being taken not to entangle guns or baggage on the main route until the movement of the parallel columns had produced its effect.

On the 7th of November the Commander-in-Chief's party marched into Peshawur, then ruled by the famous adventurer Avitabile, and my father used to relate how the road between Jamrud and

Peshawur bore traces of Avitabile's rough and ready system of justice. Suspended between the trees which fringed the road were the bodies of several unfortunates who had been condemned to death, and in parts these ghastly warnings to the disaffected population of the district hung one above another in double and triple rows. In the evening the English General and his staff dined with the governor, when my father made Avitabile's acquaintance, and his journal of the 11th of November contains the following entry :—

"Called on Mr. Avitabile. He was employed in giving decisions and had his judges round him. Two Kazis, two Sikhs, and two Hindoos form this conclave. He gave us a sketch of his policy, which was amusing enough. He never uses the troops, but when a couple of villages quarrel, he offers to provide them with ball and let them fight it out. This, he adds, they never are willing to do, however much they may threaten and boast.

"For Jacquemont and naturalists in general he expressed a supreme contempt."

From Peshawur my father went on towards the Sikh capital at Lahore, meeting on his way Mrs. Macnaghten and her party, who were travelling up, unsuspicious of any danger, to the scene of their captivity. He also met Eldred Pottinger, who had been with him at Addiscombe, and I extract the following entry from his journal of the 15th December :—"Pottinger came into our camp and we had an hour's chat with him. He gives an extraordinary account of the siege of Herat. The Persians acted without system throughout the business. On one occasion they had obtained possession of the rampart and were bringing up gabions, &c., to form a lodgment on the top of the breach, but seeing a party of Afghans who had been driven from another part of the works and were going along the lower Shirazee, they thought the Afghans were coming to cut off their retreat and quitted their post as fast as they could. Pottinger says there were instances of individual bravery, but that on the whole it was a mismanaged affair. The battalion of Russian deserters did not appear much in earnest in their attack, but contented themselves with pummelling the Afghans well whenever they sallied. The Russian General or Engineer seems to have known little or nothing of military matters. The Persians on receiving a supply of ammunition expended it in a day or two, and then had to wait a month before they could again open their guns, so that, as Pottinger put it, they just did enough mischief to point out where repairs were requisite."

On Christmas Day Sir John Keane and his party reached Lahore, and three days later they witnessed a grand review of the Khalsa army. My father was surprised by its efficiency and soldierly appearance. More than thirty thousand regular troops, with 120 guns, turned out to do honour to the British Commander, besides irregular horse and some hundreds of the wild Akalis, or soldier priests of the Sikh sect, with their dark blue garments and bracelets of steel. "I certainly did not expect," he wrote, "to see so respectable a force, so good an imitation of European organization. Whether or not it be more than an imitation remains for some day's proof." That day was not long in coming. Runjeet Sing was dead, and even at this time his weak successor could hardly restrain the eagerness of his soldiery. As Sir John Keane passed down the ranks on his elephant the Akalis raised a shout which savoured more of defiance than salutation, and the hostility of these fanatics broke out more than once into open menace, and even violence, during the stay of our people at Lahore. Six years later the solid regiments of the Khalsa, with their French three-deep formation and slow steady movements, had faced us in more than one doubtful battle, and proved themselves well worthy of our steel. At the time, however, their spirit was not suspected, for they had covered themselves with disgrace during the late operations in Afghanistan, and in calculating the force required to meet the Lahore army my father writes of their "proverbial faint heartedness" as one of the causes which, combined with a want of good officers, would militate against their ultimate success.

On the 1st of January, 1840, my father recrossed the Sutlej and was once more in British territory. The year's campaign had been of much service to him. It had made his name as a brave and capable officer, and had given him some experience of war. It had also enabled him to acquire much valuable information regarding Sind, Afghanistan, and the Punjab, and had thrown him into close contact with a number of men whose names have now become historical. Keane and Sale, Macnaghten and Burnes, and many other military and political officers who bore a part in the Afghan drama, he had come to know well;* and afterwards,

* Keane he knew intimately. He had been introduced to the General by the Chief Engineer, and soon afterwards the acquaintance was cemented by a chance incident which is worth recording. Going over to the General's tent one day with a message from Thomson, my father found Keane in bed, with a file of newspapers beside him. He was ill at the time, and was fretting over the adverse criticisms of these journals, which had attacked him in chorus. My father tried to cheer him

when his experience had been enlarged by two years' work as Private Secretary to Lord Ellenborough, this fact led him to undertake the history which has more than once been mentioned in the course of this narrative. It was not published during his lifetime, for many circumstances combined to prevent its completion, and in the meantime Kaye's well known history was given to the world. But before this work appeared a portion of my father's manuscript was converted into a long review article, which is repeatedly quoted by Kaye, and has had a marked effect upon the historian's treatment of some portions of his subject; and when the second Afghan war broke out, the whole was brought to light. Its value as a truthful record of facts has since been abundantly recognized.* My father's Afghan sketches, surveys, and astronomical observations, also proved to be of much value and interest. His sketches were unfortunately lost three years ago, when being copied for the use of officers in the field, and later experience has added to our knowledge of the country and its fortresses; but all maps of Afghanistan published between 1840 and 1880 were based to a great extent on his labours, and those of his fellow surveyor Anderson, for the earlier maps were very incorrect, and the Officer in charge of the Quartermaster-General's Department of the force came to the Engineers for every sort of information.

up and partly succeeded, telling him with the ready confidence of six-and-twenty, that no one cared a rap what the newspapers said, and urging him not to let himself be troubled by their ignorant criticisms. The conversation went on for a considerable time, and Keane's final answer was, "Well, I know you are right, Durand, but for the life of me I can't help caring." From this time Keane took a strong liking to him, and often consulted him about matters of importance. My father did not consider that he was possessed of any brilliant ability, but always spoke highly of him as a man of sound sense and good feeling, with plenty of courage and confidence.

* Sir Frederick Roberts, upon whose staff I had the honour of serving in Afghanistan, had a copy of my father's work with him during the campaigns of 1879 and 1880. He writes of it as "intensely interesting," and as having quite altered his opinion regarding some features of the first war.—"I never referred to it without gaining valuable information."

# CHAPTER IV.

## 1840—1844.

Preparation of Plans and Report[illegible]s connected with the Afghan Campaign—Course of Events beyond the Indus duri[illegible]ng 1840—Surrender of Dost Mahomed—Application for Furlough—Vincent Eyre—[illegible]General Elphinstone—Voyage to England—Proposed Retirement from the Compa[illegible]ny's service and Preparation for the Ministry—Appointed Aide-de-Camp to [illegible]Lord Ellenborough—Return to India—Disasters in Afghanistan—Appointed Priv[illegible]ate Secretary—Wars in China and Afghanistan—Lord Ellenborough and Sir Jo[illegible]n Kaye—Simla—Return of the British force from Afghanistan—Marriage—Trou[illegible]bles in Sind and Gwalior—Battle of Maharajpore—Disaffection in the Native arm[illegible]y—Recall of Lord Ellenborough—Administration of Lord Ellenborough—His Cha[illegible]cter.

THE greater part of the y[illegible]ear 1840 was passed by my father at the hill station of Mussooree[illegible], where he was employed in preparing a number of maps, plans, [illegible]and reports, connected with the late campaign.

During the first few mo[illegible]nths of the year things went fairly well in Afghanistan, but befor[illegible]e the close of the summer the outlook beyond our western front[illegible]ier began to darken. The loss of Kelat by our protégé, Shah New[illegible]az Khan, was followed by the disastrous defeat of Clibborne's det[illegible]achment near Kahun, and at the same time the news which came[illegible] from the Punjab was such as to give cause for serious anxiety. When my father left Mussooree in October, troops of all arms[illegible] were again in motion towards Feroze-pore, and it seemed prob[illegible]able that a fresh advance across the Sutlej, either against the t[illegible]urbulent Sikh army, or in the direction of the Afghan border, m[illegible]ight soon be forced upon us. Under these circumstances my fat[illegible]her, who had meanwhile been appointed to the charge of the Rohil[illegible]cund canals, applied for permission to join the army in the field, [illegible]and made ready to enter upon a second campaign.

The prospect of active s[illegible]ervice was, however, of short duration. The death of Maharaja K[illegible]urruk Sing at Lahore was not followed by any serious outbreak; [illegible]and on the 21st of November a cricket

match in which my father was playing at Delhi was interrupted by the receipt of a Gazette Extraordinary announcing that the Amir Dost Mahomed had come into Cabul and surrendered to Sir William Macnaghten. This unexpected piece of good fortune caused much satisfaction in India, and for a time removed from men's minds the rising apprehension of trouble. "Once more," my father wrote in his journal, "Lord Auckland's luck is beyond calculation, and promises to carry him through everything." The preparations for the assembly of an expeditionary force were discontinued, officers were again permitted to go on furlough, and, seeing that there was no chance of service, my father applied for leave to England. He had now been eleven years away from home, and the *heimweh* was strong upon him, while nothing seemed to call for his longer absence in "the land of hot winds and monotony."

Pending the result of his application my father stayed for a time in Meerut with his friend Vincent Eyre of the Artillery, afterwards so honourably distinguished, who was then about to start for Cabul with his wife and children. General Elphinstone was also in Meerut at the time, and my father made his acquaintance. In later years he always spoke of the unfortunate commander with pity and respect, as a gallant gentleman, who, though broken by ill-health and incapacitated for his difficult position in Cabul, was yet undeserving of much of the obloquy which has been heaped upon his name. At the close of December the required orders arrived, and early in January, 1841, my father was on his way to Calcutta. Two months later he embarked on board the *Scotia;* and on the 1st of July, after a tedious voyage round the Cape, during which, he notes, "the only event of importance was the freak of an ambitious young lady who would not rest satisfied until she had paid a visit to the maintop," he landed at Margate. Next day he was with his old guardian Deans in London.

At this time my father's religious convictions, growing stronger year by year, had led him to contemplate resigning his military career in favour of the Church. Eleven years of exile had made him very unwilling to return to India; and this may have influenced him to some extent in forming the idea. Moreover, he was hurt at the manner in which his services had been ignored. The results of his professional labours in Afghanistan had been appropriated without acknowledgment, and the credit assigned to others; while his absence with the army had lost him the secretaryship offered to him by Lord Auckland, and had also had the effect of throwing

him back in the Canal Department. Shortly before he left India he had found himself reduced to a salary of twelve pounds a month, and his prospect of immediate advancement seemed small. Always, I think, rather inclined to look on the dark side of life, and to chafe hotly against anything which savoured of injustice, he had been much angered and disheartened by the reception accorded to him in the Calcutta offices, and had allowed the matter to prey upon his spirits. Shortly after his return he wrote in a tone of bitterness to his brother officer Thomson, who was also in England, declaring that he was disgusted with the Company's service and heartily wished himself out of it. His desire for a clergyman's life, which had been growing on him for years, was probably strengthened by this feeling of dissatisfaction; and during the summer of 1841 he had at one time almost made up his mind to send in his papers and enter his name at Oxford. That he did not do so in the end was due partly to the influence of the then Bishop of Carlisle, a relation of his father's, who maintained that he would find the change of profession a disappointment, and partly to the fact that his religious convictions, strong as they were, were not altogether in accord with the views then considered orthodox.* Eventually the idea was reluctantly abandoned, and in September he wrote to a friend that he should remain in the army—"After examining myself I found I was unfit for so serious a charge as entering the ministry."

A few weeks later his thoughts were turned in a new direction. After some pleasant visits to friends in the country he had returned to London, and the middle of October found him in his old home in Connaught Terrace. About this time it was given out that Lord Ellenborough was to succeed Lord Auckland as Governor-General of India, and soon after my father's arrival in town he was asked to call on Lord Ellenborough, who had heard of him from Lord Fitzroy Somerset. A long conversation with the new Governor-General ended by his being asked to draw up a paper on the Punjab. Lord Ellenborough, though he cherished anticipations of a peaceful rule in India, was yet fully alive to the danger which threatened us from the side of the Sikhs, and determined to be prepared in advance. "What I want," he wrote, "is a military memoir for the Duke of Wellington, to enable me to obtain from him before I go his views as to the best mode of

* He found, I believe, a special stumbling-block in the doctrine of eternal damnation.

carrying war into that country, should I unfortunately be obliged to do so." At the same time he offered my father an appointment as Aide-de-camp on his staff.

The offer was not immediately accepted, for my father was disinclined to leave England so soon after his return, and he did not care about the appointment. Advised, however, by his friends, who knew that Lord Ellenborough had formed a very favourable opinion of his abilities, and anticipated that the chance would lead to something better, he eventually resolved "with a heavy heart" to forego the rest of his leave, and a week later he wrote to accept the offer. His memoir on the Punjab elicited a warm expression of approval from the Duke of Wellington, and proved to be exactly what was required.

Towards the close of November my father sailed for India with his chief on board the *Cambrian* frigate. The voyage was uneventful. In little more than a month they reached the Cape, where he met an old friend and fellow soldier of his father's, Sir George Napier, brother of the historian; and on the 21st of February, 1842, they were off Madras.

Here the calm of the voyage, and with it Lord Ellenborough's dreams of a peaceable rule, were destined to be rudely dispelled. As the *Cambrian* swept up to her position in the open roadstead "all were on deck, gazing at the low, burnt, forbidding aspect of the shore, and watching the various objects which the town of Madras and the battlements of Fort St. George presented to break the long line of flat coast. Curiosity was, however, quickly changed into excitement, when, after the customary signals and compliments had passed, the Madras flagstaff hastened to hoist colours, which as their import was gradually deciphered spoke of disastrous news from the North-West, and of the destruction of the British army at Cabul." The brief message was soon followed by the receipt of detailed intelligence, and before he set foot in India Lord Ellenborough knew that he had been called upon to assume the reigns of government at the height of a most formidable crisis in the history of our Indian empire.* Macnaghten was

* In a speech in the House of Lords, delivered on the 10th of August, 1860, a copy of which I found among my father's papers, Lord Ellenborough gave the following account of the incident:—"I recollect very well when I approached Madras on my way to Calcutta at the end of February, not having received any news from India since October, I asked if we were near enough to communicate with the shore. I was told we were, and I desired them to inquire whether there was any news. I took the telegraph book in my hand to take down the answer

dead, and Elphinstone's division annihilated; Ghazni was in danger; Sale was beleaguered in Jellalabad, and an attempt to relieve him had ended in calamitous failure; Pollock, at the head of a disheartened and enfeebled force, was halted in front of the Khyber, unable to advance; and fears were entertained for the safety of Nott's position at Candahar. While in the north of India and in Calcutta all was gloom and misfortune, the state of affairs in the south was far from cheering. A native regiment had mutinied at Hyderabad, and it seemed only too probable that the example would be followed by the troops at Madras. Finally, to add to Lord Ellenborough's difficulties, India was being drained of a portion of her strength by the war in China. The aspect of affairs, therefore, when the new Governor-General took charge of his office was one that might well have appalled a man of less confidence and courage; and when shortly before landing in Calcutta my father, still a lieutenant of Engineers, exchanged the appointment of Aide-de-camp for that of private secretary, he knew that hard work and stirring times were before him.*

During the remainder of the year 1842 the subject which filled all men's minds in India was the course of events in Afghanistan. There were not wanting other causes of anxiety, for setting aside the fears of mutiny among our native troops, and the war in China, —which Lord Ellenborough resolutely and vigorously pressed to a conclusion, though urged from all quarters not to part with any of his available force—a troublesome insurrection broke out in Central India, while the Sikhs and Nepalese showed signs of restlessness, and other States seemed likely enough to follow their example. But the safe extrication of our dispersed and endangered troops from their position beyond the Indus, the recovery of the soldiers and of the English officers and ladies who were prisoners in the hands of the Afghans, and the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow, were the objects which required

myself. It came, 'Yes, very distressing from the North-West, the army destroyed.' This was the first intimation I had on my arrival of the actual state of things then existing."

* The appointment was first offered to Lord Canning, who refused it; and when offered to my father it was not at once accepted. Thinking that it might be better for Lord Ellenborough to have a private secretary acquainted with the recent course of affairs, he suggested that the Governor-General should keep on Mr. Colvin of the Civil Service, who had been private secretary to Lord Auckland. But Lord Ellenborough would have nothing to say to this arrangement.

attention before all. To these objects accordingly Lord Ellenborough directed the full force of his abilities and energy; and whatever may be the opinion formed regarding some of the directions issued by him to his generals, a point upon which he has been fiercely assailed, there can be no doubt that from the time he landed in India fresh spirit was infused into the councils of Government, and into every branch of the military administration, and that within seven months of his assumption of power we had triumphantly re-occupied Cabul and vindicated the honour of our arms.

It was Lord Ellenborough's misfortune that the history of the Afghan war was written by Sir John Kaye, whose sympathies were entirely with the ruling Indian class, the Civil Service, and who is throughout the spokesman of Lord Ellenborough's bitter opponents, and his own immediate superiors, the Directors of the East India Company. By a dexterous and not very fair use of extracts from the Governor-General's correspondence, Kaye has endeavoured to show that Lord Ellenborough acted with weakness and vacillation, and that the sole credit of our successes in 1842 was due to his subordinates, who saved our honour in spite of him. This view of the case, put forward with all the eloquence of the historian's best days, has been too easily accepted. Perhaps the best answer that could be made to such an attack is the answer made by Lord Ellenborough himself when the Court of Directors brought a similar charge against him. After alluding to the exertions necessary for the assembling and equipment of an army of reserve numbering nearly forty thousand men, the Governor-General wrote to Lord Ripon, then President of the Board of Control: "The opinion of the noble Duke,* since declared in Parliament, that in the direction of the armies in Afghanistan every order I gave, whether to halt, to retreat, or to advance, was the right order to give under the circumstances known to me at the time, is, I say it with all due respect for the gentlemen of the East India Direction, sufficient to console me for the 'measured acknowledgment of my services' which, according to the measure of their military knowledge and of their justice, it was alone their intention to bestow." It would be difficult to find a more complete rejoinder. The Directors of the Honourable Company thought Lord Ellenborough's military measures entirely wrong. The Duke of Wellington thought them entirely right.

* Duke of Wellington.

There is not much room for doubt as to which authority was the better judge; and the scale is hardly to be turned by the fact that the view of the Court of Directors is the view favoured by Sir John Kaye, a popular writer, but wholly ignorant of war, and incompetent to criticise military operations, against whose supporting testimony, moreover, might be placed the general verdict of the Indian army.*

In making the foregoing remarks, however, I do not wish to imply that my father's opinions coincided on all points with those of his distinguished chief. Though I have been unable to find among his papers any discussion of Lord Ellenborough's military measures, there is good ground for supposing that he generally approved of them. But with regard to other matters he more than once disapproved, and opposed, though he could not prevent, the Governor-General's acts. The affair of the Somnath gates was an instance. Possessing, as he did, a keen sense of the ludicrous, he had seen the full danger of Lord Ellenborough's famous proclamation; and on the 22nd of March, 1843, he writes in his journal:—"The overland mail arrived. . . . . The proclamation to the Princes and Chiefs regarding the Somnath gates was a subject in England of much ridicule, and the Home Government are not pleased with it. . . . . The Despatch of the Secret Committee is an excellent one. The Duke wrote an excellent letter to Lord Ellenborough bidding him be more cautious and careful." And in other instances he did his best to keep the Governor-General from falling into mistakes which his calmer tone of thought and his Indian experience enabled him to foresee. Lord Ellenborough, however, though he was singularly tolerant of plain speaking on the part of his secretary, was not a man to be led entirely by the judgment of those about him, and my father's representations did not always meet with success.

The summer of 1842 was spent by the Governor-General at Simla, now the regular head-quarters of the Indian Government during the hot weather months, but at that time nothing more than a small collection of cottages on a fir-clad ridge of the Himalayas. Contrasted with the luxury in which an Indian Viceroy

* An examination of the charges brought against Lord Ellenborough by Sir John Kaye will be found in an Appendix to this volume. A civilian is necessarily at a disadvantage in writing upon such a question; but as Sir John Kaye was practically a civilian himself, I feel less hesitation than I should otherwise have felt in pointing out what I conceive to be the evident inaccuracy and unfairness of some of his statements.

now makes his annual progress, Lord Ellenborough's journey to Simla was a rough one. No arrangements had been made for the Governor-General's visit, which was sudden, and from Umballa to the foot of the hills my father drove him "buggy dâk." "It was great fun," he afterwards said. "The buggy was very dilapidated and broke a spring *en route*. Lord Ellenborough was in high spirits, greatly amused, and evidently enjoying all the absence of state; and the more the buggy bumped the more his spirits seemed to rise. He seemed to be struck by the manners and customs of the people, resembling so closely Biblical manners and customs. A man with a small boy and a laden ass came out of a field; he exclaimed: 'There now, there is Abraham and Isaac,' and it so happened that the man was a venerable white-bearded fellow." With Simla itself, however, Lord Ellenborough was not equally pleased. The rainy season in the Himalayas is disagreeable, and he felt, moreover, that he was too far from his work. There being then no telegraph, his orders were delayed by some days, a serious evil in critical times, and the Governor-General lost the opportunity of seeing different parts of India, which he regarded as essential. Before the close of the autumn, therefore, he had made up his mind not to return to the hills, and he never did so.*

By this time the Afghan and Chinese wars were both at an end. I have already said that on his arrival in India Lord Ellenborough had refused to let the immediate peril in the North-West interfere with the vigorous prosecution of the war in China. Far from diminishing the force prepared for this object he added to it; and at the same time he took upon himself the serious responsibility of setting aside the instructions sent to him from England for the conduct of the expedition. Thoroughly convinced that the plan of acting on the Pei-Ho against Pekin, which Her Majesty's Government had approved, was faulty and dangerous, and that the most vulnerable point was the Yang-tse-Kiang river, which enabled our force to strike at the very heart of the Chinese empire, he authorized Sir Hugh Gough to act upon this line. The result showed the correctness of his judgment, for a single season sufficed to bring the war to a completely successful close,

* Simla tradition has preserved an anecdote of his arrival which is worth noting. He reached his destination in the evening, dusty and tired with his journey up the hill, and presumably not in the best of tempers. On stepping out of his "doolee" he found himself surrounded by a number of officials, who had assembled to welcome him. The compliment was one that Lord Ellenborough had not expected or desired, and his first involuntary exclamation was, "Oh, go to the devil!"

and the summer of 1842 saw our armies triumphant from Cabul to Nankin.

In November Lord Ellenborough left Simla for Ferozepore, where the forces returning from Afghanistan were to be received by the army of reserve. There was a fine display of troops, and much festivity; and my father had an opportunity of becoming well acquainted with the chief heroes of the late campaign, notably Nott and Pollock, with whom he had for some time been in constant correspondence. He always spoke of Nott as being by far the greatest commander that the war had developed. But to him doubtless the most memorable feature of the great gathering on the Sutlej was a fact unconnected with the pomp and circumstance of war. It was here that he became engaged to his future wife, a daughter of one of the Afghan generals, Sir John McCaskill; and on the 28th of April, 1843, they were married at Meerut. Indian honeymoons are short, and by the 1st of May he was back again at his work; but from this time, for fourteen years, he enjoyed in his private life a degree of happiness which falls to the lot of few—happiness never clouded except by separation, and fully compensating him for the many trials of his public career.

During 1843 the main questions which occupied the attention of the Governor-General were the affairs of Sind and the Punjab, the trouble brewing in Gwalior, and the mutinous condition of some of our Native troops. Regarding Sind it is unnecessary to say much here. Every reader of Indian history knows how Sir Charles Napier broke the Belooch power, and how the country of the Ameers became a portion of the British empire. There was much angry discussion at the time, and afterwards, about the justice and policy of the war, and Lord Ellenborough was fiercely attacked. My father's sympathies in the matter were naturally with his chief and the Napiers, though he could see that there were faults on both sides. In a letter written some years later, he remarks that Napier's history of the conquest of Sind had erred as much in one direction as Outram's opinions had erred in the other.

Towards the close of the year the aspect of affairs in the great Native State of Gwalior became so threatening that the Governor-General left Calcutta for the North-Western Provinces in order to be near the scene of action. There was then no apprehension of serious hostilities, for the army of Sindia was believed to be worthless, and it was hoped, moreover, that it would be found possible

without the use of force to put an end to the internal troubles which had disturbed the Gwalior State since the accession of the young Maharaja nine months before. Soon after Lord Ellenborough's arrival in Agra, however, this hope came to an end. The mutinous soldiery of Gwalior were still regarded as a contemptible rabble, but it was clear that they intended to resist our interference in the concerns of the State; and on the 28th of December they met us in open fight on the field of Maharajpore. They were defeated, but after a stubborn conflict, the Mahratta artillerymen particularly fighting with desperate valour, and inflicting severe loss upon our infantry, who advanced straight upon the muzzles of their guns. Almost to a man they stood to be shot down or bayonetted in their batteries, while their foot for a time maintained a hand-to-hand struggle, and only gave way at last when the superior discipline and manœuvring power of our troops rendered further resistance hopeless. On the same day another body of the enemy was defeated at Punniar.

During the action of Maharajpore my father remained with Lord Ellenborough, who was himself for a time in the thick of the fight, and greatly distinguished himself by his coolness and courage. He has been blamed, and with some show of justice, for thrusting himself on this occasion into unnecessary danger. It is not desirable that an Indian Governor-General, especially a civilian, should participate, if he can avoid it, in the risks of actual warfare. But, as a matter of fact, Lord Ellenborough's conduct at Maharajpore was not such as fairly to deserve the censure which it has incurred. His presence on the field of battle was due to an accident. The evening before the action, when all hopes of a peaceful settlement had come to an end, Lord Ellenborough asked the Commander-in-Chief where he ought to remain, and he was told "in rear of the reserve battery." The advice was obeyed, but an unforeseen movement on the part of the enemy brought the reserve battery under fire at the very beginning of the advance, and with it the Governor-General, who was following in the grey dawn the movements of the guns. The Foreign Secretary, Currie, thereupon suggested his retirement to a safer position, which had been indicated by a staff officer, and Lord Ellenborough said, "Very good," and turned his horse in the prescribed direction. It so happened that this change of position had the effect of bringing the Governor-General into the open within 350 yards of a Mahratta battery, and the enemy's gunners, seeing at once that some one of importance was in their front, saluted the party with a shower of grape. The

thing was so sudden that my father had barely time to speak a word of warning, and to thrust his horse forward in front of the Governor-General, when the guns opened and the grape whizzed about them, knocking up the ground under their horses' feet, but fortunately doing no damage. Once in it, Lord Ellenborough's spirit was roused; and, as my father afterwards said, he "thoroughly enjoyed it and seemed utterly regardless as to danger." It was no wonder that our troops, who saw his bearing under fire, greeted him with enthusiasm, and that the supposed "indiscretion" of his conduct was not of a nature to lower his popularity with the army. His kindness to the wounded also greatly endeared him to all. He went about among them with his pockets full of gold pieces, sitting by their bedsides and cheering them up in every way that he could think of, until he was told that his words "did more good than the doctors." His distinctive title of the "Friend of the army" has brought upon him much sarcasm and censure, but it was as nobly won as it was deeply prized.*

It seemed to be my father's fate, as it was his father's, to have exceedingly narrow escapes in almost every action in which he was engaged. At Maharajpore, after Lord Ellenborough had retired to the least exposed position that could be found, my father remained for some time on horseback watching the progress of the fight. Eventually Lord Ellenborough sent a message asking him to dismount. He had just done so, and walked a couple of steps towards the tree under which the Governor-General was seated, when a round shot passed over his horse, actually grazing the leather of his saddle. He used to say with a soldier's half laughing belief in "luck" that "it was not in the family to be hit," and he had some grounds for his confidence, for few men have faced shot and steel so often at close quarters without a wound.

The victories of the 28th of December were of the utmost importance to the peace of India. Not only did they finally break the power of the Mahrattas, but they effectually checked for a

* Lord Ellenborough did much to improve the condition of the soldier in peace as well as in war. Amongst other things he made special efforts to relieve our Europeans as far as possible from the sufferings to which they were exposed by being kept in the heat of the Indian plains. Sir Henry Lawrence writes of him in the *Calcutta Review*:—"If Lord Ellenborough had done nothing else in India, he would deserve well of his country for establishing three European stations on the hills."

time the aggressive spirit of the Sikhs, who were watching the issue of our operations with much interest, and had brought together no less than 70,000 men within three marches of the Sutlej. Shortly after the close of the year, having revised our relations with the State of Gwalior, which was treated with scrupulous moderation, Lord Ellenborough returned to Calcutta.*

He was followed by bad news, for the spirit of mutiny was spreading among our Native troops in the north, and during the next few months the condition of some of the regiments in Sind was such as to impress my father with a feeling of very serious anxiety. Our Native army at that time was very much more numerous than it now is, while our European force was small, and he had long felt that the position was far from secure. On the 29th of March, 1844, he writes in his journal:—"From its superiority in numbers, and in character, the conduct of the Bengal army is of much greater importance as far as our power is concerned than the conduct of either of the other two armies. A mutiny of the Bengal troops . . . carries with it, therefore, much more of danger than a mutiny elsewhere . . . . Danger there always is in India, and very great danger too . . . . Very few men seem fully to appreciate the nature of our power in India, how easily and vitally that power may be shaken. Few are willing to envisage or to admit the fact, particularly persons who have passed their lives . . . in the civil service of the government . . . By God's will we are here, by the continuance of that will we can alone remain. The volcano has a crust over it strong enough to enable us to tread in safety over the smouldering violence beneath, so long as the power is restrained which could at any moment burst under our feet and swallow all up in general confusion and ruin." For the time the volcano remained inactive, but every one knows with what appalling suddenness and power it burst into action a few years later.

During all this time Lord Ellenborough's measures had been making him exceedingly obnoxious to the Court of Directors, and in June, 1844, Calcutta was startled by the announcement that the Court had decided upon his recall. Such a step was generally unexpected, for though it was well known that the relations existing between the Governor-General and the authorities in Leadenhall Street were becoming more and more strained, it was

* I have been told, though I am not sure of the fact, that the "Maharajpore Star," which was made from the metal of the captured guns, was designed by my father. It is one of the handsomest of our military decorations.

known also that Lord Ellenborough had the support of Her Majesty's Ministers, and few anticipated that the Directors would venture to exercise the power vested in them by law. The step, however, was taken, and a few weeks later Lord Ellenborough was succeeded by his brother-in-law, Sir Henry Hardinge, who had denounced his recall as an "outrageous proceeding," and who as one of the Ministry had approved his acts.

The following letter, written to a friend in England at this time, shows how the matter struck my father :—

"You will have judged, I have no doubt, that the news brought by the last mail would not to myself be very surprising. Of course it astounded all India, for it is inexplicable to the natives of India, of all classes, why a Governor-General successful in all that he has undertaken should be recalled by the Court of Directors in opposition to the Ministry. . . . It will puzzle the logic and ability of the residents at the different courts of Native princes how to expound the matter. . . . However, the blow is struck, and, as far as India is concerned, at a most lucky moment, for all is quiet, and bears some promise of remaining so, for which thank Heaven, as India needs peace and rest. But what she most needs, as far as our rule is concerned, is something that shall give it an air of permanence and stability. All with us is eternal constant fluctuation, inducing naturally doubt and uncertainty. A native can fix his eye upon nothing which has even that common degree of permanence and system necessary for the healthy progress of civil administration, necessary, too, for confidence in the ruling power. With us, all, from the Governor-General to the magistrate of a district, are flitting shadows, seen for a moment and then gone. India is a sort of theatre on which European functionaries perambulate. The crowd in the pit and gallery gaze, as character after character comes and goes, with much the same sort of feeling as to their permanence and reality. In India they won't even take the trouble to clap or hiss. The thing is too transient to engage them, and cannot have time to make any impression. Providence has for wise purposes not only permitted but given great success to our sway in India. By God's will we are here, and by His will alone; for the folly or timidity of one weak man, and that in no very exalted position, may any hour raise the whirlwind that shall sweep us away. This is no exaggeration, and it is no reason for fear or doubt. He who overrules equally the folly and the wisdom of men will continue to overrule them. . . . I see no reason why, judging from the past, our rule should not last another

century; at the same time I can offer no reason why it should not pass away to-morrow. I thought this before I joined Lord Ellenborough; all I have seen in the last two and a half years only confirms me in my old opinion."

In truth the sudden dismissal of the Governor-General of India by the directors of a company of merchants was a strange anomaly; and whatever the evils of party government in this country—evils which will not fail before long to make themselves grievously felt—it is fortunate that our rulers are no longer dependent for the continuance of their power upon the caprice of Leadenhall Street. There was no doubt as to the view taken of the matter by the highest authorities in England. The Duke of Wellington had throughout given Lord Ellenborough unflinching support, though with much sensible and timely advice regarding the propriety of constitutional government and conciliatory behaviour. He was now thoroughly and openly opposed to Lord Ellenborough's recall. And the unanimous feeling of Her Majesty's Ministers, to quote the words of Sir Robert Peel, was one of deep regret. Lord Ellenborough retained their "entire confidence," and they protested against his recall as "unjust and imprudent." But it must be added that the opinion of the Government was opposed to the opinion of a considerable section of the British public. Misled by the Press of India, which then in no way represented the people of India, but simply the ruling class—the civilians—whom Lord Ellenborough's measures had alienated, the English Press became for a time exceedingly unjust; Lord Ellenborough's conduct and character were made the mark of very severe attacks; and a good deal of popular feeling was aroused against him. The Court, therefore, were sure of support when they determined upon his recall.

The main reason of their hostility was not difficult to see. They attacked, it is true, his public measures; and he gave them an opening for so doing by a variety of more or less imprudent acts, and by the sarcastic and defiant tone of his letters. But the main reason lay deeper. When Lord Ellenborough landed in India the civil administration of the country was the patrimony of the directors, and afforded a rich provision for their relatives and all having interest with them. Of course the Civil Service was accordingly a favoured service. To quote Sir John Kaye:—"It had fattened upon the golden eggs, and scattered the feathers among the military. It had not only appropriated all the large salaries, and divided almost all the honours of the State, but

had on every occasion been permitted to ride roughshod over the military. The Court of Directors had especially cherished this privileged class, and Governors-General had been too prone to imitate this exaltation of one service at the expense of another. It was a just and generous thing to raise the military, too long degraded, to their right position." This Lord Ellenborough soon set about doing. When leaving India, Lord Auckland had told him that he would find a lack of instruments, but that they were to be got from the army more easily than from the Civil Service. Rightly or wrongly, Lord Ellenborough accepted this view, and, having accepted it, he proceeded fearlessly to act upon it, which Lord Auckland had shrunk from doing. Deserving soldiers were given appointments hitherto reserved for the *protégés* of the Court, and the whole interest of the Court and the Civil Service turned against him. He may have gone too far, as Kaye contends, and exalted the army unduly at the expense of the civilians; but the most moderate reforms in that direction would have been sufficient to arouse the undying hostility of the privileged class. "The selection of military men," wrote the Court, "for important offices previously held by civilians can hardly fail to impair the efficiency of the Civil Service of India." This was the head and front of Lord Ellenborough's offending, and this led to his recall. His successors, Lord Hardinge and Lord Dalhousie, were always most careful to avoid any such mistake; and they were consequently enabled to carry, without opposition, measures which in Lord Ellenborough's time would certainly have been denounced and disallowed by the authorities in Leadenhall Street.*

The distribution of patronage is perhaps the branch of a Governor-General's duties with which an Indian private secretary is, or ought to be, most visibly connected. Coming out fresh from England, or at most possessing a very much slighter experience of Indian affairs than the responsible advisers of the Governor-General, he can rarely do anything but harm by active interference with the course of public business; and such interference is viewed with considerable jealousy by the public officials

* Sir John Kaye's words cited above are taken from an article which he contributed to the *Calcutta Review* shortly after Lord Ellenborough's recall, when the events of the past few years were fresh in men's minds, and Kaye was not yet so closely connected with the Court of Directors as he afterwards became. This article, though hostile, gives a much less unfair account of Lord Ellenborough's measures than the subsequent History, and a comparison of the two is instructive. It was republished in the *Selections from the Calcutta Review* for March, 1881.

concerned.* But it is inevitable that he should be charged with the duty of weighing conflicting claims and recommendations, and of aiding his chief in the selection of men for the various appointments which may fall vacant. It will not be out of place, therefore, if I quote here a further extract from Sir John Kaye's article. He writes:—"Lord Ellenborough, it has been said, and truly said, distributed his patronage openly and honestly. Nepotism was far from him. Backstairs influences were never at work to turn his patronage into a corrupt channel. The importunities of powerful friends availed nothing, nay rather, they injured the cause of the party for whom they were employed. Interest was not spoken of as the one thing needful to success during his administration. The Governor-General . . . . . regarded the characters and qualifications of men, not their friends or their friends' friends, and determined to bestow the best appointments in his gift upon those alone whom he considered to deserve them." Sir John Kaye adds, that he was often wrong in his choice, being led into injustice by his strong personal prejudices. But the testimony I have quoted, coming from the man who has done more than any other to damage Lord Ellenborough's reputation, is valuable, both as regards Lord Ellenborough himself and as regards my father.

There was one appointment made by Lord Ellenborough to which my father always looked back with peculiar satisfaction—the selection of Thomason for the Lieutenant-Governorship of the North-Western Provinces. Knowing him of old, and highly appreciating his character and abilities, my father had endeavoured from the first to impress the Governor-General favourably in his behalf; and in September, 1843, Lord Ellenborough was anxious to nominate him to the Agra Government. The nomination, however, was opposed in Council upon the ground that Thomason was too young for such a post; and on coming out of the council

* It has been marked enough at times, and has more than once resulted in grave injury to the interests of India. I remember some years ago speaking on the subject to a former private secretary, who was known to have had great influence with his chief, and to have wielded much irresponsible power. He was probably one of the ablest and strongest men who have ever held the appointment, and his own feeling was that his position had been a completely false one. "Personally," he said, "I was delighted to pull the strings, and nothing would have pleased me better than ruling all India by myself; but it is an utterly wrong state of affairs, and a viceroy is bound to come to grief sooner or later who expects to do everything through his personal staff."

room, Lord Ellenborough seemed doubtful, and rather inclined to appoint General Nott. Such a selection was not perhaps as unsuitable at that time as it would be now, for many of the Lieutenant-Governor's duties were connected with the powerful States beyond our border; but with all his respect and liking for Nott my father thought the choice a bad one, and said so, giving his reasons. Lord Ellenborough was silent for a time, and then said, "I don't care for the Council, I will appoint Thomason." Soon afterwards the order was issued.

Lord Ellenborough's choice of a civilian for a high appointment in the political service was hardly so fortunate. He picked out Mr. Hamilton, afterwards Sir Robert, to succeed a military man in the charge of the Central India Agency; and the new agent distinguished himself shortly after his arrival by the unauthorized elevation of young Tookaji Holkar to the Chiefship of Indore with all the formalities usual in the case of an hereditary successor. This step lost Government the opportunity of marking an important line of policy in our dealings with our feudatories, for the young chief was not a lineal heir, and Lord Ellenborough had proposed to recognize his succession on certain suitable terms. Hamilton was severely censured, and the Foreign Secretary, Currie, afterwards well known both in India and at home, wrote to the Governor-General:—"It is a great pity that the only member of our service whom your Lordship has tried in a political appointment should have failed so sadly." It was a great pity, for the Civil Service did not lack men of political aptitudes.

For the rest Lord Ellenborough's administration was remarkable in more than one respect. It was a period of almost incessant war, war uniformly successful, and conferring much honour upon our armies. Lord Ellenborough has been greatly blamed for forgetting the peaceable professions with which he started for India, but it is difficult to see how he could have avoided the military undertakings which signalized his rule. So at least my father always thought, and he was as much averse from bloodshed as any man could be. He saw clearly that India needed peace and rest, and he had known enough of war to understand its horrors. "I hate war," he wrote in one of his letters about this time, "though I hope that is not incompatible with loving my profession." But he never blamed the Governor-General for the wars which were forced upon him.

Lord Ellenborough introduced something like system into the routine of Indian public business, which had previously been

carried on in a strangely primitive and cumbrous manner,* calculated to throw an impossible amount of work upon the Governor-General in Council; and he left the finances of the country in a greatly improved condition.† He was, perhaps, the first Governor-General who fully realized the position in which the British Government now stands towards the Native States of India. Averse from wholesale annexation, as he showed in the cases of Gwalior and Indore, both of which States afforded him opportunities which Lord Dalhousie would hardly have allowed to pass, he was yet determined that our supremacy should be understood and respected by all, and that the Native States should for the future submit to such a measure of control as might be necessary for the general order and welfare of the Empire. Clearly perceiving that the doctrines of European international law were not applicable in their entirety to our relations with those States, he refused to permit gross misgovernment or disorder in any principality within our external frontier. "The British Government," he wrote in 1843, "has now for many years assumed the rights and performed the obligations of the paramount power in India within the Sutlej . . . . . It matters not whether our position . . . . . has been forced upon us by circumstances, or has been the settled object of our arms and policy. We, of the present day, must maintain what we find established; for to recede from that position once acquired would be to draw upon ourselves the hostility of many States, and to shake the confidence of all in the continuance of our military preponderance, by which alone all we have was won and can be preserved. Nor, while by receding from that position, we endangered our own existence, should we fail to bring upon all the States now dependent upon us the most afflicting calamities. The withdrawal of our restraining hand would let loose all the elements of confusion. Redress for the daily recurring grievances of the

* Until then almost every paper received in the several Government offices used to be submitted without any sort of preparation direct to the Governor-General and the members of Council. The germ of our present system of office work, so far as the Government of India is concerned, lies in the following order of Lord Ellenborough's dated the 4th of March, 1842:—"The several secretaries will in future attach a short memorandum stating the principal facts contained in the collection to each set of papers transmitted; and in the margin of such memorandum note the number of the document and the paragraph on which the statement of facts rests."

† My father was nominated secretary to a financial committee appointed by him in 1843, and in this capacity had an opportunity of gaining some knowledge of financial matters, in which he afterwards took great interest.

several States against each other would again be sought, not from the superintending justice of the British Government, but from the armed reprisals of the injured; and bad ambition, availing itself of the love of plunder and of war, which pervades so large a portion of the population of India, would again expose to devastation countries which under our protection have enjoyed many of the advantages of peace. To maintain, therefore, unimpaired the position we now hold, is a duty not to ourselves alone but to humanity."

This is the principle which underlies all our dealings with our feudatories, but it was never, I think, clearly recognized and enunciated until this time.

But Lord Ellenborough went farther than this. He was the first who put a stop to the custom by which our Governors-General were required to present the "nuzzur" of homage to the Delhi emperor; and it is a curious fact that in 1842 he contemplated the transfer of the imperial title, which took place thirty-five years later under the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton. The following are extracts from a letter written by him in 1842 to Lord Wellesley, which was never sent, but a copy of which he gave to my father. It is, I think, interesting as foreshadowing the policy of future years and future rulers on more than one point:—

"From the camp of the army of reserve I shall, after reviewing that army and those returning from Cabul, together 36,000 men, in the presence of all the Punjab sirdars and all the protected Sikhs, move my own camp to Delhi and remain there two or three weeks.

"I entertain the desire rather than the immediate design of inducing the Delhi family to leave the palace there, and ultimately to depose the Imperial title, with the view of placing it by the voluntary offer of the princes and chiefs of India upon the head of the Queen. The palace at Delhi I would make at once a fortress and a palace. It would be the residence of the Governor-General when in the upper provinces.

"It appears to me to be necessary to look forward a little, and to consider under what system of government we can best preserve the empire we have won. My impression is that it is expedient to give to these Native princes a natural relation to the head of the government. They are at present in a false position, which is constantly filling them with alarm. I look forward to being able, if I had the Native princes in their true position, to obtain several concessions which it is in vain to hope for now.

"The first would be the entire freedom of internal trade; the second the establishment of one uniform currency."

Among Lord Ellenborough's letters to the Queen, published by Lord Colchester, is one upon the same subject; and I quote it here, at the risk of some repetition, as an indication of the principles upon which Lord Ellenborough desired to treat Native States and the people of India:—"The Governor-General," he wrote, "is now on his march to Delhi, where a force of 7,000 men will be assembled, in the midst of which he will receive several of the chiefs of Rajputana, and the Mussulman feudatories who reside near the ancient seat of imperial government.

"The recollections of the imperial authority, now practically transferred to the British Government, will thus be in a manner revived; but Lord Ellenborough cannot but feel that the anomalous and unintelligible position of the local government of India excites great practical difficulties in our relations with native chiefs, who in an empire like ours have no natural place, and must be continually in apprehension of some design to invade their rights and to appropriate their territories. All these difficulties would be removed were Your Majesty to become the nominal head of the empire. The princes and chiefs of India would be proud of their position as the feudatories of an empress; and some judicious measures calculated to gratify the feelings of a sensitive race, as well as to inspire just confidence in the intentions of their sovereign, would make the hereditary leaders of this great people cordially co-operate with the British Government in measures for the improvement of their subjects and of their dominions.

"Lord Ellenborough can see no limit to the future prosperity of India if it be governed with due respect for the feelings, and even the prejudices, and with a careful regard for the interests, of the people, with the resolution to make *their* well-being the chief object of the government, and not the pecuniary advantage of the nation of strangers to which Providence has committed the rule of this distant empire."

I do not know by what means the "voluntary offer" of the imperial title would have been brought about; but in all probability when the time came this would not have been regarded as an essential condition of its transfer; and in any case the removal of the Delhi family from the scene of their former power and greatness would have been, if practicable without indignity and wrong, an undoubted benefit to our rule. The presence of a Mogul emperor in Delhi fifteen years later doubled the danger of

the sepoy mutiny by supplying our enemies with a head and the semblance of a great national cause.

I have quoted above a letter from Lord Ellenborough to Lord Wellesley. Before closing this chapter I cannot refrain from quoting a letter from Lord Wellesley to Lord Ellenborough, some passages of which Lord Ellenborough wrote out and gave to my father. They ran as follows:—"I always considered the honour of the troops acting under me as my own. I viewed their interests in the same light; and I think those gallant men, whose memories I must for ever venerate and love, really returned my sentiments, and that part of their ardour on service was to be ascribed to their confidence in my gratitude and affection." . . . . . "I confess I loved (that is not an expression of sufficient strength), I *adored*, that army which in the execution of my orders had raised my name to such an eminence of glory, and had so much extended and strengthened the empire of my country." The letter from which these extracts are taken my father read out to Lord Ellenborough, remarking, as he put it down, that it seemed to him "like the last flare of the candle in its socket." The next mail they heard that the great Marquis was dead.

On the 1st of August Lord Ellenborough embarked for England. My father had applied for leave to accompany him as far as Suez; but this was refused; and he parted from his chief on board the *Tenasserim* a little below Calcutta. "I wished to have said a few words," he writes in his journal, "but could not. In shaking hands with me he said 'God bless you. I wish you all happiness and success.' It took a few minutes before I recovered myself and could speak to any one. Nobody, however, observed this."

So ended my father's official connection with Lord Ellenborough, a man who, whatever his faults and errors of judgment, was one of the ablest among the many able men who have ruled India on behalf of the British nation. The two years spent upon his staff were of service to my father in many respects. The private secretaryship is perhaps the position of all in which a man enjoys the best opportunities of seeing from the inside the working of the whole machinery of our Indian Government. It is, moreover, a position of much interest, especially in stirring times; and it gives a man what is always useful in after life to an Indian officer, a personal knowledge of different parts of the country, and of all the principal actors on the Indian stage. At the same time my father did not fail to suffer considerably from the connection. The secretaryship had until Lord Ellenborough's time been re-

garded as one of the prerogatives of the civil service; and Lord Ellenborough's selection of a military officer for so lucrative* and important a place gave great offence, a feeling which his subsequent measures did not tend to allay. In particular, finding that some of his leading officials were unable, or unwilling, to keep silence upon important questions, even where secrecy was most essential, the Governor-General more than once withheld from them information which under ordinary circumstances they would have received. This was of course bitterly resented, and my father, whom he trusted implicitly, was thus brought by no will of his own into relations of personal antagonism with several men who afterwards rose to positions of power and distinction. He saw clearly enough the danger, both to himself and his chief, of the existence of such relations between the Governor-General and the heads of departments, and he did his best to induce Lord Ellenborough to avoid as far as possible measures savouring of want of confidence. But he could not always succeed, and he afterwards suffered severely for his participation in these and other acts of Lord Ellenborough's, being regarded, and doubtless with some reason, as specially responsible for the manner in which, during Lord Ellenborough's administration, the army was favoured at the expense of the civil service.

My father's personal connection with his old chief continued to the end of his life. During his tenure of the secretaryship he had refused in succession several desirable appointments which the Governor-General wished him to take up. Amongst others, fearing to compromise Lord Ellenborough's reputation, he declined the political agency on the north-west frontier, then perhaps the most responsible appointment under the Government of India, which for a lieutenant of Engineers would have been an unprecedented distinction. Lord Ellenborough appreciated the motives which influenced him in this decision, and a warm personal friendship sprang up between them which was never interrupted. Many scores of letters written by Lord Ellenborough in the course of the five-and-twenty years which elapsed between his recall and his death remain among my father's papers; and they serve to show his character in a very different light from that in which it has too often been represented. A scholar and a gentleman, full of warm and generous impulses, of patriotism, and of soldierly feeling, Lord Ellenborough could not fail to be honoured and loved by those who

* The pay was then about £4,000 a year.

really knew him, and whom he trusted. He was, perhaps, unduly self-sufficient; and the fervency of his imagination led him at times into errors of judgment, and exposed him to the derision of men infinitely his inferiors. But Lord Ellenborough's faults were those of a fine character, wholly free from cowardice or hypocrisy. His spirit remained the same to the end, and in 1870 when his health was failing, and his voice was no longer audible in the House of Lords, he wrote to my father:—

"We have allowed the Russians to get into the position from which Alexander and Mahomedan conquerors made their spring upon India, and depend upon it they will make their spring whenever there is a good opportunity. If I were thirty years younger I should like to be there to meet them." "As it is," he adds, "I am in my eightieth year, but I hope I may be allowed to live to shake you by the hand once more." He never did so, and this letter is one of the last expressions of a friendship which, considering the difference of circumstances and position, was singularly close and enduring, and did credit to the warmth of feeling and constancy of a man who was described by his enemies—and his imperious character had made him many enemies—as wholly vain and fickle and selfish.

## CHAPTER V.

### 1844—1849.

Appointed Commissioner of Tenasserim—George Broadfoot—Work on Tenasserim Coast—Sir Herbert Maddock—Difficulties of position in Moulmein—War with the Sikhs—Troubles in connection with the Burmese Teak forests and conduct of the Moulmein Assistants—Proceedings disapproved by Bengal Government—Removed from Commissionership—Attacks of the Press—Dr. Duff—Vincent Eyre—Lord Hardinge—Offered the post of Chief Engineer at Lahore—Sails for England—Regret in Moulmein at his Departure—Judson and the American Missionaries—Appeal to the Court of Directors—Sir John Hobhouse—Begins to write a History of the Afghan War—Disturbances in the Punjab—Returns to India—Ordered to join the Army on the Chenab.

IMMEDIATELY after the news of Lord Ellenborough's recall had become known, Mr. Thomason, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, offered my father the charge of the Ganges canals, then about to fall vacant. "I trust," he wrote, "that some high office awaits you, and shall the more rejoice the higher it is. But if you determine on returning to the proper duties of your profession, I should be sorry if silence on my part should cause you to forget how highly your talents and your exertions will be prized in one of the most difficult and important engineering works now in course of construction." At the time, however, it did not suit my father to take up this appointment, as he had applied for leave to accompany Lord Ellenborough; and soon afterwards, his application having been refused, he was offered by Lord Hardinge the post of Commissioner on the Tenasserim coast.

The charge of our Burmese province was not then what it is now; for our possessions in that part of the world included only the districts acquired eighteen years before by the treaty of Yandabu. But the Tenasserim commissionership was nevertheless an important and onerous charge, involving the management of our relations with the Court of Mandalay, and the administrative control of a large and difficult tract of country. From north to

south the province was some 500 miles in length, with a breadth varying from 40 to 80 miles, and though thinly peopled, it contained a variety of different races whose peculiar customs and circumstances required careful study. My father, who was still only a very junior captain in his corps, accepted the offer with gratification; and in the middle of September he took over charge at Moulmein from his old friend George Broadfoot, the hero of the "Illustrious Garrison" of Jellalabad, who had been appointed to the agency on the north-west frontier. His arrival was entirely unexpected, and at first Broadfoot, who had passed through rather a stormy time in Burmah, thought matters had gone against him. "Well, Durand," he said, after the first greetings had been exchanged, "what brings you here?" "I have come to relieve you." "The devil you have. Why, what is the matter?" The state of the case was soon explained, and Broadfoot, who had suffered much in health from the Burmese climate, was delighted at his transfer to the north-west agency, then the finest political appointment in India.

My father found Tenasserim in an extremely backward condition. Broadfoot had since his appointment to the commissionership in 1842 thrown himself with characteristic energy into the work of improvement, and had done a good deal towards rooting out some of the prevailing abuses. Corruption was no longer open and unchecked among the Native officials, and some attempts, not altogether well directed, had been made towards a fairer and more satisfactory assessment of the land revenue. But Broadfoot's energetic rule had been short; and almost everything remained to be done. The administration of justice was thoroughly unsatisfactory; the few European officers in the province knew nothing of the country or its people; and there was little disposition to respond to any measures for their benefit. Such was the universal ignorance of the language that Judson, the missionary, who was the best Burmese scholar of the day, assured my father there was not a single officer in the country capable of translating a few sentences of English into the vernacular. Letters sent to the Burmese authorities were, he said, usually unintelligible. When a letter was received, the native messenger was interrogated as to its purport; and the Burmese proceeded to take action upon his reply.

At the same time the Court of Mandalay were threatening the Siamese provinces adjoining our border, and the movements of their troops gave serious cause for anxiety.

My father's first desire was to obtain some personal knowledge of the province and of its inhabitants; and after a short time spent in Moulmein he started for a tour of inspection. The march was an exceedingly difficult one, for there were no roads, and where water communication ceased it was, as a rule, necessary to cut a pathway day after day through dense forest. The people, moreover, unaccustomed to the visits of Europeans, were wild and shy; supplies were difficult to obtain; the climate even at this season was oppressively hot; and fever was prevalent. At the end of the "cold weather," however, my father had gained, chiefly by the aid of the missionaries, who acted in these wild tracts as the pioneers of civilization, some valuable experience of the customs and circumstances of the people; and he was hard at work upon their languages, which included not only Burmese but other equally difficult tongues. The bulk of the population were, in fact, not Burmese but Talain, and amongst the other tribes with which my father had to deal were the Karens and the Toungthoos, both entirely separate in language and habits from each other and from the Burmese and Talain. Under these circumstances he saw that the task of bringing the province into order must be a hard and protracted one, but it was the more interesting on that account; and, full of youth and energy, he set to work upon this entirely new field as only a young man could have done. His marriage had proved intensely happy, and the beginning of 1845 found him contented beyond measure, praising God for all the blessings vouchsafed to him, and rejoicing in the wide career of usefulness which had been opened to his labours. Almost the only matter which troubled him at this time was his anxiety for the success of Lord Ellenborough, who had been somewhat disappointed by his reception in England, and wrote strongly about the change which had come over the state of affairs. One of Lord Ellenborough's letters received in the course of this year has always seemed to me characteristic in its chivalrous devotion to his great master, the Duke of Wellington. "I walked home with the Duke," he writes, "on the last day of the session. He is original, acute, and vigorous as ever in mind, but outwardly he looks shaken and old. I have a presentiment that he will not attend the House next year. I can hardly wish him to do so, for it is painful to see him generally leave the lead to Lord Stanley, and yet more painful to one devoted to him as I am to hear the remarks made upon him by his colleagues when he does speak. They rely upon his deafness, and forget that those who sit behind him are not deaf too. I have con-

sequently changed my place which I usually occupied behind the Duke." This letter called forth an indignant answer, as it well might do. I have cited it here because it illustrates the side of Lord Ellenborough's character which was least shown to the world, and which endeared him to those who really knew him.

My father's prosperity did not last long. In the summer of 1845 the aspect of affairs on the Sikh frontier became so threatening that Lord Hardinge left Calcutta for the Upper Provinces, and from the time of his departure difficulties began to arise in the working of the Burmese commissionership. Until then my father had received the necessary support in his measures of reform, and had gained the marked approbation of Government by his dealings with the Court of Mandalay, and in other matters. From the day that the Governor-General's hand was removed, he began to meet with opposition and censure on the part of his superiors, and the year 1845 was destined to be for him the commencement of a long course of disappointment and supersession which embittered the rest of his life, and effectually ruined his prospects of advancement in his career.

It is always disagreeable and difficult in a work like the present to enter into the story of a man's differences with those in authority over him. To most readers such a story can have little interest; and the natural conclusion when differences end in censure and degradation is that censure and degradation were probably not undeserved. Accusations of injustice and persecution brought against officials in high place are apt to be regarded, and rightly so, with something more than suspicion. The presumption is all against a man who is declared unfit for an appointment, and removed from it; and the world will not believe in a conspiracy to ruin him. Nevertheless it must be allowed that wrong is sometimes inflicted; that a body of men in authority may occasionally be led to view the conduct of an officer with prejudice and unmerited disfavour, and to treat him in consequence with cruel injustice. Indeed, it is probable that few public officers pass through their career without being at one time or another more or less misrepresented and misjudged. That my father was at this time misrepresented and misjudged to a very unusual degree is, I think, beyond dispute; and in writing an account of his life it is not possible to avoid some mention of a matter which exercised so important an influence upon his prospects and character. As an illustration of what could be done in the "good old days" of the Company's rule in India, the story may not perhaps be altogether devoid of interest.

When Lord Hardinge started for the northern provinces, he handed over the government of Bengal to Sir Herbert Maddock, of the civil service, who became also president of the Governor-General's Council. Unhappily my father's relations with the deputy-governor were the reverse of cordial. I have already remarked that some of the leading officials had been treated during Lord Ellenborough's administration in a manner savouring of mistrust. This was especially the case with Maddock, who, when Lord Ellenborough arrived in India, was holding the position of Foreign Secretary. It was said that Maddock had more than once divulged important information which he should have kept secret; and further, that he had not hesitated to work in private correspondence against the Governor-General's orders. Under these circumstances Lord Ellenborough withdrew all confidence from him; and on one occasion, when sending specially secret instructions to General Nott, entrusted their transmission to the private secretary, leaving the Foreign Office in ignorance of the whole affair until there was no danger to be apprehended from any unauthorized disclosures. This action led, naturally enough, to a very disagreeable correspondence, in the course of which Maddock tendered and then withdrew his resignation; and my father, who had simply obeyed orders in the matter, was ever afterwards regarded by him with feelings of hostility, which he took little pains to hide.

In his position as deputy-governor of Bengal Maddock had the immediate control of the Tenasserim commissionership; and the Governor-General, being at a distance, and engrossed by the approaching conflict with the Sikhs, was little likely to interfere in ordinary matters with any action taken by his council at headquarters. In fact, as my father wrote, the secretaries governed India; and he knew that under these circumstances his position was likely to be a dangerous one. "However right," he wrote to Lord Ellenborough, "I shall feel neither confidence nor security under Sir Herbert Maddock's rule, for if he can seize any occasion to annoy or discredit me, he will. Nevertheless, this shall make no difference with me, I shall hold on my course without fear or favour, *coûte que coûte.*" He did so, but it cost him dear. It would be impossible to enter here in detail into the matters which the deputy-governor saw fit to take up against him, but he found himself harassed by a series of petty annoyances calculated to lower his position and impair his usefulness. His orders to his subordinates were reversed on private letters from themselves to

the Calcutta officials, which he had no opportunity of meeting; anonymous paragraphs in local newspapers were brought in evidence against him; and in many other ways he was subjected to the kind of covert persecution which a powerful superior can so easily inflict. Of course the discontented party in Moulmein were not slow to take advantage of their opportunity. Some of my father's measures of reform had necessarily been opposed to the interests of a portion of the mercantile and official community, and a regular cabal was soon formed against him. This was led by an officer who had conceived himself superseded by my father's appointment to the commissionership, and by another official whose connection with the management of a newspaper, surreptitiously continued against the orders of Government and in defiance of a distinct promise to the contrary, my father had been obliged to stop. The press in Moulmein was steadily worked against him, and its misstatements were taken up in Calcutta, where the official in question had also a press connection. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that he found his authority thwarted in all directions, and that he soon realised the impossibility of continuing to administer successfully a province in which the adverse opinion of his immediate superior and the certainty of his removal when opportunity should occur, formed the common topic of conversation.

Such was the state of affairs when, in the beginning of 1846, news arrived at Moulmein of the fighting in the North-West, and of the fearful losses suffered by our troops in their conflicts with the Khalsa army.

My father had long regarded a Sikh war as certain and imminent; and in view to possible eventualities he had, soon after his arrival in Burmah, drawn together the detachments of European troops scattered along the coast and kept them under his own eye in Moulmein. In May, 1845, he had written to inform the Governor-General that the whole of the European regiment, and one of the two Native regiments, which formed the garrison of his charge, could be withdrawn at any moment if required. At the time it was thought both in Moulmein and in Calcutta that he was running a serious risk in thus stripping Tenasserim of troops, and he was informed that their being required was very improbable; but the offer was not forgotten. On the 18th of January, 1846, he received an urgent order from Calcutta for the immediate despatch of the Europeans, and within three days the whole were at sea. The second Native regiment was also withdrawn.

The letter conveying this order conveyed also the intelligence that some thirty Queen's officers, and a large number of Company's officers, had been killed in the late battles, and that in all 1,700 Europeans had been killed or wounded. Soon afterwards he learned that he had to deplore the loss of many of his own friends. Broadfoot had fallen at Feroz Shah, the last of three gallant brothers killed in the Company's service. Sir John McCaskill had closed a long and honourable career by a soldier's death. Somerset, a son of Lord Fitzroy's, who had come out with Lord Ellenborough, and had been badly wounded at Maharajpore, was also among the slain. And several others whom he had known and cared for had gone down before the Sikh guns. Their death, and that of the hundreds of brave men who died with them, he held to have been wholly unnecessary and due to culpable shortsightedness. "I consider the present loss," he wrote to Lord Ellenborough, "as a pure sacrifice to the press, a sacrifice which it is *a disgrace* to have incurred in the manner we have,—not to the soldiers, whose hardy valour has overruled, under the favour of God, the gross errors of their rulers; their honour stands the more untarnished as British soldiers from the very errors which have cost so much blood,—but it is a disgrace that with such an army as that which might and ought to have been in readiness to repel invasion, the Sikhs should have been allowed to effect entirely unmolested the passage of the Sutlej, form an entrenched camp, and boldly, though not very skilfully, attack our dispersed forces. . . . . Nothing short of a pusillanimous deference to the press could have induced such absolute negligence of all reasonable precaution as has characterized our proceedings on the frontier. Thomason and Dorin have their money well forward and in hand, but all else is *nowhere* . . . . . The press, which in fact was the cause of the present posture of affairs, is now beginning to wheel round, and to talk of bad management, serious errors, &c., &c. The *Friend of India*, Your Lordship's most bitter opponent, and ablest of the press, confesses the wisdom of your policy in destroying the Gwalior army; and others go further. Every military man whom I meet broaches the subject of the war with 'matters would have been very different had Lord Ellenborough been here.' I listen but say nothing, and content myself with wishing that for the honour of our arms you had been here.*

* In a later letter he writes :—"My correspondents still harp on the deafening roar with which your name, as a toast, was received at Ferozepore, cutting short all oratorial flourish and showing that the officers drank it with a will."

. . . . . The fact is that this victory has had none of the results of a victory, but the contrary. It amuses me to hear people speak in the customary Calcutta croak. Some call it a terrible disaster, and all give Burleigh-like shakes of the head. You would think the empire in imminent peril, and the odds against us great. Melancholy it is that a Governor-General and a Commander-in-Chief should be sitting in their present state of checkmate at Ferozepore, awaiting guns, ammunition, provisions, stores of all kinds, and that madman (so the people here now designate him) Sir Charles Napier; but matters after all never mend by long faces."

This letter was written from Calcutta, where, on hearing the news of our losses, he had accompanied the troops sent from Burmah. He had made no application to be relieved of his charge, but there seemed to be a good opportunity of getting out of a position which he felt he could not hold much longer; and knowing the paucity of engineer officers available for operations in the field, he had thought it his duty to place himself where his services could, if required, be immediately utilized. On arrival in Calcutta, he reported his presence to the Governor of Bengal, and intimated his readiness to return to Moulmein, or go up to the front, as Sir Herbert Maddock might decide. Somewhat to his surprise he was severely censured for this step, and ordered to return at once. He had left all perfectly quiet in Burmah, so that a few days' absence from Moulmein could do no harm, and in the time of his predecessors it had been understood that the trip might be made without objection, though there had been in their case no such special reason as he could show. Moreover, he had thought it probable that Maddock would be glad of the opportunity of making, at once, and without any difficulty, the change which he was known to be contemplating. Finding, however, that this was not the case, my father returned to his charge, and was soon again at work in Moulmein.

Not many months after his return the final trouble came. The teak forests of Burmah are of great value, and at this time they were being shamefully abused by the agents of certain mercantile firms which had hitherto enjoyed the privilege of supplying timber to the Admiralty. Among these firms the principal one was a large agency house in Calcutta, which then enjoyed a high reputation, and had great influence with some of the leading men in India and with the Court of Directors. There was at the time a good deal of speculation going on among the Calcutta officials; and

many of the highest among them had become seriously embarrassed. The great agency houses, therefore, wielded a power which was not to be despised. Unfortunately it was the house referred to which came most prominently before my father's Court for breach of forest laws. Against such an adversary he had no chance. The agents of the firm in Burmah were convicted by the Conservator of Forests of wanton destruction of timber, and a portion of the forests held by them was resumed; but such was the influence of the firm in Calcutta, that while the case was under inquiry before the Commissioner's Court, a peremptory order was issued by the Deputy-Governor, upon their *ex parte* statement, directing the restoration of the forests. When this order reached him my father had already ordered the restoration, finding that the Conservator's action was technically incorrect, the penalty clause of the forest rules having some time before been temporarily suspended. But this was at the time unknown to Sir Herbert Maddock, and the order was a most improper one. The chief cause of trouble, however, arose from the fact that while Lord Ellenborough was at the head of the Admiralty, my father received orders through the Government of India, directing him to make arrangements for the supply of Her Majesty's navy with teak. He entrusted the duty to the officer in charge of the Commissariat Department on the coast, who entered upon it with so much energy and success that he soon obtained complete command of the market, and was able to supply the timber at little more than half the former price. Of course this was a serious blow to the commercial firms, and created much jealousy. Captain Rowlandson was opposed and obstructed in every way; and he became the mark for gross abuse and attacks in the Moulmein press, which were taken up by the papers in India. Eventually, an anonymous paragraph, full of disgraceful insinuations, having attracted the attention of the Deputy-Governor, who had meanwhile ordered the discontinuance of all purchases on behalf of Government, Captain Rowlandson lodged a criminal charge against the editor of the newspaper in which it had appeared. About the same time Captain Rowlandson brought a criminal charge against a person of the name of Lenaine for fraudulent conduct in timber transactions.

Neither of these cases came in the first instance before my father's Court. The editor's case was sent up to his Court because the magistrate who tried it found that it was beyond his own competence, and that therefore it must be committed for trial

before the Commissioner. Lenaine's case was called up into the Commissioner's Court in consequence of an apparently well-founded complaint lodged by the prosecutor to the effect that the trial was being conducted by the subordinate Court in an unfair and improper manner.

Out of the latter case arose a third, for it appeared that while the trial was going on, the defendant Lenaine had endeavoured to induce one of my father's assistants to influence in his favour the magistrate who was dealing with the case, and that some communication calculated to serve this purpose had in fact passed between the two officers. Captain Rowlandson therefore charged them both with conduct subversive of justice, and much against his wishes my father was compelled to hold an investigation into their proceedings. He endeavoured at first to avoid the scandal of a public enquiry by calling upon both officers to state in writing what communications had passed between them in regard to the case, but the replies were so unsatisfactory that in the end the matter had to be taken up, and a very disagreeable enquiry ensued. To my father it was the more disagreeable from the fact that one of the accused officers was a close personal friend of his wife's family; but he felt it his duty to set aside all such considerations, and also to avoid any appearance of partiality in favour of his own subordinates. They were, therefore, called upon to face their accuser in person.

The result was that, as regards the first case, the editor was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and fine. As regards the second, the man Lenaine was convicted of feloniously abstracting Government timber, and also sentenced to punishment. As regards the third, the two magistrates concerned were held to have shown a want of official probity, and were suspended pending the orders of the Bengal Government.

The editor thereupon appealed to the Calcutta Sudder Court; and at the same time addressed a petition direct to Sir Herbert Maddock, requesting his interference. On receipt of this petition, which was grossly untrue in its statements, the Deputy-Governor at once, and in entire ignorance of the merits of the case, then in appeal before a judicial tribunal, directed the suspension of the sentence and the release of the prisoner.

Lenaine also appealed to the Sudder Court, and simultaneously sent a petition to the Deputy-Governor.

When these two cases came before the Calcutta judges, it was ruled that the Court could not receive them in appeal. The

Deputy-Governor then requested that the Court would report on the cases without trying the appeals. Upon this much difference of opinion arose, but in the end the majority on one ground or another reported against the legality of the conviction in both cases, and thus upheld the judgment of the Deputy-Governor, who had already cast the weight of the Government without stay or hesitation against my father's proceedings. Counsel in England afterwards gave opinions opposed to this decision, commenting in no measured terms upon the verdict of the majority of the Calcutta Court; but for the time the Deputy-Governor found himself supported in his views by high legal authority, and his hands were of course greatly strengthened thereby. As regards the two suspended magistrates, the Deputy-Governor at once cancelled their suspension, pronounced that not the smallest impeachment rested upon their character, and condemned the investigation into their conduct as an act of official indiscretion.

Soon afterwards my father learnt that he was to be relieved of his charge. A letter from the Bengal Government informed him that the Deputy-Governor had been "constrained to represent to the supreme Government" the necessity for his removal. The letter went on as follows:—"The Hon'ble the President in Council has now . . . . . replied to the reference thus made to him, and has expressed his decided concurrence in the opinion of the Hon'ble the Deputy-Governor of Bengal." When it is remembered that these two honourable functionaries were one and the same, and that Sir Herbert Maddock as President in Council decidedly concurred with Sir Herbert Maddock as Deputy-Governor, it is difficult to regard the whole transaction, scandalous as it was, without a feeling of amusement. The "council" consisted of one civilian member, the Commander-in-Chief and the military member being absent. To my father, however, the matter was sufficiently serious. The farce was solemnly gone through, and he was removed from his lucrative and honourable appointment. For many months past it had been believed on the Tenasserim coast that he would infallibly be removed sooner or later by the Government of Bengal and replaced by Mr. John Colvin of the Civil Service; and Sir George Pollock, who was then Commander-in-Chief, had openly expressed his conviction that this was intended. There was, therefore, no surprise when the appointment was made. About the end of the year Mr. Colvin arrived, and my father handed over charge and sailed for Calcutta.

In the meantime he had for months been violently assailed by the Indian press, misled as to the facts of the case, and roused to indignation by his stern treatment of the Moulmein editor. At that time there was no reading public in India except the official public; and the press, as I have before remarked, represented not the people of India but men in office there. In the present instance the attack was led by the *Friend of India*, a cleverly-written paper, which was the organ of the Bengal Secretariat, and had been Lord Ellenborough's chief opponent. It carried weight, both from its ability and well-known official connection, and from the fact that it had originally been started by the three celebrated missionaries, Carey, Marshman, and Ward, under whose management it had been a conscientious and valuable public print. The editor of this paper denominated my father the "Jeffreys of India." Its columns contained, issue after issue, a string of denunciations and calumnies, and a very strong feeling was excited both in official circles and among the lesser newspapers, who for the time joined with one accord in condemning my father's conduct. He took the abuse heaped upon him without saying a word in his own defence. There was only one monthly mail between Calcutta and the Tenasserim coast, so that it was impossible to contradict any mis-statements for weeks after they had been put forward; and, moreover, he was disinclined to take up his pen with such an object. After some time, however, the storm was suddenly checked by the spontaneous efforts of two men who stepped forward to help him—Dr. Duff and Vincent Eyre of the Artillery. Duff had then become the editor of the *Calcutta Review*, and had good opportunities in other ways of bringing facts to light. Feeling sure from what he remembered of my father on board the *Lady Holland* that some of the personal charges brought against him must be false, Duff wrote to friends in Moulmein for correct information, and was soon satisfied that his suspicions had fallen very far short of the truth. Though at the time he had no personal acquaintance with my father, he at once took up the defence of a man whom he believed to be unrighteously persecuted; and the high reputation which he had acquired by sixteen years of devoted labour in the cause of Christianity made it impossible that his voice should not be listened to. In process of time his indignant remonstrances, and the accuracy of his information, produced their effect upon the tone of the press. Vincent Eyre also struck in with characteristic energy. At a time when he was under a cloud as one of the

Cabul prisoners, my father had stood up for him in public and in private, insisting upon it that the young Artilleryman had done his duty nobly, and that if all had been equally gallant and resolute, we should not have had to mourn the loss of our army and our honour. Now that his reputation was clear from all stain, Eyre remembered the generous support he had received, and came forward with offers of help. "You have been unjust to yourself," he wrote, "in despising the strictures of the press, which no public man, however elevated his rank, character, and position, can afford to do with impunity. If, on the one hand, the press is often through misinformation and the malevolence of parties guilty of injustice, it as frequently acts as a check on the injustice of Governments." Accordingly he also set to work to expose the mis-statements which had obtained circulation; and though in the meantime my father's official character had greatly suffered, the further dissemination of the mischief was sensibly arrested. Nevertheless, the subject continued to agitate the Indian press for months to come. In August, 1847, Dr. Duff wrote to my father:—"The spirit of hostility towards you here is so inveterate and desperate as to amount to a perfect mania . . . . . Sincerely do I sympathize with you and your family. I never knew a more decided case of victimizing. But the Lord, in whom you have trusted, will yet deliver you to the confusion of your enemies. Even if there had been errors of judgment, which yet remain to be shown, the straightforward integrity of your motives, so transparent throughout, ought to have sheltered you." . . . . . He writes again in the following November:—"There is a spirit of singular and desperate determination against you and your claims in high quarters. Nevertheless, the truth will in the end prevail." Many years afterwards the *Friend of India*, the leader of the crusade against him, referred to the matter in the following words:—"Moulmein affairs raised a great storm in the press and in Calcutta circles in 1846–47. We have carefully read every word on either side of the dispute, and have come to the conclusion that, except in decreeing an excessive fine in the case of the most scurrilous and unprincipled paper that India has ever seen, Captain Durand did his duty with the same wisdom and more than the courage which he showed at the Cabul Gate of Ghazni."*

* In an article upon Lord Hardinge's administration, contributed to the *Calcutta Review* in 1847, Sir Henry Lawrence briefly referred to my father's appointment; and I cannot refrain from quoting his testimony. "Captain Durand," he wrote,

26385

I have already said that the Governor-General had had nothing to do with my father's recall. When my father proposed to appeal to him against the censures of the Bengal Government, Sir Herbert Maddock refused to forward the representation, declaring that an appeal could only lie to the Court of Directors, though it is to be remarked that at the same time he was endeavouring, upon a representation of his own, to secure the Governor-General's concurrence in his measures. The following letter, written a few months afterwards by Lord Hardinge, will show the view which he took of the case:—

"I wrote some time ago to Lord Ellenborough on the unfortunate affair of Durand's supersession.

"I appointed him to his office soon after Lord Ellenborough left India, and during the year that I remained in Calcutta transacting the governor of Bengal's duties, he gave me entire satisfaction, and I considered him as prudent in his public duties as I had found him amiable in private intercourse. When the Governor-General leaves Calcutta an Act is passed by which a division of duties takes place. Bengal, Madras, and partially Bombay, are severed from the Governor-General, and all the power vested in the president in council, namely, Sir Herbert Maddock, the Deputy-Governor of Bengal. . . . . Thus you will perceive I have, whilst on this frontier, nothing to say to Bengal and the coast provinces. The papers were as a matter of courtesy sent up for my information, because I had made the appointment. All the important steps were taken by the president in council without reference to me, and as I had made the appointment and had no right under the law to interfere, it was the more incumbent upon me to avoid giving any opinion. . . . . The president in council, after he had sent the papers home, and had adopted decisive measures against Durand, wrote to me officially requesting me to give an opinion. I officially refused. I did not choose when it was too late to be a registering clerk to his edicts. . . . . I said that I respected Captain Durand as a gallant soldier, and that if coming to an opinion I should concur with the president, it was an unnecessary act of harshness to load an officer, *if* in the wrong, with the Governor-General's judgment against him which the forms of office did not require.

"has since been removed; but, when appointed, no man in India, of his standing, bore a higher character for talent, application, and business habits; and even those who have since condemned him find him guilty mainly of errors of judgment. A more honourable man than Captain Durand of the Bengal Engineers does not exist."

"I then offered Durand the situation of chief engineer at Lahore, the advanced post of the army, £1,500 a year. This was immediately after his supersession, and subjected me to some comment."

In ordering the offer to be made, which was done in flattering terms, with a pointed reference to my father's "distinguished gallantry," Lord Hardinge added—"This at all events will show that *I* am not displeased with him." The offer was however refused, in a letter which Lord Hardinge rightly characterised as "cold." The war was now at an end; and my father feared that his acceptance of the post might be construed as a tacit acknowledgment of being in the wrong; and moreover he felt that whatever the letter of the law, the case was one in which the Governor-General should not have stood wholly aloof. As a fact, the Act referred to by Lord Hardinge in no way deprived him of his general powers of control. It was neither the intention nor the effect of that Act to reduce the Governor-General to the position of a provincial governor. This was the view taken by Lord Ellenborough, who wrote about this time—"I see that your proceedings with respect to the editor of a newspaper and to your assistants have brought you into hot water. . . . . I do not expect that you will receive justice at the hands of Sir Herbert. . . . . It is a matter in which reference must be made to the Governor-General, and I hope he will act upon his own view of the case." My father, therefore, felt that Lord Hardinge could and should have insisted upon having a voice in the matter; and under these circumstances he was doubly disinclined to accept the appointment which Lord Hardinge offered him. Lord Hardinge afterwards stated that he had never read the papers in the case. Certainly in the present day the summary removal of an officer holding charge of an important province would not be looked upon as a question of which the Viceroy could properly wash his hands.*

Having declined the Punjab appointment my father sailed for England to seek for justice at the hands of the Court of Directors. He had at first been refused leave on the ground that as Commissioner of the Tenasserim provinces he was responsible for the accuracy of the provincial accounts, until those accounts should

* It may be added that in the rules issued under the Act a special provision had been entered to the effect, that during Lord Hardinge's absence all appointments in the gift of, or requiring the confirmation of, the Governor-General in Council, should be made and confirmed by the Governor-General.

have been audited; and it was only after depositing as security a lakh of rupees, which he fortunately possessed in Company's paper, that he was permitted to leave the country.

During his two years' administration of our Burmese districts he had greatly reduced the military expenditure; had checked the aggressive tendencies of the Mandalay government; and had done much towards purifying the administration of justice and equalising the incidence of the land tax. A new and complete system of land assessment had been introduced by him after laborious inquiry, and had conferred great benefit upon the province. He left a quiet frontier, a contented people, and a rapidly increasing revenue. The administrative scheme which he set in operation, and which his successor Colvin developed, was, in fact, the germ of the famous "non-regulation system," afterwards elaborated and applied on a great scale to the Punjab and to subsequent acquisitions of new territory. And the judicial system which he organized was afterwards quoted before the Indian Commission of 1852 as a model of simplicity and efficiency.

The warm expressions of sympathy which my father received at parting from every class of the community which he had been declared unfit to rule did much to console him for the injustice and calumny which he had gone through. The native inhabitants of Moulmein came forward in hundreds, independent of the Europeans, with addresses showing their appreciation of his efforts in their behalf; the Europeans also addressed him in the same sense; even the merchants, though they disapproved of some of his measures, spoke of the "able, honourable, and upright manner" in which he had done his duty; and among the missionaries, whose work he had aided by every means in his power, his departure was regarded with the deepest regret. Foremost of these were the little band of Americans, headed by Judson, as brave and devoted a body of men as ever sacrificed their lives in any cause. Years afterwards my father wrote for the *Calcutta Review* a long article upon the career of Judson and the American mission, which will be found reprinted in the second volume of this work. It supplies some record of their noble and self-denying labours; and shows the deep interest which he took in the spread of education and the advancement among the Burmese races of the cause of Christianity. At the time he acknowledged their touching address with a few warm words of farewell. "Amidst oscillations of purpose, changes of men, variety of measures and system in the secular administration of these provinces, one only institution . . . . has been uniformly

permanent in its aim, constant in system, stable in its labours, its whole energy devoted to the cause of religion and of its handmaid education. With single-eyed solicitude for the high interests of the various people among whom it was situated, the members of this institution have mastered difficult languages; developed their form and structure; formed schools for the acquirement of various knowledge imparted in these tongues; and raised imperishable monuments of their labours by putting into the hands of their scholars careful translations of the Scripture. . . . . In bidding you farewell, therefore, I do so with no ordinary emotions; wherever I go I shall bear with me the interests of your mission at heart."

In March, 1847, my father arrived in England. He at once set to work to prepare his appeal to the Court of Directors; and as the main grounds of his removal had been his proceedings in the judicial cases, upon which some of the Judges of the Calcutta Sudder Court had ruled against him, he submitted these cases to counsel, meanwhile warning the Directors that a memorial would shortly be put in.* The opinion of counsel was affirmatory of the legality of his orders, and armed with their opinion he presented his appeal.† After some delay it was rejected. He was informed that Sir Herbert Maddock's orders had already been approved, and that the Court saw no reason to alter their determination. Upon this he called on Sir John Hobhouse, afterwards Lord Broughton, who was then President of the Board of Control, and expressed his surprise and disappointment at the haste of the Court of Directors to support the Deputy-Governor. I give in his own words an account of what followed:—"Sir John Hobhouse," he

* Putting aside the two judicial cases, and the connected investigation into the conduct of his assistants, the Government of Bengal held that he had acted harshly and improperly in two minor matters towards young officers who had shown a want of subordination. As it was afterwards shown that the decision of the Deputy-Governor in these two cases arose from misapprehension of the facts, I have not gone into them.

† It is a curious illustration of the mistakes of which high legal tribunals are occasionally guilty, that in these cases the majority of the Court specially objected to his decision, on the ground that the trials had been without jury. As a fact, a jury had never been assembled in the Tenasserim provinces; and he was able to deliver a crushing counter-blow. All trials involving sentence of death had by rule been referred by his predecessor and himself to the Sudder Court, who, acting on juryless proceedings, had not only passed sentence, but themselves drawn out, signed, and issued the death warrants. If, therefore, they were right in the ruling that his decisions were illegal for want of a jury, they convicted themselves of a long series of improper executions.

writes, "assured me that no mention had been made to him of any intention on my part to submit a memorial; that the leading men of the Court of Directors had several times, in the course of interviews with himself, pressed him to support Sir H. Maddock; that when so doing they urged the strength of my language in replying to the Bengal Secretary's letter, paragraph by paragraph in half-margin, rather than that I had been wrong in what I had done; on the contrary, that they had assured him most positively that my removal by Sir H. Maddock had not affected my character or prospects, and that on my return to India I should be employed in as high situations as those I had latterly held; that upon these repeated and strong assurances he, as President of the Board of Control, had given the Court of Directors a qualified support for their deputy governor, Sir H. Maddock, having been careful to expunge from their draft despatch whatever seemed capable of proving injurious. He asked me if I had seen the despatch, and offered me a copy of it, and concluded by strongly recommending me to make myself easy on the matter, and that I should find when I went back to India that I should be employed exactly as I had been before, and should be no sufferer in any respect from what had passed."

With this assurance he was forced to be content. He had been publicly censured and degraded, and had failed to obtain any sort of redress. To the end of his life he attributed this treatment to personal hostility on the part of the Deputy-Governor, and to the prejudice of the Court of Directors in favour of their civil servants, and against Lord Ellenborough's confidential secretary. He may have exaggerated the strength of these feelings, and the bitterness with which in after years he spoke of those concerned did him harm in the eyes of others. But he did not speak without reason; for, putting aside Sir Herbert Maddock, he was informed by a member of the Court itself, who tried to help him, that the directors were almost to a man "violent in their prejudice" against him. Nor, considering the hostility of the Indian civil service and the Court of Directors towards Lord Ellenborough, a hostility which may or may not have been deserved, but which undoubtedly existed, is it astonishing that such a prejudice should have been formed. If in after years, when the assurances upon which he had relied proved to be fruitless, and he found himself a marked man, kept down in subordinate positions while others were rising all round him, the bitterness of his heart broke out into indignant denunciations of those who had ruined his career, surely that also

was not a thing to be wondered at. If he spoke strongly, at least he had suffered much.*

In the autumn of 1847, after some visits to friends and a trip to the Scotch lakes, where he tried to forget his troubles in the enjoyment of the glorious scenery about him, my father returned to London. It was at this time that he began to write his history of the Afghan war. Lord Ellenborough's papers amongst others were placed at his disposal; and with his knowledge of Afghanistan, of the course of events in India during the last ten years, and of the chief actors on the Afghan stage, he had some special facilities for producing a correct and life-like narrative. He found nevertheless that the task was a difficult one, for, to begin with, he had no very high opinion of his own literary powers, and therefore wrote slowly, and in the second place he felt that he "knew too much." It was hard to tell the truth without severe reflections upon some whom he would have been sorry to injure; and he doubted whether in the end he should care to publish the work. "Some truths," he wrote, "would be severe and startling, however calmly and considerately told. Havelock† confessed to me that he would be sorry to write the true history of what he had known and seen. Knowing all he alluded to and a good deal more, I may well ponder." . . . . . "Then I often think that the hour has passed, and that the world's history is moving too fast for the present to care what occurred in India five or six years ago. You encourage me by saying it must be popular and useful. I often doubt both, and to crown all often doubt whether my time might not be more usefully spent . . . . . and that I am leading a life profitless to myself and others. I trust, however, in God to guide, and wait . . . . . upon His will, asking for more patience, more faith, and more entire denial of self, which is at the bottom of unchristian restlessness such as that which now and then perturbs me." However, the work afforded him occupation, and he passed a considerable part of the winter and spring in writing, endeavouring as he went on to improve his style by the study of historical works in English and other languages. Lord Ellenborough had

* I see that Colonel Malleson, in the first volume of his "History of the Indian Mutiny," refers to this matter, characterizing the charges brought against my father as "frivolous in themselves, and subsequently proved to be utterly unfounded." When this book was published Colonel Malleson had had no communication with myself, or so far as I know with any other member of my father's family, on the subject, so that his testimony is unbiassed.

† Sir Henry.

recommended him to turn in particular to the classical authors, and he writes in reply—"I am very much obliged to your lordship for the books and for your remarks. Cæsar, Sallust, and Tacitus were always my favourites, . . . . . and it will be no task to me to follow your prescription of an hour a day with one of the three. Livy was never so much to my humour, though in after life we became a little reconciled to each other."

In the early summer the work was interrupted; and it was, I believe, never resumed. The life of an Indian official is at best ill-suited to the prosecution of a literary task requiring such close and constant application; and during the remainder of my father's career the pressure of official business left him little leisure. Moreover, Kaye's well-known work was produced not long afterwards, and my father thought there was not room for two histories of our Afghan campaigns. The manuscript, therefore, went to press in 1879 almost exactly as he had left it more than thirty years before.

The year 1848 was a memorable one all over Europe, and before passing on to the circumstances which brought his writing to a close, I insert here some extracts from letters written about English and Continental politics during the course of the summer. I doubt whether my father would have subscribed a few years later to all the views there put forward, for his tolerance in matters of religion was in after life remarkable, and, like most Indians, he was unable to go entirely with the opinions of any English political party. But the letters seem to me characteristic of his line of thought, and they serve to show the opinions he held at the time.

*To Dr. Duff, 17th April*, 1848.

"The Kennington Common Chartist Meeting proved a great moral victory in favour of order, and the hopes of Republican Europe were sadly disappointed at the result. The Chartists threaten more formidable meetings and demonstrations, but they are not likely to be more successful or serious. As spring is now opened we may expect war to become more active. In Lombardy the Austrians are stronger than their foes wish them. Russia is in great strength, and Germany, though alive with a glowing spirit of liberty and reform, anything but united. Russia is so placed that her army can fall on Austria or Prussia according to circumstances. The latter *is* at war on the Eider, having sup-

ported the Holstein insurrection. The newspapers convey inaccurate ideas of the state of Berlin and Vienna. The King of Prussia's authority is gone and democracy is paramount, but assumes a different form from the Parisian, the German mind and people being different. Austria is no longer an empire, but a confederation; Bohemia and Hungary have started on a series of constitutional experiments independent of its head. I fear that Russia and France will push their war columns into Germany and Lombardy before well arranged organized constitutions can in either country have found time to be formed, much less carried effectively into practice. War is no time for laying the foundations of constitutional liberty. In England but one feeling exists—to keep out of Continental wars, and to maintain peace, order, and credit at home. All parties are concurrent; and the fact that the Whigs are in place is favourable to the nation's welfare, for their political opponents give them an honest, patriotic support, which the Whigs, were they not in the enjoyment of place, would never have given to the Conservatives. The result is a strong Government at the moment most needed. Ireland would by this time have been in a blaze of rebellion had the Conservatives imitated the Whig example of a few years back. Ireland is our greatest danger; and the Government, with the fear of their former speeches before them, have been too slow and vacillating in precautionary measures. There is some risk of revolt and bloodshed from the length to which parties have gone before a check has been attempted. God overrules all, and man takes the credit to himself of the issue when favourable. I trust He who has, in the year that I been in England, carried England through impending famine, bankruptcy, and revolution, may so order events in Ireland that bloodshed be avoided and order maintained; but no one can be sanguine of either except by God's favour."

*To Lord Ellenborough*, 31*st May*, 1848.

"I was very glad to read your lordship's speech on the Jewish Disabilities Bill. The bold avowal of the resolve that this country will not part with the distinction of being ruled by a Christian government was the assertion of a broad principle invaluable at all times, but particularly now. Moreover, it was giving voice to the deep and, in my opinion, well founded conviction of the great body of the people of the country that the real strength of England lies in

her truthful sincerity in the religion of Christ. Whether on the Jews question or on any other, it was a broad, open, honest confession which was wanted from some public man. I am glad that your lordship should have been the man. I care little for the question on which it was enunciated, but much for the principle, which I regard as the life-blood of England."

*To Dr. Duff*, 17*th June*, 1848.

"In Europe matters are going from worse to worse. The nations seem in course of being sifted with the sieve of vanity. In England God has given a pervading thread of real religion and good sound sense which promises to keep her free from the absolutely social revolutions now taking place on the Continent. The Chartist threats have proved dangerless in consequence of the strong feeling of all men of all parties in favour of order; and as there is every disposition shown to listen to and entertain all properly advanced representations on the part of the people, and the various interests which split them into political classes, discord and violence will, I hope, fail of striking root here."

A few days after this last letter was written my father had made up his mind to return to India. He had always disapproved the "half-and-half finale" of Lord Hardinge's Sutlej campaign. After the expenditure of so much blood and treasure we had shrunk from pushing our successes to their legitimate conclusion, and had patched up a peace which could not last. The Sikh state and army had been left to brood over the defeats which had so nearly been victories for them, and to gather strength for a fresh effort; while the rich and beautiful country of Cashmere, which would have formed one of the brightest jewels in the British crown, had been sold for a sum of money which was hardly worth acceptance. From the first my father had declared that this peace, which we owed partly to the effect produced by our losses in the field, and partly to the generosity of Sir Henry Lawrence, was an ill-judged and delusive measure, and that a final trial of strength with the Khalsa army was inevitable. In June, 1848, news was received in England of disturbances at Mooltan, and he at once saw that the flame was likely to spread. Though both Lord Hardinge and Sir Henry Lawrence, who were then in England, had assured the Court of Directors that the peace was solid and lasting, and though the Mooltan disturbance was at first represented as a matter of no moment, he persisted in the opinion

that the close of the rainy season would be the signal for hostilities, and throwing up his furlough took his passage for India. For so doing he incurred some ridicule at the time, and his forecasts were treated at the India House with calm contempt. The Court of Directors, he was told, had a plan of Mooltan, which was nothing of a place, and could make no resistance, and there was no sort of reason to apprehend disturbances elsewhere. The aged Duke of Wellington, however, whose prescience on all Indian matters was as unfailing as ever, thought differently, and said my father was "quite right to go." He was informed soon afterwards by Lord Ellenborough that the Duke had intended to send him out with Sir Charles Napier, whom at the time the Duke wished to see nominated as Commander-in-Chief in India.

My father left England in July. The steamers up to September being already full, he was forced to take a passage in a sailing vessel, going round the Cape, and as luck would have it she made an exceptionally slow voyage. It was not until the beginning of December that he found himself at the mouth of the Hooghly. Here, however, the correctness of his calculations was immediately shown. War had already broken out; an army was assembled upon the Sikh frontier; and orders directing him to join the Commander-in-Chief were awaiting him. On the 7th of December he writes to a friend in England :—

"I start to-morrow for Ferozepore, and travelling without a day's rest hope to reach that place on the 24th. I would have started the day after landing, but the dâks were all occupied up to the 8th. On the 4th we received the accounts of the affair on the Chenab and the melancholy loss of Cureton. The press has of course made the most, and a great deal too much, of the costly reconnaissance. The natives, always eager for our misfortunes, have exaggerated the affair into a Sikh victory, and Sikh valour stands high in their estimation, even to that degree that their advent in Calcutta in the course of a month or two was talked of. People in Calcutta are in hourly expectation of the news of a general action on the Chenab, but the Sikhs will not play their game well if they let themselves be brought to action for some time to come. . . . . The state of the 4 and 5 per cent. paper will show you the prospects of the Government as to money. They are very bad, and the cost of this campaign will be excessive. The commissariat arrangements were delayed until the hopelessness of avoiding operations was forced upon the Government, and the consequence is that the commissariat charges will be frightful;

the feed of an elephant is now costing about Rs. 130 per month, all else proportionately heavy in cost, and, what is worse, much wanting in spite of expenditure. Lord Hardinge's Punjab policy is admitted on all hands to have broken down completely, and he will prove one of the most expensive governor-generals to this unhappy country. The eighteen lakhs of gratuity to effect the reduction of the army, the forestalling of the invaliding for a year, &c., &c., is clear money flung away, the disbanded men being now invited to return to their colours and the army increased to its late strength. The country wants European troops. C—— in a letter to —— boasts that the application for reinforcements from England was referred to Lord Hardinge, and that he pooh-poohed it, and assured them that Sikh blood and Sikh treasure would put all down, and the Punjab be soon tranquil. If so, Lord Hardinge has done Lord Dalhousie no service; in fact, played him as ill a turn as when he carved out work for him by reducing the army in order to go off the stage displaying his famed financial minute. I said at the time that he was carving out trouble for his successor."*

Three weeks after this letter was written my father rode into the head-quarters camp at Ramnuggur, and reported himself to Lord Gough.

* My father had never a high opinion of Lord Hardinge, whose highest quality, he said, was "courage—and skilless courage."

## CHAPTER VI.

### 1849—1853.

Position of Lord Gough—Advance against the Sikhs—Battle of Chillianwala—Dawes of the Artillery—Lord Gough—Battle of Goojerat—Sir Colin Campbell—Annexation of the Punjab—Offer of a Deputy Commissionership in the Punjab—Appointed Political Assistant at Gwalior—Offered the command of the Sappers and Miners—Appointed Political Agent in Bhopal—Sir Charles Napier—Depression at his position—Failure of applications for promotion and Brevet rank—Sir Robert Hamilton—The Secunder Begum—Essays contributed to the Calcutta Review—Death of the Duke of Wellington—Employment of natives and spread of Education—Appointed to officiate as Resident at Nagpore—Resigns Bhopal appointment and sails for England.

WHEN my father joined the Commander-in-Chief affairs were at a deadlock. Mooltan, whose strength had been despised, was holding out stoutly, and afforded occupation for a considerable portion of our force; while the revolted armies in the Punjab were too strong to be hastily attacked. Lord Gough chafed at his inaction, but he was withheld by the orders of the Governor-General from an immediate advance, and in the meantime Dost Mahomed's Afghan troops were joining their old enemies the Sikhs against us. It seemed as if an indefinite time might elapse before anything was done, and the army was beginning to wax impatient at the delay.

On the 11th of January this state of affairs came to an end. My father writes in his diary:—

"Sir Henry Lawrence arrived in camp, ostensibly as an amateur, but I suspect that he brought orders from the Governor-General, for we are to march to a position in front of Dingee at 6 A.M. to-morrow, and whilst in the Commander-in-Chief's camp to-day the projected attack on the enemy's position was told me by General Campbell.* He had just been with the Commander-in-Chief, who had spoken of attacking the Sikh position on the 13th, the day after to-morrow. Campbell, seeing that the Commander-

* Lord Clyde.

in-Chief had no intention of properly reconnoitring the position, was anxious on the subject, and we went into Tremenheere's tent to discuss matters. Campbell opened upon the subject, announcing the intention to attack, and that it was to be done blindly, that is without any reconnaissance but such as the moment might afford on debouching from the jungle. He advocated a second march from Dingee, the force prepared to bivouac for the night, and that the 13th should be passed by the engineers in reconnoitring, supported by the infantry in driving the enemy out of the jungle. Campbell wished Tremenheere, as chief engineer, to suggest this necessary measure in a quiet way to the Commander-in-Chief, but Tremenheere said that since the passage of the Chenab the Commander-in-Chief was determined to take no advice, nor brook any volunteered opinions, and he proposed that I should speak to John Gough,* and try to engage him to put it into the Commander-in-Chief's mind to adopt such a course. I of course agreed to do so, and was to mention that Campbell, Tremenheere and myself had agreed on the necessity of doing all that was possible to ascertain what was to be attacked before rushing at the Sikh position."

I do not know what came of this improvised council of war; but on the following day, after a march in advance, my father writes again describing the Commander-in-Chief's projected plan of operations, and adds: "The scheme is good decidedly, and if not departed from ought to give a decisive victory." Unfortunately it was departed from, a contingency which my father's experience of Lord Gough during Lord Ellenborough's administration had led him to regard as probable; and the result was one of the bloodiest and most doubtful battles ever fought on Indian ground. Throughout the day my father was in attendance on the Commander-in-Chief, and had a good opportunity of seeing what went on. The following was his account of the fight, written a few days afterwards to a friend in England:—

"*Camp Chilianwal, 19th January*, 1849.

"MY DEAR SIR,—You will I know be interested in the account of the first action I have seen since I joined the army on the 3rd. It took place earlier than was in general anticipated, the Governor-

* General Sir John Gough, G.C.B. This officer, who was nephew of the Commander-in-Chief, and quartermaster-general of the force, was connected with my father by marriage.

General's orders having been prohibitory of any conflict before the fall of Mooltan. The alliance of Dost Mahomed with the rebel chief Chuttur Singh, and a desire to strike a decisive blow before the Sikhs should be joined by their Afghan friends, may have led the Governor-General to modify his injunction and to give a qualified sanction to an attack provided it could be made with effect. The result has been a sanguinary action, but I am sorry to say, without any corresponding advantage. The war is no nearer its end, so far as human foresight can judge, than prior to this very sharply fought and for a time very doubtful contest. I joined the army after the affairs on the Chenab, and when the Sikhs had fallen back from that river to the Jhelum, on the left bank of which they took up a strong position, and were said to be carefully intrenching themselves, about a place called Moong. Lord Gough was in position about seven or eight miles from the Chenab, opposite to Ramnuggur, and some eighteen or twenty miles from the Sikh army. A large camp remaining long at one place eats up everything around in the shape of forage, &c., and a move is essential for the benefit of man and beast. Accordingly we moved to our right a few miles, but not much nearer to the Sikhs; at last however we moved to Dingee, and there on the 12th it became evident that we were likely to be soon measuring strength with the rebel army. On that day the commandants of divisions and those of brigades of artillery were in communication with the Commander-in-Chief, and such conferences always betoken a storm.

"The plan of attack, should we be forced to come to action, decided upon by the Commander-in-Chief was excellent.

"We were to march from Dingee along the high road to Kokree, and from thence diverging towards Russool, our heavy guns and Campbell's division of infantry, with the main body of the cavalry in reserve, was to take up a position about H, whilst Gilbert's division of infantry, with the greater part of our field guns, moving on Russool, was to overthrow the Sikh left and thus prevent their retiring along the high road to Jhelum. Their left thus turned, Gilbert and Campbell were conjointly to operate against the Sikh line, which would have been doubled back upon Moong and driven to the southward.

"The senior engineer and myself were ordered on the morning of the 13th to push along the road towards Russool, reconnoitring ahead of the force; this we did. I got to about T, with Kokree

on my right and the enemy's position on the hill in my front. A Sikh picket of horsemen being in our front we were forced to pull up, but I saw their troops in motion down the face of the hill towards their position, S2, horse and foot marching down to take up their line. We returned to Umrao, where we had left the Commander-in-Chief, and reported what we had seen, and that the road was clear upon Russool, that is as far as we had been and could see. The Commander-in-Chief then advanced from Umrao, but hearing from some villagers that the Sikhs were at Chillianwala, the senior engineer and myself were sent off with orders to feel up to the village, and to see whether it was occupied. We




accordingly did so, and soon returned reporting cavalry and infantry in position on a mound in front of the village. Upon this the Commander-in-Chief turned the force towards Chillianwala and after a short cannonade the Sikh outpost of two or three thousand men retired upon their main body in position at S1, S2. From Chillianwala we obtained a clear view of the Sikh position, and the Commander-in-Chief drew up our force at E in front of the village, and facing Shere Singh's force S2, which was separated

from Atar Singh's force S1, by an interval of some three quarters of a mile. Between their position and our own lay a belt of rather dense, low jungle, not forest, but a mixture of thorny mimosa bushes and wild caper. The Commander-in-Chief was inclined to encamp, but the Sikhs thinking themselves within range opened a cannonade upon our line from Shere Singh's force. As they were a good 2,000 yards off, and probably more, their shot had no effect, except one, and that was to put Lord Gough's Irish blood up (as he said), so he ordered the heavy guns to take up a position in the centre of his line, and towards the Sikhs, and to return their fire. This was about 1½ P.M. Before this he had ordered Tremenheere and myself to reconnoitre their position, taking some infantry with us, and we had gone to Campbell to get the party when we found that from a mound we could make out the whole position. I could see them almost as plainly as our own force, and my senior went to the Commander-in-Chief to tell him that if we dipped into the jungle, we could see nothing, but that from the mound in question everything could be clearly made out. However, whether it were the opening of the Sikh cannonade, or what, I know not, but the Commander-in-Chief never came; and the first thing I heard after the opening of the cannonade was an order to Campbell to advance and turn the enemy's right flank.

"The Commander-in-Chief appears to have had in view when he gave this order Shere Singh's force, which was in his front, and with which the cannonade waxed warm. At the same time that Campbell's division was ordered to advance, that of Gilbert on the right was directed to do the same, so that our whole line, except Penny's brigade in reserve, moved forwards. The heavy guns were firing at a range of some fifteen or seventeen hundred yards; still the execution from these pieces was great, and might have been continued longer with advantage; but the advance of the infantry soon necessitated the fire of our heavy guns to cease. Then began a contest of the most mixed and curious description, to understand which I must give another rough sketch* as follows:—

* This sketch and the preceding one have, I imagine, no pretensions to strict accuracy. They are hastily traced in ink upon the sheet of thin Indian paper on which my father was writing; and they have been exactly copied, except that, for clearness' sake, the lines showing the British position have been shaded instead of being printed black. The sketch of the country between the Jhelum and Chenab, a few pages further on, is similarly taken from my father's letter. But, rough as




"Campbell's division consisting of two brigades moved forward. The right brigade, in which was H.M.'s 24th, a fine strong regiment, came in front of Shere Singh's right, and carried the guns; but being attacked by the Sikh infantry and cavalry, it broke and fled right back to the village of Chillianwala, suffering very heavily in its flight. Meantime Campbell's left brigade, engaged in front with Shere Singh's right, which it had turned, was suddenly engaged in rear also, Atar Singh's force coming to aid their companions. The cavalry and horse artillery on the left of Campbell at A checked in a good measure this attack of Atar Singh's force on Campbell's rear. The guns expended 1,200 rounds and silenced Atar Singh's pieces, but they could not take them, nor entirely prevent the infantry from assailing Campbell's rear; that brigade had therefore to fight both to front and rear, and only made good its ground by dint of hard fighting, the pluck of H. M.'s 61st being thoroughbred. They took and spiked many of Shere Singh's guns on his right.

"If the conflict was sharp and doubtful for a while on our left, our right was not a whit better off. Gilbert's division advanced and came into contact with the Sikh front, and was soon warmly

they are, they will, I think, serve to illustrate the position in each case. The sketch of the action at Goojerat is also taken from a sheet of letter paper; but the original was traced in colours, and more carefully finished than the other three.

engaged. His right was supported by the cavalry brigade, and a brigade of three troops of horse artillery. The cavalry, consisting of Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, the 9th Lancers, and the 1st Native Cavalry, made a forward movement with the view of charging the enemy. The 14th unluckily formed in front of the guns, so that these could not open. The advance was disordered by the jungle, which did not admit of a perfect formation being maintained, but still there was no very serious difficulty on this score; however, a party of Sikh horse not greater in numbers than Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons showing themselves, the 14th most unaccountably wheeled about, and fairly swept over our own guns, and caused the capture of six pieces. Their example was followed by part of the 9th and 1st, and the scamper to the rear was, I assure you, anything but pleasant to behold, for at that moment a staff officer had just galloped up and reported Campbell's right brigade beaten back to the village, and our centre thus broken into. In our front fugitives from Gilbert's brigade were only stopped by the Commander-in-Chief's staff, whilst on our right the European Dragoons and guns had fallen back in confusion before a mere handful of irregular horse.

"However, although Gilbert's right was thus fairly open to the enemy, and he, like Campbell, had to fight to front, to flank, and even to rear, yet the pluck of the European infantry was again here conspicuous; and being aided by the admirable conduct of Dawes' battery of nine-pounders, which were always at the right place at the right moment, fighting like the infantry to flank, front, and rear, according to circumstances, the enemy's position was taken, and the Sikhs had to fall back on Russool, beaten, but not pursued, for nightfall came on, and our cavalry and artillery on the right were after their repulse kept hugging the village from whence they had originally started. Moreover, the Sikhs carried off four of our guns, and recovering many of those we had spiked and had not drawn off for want of means, their loss in guns only amounted to twelve. They fell back on Russool, and there collected their forces. . . . . Could we have attacked again on the 14th, we should have carried their position easily, for they were much shaken, and their loss great; but ours too was heavy, 2,500 men killed and wounded, and worse than all confidence shaken in our European cavalry. The heavy black* line across Shere Singh's position shows the manner in which Campbell's and Gilbert's bri-

* Shaded in the printed plan.

gades were holding the Sikh position at the close of the day. As it got dark the troops were withdrawn to Chillianwala, and the next morning the camp formed with our right parallel to the line of hills and our left on Chillianwala.

"I wish we had thrown our right on Kokree and held the hilltop, for then we should have covered the road to Russool from Kokree, and also the main road by Khoori upon Kowar, by which we might at our convenience cross the range and turn the Sikh position. We have neglected this; and during these nine days the Sikhs have been busy raising batteries and entrenchments. Our victory is very poor in results, and we are just as far as ever from having brought the war to a conclusion. This is the 22nd, and we must, I suppose, wait here for a month till reinforcements reach from Mooltan, after the capture of the citadel. Meantime the Sikhs are getting up their reinforcements, and a son of Dost Mahomed with some 800 Afghan horse is advancing to aid the Sikhs. I have no great apprehension of the value of Afghan aid to the Sikhs, and am pretty sure that Chuttur Singh will eventually repent his connection with Dost Mahomed. I wish I could see my way through this campaign, and could hold out the prospect of a speedy settlement of the Punjab, but it would be unwise to hold out any such flattering hopes. . . . . At present we are employed in all sorts of curious ways, cutting jungle amongst others. Lord Hardinge rendered our corps of sappers and miners entirely inefficient, and we have not a man who can mark out a trench or a battery but the engineer officers themselves; the few sappers and miners Lord Hardinge left us unreduced are at Mooltan. Here we have nothing but very so so pioneers, and the consequence is that the few engineer officers have to execute the petty details that a corporal or private of sappers would be perfectly equal to."

My father adds in his diary that the 29th, 61st, and the Company's Europeans "fought like tigers":—

"The conduct of Dawes and his battery is much admired. He was with Gilbert's division; and wherever the enemy showed himself, front or flank, Dawes' guns were sure to be at the right point, and at the right moment. Dawes was struck in the leg by a grapeshot, but would not dismount, for fear, as he told me, that if he once was off his horse, he might not be able to remount. When I saw him he was standing giving his orders, and conducting his duty as if nothing was the matter, and I spoke with him a good quarter of an hour before I found out that he was wounded, and

then only in consequence of a message from the doctor which made me ask the question whether he were hit."

Many years afterwards, in speaking of this fine officer, who unfortunately left the service early, my father mentioned that he had received from the men of Gilbert's division a very touching honour. After dark, when the fight was over, our troops fell back from the position they had won, and many of our wounded were left where they lay, though the Sikhs were known to be a merciless enemy. Dawes collected a number of these unfortunate people, and brought them off upon his guns. That night's encampment was a disorderly affair, but next day when the camp had been settled and marked out, Dawes led his battery to their ground, and the men of the division turned out of their own accord and cheered him as he passed along. That, my father used to say, was an honour worth having—the spontaneous homage of the soldiery.

I extract from his journal the following comment upon the plan of the fight:—

"The Commander-in-Chief did wrong in altering his original project of attack; wrong again in attacking at 2 or 2.30 P.M., for there was not day enough before him for the pursuit had his cavalry been in heart and condition to follow; wrong in failing to concentrate the fire of his artillery upon the centre, or whatever point he selected for attack; wrong in taking to all appearance no account of the fact that Campbell's division was outflanked by Atar Singh's force, and Gilbert's by the enemy's left. Had the Ghorchurras gone on we should have had a sorry account of baggage, heavy guns, &c. . . . With 60 pieces of artillery we might have forced the enemy's position anywhere . . . . but except Dawes' battery no artillery was actively engaged, except the heavy guns at a distance of 1,700 yards."

My father had, however, no mean opinion of Lord Gough's abilities. He used to say that the Commander-in-Chief's plans were almost always admirable if only he would stick to them. Unfortunately one never could be sure of this; for directly the first shot was fired Gough's "Irish blood" got the mastery; and the fiery old man was apt to forget all about his plans, and to throw away his advantages by entering into the fight, and moving about the field, instead of taking up a position from which he could see and direct. Even so, however, he did some good, for his presence was "always good for a cheer from the European infantry."

The night of the 13th was one of terrible confusion. My father

had slept on the ground with his saddle for a pillow; and waking in the grey of the morning his first thought was for an advance. There are some things, he afterwards said, about which the truth never would or could be told, and what occurred then was one of them. But it may be said without indiscretion that he did all in his power to bring about a forward movement; and that the conduct of some of our troops had been such as to make the Commander-in-Chief decide against this course. The decision was unfortunate; for, fearful as our losses had been, the loss of the enemy had been greater, and they were in no condition to withstand a fresh onset. It was afterwards admitted by the Sikhs themselves that if we had advanced on the morning of the 14th, the complete defeat of the Khalsa army, shaken and demoralised by the conflict of the previous day, would have been almost inevitable. But it was not then understood how severely they had been tried by the fight, and the heavy rain was against moving. The opportunity was therefore allowed to go by; and long weeks of weary inaction followed before the fall of Multan, and the arrival of the troops detained before that place, enabled us to venture on another attack. During this time my father was constantly in the saddle reconnoitring, and obtained a thorough knowledge of the surrounding country. This, and his former acquaintance with the Commander-in-Chief, who frequently consulted him, enabled him at times to offer useful advice, and to exercise some influence on the issue of the campaign. He believed that it was mainly owing to his earnest and repeated representations that Lord Gough set aside the views pertinaciously pressed upon him by his political officer, Mackeson, and avoided a second fight, once the Sikhs had acquired fresh strength and confidence, until the Multan force came up.

On the 28th February, after the crowning victory of Goojerat, he writes again:—

"*Camp Goojerat, 28th February*, 1849.

"MY DEAR SIR,—My last letter giving you an account of the battle of Chillianwala, a sanguinary, and at one moment a doubtful action, will doubtless have reached you. That fight was a resultless one, for, although 30 guns had been spiked during the day, 12 only were brought in, and the rest not only recovered and carried off by the Sikhs, but three of our own guns as well. The enemy fell back on the formidable looking position of Russool, not above three miles from our own camp, and overlooking it; there they commenced to raise batteries and entrenchments with much

activity. It must be acknowledged that the battle of Chillianwala had had a lowering effect on the tone and confidence of many in the British ranks, and there was as much croaking amongst the downhearted as if we had been beaten. Moreover the Commander-in-Chief and some of our generals of division did not feel very confident as to the Native troops being able to cope with the Sikh infantry, and the conduct of the dragoons and the repulse of Her Majesty's 24th showed that even our Europeans can occasionally turn too. Lord Gough, pressed by the Governor-General to risk nothing, determined to await the arrival of the reinforcements which the fall of Multan would set free.

"Accordingly we remained quietly in observation of the position of Russool, neither harassing, nor being ourselves at first harassed by, the enemy. As time wore on the Sikhs were joined by Chutter Singh, with the troops and guns set free by the capture of Attock; subsequently their numbers were further swollen by a body of Afghan horse under the command of Akram Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed. After these accessions to their force they began to evince symptoms of activity, and to show more boldness, threatening outposts, carrying off camels, and evincing a daily increasing confidence. Their numbers were variously estimated at from 40,000 to 80,000 men of all arms. On the 26th January news of the surrender of the citadel of Multan reached the Commander-in-Chief, and a salute was fired by our heavy guns in honour of the event, and to make it known to our *friends* at Russool. They turned out to see what was the matter, but the chiefs took good care that the soldiery should remain ignorant of the fate of Multan, and it was not until some of the fugitives from Multan, a fortnight after, reached the Sikh camp, that the loss of that place was ascertained by the Sikh soldiery. It was now evident that the chiefs, if they knew their game, would endeavour to bring us to action, either by attacking us, or by inducing us to attack them, before our reinforcements joined. The Commander-in-Chief caused a few trenches and a redoubt to be thrown up in order to give additional security to his camp and position, and resolved there to await the arrival of the Multan troops.

"On the 3rd February the Sikhs were partly in motion, and on the 5th they occupied a position in front of the mouth of the Khoori Pass, still, however, holding with a considerable body the hill position of Russool. For some days their intentions were not clear. Our direct communication with our bridge at Ramnuggur was covered from both wings of the Sikh army by the position of

Chillianwala, and as our reinforcements were moving up the left bank of the Chenab to Ramnuggur, it was clearly advisable to stand fast till the Sikhs made a more pronounced movement. On the 11th February, the Sikhs moved out a short distance from their camp at Khoori, formed in battle array, and endeavoured to tempt us to action. The skirmishers of a party of cavalry sent out to observe the enemy were engaged, but the enemy withdrew into their camp without having even driven in our cavalry skirmishers; that night, however, they evacuated the position of Russool, and on the 12th I rode over and examined the line of




works which they had thrown up. Had we rashly gone at the position we might have suffered very severely; but, if we had cautiously attacked, the position was virtually a *cul-de-sac* from whence the Sikhs could not have withdrawn a gun, and in defending which they would have lost many men.

"On the night of the 13th they struck their camp at Khoori, and marching all night towards Goojerat, they stole quietly away from under our very noses, and threatened by this sudden movement the passage of the Chenab and a march on Lahore. The 14th

was passed in indecision, and we did not move. On the 15th we marched to Lussooree, a place near Hasalanwala, and on the 16th by moving to Saidoolapoor, we covered and were in communication with Ramnuggur, to which place the head of the Multan column had arrived. On the left bank of the Chenab a brigade was pushed up to Wuzeerabad to watch and check any attempt on the part of the Sikhs to cross the river. Upon the 17th we made a short march towards the enemy in order to occupy his attention and prevent his crossing the Chenab; but, being that morning only joined by a part of our reinforcements, and the remainder being two days in rear, a nearer approach, which might have brought on an action, was unadvisable. On the 18th, we crept a little nearer to the enemy, who now expecting to be attacked drew out his line of battle daily; we, however, advanced no further than Koonjah. On the 19th, Dundas, with the Bombay European regiment and the 60th Rifles at length joined, and on the 20th, another short march placed us in battle order in front of Shadeewar, within between three and four miles of the Sikh camp and position.

"The morning of the 21st was clear and beautiful, and the snowy mountains of Cashmere formed a magnificent background to the plain of Goojerat. That plain is intersected by two channels; the one, which running from Bimber passes to the west of Goojerat, is at this season of the year a dry sandy bed, presenting no serious obstacle to an army; the other, to east of Goojerat, is dry above the village of Gillawala, but even at this season has water in its bed below that village. The Sikh line of battle extended from Morarea Tibba, where their cavalry showed in force, along an easterly bend of the Bimber channel, and then struck off by the three villages of Kalra, occupied by their infantry, to Malkawala on the left bank of the Eastern channel, where also their cavalry showed in force; their position extended, therefore, nearly six miles, if not quite. The Commander-in-Chief had hoped to be able to turn the Sikh left, expecting that it would, as on several previous days when they drew out in battle order, be thrown more in advance of the centre Kalra. Our advance was to be regulated by the direction of the Bimber channel, along the left bank of which the heavy guns were to move, the right and left wings of our army hugging with their respective left and right flanks the heavy guns and the dry river bed in question. I was with General Campbell, whose division was to have occupied the enemy's attention in front, whilst the right wing of our army with

its batteries of heavy guns and powerful field artillery overthrew and doubled up the enemy's left; this, however, the Sikh position did not offer the opportunity of carrying into execution, and it became very much a front to front battle.

"The fight commenced at 9.30 A.M. by our heavy guns opening from a position a little in front of Hariwala, but they were too far off, and after some firing the line advanced, and had to carry the villages of Kalra: in this operation our greatest loss ensued, for the regiments which assaulted the villages lost a good many men. On our left, where I was, the villages of Jumna and Loonpoor being unoccupied, they were passed without opposition; but Campbell's division had no sooner passed them than it came under a fire of round shot from some heavy pieces drawn up on our front on the left bank of the nullah and in advance of the Sikh line. The division was therefore deployed into line, and Dundas's brigade the same, whilst our artillery, trotting some 300 or 400 yards briskly to the front, began to reply to the Sikh guns. Meantime the heavy guns, Kalra being carried, had taken up a position beyond the village, and aided by our numerous and well-served field guns, had opened a storm of shot and shell which silenced the enemy's artillery and made their masses of horse and foot give ground; the same result was taking place from the fire of our artillery in front of the left wing. The Sikh leaders made several attempts to bring up their line of infantry, and to encourage their horse to charge up to our guns and line; but their resolution melted away as soon as they came fairly within range of our guns, which now advanced, supported by our line, right up to the bend of the nullah which had formed part of the Sikh line of battle. Here Campbell threw forward his left, and our right wing having dispersed all in its front, a general advance took place, and we marched through and over the Sikh camp around Goojerat, and ultimately formed line of encampment to north of Goojerat with Gehki in our immediate front. The cannonade was over by 1 P.M.; and by 2 P.M. we were in our new line of encampment. The cavalry continued the pursuit, and pressed the enemy steadily for some hours, heading them off the Jhelum road.

"Our loss in this action has been 800 killed and wounded; that of the enemy has been far more severe, and we have captured 53 of their guns, besides all their camp equipage, and a quantity of shot, shell, arms, and ammunition. In fact, the victory given us is a very complete one. Our inactivity at Chillianwala after the sanguinary fight from which we had come off victorious indeed, but

shaken in confidence, seemed to cause as much confidence and elation among the Sikhs as if they had really beaten us. I cannot otherwise account for their taking up the position they did at Goojerat, one which offered them no advantages, and which was exactly such as we could have desired. The battle was well managed; few or no mistakes were made on our side; and Lord Gough adhered to his original plan of operation as closely as circumstances admitted. Each wing of the army had a reserve of infantry and guns. The baggage was safe behind the village of Shadeewar, and well out of the way, a great blessing to an Indian army on a day of combat. The Afghan horse were charged by the Sind horse, and lost a good many men, amongst whom was Akram Khan, Dost Mahomed's son. They fled from the field straight to Jhelum, and crossed that river that same night, so that their fear gave them good spurs and good speed. The Sikhs fled in confusion; part throwing away their dress, arms, and accoutrements, dispersed to their villages on the left bank of the Chenab, but part holding together, though disorganised, made their way to the Jhelum, and crossing on the 22nd and 23rd effected a junction with Atar Singh, who with some guns and infantry and cavalry had been left to guard the boats and the fords. Gilbert, with a strong force, was marched on the 22nd towards Jhelum. He reached it on the 25th, and on the 26th they wrote that the Sikhs had burnt all the boats and retired from Jhelum, with the exception of a rear guard of three guns and some cavalry.

"I am glad to have seen two such field days as the 13th January and the 21st February. It remains to be seen what course Lord Dalhousie will adopt. Lord Hardinge's half measures and wretched policy render everything the more difficult for Lord Dalhousie, and the Lawrence influence will of course be exerted to nurse the bantling of a mixed government which has brought on this costly war. Lord Dalhousie is bent on at once marching to Attock and Peshawur to recapture those places and drive back the Afghans. . . . . Beyond having seen the actions of the 13th January and 21st February, I can derive no advantage, and I have the pleasure of finding myself superseded in the army by numbers both in the infantry and in the artillery. Some of my juniors are now majors, and will after these affairs be lieutenant-colonels. I had the satisfaction of serving on the 21st with a very good officer—General Campbell of the 98th. He is a friend of Sir C. Napier, and as cool, brave, and judicious an officer as you can wish to see for a hot day's work.

"I can write no more accounts of the battle of Goojerat, so pray let Mr. Drummond, Lord Lovaine, and any one else whom you think sufficiently interested in the matter to care for a perusal of a letter from me, peruse this description of as fine a military sight as could be witnessed, sorrily enough told. One hundred and forty guns were pealing around Goojerat discussing the fate of the Punjab, and the issue of the debate is, thanks to Him in whose hands are the issues of such events, very unmistakably in our favour. May we be granted wisdom to make good use of victory."

A little later he writes again:—

"I am glad to have seen this campaign. It has been full of instruction to me; and I do not regret having missed the siege of Multan, as I think the doubtful sanguinary fight of the 13th one of the most striking events in the history of our wars in India. It has pleased God to carry me through the storm and capture of Ghuznee, the general battles of Maharajpore, Chillian, and Goojerat, without a wound, and I feel very thankful for such merciful protection. Happy shall I be if it is my good fortune to have seen and been a partaker in the first military success of Queen Victoria's reign, and to have shared in what I heartily hope, as far as India is concerned, may be the last, . . . . . trusting at the same time that Her life may be a very long one. . . . . I hear that the Governor-General has referred the question of the annexation of the Punjab to the Home authorities, recommending the adoption of the measure. One thing is certain, that we cannot, as irrationally recommended by the *Times*, evacuate the country; another equally so is that any tinkering of the Hardinge policy will, in two or three years, breed us exactly such another affair as the one now concluded, the fruit of a shallow policy and half measures. The only safe course is annexation; but very valuable time is being lost in striking the iron whilst hot, and making known the resolution whilst our army is afoot, and the impression of victory strong upon the people."

Every one knows what followed. Fortunately for India Lord Dalhousie was Governor-General, and Lord Dalhousie's views inclined readily towards annexation. Notwithstanding the failure of the first experiment, Sir Henry Lawrence, misled perhaps, more than anything else, by his chivalrous sympathy for a fallen foe, tried hard to re-establish the Native rule. Had he succeeded, a third Sikh war would sooner or later have been inevitable; and there is little room for doubt as to the circumstances under which

that war would have broken out. If, eight years later, when our power was reeling from the revolt of the sepoy army, fifty thousand Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej and marched upon Delhi, it needs little imagination to realise the result. It has often been said, and this view was strongly held by my father, that Lord Dalhousie's sweeping annexations, unaccompanied by any increase of European strength, were among the main causes of the mutiny; but it is none the less true that when the mutiny came one of those annexations proved to be our greatest safeguard, and the fact should be remembered by those who oppose indiscriminately every extension of territory in the east. If the proud zealot soldiery of Khalsa, our opponents in several bloody and doubtful battles, had once more been left to gather strength and watch their opportunity, the history of our rule in India might have been very different from what it was; and it is possible to conceive circumstances under which the British Government may again be called upon to push the red line forward in more than one direction. No one probably, who has thought over the question, would wish to see a revival of the spirit of annexation as regards our Indian feudatories. The maintenance of their possessions, and of their confidence in our purity of purpose, has been and will be a tower of strength to us; but the question does not end with them.

The Punjab war being over, and the army broken up, my father applied to Lord Dalhousie for employment. Before leaving England he had again called upon the President of the Board of Control, and had again received the most explicit assurances that on his return to India he would be employed in the same position as before. And Lord Dalhousie, whom he had seen at Loodiana, on his way to the front, had received him "very graciously." He was therefore full of hope that the injustice done to him would now be remedied, and his hopes were strengthened by the fact that the Governor-General had at this time an unusual amount of patronage to dispose of. The commissionership of the Tenasserim provinces was again vacant, my father's successor having been promoted to a higher berth. At the same time, the annexation of the Punjab having been decided upon, the civil administration of the country had to be organized; and besides the three appointments to the Board of Administration several commissionerships of divisions were created. Few men had then enjoyed such opportunities as my father of becoming acquainted with the Punjab and its politics. "The first seven years of my service in India," he wrote to Lord Dalhousie's private secretary, "were passed in the protected Sikh

States. Since 1838 my attention was necessarily turned to the Punjab, across which at the close of 1839 I surveyed. When Mr. Clerk was forced from his post as agent on the north-western frontier by sickness, the Governor-General, but for my own opposition, was meditating placing me to act for Mr. Clerk, who repeatedly sought to be relieved. I may say therefore that during the whole of my service in India, from the time when as a youth I requested on landing to be sent to the North-Western Provinces as the most likely frontier for war, to the late concluding scene at Goojerat, my attention has been turned to the Punjab, the Sikhs, and their politics." Nevertheless, the opportunity was not taken, and in answer to his application he received the following letter from the private secretary:—

"*Camp Ferozepore, 13th March*, 1849.

"My dear Sir,—The Governor-General desires me to say, with reference to your letter, . . . . . that, as he has already informed you, he has every desire to serve you, and to give effect to the recommendation which he has received from Sir John Hobhouse in your favour; but it is impossible for His Lordship to give you any assurance that it will be in his power to employ you exactly as you were employed before you quitted India."

This was not promising; and a few days later the first letter was followed by another offering my father a deputy commissionership, that is the charge of a single district, in the new province. The higher appointments in the Punjab were with scarcely an exception to go to civilians of no long standing, men wholly ignorant of the Punjab and all connected with it; while Tenasserim was given to a Major Bogle then serving with the army.

The offer was at once refused. "I am ready," my father wrote, "to serve wherever the Governor-General deems it advisable to employ me, but as you ask me whether I should like a deputy commissionership in the Punjab, I feel it but honest towards the Governor-General, and justice to myself, clearly to answer the question by stating that it would be with very painful feelings that I should enter upon the execution of duties of a subordinate character, and under men, without intending the remotest reflection on any of them, to most of whom I have held superior appointments. Without presumption I hope I may add that whilst in those appointments I am conscious of having done good service to my country; and I write this with not a particle the less confidence, notwith-

standing the impunity with which Sir H. Maddock groundlessly removed me from the charge of the Tenasserim provinces. . . . . Perfectly aware that it may not be in the power of the Governor-General to give me any assurance of literally employing me exactly as before I quitted India, yet I trust that my services, civil and military, have been such that I may hope for employment of a less subordinate character than that which you have been very kindly permitted to ask me whether I should like."

This letter gave offence, and my father was informed that "with reference to the peculiar qualifications requisite for the higher appointments to be created," Lord Dalhousie considered him to have excluded himself altogether from employment in the Punjab by his refusal of a deputy commissionership. He was, however, offered instead the "political" post of assistant resident at the Court of Gwalior, which was about to be vacated, being warned at the same time that the appointment could only be given "on a purely temporary footing." This was a second-rate charge; and it was rendered none the more acceptable by the fact that the actual incumbent, an officer of no experience in responsible civil duties, was one of those selected as possessed of the "peculiar qualifications requisite" for a Punjab commissionership. Nevertheless, as it did not place him in subordination to any junior, and as the work was of some importance, involving practically the entire control of our relations with the great Native State of Gwalior, my father did not decline it. There was at all events a possibility that something better might result. In the meantime, hearing that the letter which Lord Dalhousie had received from Sir John Hobhouse was not as full and decided as he had a right to expect from the promises made to him, he wrote to the latter recapitulating the facts of the case and asking for a few words in support of the exact accuracy of his own statements. He was never favoured with a reply.

Early in May, 1849, my father took up his appointment at Gwalior. It was not altogether a pleasant one. "Think of the retrograde promotion," he writes at this time. "I am now an *acting assistant*. However, I determined not to offend by making a second refusal, so I came here, the vilest, hottest place that can be conceived. Thank God, we got over the long dâk journey very well; and my good wife, who could not be induced to stay at Simla, suffered far less than I had reason to anticipate, a dâk journey at this season being no joke for a man, and trying enough for a lady. We had no sooner arrived than the hot winds set in,

blowing night and day. The house can by their agency be kept cool; but there is no going out, either morning or evening, with any pleasure; the barren hills of rock absolutely breathe out heat, and one feels much as you do at the mouth of a respectable furnace in a cotton manufactory. No wonder the emperors selected the fort of Gwalior for the prison house of their rival brothers and relatives. A few years on these rocks would make a dried specimen of any man." However, my father soon found that there was good work to be done. Trouble was brewing among the officials and troops of the State; and shortly after his arrival it seemed not improbable that the dissensions prevailing in the Court might, if not carefully watched and controlled, result in a second outbreak similar to that of 1843. Under these circumstances the acquaintance which he had made with the politics and leading men of Gwalior during Lord Ellenborough's administration were of much use to him; and he was able from the first to exert a powerful influence over the course of affairs. In the end all passed off quietly, and bloodshed was averted; but the nine months during which he remained in the State were a rather critical period, and on his departure he received a marked expression of the approval of the Governor-General for the successful results of his management.

In the meantime Sir Charles Napier, forced upon the Court of Directors by the voice of the nation after the undecisive battle of Chillianwala, had come out to India and assumed the command of the army. He did so with much reluctance, fearing that his hands would be hopelessly weakened by the hostility of the Court, and only yielded at last to the strong pressure put upon him by Lord Ellenborough. In expressing to Lord Ellenborough his hope that Sir Charles Napier would go, the Duke of Wellington had also expressed a doubt on this point. Lord Ellenborough's answer was—"He shall go," and he had followed up the assertion by an earnest appeal to Sir Charles Napier's soldierly feeling and loyalty. Eventually after some difficulty he was successful. Soon after Sir Charles Napier's arrival he offered my father the command of the sappers and miners. "I want to know," he wrote, "if this will suit your book. . . . . If it does, do let me hear from you directly. Nothing will gratify me more than that the first thing in my gift should go to one of Lord Ellenborough's friends, and *no job*, for that I do for no man living, intentionally. If I did, I could never look Lord Ellenborough in the face. Your claims appear to me to be stronger than those of any man above

you." The offer surprised and pleased my father more than he could say, for Napier was no mean judge of a soldier, and the command was one he had often longed for. But, smarting under a sense of wrong, and determined if possible to obtain from Sir John Hobhouse and Lord Dalhousie a clear recognition of the injustice inflicted upon him, he felt that he could not accept it. His answer was as follows:—

"Had it been vacant at the time I spoke to Grant, it would have been most acceptable; for then I had refused the deputy commissionership in the Punjab, and the question of my coming here or not was still open. Once here I feel in honour bound, however deeply hurt at the manner in which I was sent here, to remain until relieved, and to await the upshot of Sir John Hobhouse's reply. . . . . I assure you it is no small disappointment to a man to whom his profession was the study, pride, and passion of long years of his life to forego the command you offer . . . . . I shall always be proud of your offer. To have commanded my corps, particularly during war, and under Your Excellency, would be the greatest gratification that could have been granted me. In consideration of my duty to my family I must, as it is peace and not war, deny myself what for many years was an object of ambition." He added that he felt he could not, with a growing family, perform as he should like to do the duties of hospitality to his juniors which the command would entail; and further that his acceptance of the offer would be made use of against him. It would be said that he had deprived Lord Dalhousie of the means of righting him, by throwing up in disgust everything which had been given him.

The refusal was unfortunate; for a man of Lord Dalhousie's imperious temper was little likely to grant promotion which was demanded in plain terms as something like a right, and my father lost a promising opening for distinction in his own branch of the service. Shortly after his refusal he was shown what he had to expect by the offer of the political agency at the Mahomedan Court of Bhopal. This was one of the least considerable charges in the political service, and inferior in emolument to the post in which he was then acting at Gwalior. As compared with the commissionership of the Tenasserim provinces it was an exceedingly low appointment, and the fact of its being offered to him as a permanency showed clearly that there was no intention whatever of reinstating him in his former position. This was a sorry termination of three years' striving for justice, and so my father felt

it. For the sake of his family he resolved not to decline the post, but he took it with a heavy heart, feeling that he was, in fact, acquiescing in his own effacement.

His letter again gave great offence. Not perceiving that he had any particular cause for thankfulness he merely wrote a few lines expressing his readiness to "serve wherever the Governor-General might be pleased to employ him." He was informed in reply that he had been selected for the appointment "as a mark of favour and to the exclusion of other deserving officers," and that he must give an explicit answer. Even Sir Charles Napier now turned against him. The old soldier's letter is so characteristic that I quote the following extracts :—

"29*th July*, 1849.

"My dear Durand,—You must ere this be aware how much I wish to serve you. The moment I heard from Lord-Dalhousie that he meant to offer you Bhopal I made my nephew write to you to say I hoped you would accept it. The very next morning your letter told me what you had done, and I regretted that my advice was too late.

"I much fear this may be too late, and I perhaps have no right to offer my opinion, but I cannot resist the desire I feel to see Lord Ellenborough's friend act right, and I frankly tell you I do not think you have done so. You had no cause to give such an answer to the Governor-General as you have done. His desire has been to serve you. If he had not this desire, he might have left you to vegetate and taken no notice of you at all. . . . . Were I in Lord Dalhousie's place I tell you honestly I would throw you overboard on receiving your answer. Had he done so you could not have complained. His desire to serve you has been evident, and in return your answer is very little short of insult. I have never read a word on the subject, but you and others think Hardinge ill-used you. Well, *tell him so!* I thought Lord ——— ill-used me, and I told him so in *my* plain English; but I did not make a quarrel with his successor, because he did not make up to me for Lord ———'s foul treatment. . . . . If one man insults you, you have no right to insist on an apology from another who has no concern with the quarrel, especially if he tries to make up to you for the ill-usage you have received. I repeat to you, my dear friend, you are *wrong*, and were I in your place I would say to Lord Dalhousie that I was sulky at the mischief

done me by Lord Hardinge, and had in a fit of temper replied to Lord Dalhousie's kindness very improperly, and that I accepted his offer with gratitude to him.

"Recollect that this advice is not given to you by a *courtier*, but by a man who has held the world at arm's length all his life, but who, in the long course of his career, never took fire or huff at any man till he was sure hostility was *intended*. . . . . If, however, you feel that Lord Hardinge insulted you, and that Lord Dalhousie is bound to make it up, I have no more to say. Quarrel with him as much as you please; but do not expect me to agree with you, for I do not. All I can say is that I shall be ever ready to serve you if I can."

This was plain speaking, but my father knew it to be well meant, and he accepted the reproof without resentment. Though he could not see the matter as Sir Charles Napier saw it, he felt that his own judgment might be at fault upon a point so closely concerning him, and he resolved to act on the proffered advice. He had already written explicitly accepting the Bhopal appointment. He now wrote again expressing his obligations to Lord Dalhousie, and informed Sir Charles Napier that he had done so. A cordial letter to Sir Charles elicited an equally cordial expression of satisfaction at his decision, and soon afterwards the following :—

"My dear Durand,—I could not see Lord Dalhousie, but I wrote, as time is everything in these matters. He says 'Major Durand shall be agent at Bhopal and stand with me as fair as ever he did.' Again, 'You are aware already that I think Major Durand an able and good man.' You are all square now, and very good natured in bearing all my advice, which was not merited as far as your feelings went, but your *words* did not do you justice. I shall not be very long in India, but while I am, believe me always ready to serve you if I can."

Soon afterwards my father took up his new appointment, and there he remained with little intermission until the end of 1853. He was now reduced to less than half the pay which he had received eight years before, and to a much lower position in the public service, though up to that moment he had not received one word of censure or disapproval from any person but Sir Herbert Maddock, and the censure of Sir Herbert Maddock had been proved to be unfounded. This period of his life was a trying one.

Time after time he saw political posts of importance, any one of which he could have had for the asking during Lord Ellenborough's administration, and several of which had been offered him, given away to his juniors, while he remained unnoticed in his obscure charge. Ostensibly he was not in disgrace. From many of those who were in a position of influence at head-quarters he received assurances of good will, and more than once he was told that the Governor-General had every desire to serve him. But still as place after place fell vacant, his applications were met by the same answer, that the appointment had already been given away, until at last, seeing no chance of better days, and weighed down by the burden of an increasing family, he contemplated retiring from the service upon a captain's pension and settling down at home. "The children are pale and thin," he writes in 1853; "I am afraid the two eldest ought to go home this cold season, for it is risking their strength and stamina keeping them out here; but then comes the weighty question whether with such heavy home expenditure as this would entail, it would not be better, instead of burning the candle at both ends, to go home ourselves. Abroad we might manage to live and bring up our children on about the same sum as I shall have to remit to five children at home in England. Of course I should much prefer, if I left India, living in England; but we could not do that very well unless I got some occupation which added to my income, and that a man out in India has little or no chance of obtaining. I pray God to guide me in this matter, for I wish to do nothing hurtful to the interests of my large family, or unwise—the object of life, so far as mine is concerned, being now the welfare and interest of my wife and children. . . . . Perhaps, my capital being health and capacity for work, it would be wiser to be in England than to hang on and break down in India."

My father's depression at this time was increased by his failure to obtain the military rank which was unquestionably his due. By an oversight on the part of Lord Ellenborough his name had been omitted from the list of recommendations for brevet rank after the Gwalior campaign; and though Lord Ellenborough deeply regretted the mistake, and afterwards did his best to remedy it, the ground lost was never recovered. At the time that they were going over the list together my father shrank from saying anything to the Governor-General about the matter, thinking Lord Ellenborough might himself remember it sooner or later, and feeling that

in any case he could not bring forward his own name. A word then would have got him the step as a matter of course; for in addition to the fight at Maharajpore he had his Afghan services to fall back upon. The word, however, was not spoken; and while a number of officers who had not previously seen any active service got their brevets for this action, he got nothing. In 1849, after the Punjab campaign, he became a major by brevet; but, again, many who first saw service in that campaign received the same reward, and some of his juniors now became lieutenant-colonels. Under these circumstances, after some hesitation, he determined to submit his claims to an extra step of rank. He felt that the brevet of lieutenant-colonel would be of much use to him even in the political department, and that unless it were given him he had little chance of going on service again without being commanded by his juniors. An application was accordingly sent in to the Horse Guards, together with a letter to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, from which I extract the following passage: "Nothing but the extreme importance which rank has now become to my prospects, to the interests of my family, leads me to take a step which I otherwise should have abstained from. Although from the Court of Directors I have nothing to look for, as the offence of having served Lord Ellenborough faithfully is unpardonable, yet Sir John Hobhouse can scarcely object to the mention of the service at Ghuznee, for the administration of which he was a member made Sir John Keane a peer, and gave a step in the peerage to Lord Auckland, after that event. Owing to Captain Peat's mistake, and General Sale's causing the retreat to be sounded, Major Thomson could acquaint your Lordship that but for his counteracting the error upon my report of the real state of affairs the morning's work might have ended very differently both for Ghuznee and the peerages. Then as also subsequently I feel that I was a mere instrument in the hands of God; I would abjure everything like laying claim on account of any merit of my own; but it was the will of Providence to confer on me the good fortune of the service at Ghuznee, and subsequently . . . . . that of being with Lord Ellenborough in the capacity of private secretary during a very critical and eventful period of continual war; closing with that, at the time but half appreciated stroke of political foresight, the destruction of Sindia's formidable army and artillery at Maharajpore."

The attempt, however, was unsuccessful, for the Duke of Wellington could only act on the recommendation of the Indian

authorities, and his military secretary was directed to express his "deep concern that it was not in his power to give effect to the application." Lord Fitzroy's letter went on as follows:—

"In stating this to you, I am instructed to add that, entertaining as he does the highest respect for your talents, character, and services, it is a matter of peculiar regret to him that the circumstances you have now set forth were not brought to his notice by the authorities in India at a time when it might have been possible to have favourably considered them."

The terms in which the refusal was conveyed were of course gratifiying, but nevertheless it was a refusal, and my father felt the blow keenly. "The decision is a great disappointment to me," he wrote to one of his friends:—"The rank would have been of the utmost present importance, and moreover I wished to have it, if earned and deserved, from the Duke. Military service, if it occur and I am ordered upon it, must inevitably prove unpleasant to me, as I shall find myself commanded by juniors in the army; and in political service this want of rank will prove a capital excuse for continuing to treat me as they have begun. Humanly speaking my game in India is up, at any rate it promises to be a most disagreeable one . . . . . When too late I have found out the error of never asking. I started in my military career with the notion that honours begged were not worth the having, and this I still think, but there is a difference between honours and rank, and I felt it a duty to my family, as rank materially affected my prospects, and therefore theirs, to make the application I did."

With this letter my father laid the matter aside; and he had given up all idea of making any further effort when, in May, 1850, he was informed that without a word from him, Lord Gough had been actively interesting himself with the Court of Directors to get the extra step. Lord Gough's letter ended with the following words:—"I earnestly solicit the favourable consideration of the Court of Directors to the merits and services of one of their most able and deserving officers." The reply was to the effect that when the claim was brought before the Court through the usual channel of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the Governor-General, it would receive every consideration. This reply Lord Gough sent to my father with an account of what he had done, and a recommendation to try again. The Court, he said, were hurt at the first application not having gone through them.

Thus encouraged, my father took up the point again, and wrote to Sir Charles Napier, who promised to forward his application and hoped it might succeed. He did in fact forward it on the 26th June, 1850, with the remark—"Brevet-Major Durand's services are so generally known, and his abilities so universally admitted, that nothing need be said by his Excellency to add to the strong claims he has put forward." So far all had gone well, but unfortunately another hitch now occurred. The application was received by Lord Dalhousie in camp, and was forwarded by him to the Military Department at Calcutta for action. By the Military Department it was sent home with a simple covering despatch; and the Court of Directors, seeing no special recommendation from the Governor-General, shelved the papers. In acknowledging receipt they wrote—"These documents will be placed among those which are referred to when officers are selected to receive distinctions from Her Majesty."

When informed of the result of his application and of the reasons adduced for the action of the Court, my father was at first disposed to think that Lord Dalhousie's omission had been intentional. It so happened that at the time the application was submitted Lord Dalhousie and the Commander-in-Chief had fallen out. When informing my father that he would send on the papers Sir Charles Napier had written—"I am going home. The Governor-General and myself take such opposite views of my duties and his, that my remaining can do no good to the public; so I resigned, telling him what I believe to be the truth, that in case of difficulties arising I did not feel safe under him. We have no personal or immediate quarrel, so I hope the public service will not suffer, but I am very desirous of being relieved." The application, therefore, went in at an unpropitious time, and my father had perhaps some reason for imagining that it might have been unfavourably received. This, however, was not the case, as Lord Dalhousie afterwards assured him.

Lord Fitzroy's comment upon this second failure was as follows:—

"Horse Guards,
"*24th May*, 1851.

"My dear Durand,—

"Your letter of the 10th of March reached me four or five days ago, and I cannot say how disappointed I was to learn the result of the efforts made through Lord Gough, and at his sugges-

tion by yourself, to obtain the recommendation of the Court of Directors. . . . . .

"It appears to me, however, that your application was grounded upon your services during the late Punjab campaign In my opinion it ought to have been founded upon your anterior services, and particularly upon those which you are acknowledged to have rendered at Ghuznee at a period when the practice of promising brevet promotion to subalterns for distinguished conduct in the field, on their attaining the regimental rank of captain, did not prevail; and which services, therefore, though so fully recognized by Lord Keane, remain unrewarded. It may be too late now to press these services upon the Court of Directors, but they certainly constitute your claim, and a very good one it is.

"You are, doubtless, aware that the Commander-in-Chief cannot recommend an officer of the Company's army for a mark of Royal favour, but at the instigation of the Board of Control and the Chairs."

He did not add, what was the case, that the Duke of Wellington, when sending up some other names, had of his own accord called for my father's papers in order to afford the Court an opportunity for submitting a recommendation; but that the Court had sent them over without a word, and that the Duke, bound by distinct rule, had been forced to return them.

My father had not been at all sanguine of a satisfactory issue to the affair, and he was not, therefore, greatly surprised at the answer of the Court; but coming when other things were going wrong it served to depress him still further. He could now see no prospect of advancement, either in the political service or as a soldier, and he wrote at this time in much dejection of spirits, attributing his want of success to the wilful hostility of others.

"No rank now given me, if it were much higher than that applied for, can make up for what I have gone through—no honours either. It was God's will that I should experience that the path of duty may lead to disgrace, faithless treatment, and insult, as well as to the reverse of all this. Many far better, far more deserving men, have trod the same path with like results, and I know . . . . . that as before God I deserve nothing, none of the many blessings with which my life has been brightened . . . . . but one thing I feel, that no after career, whatever were its prosperity, could make me forget what I have gone through. It would be comparatively valueless to what it otherwise would have been, and would come as quite another thing, rather for my family

than for myself . . . . . Annie accuses me of being in the blues, perhaps she may be right, but my blues are assuming the form of very permanent ones, whenever I get on my own affairs."

His happiness at this time was not increased by the fact that his immediate superior, Mr. Hamilton, the Resident at Indore, was a man for whom he had little regard. As I have noticed elsewhere, Hamilton had, early in his career at Indore, incurred the displeasure of the Indian Government by his proceedings in connection with the elevation of young Tookajee Holkar to the chiefship of the State; and in later years he came to identify himself in a peculiarly close and unsatisfactory manner with the fortunes of this ruler. In Central India a different stamp of political officer was specially requisite. After the fall of the Mahratta powers the great stretch of country which had been under their sway was wisely broken up by Sir John Malcolm, who dotted it with small guaranteed chiefships, owing everything to the British Government, and certain to stand by us under all circumstances. It has always been the policy of the greater chiefs to encroach on these small States; and the matter requires incessant watchfulness. This my father early recognized; and more than once he found it necessary in consequence to oppose the proceedings of his superior officer, who was inclined to support the Indore State in its encroachments, and to sacrifice the interests of the small and comparatively powerless principalities. My father also disapproved strongly of Hamilton's method of dealing with the public money at his disposal. There was then considerable laxity in the treatment of local funds in out-of-the-way parts of India, and Hamilton's proceedings in this respect were specially open to objection. Altogether, though my father scrupulously refrained from committing himself in public to any criticism upon his superior, it soon came to be pretty clearly understood that he and the resident were not in cordial agreement. For the time he managed to steer clear of any open difference, but he disliked the position and felt unsafe in it. "I wish much that I were elsewhere," he wrote to a friend in England, "for, however right I may be in any matter, my Moulmein experience has taught me what to expect. . . . . It is very unpleasant to be in any way under such a man, but with God's guidance I hope to do my own duty truthfully and honestly, and, however unpalatable the course I pursue and the views I take, I trust to be given sufficient caution and firmness to hold my own walk, and keep clear of absolute conflict. In principles I feel

that we are not in unison. He writes himself up in the papers, and a friend sent me an extract from the *Bombay Telegraph*, his paper *par excellence*, reflecting upon me. I wrote in my own name a letter published in the *Bombay Times*, which, though good-naturedly written, will have given him such a rap over the knuckles that I doubt their being in a hurry to fly their kite at me again. All this sort of thing is not agreeable."

Altogether the years which my father spent as political agent in Bhopal were far from bright. Nevertheless, if the time was one of disappointment and depression, it was not altogether without pleasure and usefulness. I have already said that his marriage had proved a thoroughly happy one, and in my mother's society he found a consolation for much of the trouble of his public life. Moreover, he had been from his youth a great lover of children, and with two or three growing up about him he had always something to distract his thoughts and lighten the gloom into which he sometimes fell. He entered into their small joys and sorrows with a tenderness which made him beloved beyond all measure; and he found his reward in their trust and affection. I quote here an extract from a letter written many years afterwards by Sir Vincent Eyre, who at this time was commanding the artillery of the Gwalior contingent:—"I paid my dear friends a visit at Sehore from the 20th of April to the 17th of May, 1852, to which I look back as one of the most enjoyable periods of my Indian life, for theirs was a truly happy home, in the highest sense of the term. . . . . Your father entirely threw aside his habitual reserve in my favour, and thus enabled me to see the workings of his mind, and to form a truer estimate of his character, both morally and intellectually, than any one else outside his own domestic circle at this period of his life was privileged to do. Perhaps, too, I am not far wrong in conjecturing that his quiet existence at Sehore formed a sort of tableland in his public and private career, affording him more ample leisure than any period that preceded or followed, for giving free scope to the exercise of his highest qualities, both of heart and head. . . . . It is to myself a matter for thankfulness to reflect that it fell to my pleasant lot to be on these confidential terms of intercourse during what was probably his life's noblest and happiest phase—for never was a really *noble* man blest with a nobler wife. . . . . With reference to this visit to Sehore I find the following entry in my journal:—'Never have I spent so happy a month in India. Durand himself has been my friend from

boyhood upward, and his wife is one of fourteen years' standing; and their joint friendship has been one of my greatest blessings and greatest sources of enjoyment. He is a noble fellow, and she is worthy of him.'"

Nor was my father's work during this time, though of a comparatively subordinate nature, without its usefulness. The Mahomedan State of Bhopal, his special charge, was then under the control of a very remarkable ruler, the famous "Secunder Begum;"* and he soon succeeded in gaining her confidence and good-will. Under such circumstances, when a political officer becomes the confidential friend and adviser of a Native chief without losing sight of his duty to his own government, his sphere of usefulness is much increased. The British Government does not ordinarily interfere, or wish its officers to interfere, with the internal administration of the great Native States; but if thoroughly satisfactory relations are established between the British representative and the Native chief, the influence of the former can be exerted in various ways with much benefit to the State concerned. Such a relation was established during my father's tenure of the agency at Bhopal; for the Secunder Begum, whom my father used to speak of as "the best man of business" he had ever known among Native chiefs, was sensible enough to see that his advice was honest and disinterested, and to follow it accordingly. The State was rapidly freed from financial embarrassment, and brought into a condition of thorough order, and when my father left it Bhopal was one of the most flourishing principalities in Central India. Nor was this all. The friendly feeling with which he had inspired its ruler afterwards bore good fruit in time of need. Throughout the mutiny there was no stauncher friend of the English than that brave and cool-headed woman. When State after State turned against us, and enmity, open or concealed, was nearly universal, the Secunder Begum showed a noble example to all around her. Reproached and threatened on every side, even by her own subjects, she adhered with unflinching loyalty and courage to a cause which at times must have seemed well-nigh hopeless, and from first to last she stood out in the sight of all as one of the very few Native chiefs who boldly and unreservedly cast in their lot with the British Government. There was no treachery or trimming in the

* The Secunder Begum was not actually the chief of the State, but was conducting the administration as regent, during the minority of her daughter, under the supervision of the political agent.

Court of Bhopal, and Englishmen and natives alike knew it well. The Secunder Begum is dead, but the traditions she has left behind her have not been forgotten; and though it is said that the loyal little State has not remained altogether free from the taint of Wahabee fanaticism, no sentiment of hostility to British rule will ever find an echo in the heart of the Secunder Begum's daughter, who now rules Bhopal.

Besides the Bhopal State, my father had under his direct administrative charge the principality of Rajghur and the district of Bairseea, the former of which was by his efforts relieved from a position of almost hopeless debt, and provided with a careful and complete land revenue settlement. In addition, the agency comprised within its limits a number of petty chiefships of limited jurisdiction. All inter-jurisdictional cases came before the political agent as the representative of the British Government, and also all serious criminal cases; his judicial duties were, therefore, not light, nor at times unimportant. All this work, of course, took time and trouble, and during the cold weather months my father was fully occupied. From October to April he was generally in camp, and too busy to brood much over his position and prospects, though a few days of comparative idleness occurred now and then, and almost always brought on "the blues" again. He tried in vain to drive them away by the aid of sketching and shooting. "I am turning keen after hares and partridges," he writes rather bitterly during one of his tours, "as I am fit for nothing else." But the keenness, if it ever existed, soon wore off, and the hares and partridges were left in peace. Central India is a good country for tiger shooting, and that he enjoyed, but the tigers came comparatively rarely.

During the hot weather work slackens all over India, except in the head-quarters offices; and in Bhopal there was then comparatively little to do. My father had, therefore, much leisure on his hands, and he was fortunately induced at this time to devote some of it to writing. The *Calcutta Review* was then in its prime, and commanded the services of the cleverest pens and best heads in India. Its tone also was much more moderate and much more independent than that of the Indian Press in general, and both at home and in India it carried considerable weight. Though he always rated his powers of writing very low, the editors of this periodical gladly received everything he sent them, and some of his contributions attracted much attention. Among them was an article on the outbreak in Cabul and its causes, the substance

of which has since been republished as a portion of his history of the Afghan war. About this article he wrote to Lord Ellenborough in January, 1852:—

"Kaye's work* I have received, but have not as yet had time to peruse it; a glance or two at its contents is all that I have had leisure to bestow. . . . . I perceive that an anticipatory blow of mine has had its full effect, and others draw the corollary which I knew, when I saw him advertise his forthcoming History, his violent prejudices would prevent him from deducing, though he might find himself forced to adopt the general views I had propounded as to the glaring iniquity of the Afghan policy and Macnaghten's mismanagement. When I saw that he was going to write what purported to be a history of the Afghan war I forestalled it by an article in the *Calcutta Review*. . . . . The article created great sensation in the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, as I heard from several independent quarters, who were ignorant of the author. My object was to bring concisely into view the state of affairs at the moment your lordship took charge, and then, when Kaye's work appeared, to review it in continuation of the article, but Kaye reviewed his own book before it was published. I see that by dint of making every one deny that they were the authors of the obnoxious article, the Court of Directors have come to a pretty correct conclusion as to the author, and Kaye evidently has adopted the same opinion. I suspect that the article forced him to remould much he had written; and what is a source of great satisfaction to me is to find English periodicals drawing conclusions, doing justice to your lordship's acts, in spite of Kaye's contrary bias. . . . . Of course I have kept my own counsel as to the authorship of the article, and don't wish that what is at present a surmise should be confirmed by mention of my name as the writer. It spoke too much truth to be palatable."

The article was, in fact, exceedingly plain-spoken about various matters; and contained some severe reflections on the civil administration of India under the Court of Directors, which will be found reproduced at pages 194 and 195 of the published history.

Other articles written about this time were those on the Second Sikh War, on Central India under British rule, and on the life and labours of the missionary Judson. The first is a complete

* On the Afghan War.

history of the campaign of 1849, and the second affords valuable lessons regarding the great Native States of Central India and their political relations with the British Government. The article on Judson was a labour of love, for my father had known the noble-hearted missionary in Burmah, and had watched with fervent wonder the devotion and courage of the little band of men and women who worked with him. As my father afterwards wrote, very few have had the privilege of being intimate with three such men as Judson, Corrie, and Duff; and I am not sure that Judson was not of the three the one he most admired.

The 15th volume of the *Review* also contained an article upon Hutton's "Chronology of Creation," which shows the keen and intelligent interest my father took in the scientific progress of the day.

In the 15th, 16th and 17th volumes were published some articles upon the East India Company and its charter, which attracted more attention, and perhaps did more good, than anything else he had written. These articles showed up with merciless clearness the faults and abuses of the existing system of Indian administration, and advocated numerous reforms which the mutiny afterwards forced us to adopt. They supported the interests of the natives of India, of the "uncovenanted" servants of Government, and of the army, against the jobbery and exclusiveness of the old civil service; and they pointed to public competition as a remedy for the failings of that service itself. These papers appeared precisely at the right time; for both in England and in India some feeling was then beginning to be aroused against the Court of Directors. Reformers at home were greatly strengthened by the facts and arguments which my father's experience of the country and knowledge of the subject enabled him to bring forward, and the *Review* articles were made the starting-point for some severe attacks. Before he left Sehore he felt, to use his own expression, that he was "almost even with the Honourable Court," for his pen had done much to set the stone a rolling which not long afterwards knocked their civil patronage out of their hands. In February, 1853, he writes to Lord Ellenborough:—

"I have been a good deal amused by the result of an indirect blow.

"Buist, of the *Bombay Times*, quite ignorant of the authorship of three articles on the East India Charter in the *Calcutta Review*, strongly recommended them to the Bombay people as containing all that they should press for in their petition. The Bombay petitioners

made good use accordingly of the articles in question, and I see that the *Times* and *Spectator* write in admiration of the Bombay petition; the former rather turning against the Court of Directors, and advocating consideration and delay before a new lease of India is assured to them; whilst the *Spectator* deals with the subject in his essayist manner, drawing conclusions favourable to the advance of the Bombay petitioners in the scale of people capable of having a voice in the matters they moot. Buist had no idea that I had written the articles in question, and he attributed them to some writer in England. The joke is that the blow having taken effect, the Court of Directors have apparently been at Kaye on the subject of the articles, so by way of negativing the effect of the noxious articles Kaye in the last number of the *Calcutta Review* writes two articles the key-notes of which are taken from Leadenhall Street, and abound in laudatory views of the existing state of affairs and unbounded ill-will to your lordship. It is long now since I sent anything to the manager of the *Review* in Calcutta, and I have no intention of sending more; but it was very satisfactory to me to find an indirect blow hitting so hard, and in a way the Court of Directors will feel more than any other, *viz.*, a turn of the Press against them."

Before leaving Bhopal my father also wrote for the *Review* an article upon Lord Dalhousie's Burmese War, and one upon the law relating to military officers in India. He regarded the Burmese war as unnecessary, and deplored its possible consequences, thinking, wrongly as the event has proved, that the new province of Pegu would not pay the cost of its annexation, and, perhaps rightly, that the extension of our possessions to the eastward would eventually force upon our hands an Indo-Chinese empire.*

During this time my father was also able to extend very widely his circle of reading, and a large number of the books which he left to his children are marked as having been read at Sehore. He seems at this period of his life to have devoted special attention to law and jurisprudence, a subject in which he always retained great interest.

All this helped to pass the dreary summer months. "We are leading our usual May life," he writes, in the hot weather of

* Some portions of my father's *Review* articles will be found in the second volume of this work, the proprietor of the *Calcutta Review* having courteously permitted their republication. Much of what he wrote, however, being now out of date, has been omitted.

1852, "the house dark and cooled by tatties,* the children paled by the heat, and all nature looking as if it were panting. . . . . What with work, books, and writing, aided by the noise and tumbles of the children, I find the days not over-long or heavy."

He found further occupation in the study of English and European politics, in which, then as ever, he took the keenest interest. Indian officers are too apt even now, and were much more apt thirty years ago, to lose touch of home affairs, and to become engrossed in local topics and the routine of daily duty. It was never so with him. Though he threw his whole heart into his work, whatever it might be, and was entirely free from the contemptible snobbishness which leads some Englishmen in India to look down, or affect to look down, upon the services and the society around them, yet he never became Indianised to the extent of forgetting his own country. The arrival of the monthly English mail was a great event in the quiet life at Bhopal, and he followed with untiring care and minuteness the changes taking place among Continental nations, and the condition of England and English political parties. His copious letters to England are full of these matters. His own views were Conservative, though moderate. What he wanted to see was the reunion of the two sections of the party, the Peelites and the followers of Lord Derby, and a "safe, practical, liberal conservatism, equally distinct from the ultra-Conservatives and from the Russell-Cobden Whiggism of the late premier." In 1852 he advocated as a safe and popular measure, which would be certain to turn the tables on the Whigs, the reopening of the franchise closed in favour of the ten-pound householders, and the introduction of a Conservative Reform Bill. Towards the Sovereign he entertained the old-fashioned Tory feeling. He had been brought up in the idea that an Englishman ought to "stick to the Crown if it hung on a bush," and he rejoiced in every demonstration of loyalty exhibited by the people. In 1851 he writes in answer to some criticisms on the Great Exhibition :—

"A letter from a friend gives me a good account of the opening of the exhibition. A Frenchman sitting next to her husband said he had never witnessed such enthusiasm as was shown towards the Queen. The glass palace resounded with the unanimous chorus. . . This is as it should be, and the glass house will not have been use-

* Mats of sweet-smelling grass saturated with water, and placed in the windows or doorways facing the quarter from which the hot wind blows.

less, if only to exhibit to foreigners that Englishmen are loyal to the Crown."

One thing which appears to have been constantly in his thoughts during the troubled period between 1847 and the Crimean war was the defenceless condition of England, in case of a coalition to invade her. "Lord Ellenborough remarks to me," he wrote in 1851, "that he wishes England *could* do what Russia lately did—rise armed on a necessity occurring—so that doubtless he too feels somewhat with yourself as to the defenceless state of the country. . . . . England as a nation struck me after absence from it, and a little experience of other, eastern, nations, and of war, as the most unmilitary people, the least prepared by habits, whether mental or corporeal, for self-defence, of any that I have ever met with; and our insular position is no longer the safeguard which in former days it was. God will, I hope, be England's safeguard, and overrule her negligence and errors to the fulfilment of His own purposes, but I should like to hear that the administration did something to prevent foreign nations from regarding England as a rich prey for the first well-combined descent on her shores. . . . What would become of India if England were ever invaded with success? There is a question for your politicians. But I suppose India would, under such circumstance, never be given a thought, and left to manage how it could. Pleasant days for the Europeans in India!"

My father held that India ought to be able in case of war in eastern Europe to send a force "strong in Europeans and artillery" at short warning up the Red Sea; but that as a matter of fact we were far too weak to do so. In July, 1853, he writes:—"The news brought are not very promising as to Turkey and Russia. Now the Pegu folly will tell if co-operation from India is looked for. We ought to have had the means of fitting out a respectable force of Europeans, and of despatching them to the Red Sea if requisite, but we have no spare regiments; and if we had, there are no steamers available. Depend upon it, greater means, both naval and military, are much required for our position in the East, even without a European movement, but if the Levant should be the scene of operations, there should be the means of throwing up two divisions of infantry and a proportion of artillery at short notice from Bombay."

In the meantime he had been much concerned by the death of the Duke of Wellington, which was announced to him by a letter from Lord Ellenborough. Whatever view may be taken of the

justice of Lord Ellenborough's opinion regarding the great Duke's political measures, the letter is worth reproducing. It ran as follows:—

"*Southam, September* 23*rd*, 1852.

"MY DEAR DURAND,—This is the anniversary of Assaye, and the great man who on the field of Assaye gave the promise of the field of Waterloo has been suddenly taken from us. You know all his kindness to me, and may imagine what I must feel for the loss of my best and most generous friend and adviser; but I assure you that all my private grief is as nothing in comparison with that I entertain on public grounds. With him is gone the chief security for the maintenance of constitutional government and of the peace of Europe. He gave dignity and authority to the House of Lords. His prudent counsels preserved for us our place in the constitution during the perilous period which followed the Reform Act. He has since given strength to every Government. All have in difficulties recurred to his advice and profited by his protection. His name preserved us from hostile aggression, and stood in place of the military force on which our immunity from war ought to depend. But I can think rather than write upon his loss. He is never out of my mind."

I have not space here to quote my father's answer. He also felt the great Duke's loss, both on private and public grounds, but above all for the security of England. "It will need time and events," he wrote, "before the nation practically becomes aware of the breach which the fall of this one man makes in her defences."

Before leaving this chapter of my father's life, I insert here some extracts of letters to Lord Ellenborough which show his views regarding the employment of natives in the administration of India and the spread of education among the people. He had, as I have said, advocated the interests of the natives of India against the exclusiveness of the old civil service. He now protested against an excessive reaction on this point.

"26*th May*, 1853.

"The press and public at home seem to me to be in danger as regards India of plunging from one extreme into another. You may secure a high degree of ability among Native functionaries, and it is not on the point of mere relative ability that the European functionary is the more valuable instrument in Indian

administration, but it is on those higher considerations which are the resultants of the purer and higher moral standard of England over India that the European element is absolutely indispensable to the orderly rule of this great empire. Natives have themselves repeatedly spoken out to me on this subject: 'Your military power and your integrity, our want of both and of all confidence in each other', is their concise summary of the state of the case; and confusion and bloodshed from one end of India to the other would indeed follow, as your lordship observes, if our restraining hand were removed. But I am anxious on one point, for your enemies have already sought to damage your position as leader of Indian reform by taking as a weapon against you the question of education. Retrogression on that particular is impracticable, but query whether there really be the least cause for apprehension because Calcutta baboos and their children murder Milton and Shakespear.

"In the far future a storm may be descried, but it is one during the raging of which our temporal supremacy will be indispensable to confine the conflict to the weapons of argument and persuasion, and to preclude or put down physical force polemics. The conflict *will* come between light and darkness, truth and error, but not yet for a long time, so far as one may judge by the progress of the truth in its invasion of the territory of error. When the conflict comes it will be long and arduous, but not, I should think, so long as it lasted unfavourable to our rule. When the truth shall be dominant the Asiatic will change his character, but not till then, which is far centuries off. Unless the Spirit of God act with the energy of the first century of our era we run greater danger from undertaking too many things at once, and extending empire faster than our House of Commons is prepared to supply troops. One word from your lordship in favour of sound, practical Christian education would do much good."

"13*th June*, 1853.

"When I last wrote to your lordship I had only had time to look over your own speech, not Lord Albemarle's, therefore my observations about education had reference to the use made in India of some of your remarks on this subject, not to Lord Albemarle's speech, which I had not read. My idea is that you have a thorough contempt for the system of teaching Calcutta baboos to spout Milton and Shakespear, but that you would have none to a sound, practical Christian education, not forced upon the people, but

forming the system open to the voluntary attendance of all who chose to take advantage of it; there is something extremely derogatory to our rule, and also extremely disingenuous, in the pretence of weeding all our religious notions from our educational establishments; it is both despicable and false, and felt to be both by the natives. Wherever we establish Government English schools, according to the scheme now acted upon, if acting in good faith, we ought to have no works put into the hands of the scholars, but such as have been written by infidels; the Mussulmans and Hindoos cannot but regard this as despicable; there should be no pretence of doing that which is impossible, for you cannot teach English weeding it of all its Christianity. You might as well undertake to teach it weeding it of its Saxon element. There would not be a scholar less if Government threw over this very queer sort of hypocrisy, and fairly avowed that being a Christian people our literature was Christian, and that to try to eliminate the Christian element was impracticable and false; that neither our laws, our history, nor our literature could be understood, any more than our ethics, without advertence to the religion of Christ. There is something to me meanly base in this dirty half and half renegade plan of what is styled Government English education. Dr. Duff's school has proved the utter folly of it; and now here, in the heart of a Mahomedan State, and in the midst of a large school of six hundred boys, Hindoo and Moslem, I could form an English class to-morrow and put into their hands, as soon as they were fit for it, Paley or any other Christian moralist without a word of objection from a soul. There is a strange desire to acquire English here, but no teacher is available, and the school funds would not support one without diminishing the vernacular instruction, which I think of more use to the boys, who are all sons of poor people or officials; but I am quite sure they would read any English book put into their hands if there were a teacher, and would expect it to be saturated with our own religious and moral notions as a matter of course, if on subjects in which these were concerned."

In 1853 my father made up his mind to resign his appointment at Bhopal and go home. His health was beginning to fail, and it was evident that he could not expect from Lord Dalhousie any advancement in the political service. He had, it is true, been sent for a few months during 1851 to act as Resident in Nagpore, a place of some importance, and had started in better spirits, cheering up my mother, who was unable to accompany him, with the hope that luck was beginning to turn. But he was at the

time requested to understand distinctly that the move would give him "no claim whatever to succeed to the permanent vacancy," and when the journey had been accomplished, at much expense and inconvenience, for it was the height of the rainy season, and there were no roads between Bhopal and Nagpore, he found that he had been moved simply to suit the convenience of one of Lord Dalhousie's numerous relatives, an officer much his junior, who came down from Simla to Nagpore shortly afterwards and superseded him. With this exception no promotion was given to him; and as the Indian political service was not then a graded service, so that a man had no actual claim to any appointment beyond the one he held, there seemed to be every chance of his remaining in Bhopal for the rest of his career. With several children at home he could hardly live on the pay of the agency, and there was therefore no object in his continuing to hold it except as a stepping-stone to something higher. To make matters worse he had been greatly annoyed during the year by the publication, under the authority of the Government of Bengal, of a book on the Tenasserim teak forests, containing statements about his action while Commissioner of Tenasserim, which he had already shown to be distinctly opposed to fact. On writing to point this out he was told his letter would be filed, and that nothing more was necessary. The misstatements therefore were in no way contradicted, and he was indignant at what he conceived to be an act of deliberate injustice. Altogether the outlook seemed a very gloomy one. At last, hopeless of any better fortune, and sick at heart, he resolved to go, and to find if possible some employment at home. "So far as righting me," he says in one of his letters of September, 1853, "I fear the time has long passed. That time was in 1847 and 1848, when a little bold plain speaking would have done more for me than has been done for Outram, for mine was a stronger case, and a more flagrant instance of iniquitous conduct on the part of a governor. Outram has returned in triumph. I have had years of insult and injustice, and have had every hope and prospect permanently blasted, my career ruined. . . . My last five years in India have been worse than waste of time; they have been years of painful wear of heart and mind, and of corroding indignation. It is God's will, for he has given my enemies success at all times and in everything." A few weeks later he had handed over charge and was ready for a start. "Please God," he writes on the 2nd of November, "I shall now see Mr. Deans once again; latterly every letter from him betrays the sense that unless I

returned quickly we were not likely again to meet. . . . . I have begun to *dream* of seeing my children, and can settle down to nothing."

On the 14th of December, after a difficult march across country of a month's duration, during which his wife and younger children suffered severely from jungle fever, he sailed from Bombay. He had received before starting a letter from the Resident at Indore thanking him for the "able manner in which he had conducted the important duties entrusted to him;" and he left in Bhopal a prosperous and contented State, and a ruler whose lasting good-will towards England, and warm personal friendship for himself, were the best proof of his aptitude for political employ.

## CHAPTER VII.

### 1854—1857.

Efforts to obtain Employment in England—Lord Raglan—Outbreak of the Crimean War—Correspondence regarding the Plan and Conduct of the Campaign and the possibility of utilizing the Indian Armies—Residence at Charlton Kings—Correspondence about Brevet Rank—Mr. Henry Drummond—Switzerland—Return to India—Grant of Brevet Rank—Appointed Superintending Engineer in Calcutta—Prospect of War with Persia—Correspondence with Lord Canning regarding Military Operations in Persia and Afghanistan—Appointed Resident at Indore.

On the 9th of January, 1854, my father landed in Marseilles, and a fortnight later, after a short stay in Paris, he was again in England. He had not seen Paris for five-and-twenty years, and, as might be expected, was much struck by the changes and improvements which had taken place since 1829 in the condition of the city, which, under the hand of the emperor, was being greatly beautified and rendered more suitable for the movement of troops.

Immediately after his arrival in England he set to work to procure, if possible, some employment which might spare him the necessity of continuing his career in a country now become hateful to him. Although the India Bill of 1853 had unfortunately given a fresh lease of life to the East India Company, considerable changes had lately taken place in the constitution of the Court of Directors, and, generally, in the control of Indian affairs; and his first efforts were directed towards service under the Crown in connection with India. A memorandum of his services was sent in to Sir Charles Wood, then President of the Board of Control, with an application for the permanent secretaryship to the Board, should this fall vacant, or for appointment as one of the Directors who, under recent arrangements, were to be nominated by Her Majesty's Government. This application was strongly supported by Lord Ellenborough; and by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, now become Lord Raglan, who, even in the moment of preparation for his

Crimean command, found time, of his own accord, to interest himself in the matter and to press my father's claims. The act was characteristic in its kindly thoughtfulness; and it was backed by a characteristic letter. In writing to tell my father that he had done what he could, he added: "My best wishes have always followed your career; and knowing your abilities and fitness for high and responsible duties, it has been pain and grief to me that the last effort to serve and bring forward an officer, of whom he entertained a most favourable opinion, ever made by the great Duke, should have been so signally frustrated." The application, however, came to nothing: and a subsequent attempt to obtain employment in the War Office was equally unsuccessful. Later in the year my father had some thoughts of resigning the service of Government altogether, and investing what capital he had in business. In the course of the summer he writes to Lord Ellenborough: "Sooner than return to India I tell my friends that I'd only [illegible] join any brewer, well-to-do in the world, [illegible] be too happy to [illegible] wanting assistance, or any o[illegible]ther promising business. I fear, however, that my chances in the [illegible] brewery line are not much brighter than any others, and that [illegible] have no greater prospect of being satisfactorily seated on a gig[illegible]antic ale vat than of being enthroned in Leadenhall Street." He [illegible]had little business connection; and if he had ever seriously conte[illegible]mplated the step, he soon found that there was no chance of his [illegible]being able to lay out his money profitably.

At this time the war with [illegible]Russia engrossed all men's attention, and, as eager as ever to se[illegible]e some soldiering, my father's eyes turned longingly to the Cri[illegible]nea. To go on service was, however, out of the question, for, thou[illegible]gh Lord Raglan would willingly have taken him, the fact of his bei[illegible]ng a Company's officer was a fatal bar to his obtaining any appoint[illegible]ment with the British force, and he had no wish to serve, as he[illegible] might possibly have done, under the Turks. His only chance, the[illegible]refore, of seeing anything of the war was by going out as a mer[illegible]e spectator, and this for a time he thought of doing, for he wa[illegible]s sure of a warm welcome from one at least of our divisional com[illegible]manders, Sir Colin Campbell, and the experience would have been [illegible]useful to him. Eventually, however, he gave up the idea, feeling t[illegible]hat his position would, in some ways, be an unpleasant one, and th[illegible]at for the sake of his family it would be better that he should re[illegible]main in England. Nevertheless, he continued to take a very close[illegible] and absorbing interest in the course of the great conflict, and his [illegible]practical experience of war enabled

him more than once to make timely suggestions which by the aid of some of his friends were brought to the notice of the responsible authorities.

From the first, amidst flattering hopes and prophecies, he saw that the war was likely to begin with failure and loss. "We are so thoroughly unprepared," he writes in April, 1854, "and Russia so admirably well prepared, and enjoying such a start, that it needs something more than a Hardinge in the Horse Guards, and a Graham in the Admiralty, to make up our lee way, if indeed that can be made up, before great events have occurred . . . . . The elements of discord and failure are, amid a complication of powers, interests, and conflicting pretensions, so many; the appreciation of the difficulties and probable demands of the war so inadequate; the state of preparation so backward and insufficient; and the absence of anything like a spirit capable of commanding and controlling all favourable and unfavourable conditions of our position is so dreadfully palpable, that I cannot feel sanguine that this expedition will prove a brilliant exception to our usual blundering on the opening of hostilities . . . . . Lord Raglan has the most difficult and delicate command intrusted to a British commander since the Duke's in Portugal, when Napoleon and his marshals were triumphant, and seemed to have Europe at their feet." He was anxious in particular that early and sufficient measures should be taken by the provision of transport animals in large quantities, to render our army movable on landing; and that, in view of possible winter operations, cover should be sent out during the continuance of warm weather. The immobility of our force during the whole siege of Sebastopol, and the terrible sufferings of our troops for want of cover during the winter of 1854–55, are the best comments on these suggestions. As regards the latter point he had advocated as a substitute for wooden huts, which required time to construct, and were somewhat unwieldy when constructed, the use of corrugated sheet iron. In January, 1855, he writes: "I see that the wooden houses are not yet embarked, and probably won't be so before the middle of the month, so that provided no south-west gales prevent vessels sailing out of the Channel the houses may reach by the end of February, and be put up by the time winter is over, a very gratifying piece of pleasantry for the troops who shall have outlived their sufferings. With stones and mud for the walls, and sheets of corrugated iron for the roof, which, if they pleased, could have been there in abundance of time, whole brigades could have hutted themselves and been tolerably

sheltered before the cold weather set in. The sheet iron the Turks would have carried up on their heads quicker than the troops could use it." Of course, iron is cold, but iron would have been much better than canvas; and snow, which was not likely to be wanting in the Crimea, is notoriously a warm covering.

A minor point upon which he also wrote was the provision of some organised means of quickly succouring and removing the wounded in action. He thought that in the Crimea, with the Turks for allies, our Indian system of "doolees," beds slung on a pole and carried by men, might be made to supplement the unwieldy and jolting waggons then in use. The want of some such arrangement, he said, was "not only a source of great loss and great suffering among the wounded, but also a source of weakness to your line . . . . . Men often go off to carry, assist, &c., a thing very prejudicial to a long fight, as those who go off attending on the wounded are often, as far as the fight is concerned, lost for the remainder of the day."

As regards the plan of the campaign, my father held from the first the opinion that the point upon which our weight should have been thrown was Asia Minor, where in co-operation with the Turks we might have driven the Russians back from the Caucasus, leaving France to act in the Crimea, and Austria, if she joined the allies, to act on the line of the Danube. He dreaded, with reason, the possible conflict of French and English counsels and interests upon one point, and moreover he regarded a successful campaign in the Caucasus as a paralysing blow delivered at the very base of the Russian advance towards India. This view has since been taken up by many, and there can hardly be a doubt that if we had landed a respectable force in Asia Minor in the summer of 1854 the effect would have been great. Not much was needed to turn the scale in favour of the gallant Turkish army which fought so well at Kars; and in all probability two campaigns at most would have seen the Russians driven back along the whole line.

Of course when England began to realise the magnitude of the task she had undertaken thinking men could not fail to be struck by the fact that we had a large and well equipped army in India; and the anomalies of the existing system of Indian administration, under which that army was condemned to absolute inaction while England could barely hold her own in a desperate war, gave rise to much discussion. My father took up this question warmly. On the 15th April, 1854, he writes to Lord Ellenborough:—

"The *Times* has during this lull of a vacation been publishing

several letters on the subject of the aid which might be drawn from the armies of India. Some of these were very ill-considered; one signed 'A Black Officer' is better than those that preceded, but none seem to me to allude to the real difficulty. The fact is that the service of the Crown is now getting the first taste of the consequences of the protracted life of the Company . . . . . Had the Indian armies been Crown armies, there would have been no hesitation at this time in employing a proportion of officers from India in Turkey. Two hundred officers drawn from the three armies of India would have enabled the Crown rapidly to organize fifty battalions of Turkish infantry and some fifteen corps of cavalry. . . . . Now little or nothing will be done, unless indeed with some such purpose in view an Order in Council, or an Act, were passed, rendering the Royal commissions held by Company's officers, now territorially limited, as wide of scope as those of Her Majesty's. Then the artificial difficulty of which the Horse Guards make a bugbear would be swept away, and the armies of India instead of being huge limbs in a state of paralysis where Imperial objects are at stake, could render any assistance the Crown might need from them.

"Of course the two hundred officers must be made good to the armies by an increase of the strength of officers to corps, but if this were done carefully as to selection of officers sent to Turkey, and liberally as to additional strength to establishment, the armies would not be crippled in India, and the Crown would be well served . . . . . If we had thirty battalions of infantry and ten corps of cavalry raised for Lord Raglan's assistance, whilst twenty corps of infantry and five of cavalry were raised for the Caucasian war, the masses of Russia would be met not alone by the British and French regulars, but by the disciplined masses of Turkey.

"Is it not absurd that on a questionable claim for £90 an army of 20,000 men and fifty guns can be unhesitatingly swamped in that unprofitable annexation of Pegu, whilst for really Imperial purposes in a struggle with such a power as Russia, for the sake of keeping in place a dozen Directors, not an officer even can be drawn from the three great and efficient armies of India for the most urgent emergency? This Burman blunder of Lord Dalhousie's, which employs the really spare troops of India, is a monstrous misfortune."

A few months later he writes on the same subject to the *Times*:—"You have struck on the right note . . . . . where you observe on the impolicy of the rigorous maintenance of the

iron line which divides the Imperial and the Indian services. To the jealous maintenance of that complex arrangement by which the Indian armies are segregated from the Crown may be ascribed much of what you, as the mouth-piece of the nation, are now deploring. Every one concurs, whatever their views on the propriety of the system of the British army, that the aristocratic element is therein predominant, and that it enjoys almost a monopoly of the staff and commands. Yet, because the Indian armies have been, and are, regarded as an inferior class of service, from the circumstance that they are not under the Crown, the aristocracy has as a general rule shunned the best field which England possesses for the formation of the superior order of officer, the man you want for commands and staff. Whatever their purely theoretical attainments at a place like Sandhurst, even if your staff were selected from men who had undergone that test, you could not expect the staff to be efficient when their practical acquaintance with their duties had been confined to such opportunities as may present themselves in a well enclosed, highly civilized, and troopless country like England. You might as well expect to train riflemen for action in the field by setting them to knock over leaden soldiers on a drawing-room table with a pea-shooter. The efficiency of the French staff is much more a result of the practical training in Algiers than of the mode of their selection, though that be excellent. No such efficiency was observable in the staff of the French army on the occurrence of the first great expedition after the restoration of the Bourbons—the march into Spain. They had enjoyed no Algerine experience. So with ours now; it has had no training; the dominant element either was excluded or shut itself out from that great school of practical knowledge of war—India; and none has been open to it in England; hence lamentable practical ignorance, want of forethought, and the utter absence of every attribute which a soldiery expect in their officers and leaders, except that one which the men in the ranks themselves possess—courage. The remedy is simple, if the people of England, whom it concerns most, will see it. Remove the arbitrary and artificial line which maintains a host of petty technical difficulties in order that troopless England may practically deprive herself of the Imperial advantages derivable in case of war from her Indian armies. Embarked in such a war as that now before the nation it is no time for delicate considerations in favour of a few elderly gentlemen to whom the patronage of the Indian armies has been reserved to reconcile them to the loss of their civil patronage.

This is the sole obstacle to strengthening the Crown by the vast resources of the well organized, well trained, and admirably officered armies of India. Away with petty considerations. Amalgamate, to the extent of making Royal armies, the Indian with the Crown forces, and you will do more for England in this war than the Ministry who lean at such a crisis on that broken reed, the Foreign Enlistment Bill."

About the same time my father was asked by Mr. Vernon Smith, then President of the Board of Control, to draw up a memorandum on the subject. This paper is too long to be inserted here in full, but I quote a portion of it. The first and second paragraphs were as follows:—

"England, as compared with the great States of continental Europe, ranks low as a military power; yet her wealth, influence, and possessions render her a leading power, and on occasions of general war in Europe she has to maintain her rank and importance among the great military nations, and is then forced to a sudden development of her military resources. She cannot take her place among the nations as a third or fourth rate power.

"Thus conditioned, it is manifestly an act of impolicy on the part of England to tie up her hands with regard to the aid derivable from her Indian empire and its large, well organised, and experienced armies. India, if nothing else, should be of imperial utility as a great military school and field. At present it is so, but in a very limited degree with respect to national emergencies such as the present war. After long delay, and a bargaining for prospective services not equitable towards other officers, a few men who chance to be in England are to be employed by the Crown with the Turkish contingent; but this seems the total advantage to be derived by England from her Indian armies of three hundred thousand men. The Crown ought to be differently circumstanced."

The memorandum went on to discuss the peculiar constitution and circumstances of the three presidency armies; the danger of any sudden and radical organic change, and the necessity for proceeding with caution as to the method of transfer to the Crown. The proper conditions of such transfer, and the objections which would be raised against it, were then examined in detail; and the paper ended as follows:—

"In conclusion, it should be observed that the propriety of placing the armies of India under the Crown must be viewed from the national and the imperial side, not from the purely technical

and personal; and that a host of petty difficulties would at once vanish when the change had to be effected. Those of greatest moment have been brought forward in the foregoing memorandum, minor ones have been purposely omitted; yet even the weightiest objections appear trivial when the broad features of the case are considered.

"What do the insular position of Great Britain, her comparative security from foreign aggression and her command of the seas, her limited territory, her people highly civilized and industrious but jealous of the mere semblance of military power, and intent on commerce and the development of industrial wealth and welfare: what do these circumstances effect, in conjunction with a long peace, towards fitting the nation for a sudden plunge into a gigantic war? Under such conditions her statesmen must be at fault when the storm comes; her military establishments, disorganized and inexperienced, are not likely to remedy the lack of a presiding genius by practical aptitude; her army, whatever the perfection of its mere battalion system and the discipline and gallantry of the soldier, can scarce prove anything else but a body at the expense of which statesmen, diplomatists, and generals are to buy their experience. What the purchase of that experience in men and money is likely to cost people now begin to understand. Nevertheless, it is clear that the normal condition of England in time of peace, as to circumstances unfavourable to her at once stepping forth as a military power, admits of little modification. Had England, however, no remedy? As her own soil was too sacred and limited, was there no other field she could regard as an available school of soldiery? History will reply that on one field alone the armies of England for upwards of ten years were engaged in completing a vast empire; that in the mountains of Afghanistan, on the plains of Sind, of the Punjab, of Hindustan, and of Burmah, great military operations were carried on, and always successfully; but that in consequence of an arbitrary line of distinction the Crown of England, when it came to be engaged in an European war, could derive little or no aid from the officers skilled in the organization, and experienced in the movement and provisioning, of those successful armies. England is at war, probably just beginning a long and desperate war, and that too with an opponent shackled by no respect for the interests of an effete Russian East Indian Company, and careful not to paralyze the advantages to be derived from any well disciplined and organized three hundred thousand men that he may have. His

warrior bands and their officers came from east or west as best suits his purposes and the demands of the war. Our ally, too, France, though enjoying an immense command of men and officers, does not draw a cordon round her Algerine possessions, and confine her Zouaves and Algerine horse to the shores of Africa. Her generals are many of them trained in that rough school, and do not prove the worse commanders for having undergone an ordeal analogous to that which in Afghanistan and India so many have gone through. But England, cramped in her military means at home, and devoid of officers accustomed to war on a great scale, deliberately lops off from the Crown the services of the armies of India, and ignores them and their officers."

A few days after the preparation of this memorandum my father wrote to an acquaintance who had interested himself in the matter:—

"A century, during which the British empire has been won, has given to the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay specialities of organization and of system, partly due to the differences of race, and partly ascribable to the independent, and at times divergent, action of the three separate and distinct governments. Each army, though on the same general plan, has its own regulations and customs. If you lay yourselves open to the accusation of wishing to effect a sudden radical change by the fusion of all three armies into one, and then the further change of converting that one into a Royal army by thorough amalgamation on the Horse Guards model and system, a host of complex questions and dangers may and will be raised. The measure should, therefore, be freed from all unnecessary complication, and kept as simple as possible. The problem put before the public for consideration should be—'How in the simplest way, and with the least possible disturbance of existing efficient organizations, to remove the fictitious and purely technical line of demarcation which isolates the Indian armies in order to prevent the Crown from making any use of those armies, their officers, or establishments.' . . . . . For men in high commands you want good, experienced, convertible minds, not minds whose extreme soar has been the difficulties of a smooth regimental parade. In India, until very lately, a large share of the high political charges were always in the hands of military men; this gave them a wider range and developed administrative talents. You require in a commander good administrative as well as good military ability. Wellington, Ochterlony, and others were thus formed. Only in India can you have the

opportunity of thus forming men. Lord Dalhousie has cultivated the favour of the Court of Directors by usually filling up such charges by civilians; but it is in many ways an error, and is to be regretted even in the purely military point of view. . . . . England, with regard to territory, to institutions, and to race, is so circumstanced that when war breaks out her military force and establishments can never be equal to the immediate emergency. Her remedy for this, her normal condition on the rupture of a long peace, is to render India and its well organized armies as available as possible for the supply of such military deficiencies as are inseparable from a country where they at best play at soldiers, and where the movement of large bodies, their camps, and their provisioning, are either impracticable, or so done as to be inapplicable to a state of war. The reverse of all this being the normal condition of India, regard it, and make it, your great military school. . . . . I think Lord S——— wrong in wishing that the Horse Guards had the Indian military patronage; and his opinion as to the comparative laxity of the discipline of the native troops, and that their officers would have everything to learn if transferred to European corps, is a very superficial view—using the word superficial is no derogatory sense, but as opposed to a deeper insight into matters, the surface view of which is deceptive. The main features of military discipline are the same, but the British officer must in both cases harmonise the maintenance of military discipline with the moral and national peculiarities of the two classes of soldiery. With the one class language, feeling, religion, enable the officer to sympathise easily, and the exercise of command is therefore a comparatively simple act. Where language, habits, religion, every mode of thought, is foreign to the officer, the exercise of command is a far more complex affair. The result, as a general rule, is what might be anticipated—the mind trained to the exercise of command under the simple conditions has a tendency to stereotyped routine habits, and adapts itself with difficulty to circumstances not in usual course; the mind forced to the exercise of command under very complex conditions adapts itself to the simpler form without effort or difficulty; it is like going back to a simpler problem when the mind has been habituated to deal with difficult ones. Accordingly, no hesitation has been shown by the Indian Government in transferring officers from the sepoy to the European corps, or from the native to the European artillery, when requisite."

I have quoted at some length from my father's papers on this

subject, partly because it seems to me that some of the opinions here put forward deserve attention, even under the altered conditions of the present time, and partly because his close examination in 1854 and 1855 of the several questions involved was of much use to him a few years later, when he found himself charged with the duty of representing Lord Canning's views upon the reorganization of the Indian armies after the mutiny. He had then to envisage the matter from a different stand-point, and by the light of a larger experience, but the conclusions at which he arrived were very much the same; and they were the more fair and complete from the fact that in the first instance he had been arguing from the imperial and national point of view, his object being to utilise the Indian army in case of European war, while in the second instance he had specially to guard the interests of India, and to prevent, if possible, the sacrifice of those interests by violent and sweeping measures of reform. In the meantime his opinions and arguments attracted considerable attention, and were made use of by more than one influential statesman in and out of office. Some of them were, no doubt, open to criticism; and in particular it has often been argued of late years that the Algerian experience of the French army has not proved an unmixed advantage in European warfare. But it may be remarked that India was a far finer military field than Algeria, and that in any case Algerian experience would have been very much better than no experience at all. With the English army the choice was between India and Aldershot.

As the war went on the position of our troops and of their brave and chivalrous commander, for whom my father had a strong personal attachment, was constantly in his thoughts. His letter-books are full of letters on the subject, written chiefly to Lord Ellenborough, who, though not in office, followed with the keenest interest every movement of the allied armies, and worked with his usual energy for the welfare of our own force and the efficient prosecution of the war. On many points of military detail he found my father's experience of use to him, and in their general opinions they were very much in accord. It would be superfluous to dwell upon the several points discussed in this correspondence, but, as it filled a considerable portion of my father's time during 1854 and 1855, and is an index of his views and line of thought, I quote some passages:—

"*November 8th*, 1854.

". . . . . I cannot understand why a great country like this, with vast resources, on hearing of the victory of the Alma, did not at once act upon the palpable necessity of the case, and, whatever the cost of the effort, despatch by steam draft cattle of every kind, and wheels, axles, and platforms (sides are easily added), so as to supply Lord Raglan with what was clearly necessary for the efficiency of his army. Nay, as soon as the expedition to the Crimea had been decided upon, and our Government were aware of the fact, the wants of an army so thrown ashore were too evident not to have been foreseen, and every exertion should have been made to despatch from hence draft cattle and carriage. Had this been done, and about the time that our army moved to attack the position on the Alma, a few steamers laden with such a cargo heaved into sight, how different would have been Lord Raglan's position. . . . . A blow at Menchikoff, struck without affording him breathing time from the reverse on the Alma, would have been worth all the cost of such forethought, and might have given us Sebastopol in half the time and with half the loss; but it is as you observe—the War Minister is in Printing House Square. Lord Raglan's conduct with the means at his disposal has been as able as the difficult circumstances in which he was placed admitted. He has risked his reputation upon one of the most adventurous achievements ever undertaken. The least the Government could have done would have been to foresee and provide for his palpable wants; they have not done this. . . . . The *Times* is their oracle and their wisdom, which is so far fortunate, since the *Times* has some ability, some patriotism, and puts some life and vigour into the dry bones of Aberdeen and his prating co-adjutors. What a pity that English statesmen won't think more and talk less—the inflation of hustings bombast, and constituent cajoling, never seems to leave them, even when the very matter-of-fact affairs of war and its material details are on the tapis. There is as much made of a reinforcement of some 4,000 recruits of all arms in course of despatch to the Crimea as if this were more than sufficient to make up the losses from casualties and sickness since the landing. From a casual but very guarded remark in one of 'our correspondent's' letters, I suspect that this reinforcement will not half make up for losses, and that Lord Raglan's force is very greatly reduced in numbers. On receiving the news of the Alma fight, corps from the Mediterranean and cattle from

hence should have been despatched with the hot haste that you reinforced Sir Charles Napier instantly on hearing of his first victory in Sind. . . . . I am disappointed that, except talk, so little has been done to enable Lord Raglan to accomplish the great things the nation awaits at his hands. Please God, he will succeed notwithstanding."

"11*th November*, 1854.

"I have just received the *Evening Mail* giving the cream of the *Times* to the 10th inclusive. I see that now only they are beginning to turn their attention to the possibility of sending Lord Raglan reinforcements from the Mediterranean. After the news of the Alma and march on Balaklava, when I asked Charles Hardinge whether reinforcements had been sent, or were sending, his reply was, 'No, we have none to send, except some recruits to replace losses;' and when I remarked that surely four or five corps could be pushed to the Crimea from the Mediterranean, the answer was, 'No, none can be spared, and moreover they have enough with which to take Sebastopol, which will soon be done, and then the campaign is over for the season.' Possibly he enunciated the opinion his father then entertained, certainly a very short-sighted one, wheresoever it came from. We deserve to fail, though I trust it may please God to give us success. . . . . The operation would certainly have failed, but for the French Emperor, whose strong and timely reinforcements to the army of Canrobert have alone enabled the allies to continue the siege, and staved off a great national humiliation. Lord Hardinge, at the Lord Mayor's dinner, talked of Lord Raglan as one who 'has many great abilities.' Very discriminating in Lord Hardinge no doubt, over his November turtle, but if I were in Lord Raglan's place I should certainly be in no humour to reciprocate the compliment, even with such guarded wisdom of discrimination. How ludicrous it must seem to him and the army in the Crimea to find that at such a crisis 200 men from three of the corps of the Household Heavies are ordered to hold themselves in readiness for the spring! 'Ma conscience,' as Dominie Sampson would say, how the Czar must shake at such 'prave 'ords.'"

"15*th November*, 1854.

"Canrobert's despatch of the 6th November, giving a general account of the attack in force made by the Russians on Lord

Raglan's position, forms a satisfactory accompaniment to that wretched blunder which sacrificed the gallant skeletons of our Light Cavalry Corps. Reducing Canrobert's estimate of the Russian loss on the 6th from 8,000 or 9,000 men to 6,000, and assuming, as is evident from his account, that the brunt of the attack fell on our troops, we cannot well have escaped with a less loss than 2,000 killed and wounded. Lord Raglan, therefore, on the night of the 6th, would find himself with 11,000 men at the utmost. A few more such exhausting attacks, even if we remain successful in the issue, will leave Lord Raglan at the head of a skeleton army. Field Marshal *Times* may well begin to feel the necessity for reinforcements, and those, too, not in driblets.

"Did your Lordship note the marked manner in which Lord Raglan expresses his gratitude to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe for his exertions in obtaining and sending reinforcements from the Porte? It read to me like one of Lord Raglan's quiet, gentlemanly reproofs to his own Government and the commander-in-chief for neglecting his position and difficulties when Lord Stratford de Redcliffe could be alive to them." . . . .

"16*th December*, 1854.

"The enclosed extracts are very interesting. The Russians rest secure on the known immobility of the allied army, otherwise their position on the right bank of the Tchernaya becomes critical from the moment the allies felt themselves strong enough to resume the offensive. . . . . I was surprised after a careful perusal of the long speeches on the address to find that not one soul either alluded to, or seemed aware of, the coercing influence which the lack of transport exercised on the operations in the Crimea; that from first to last Lord Raglan has been acting with fettered limbs, and hard fought battles have been comparatively resultless in consequence. . . . . Palmerston's effrontery is sublime. Who but Palmerston would have put so good a face upon the palpable neglect of the Government to prepare for the war? The people the reserve upon whom Her Majesty trusted. I think this the *chef d'œuvre* of humbug towards Queen and people, the best thing of the sort heard for a long time." . . . .

"19*th December*, 1854.

"How very unsatisfactory the accounts up to the 2nd December. Our reduced army will need powerful reinforcements if its

strength is to be maintained against the complication of trials now heaped upon the gallant soldiery—cholera, dysentery, cold, wet, work, exposure night and day, want of rest, and want of food. Much of all this too clearly to be ascribed to mismanagement, chiefly on the part of Government, if not wholly.

"The Russians seem by the last news getting nervous as to their position on the right bank of the Tchernaya. The arrival of French and English reinforcements has no doubt caused them to draw back their exposed left." . . . .

"*4th January*, 1855.

". . . . The *Times* is as hard on the Ministry as on Lord Raglan, and pronounces them incapables, justly ascribing to their inefficiency the present lamentable state of affairs. At one time I thought the *Times* was bent on making Lord Raglan the scapegoat for the sins of the Home War Department. . . . .

"I am anxious for the result of the line now being taken by the commander-in-chief of Printing House Square, for the expedition was his own particular creation. Under the spur of the *Times* the Government and Lord Raglan, but more particularly the latter, ventured reputation on one of the most hazardous enterprises ever undertaken; and the moment things go wrong the *Times* turns savagely on both, and never glances at the fact that the conditions of success depended on the place being carried before the first strong Russian reinforcements came up. If not carried before that time the game was a most hazardous one for the allies, quite beyond the ordinary chances of war against and not for them, and only to be retrieved by some most desperate stroke of vigour and genius requiring a sound, well organised army for the giant effort, when alas, but for the French Emperor's foresight, the allies could not even have held their own." . . . .

"*8th January*, 1855.

". . . . Our Ministers started this expedition without advertence to the fact that the art of war consists in fighting battles under such conditions as to secure great results, and that great battles with no results show ignorance of the craft.

"McMurdo's appointment is a whole campaign too late. I don't comprehend Lord Raglan not sweeping the Mediterranean and south coast of the Black Sea for means of transport, and

still less do I understand what Lord Hardinge and the Duke of Newcastle were about not to pour in the means of transport as soon as they ordered the expedition and knew the time it would reach the coast, especially after the warning you gave them. . . . I grieve for our noble British army, whose strength, efficiency, and renown have been most ignorantly and really most culpably sacrificed. Too late, too late, is eminently the Duke of Newcastle's motto."

"20*th January*, 1855.

". . . . If McMurdo's scheme is knocked on the head, what are they going to do? Nothing? Leave the army a motionless mass? or depend on the sympathy of the nation and the mechanical skill of Messrs. Peto and Co. to lay rails wherever the army is to move? If the nation can stomach such incapacity at the helm it deserves to lose armies and honour. A very clean sweep is wanted, otherwise our very allies, disgusted with the incompetency of our co-operation, will prove faithless—make their own terms, and leave us to extricate ourselves how we can. We are not fulfilling our share of the bargain when we leave our army without legs to move on. Would any one consider a fleet fit for service that had neither sails nor steam? . . . . I recur continually to my old definition of the British soldier, the plaything of fools in peace, and the victim of fools in war."

On the 18th of April my father was shocked and distressed at hearing from Lord Ellenborough that a complete abandonment of the Crimean expedition was possible. "I heard yesterday," Lord Ellenborough wrote, "on authority I cannot doubt, that on the failure of the bombardment the French Government contemplates the withdrawal of the allied armies from all the ground they occupy, except Kamiesh, to Constantinople. Kamiesh they are beginning to fortify, and they imagine they can hold it with 10,000 men without the risk of being entamés. The army would file off by its left. Balaklava is not deemed tenable by a garrison, so the whole army would, as the French design, be embarked at Kamiesh. This is like retiring by one bridge. . . . . I *say* nothing, but I have had a sleepless night. I am quite oppressed by the apprehension of loss and the certainty of disgrace. I think I shall go to-day to Sir William Napier about it. It is enough, however, to kill the historian of the Peninsular War."

My father answered on the following day:—

"Your note of the 18th is to me very much what the signal at Madras was when you first reached India. Such an operation as that you mention will be utterly disgraceful, and if the enemy are not all drunk or asleep should not be practicable except with great sacrifice of lives on the part of the allies, and the loss of many enduring trophies. The bare possibility of such an operation is grievous to contemplate. It will be a great triumph for Russia, and the greatest humiliation that England and France could be subjected to, short of being invaded and overrun by the Russian forces. We shall sink low in the world's estimation, and long years of war, and a train of striking successes, can alone re-establish the renown of the British arms. The eyes of the Eastern and Western world were on this duel between the Czar and the allies."

Shortly afterwards he writes again to another friend:—

"News ought to be at hand of the result of the bombardment, and one's thoughts run on little else than this portentous event. Grosser mismanagement than this war cannot be conceived. In this, as in other instances which have come within my own experience, the courage and blood of the British infantry may under Providence rectify the errors which have stamped the conduct of the war with ominous proof of the ignorance of war in which British statesmen rejoice. Heartily do I hope that we may be saved the dire humiliation of utter failure, for failure is synonymous with long years of general widespread warfare. The East and the West alike will kindle, and that great curse stalk over the earth until exhaustion restore peace to a wearied world."

During the latter half of 1854 and the first half of 1855 my father was living with his family at Charlton Kings, near Cheltenham. He had obtained in November, 1854, an extension of leave, in order to avoid returning to India until Lord Dalhousie's term of office was at an end. It is from this time that my first clear recollections of my father date. Though he had now very uncertain prospects, and a good deal in other ways to trouble him, he was happy in the society of his wife and children, and thoroughly enjoyed the pleasant country life. It was one of those short breaks in the career of an Indian official when he can gather everything he loves around him, and steep himself for a time in the ideas and associations of England before returning to work in the far away land of his exile. No one who has lived all his days at home can fully realize the happiness of such a time to those

whose lives lie among Eastern scenes and Eastern races and Eastern tongues. And to a man whose tastes were so simple, and whose affections so strong, the quiet Gloucestershire home was very grateful. Though he took the keenest interest in everything that went on in the outside world his happiness was there, and he made happiness for us all. It was the first and almost the last time that we were all together, and many remembrances come up now, after seven-and-twenty years, of long days with him at Charlton or in the Cheltenham woods, where he delighted in taking us for sketching and flower gathering rambles. Loving nature himself with a rare affection, he thought children should be as much as possible under the open sky, and he did his utmost to imbue us with his own feelings for the country. He had to a remarkable degree the knack of interesting and pleasing young people, for whom he was always ready to take trouble and to sacrifice his own comfort, and who in return took to him and trusted him instinctively. We knew it was a real pleasure to him to be with us, and it was our greatest pleasure to be with him. Never hard or hasty, and full of varied knowledge and the power of imparting it without wearying the youngest of those about him, he was a delightful companion. I have never known any man more universally beloved by children, or more happy among them.

The year 1854 was therefore on the whole the pleasantest he had spent since his appointment to Tenasserim, and though he had been unsuccessful in finding employment, he was in better health and spirits. On the 31st December he writes in his journal:—

"My visit to England in 1854 is remarkable in one respect. It has pleased God that I should again enjoy the pleasure of seeing all my own friends, even the aged Mr. Deans, now close on eighty-nine, in as good health and strength as could be expected; but they are, all of any age at least, somewhat the worse since I parted from them in 1848, and I cannot well anticipate that another equal interval could pass over our heads without causing gaps. I think the pleasure derived from Thomson's visit to London in the spring was as refreshing and satisfactory as anything since my return to England, except the meeting with my children . . . . . In a worldly sense my visit to England is a failure so far as 1854 is concerned. God, however, overrules all, and what have been disappointments may prove in the end Providential direction of events to the advantage of my poor and numerous family and myself. Whether adversity or prosperity await us in 1855, may

faith in Christ's love and care support and guide my wife and myself; and may the path of duty be made clear to us, and strength and ability granted us to walk therein whither God wills and points out."

In the summer of 1855 he left Cheltenham for the Continent, where in anticipation of his return to India he wished to settle his family for a time. He had lost heavily by the financial measures of Lord Dalhousie's Government, resulting in the fall of the Indian four per cent. paper, in which his savings were invested, to some fifteen below par; and he was therefore anxious to find some cheaper place of residence than England. Moreover, he thought it important that his children should acquire while young some practical knowledge of French and German. He disliked intensely the prospect of leaving Europe again. "The thought of returning to India," he wrote, "is more hateful to me than any language can express. It is indefinite separation from my wife and children, whilst no amount of success (if such came, which will not be the case) could wipe out the memory of the last nine years . . . . . The best years of my life have been passed in practical experience that a common proverb has accidentally dropped a negative, and that in India 'honesty is *not* the best policy.'" But it was impossible for him to remain much longer on leave, and in July, 1855, he crossed over to Lausanne in Switzerland, and settled down for the remainder of the summer in a beautiful old house at Renens-sur-Roche, overlooking the blue waters of the lake.

Before leaving England he had made one more effort to get his step of brevet rank. Sir Charles Wood, then President of the Board of Control, to whom he first applied, felt himself unable to help in the matter on the ground that my father's service at Maharajpore had been in a civil capacity, as private secretary to Lord Ellenborough. As he remarked in answer, this was hardly a fair view to take. "A round shot nearly did me very uncivil service on that day, and had I been in my saddle instead of out of it at that moment I doubt if the casualty list would have omitted my name as one dying a civil or non-military death." Moreover, his claim was not for Maharajpore alone. Though for this service by itself Sir Charles Napier and Lord Gough had considered him entitled to the rank, he had other grounds to go upon. His time on the Governor-General's staff had been a period of incessant war, with the general conduct of which he had been closely connected, and there was nothing unreasonable or unusual in the grant of military rank for indirect participation in military operations. His Afghan

service, too, had been purely military. But Sir Charles Wood, though he wrote kindly on the subject, could not be brought to see the propriety of a measure approved by every military authority concerned, from the Duke of Wellington downwards. Later, when Mr. Vernon Smith came to the India Board, the claim was more favourably considered; but here again the old objection came to the front. Nothing could be done without the recommendation of the Governor-General, and that recommendation had not been given. Lord Dalhousie had not in any way opposed the request made by the two commanders-in-chief, Sir Charles Napier and Lord Gough, but he had not backed it. My father was assured that the Court of Directors were not against him; but that they were bound by rule, and that, unless the Governor-General would recommend him, they could do nothing. With this assurance he was forced to be content. He could not, however, divest himself of the feeling that his efforts were being wilfully obstructed, and that advantage was being taken of technical objections to defeat a claim which every one except Sir Charles Wood acknowledged to be fair; and in the bitterness of incessant failure he wrote strongly to this effect, so strongly as to call forth a pointed remonstrance from one of his best friends. Mr. Henry Drummond, well known as a Tory of the old school, and a singularly able and high-minded man, had taken up the matter warmly; but, like Sir Charles Napier before him, he felt it his duty as a friend to speak without reserve, and a letter of my father's which denounced the conduct of some of the Directors as "false, base, and shuffling," called forth the following reply:—

"I am very sorry that we have been unable to succeed in obtaining what you wish, but I must say that from all I have read and heard I think you are making yourself enemies, and destroying your own prospects, by the feelings which you testify towards all concerned. This opinion is not only my own, but it is what I hear all your friends say . . . . . I have known intimately many naval officers, and I can truly say that I never knew one . . . . . who did not vow that he was the most ill-used man on the face of the earth. Many officers undoubtedly are ill-used, and you are one, but it is quite preposterous to imagine that any set of men conspire to oppress another. If success is not obtained, it should be taken like a broken leg, or sickness, or any other unavoidable misfortune. Every one has some injudicious friend or another to fan the flame of discontent, and persuade us the world is not aware of our merits, but they really only help forward our

ruin. I do not care a rush what your opinion of other people is if that opinion did not necessarily engender in them the feelings you entertain towards men on whom after all professionally you depend; and it is only for your own interest that I conjure you to give up these harsh opinions of others . . . . . You have too good a foundation for the disappointment you feel. Pray forgive my speaking so openly to you."

My father accepted the letter in the spirit in which it was written, but he could not altogether admit the justice of the reproof. "Throughout my life," he wrote, "my purpose and endeavour has been to perform every duty as unto God; which involves due reverence to man, whether one's superiors or subordinates; and with the exception of Maddock my superiors have always expressed their satisfaction. In that exceptional instance principle came into conflict with the acts of my superiors, and though very clearly foreseeing the immediate consequences to myself, I preferred the call of duty to that of expediency. It has pleased God that my so doing should result in my superiors heaping upon me everything calculated to break a man's heart, in my enemies having entire success, and the most bitter of them have risen to those posts from whence they could continue to do me the most injury. Under such circumstances no conspiracy is requisite; the mere activity of hostile influence is quite sufficient, and there has been a great variety of it at work. I know that adversity is God's gift, and although I cannot help seeing events and persons by the light of indubitable facts, I trust that the fear of God will enable me to strive to do every duty, both towards man and Himself, in a right spirit. If the fear and love of God fail in doing so, it certainly will not be the fear of man that will, for whether for good or evil, I have not been given much of it." As to the opinions expressed, he said he had only expressed them to those whom he regarded as friends; and for the future he would hold his peace. Throughout the remainder of his life he did in fact endeavour to subdue this bitterness of speech, but he found it hard, and in later years it more than once broke out again. He had reason enough for it as a rule, if not always, but it was unfortunate and did him harm. The object of this memoir being to show him as he was, and not to conceal all that others regarded as the defects of his character, I have extracted these letters here.

In November, 1855, after some pleasant months in Switzerland, during which he enjoyed more than one mountain excursion and filled up a volume of sketches, my father started for India,

leaving his wife and family at Lausanne. On the 2nd of January, 1856, he landed in Calcutta.

His first step on arrival was to procure an interview with Lord Dalhousie, and to ask about his brevet rank. Telling the Governor-General how the claim had been thrown out, my father enquired whether it had been Lord Dalhousie's wish to oppose Sir Charles Napier's recommendation in his favour. This Lord Dalhousie at once disclaimed. He said he had had no idea of the kind, asked how the mistake could be remedied, and professed his willingness to send home a letter asking for a reconsideration of the case. My father thereupon represented the matter officially. He was assured in reply that the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation had been sent home by the government of India "in the usual manner," but it was added that a second reference would now be made. This was accordingly done, and the closing paragraph of the despatch to the Court of Directors ran, I believe, as follows:—"If your Hon'ble Court are under any impression that the Governor-General or the President in Council viewed Major Durand's claim unfavourably, we trust the impression may be entirely removed by this explanation, which in justice to Major Durand we think it right to make; and we now beg cordially to join in the original recommendation of the late Commander-in-Chief in favour of Major Durand's application."

This letter seemed at last to remove all possible grounds of doubt, and my father now expected that he would get the step, as applied for and recommended, with effect from the date of the original recommendation. He was, however, to experience another disappointment. Some months later he received a cordial letter from the President of the Board of Control informing him that the brevet of lieutenant-colonel had been granted, and adding that Mr. Vernon Smith was "very much pleased that this justice had been done during his presidency to one of whom he entertained so high an opinion." But Lord Hardinge, then Commander-in-Chief, objected to the antedating of the brevet; and thus the mistake of Lord Dalhousie's Government in not backing the original recommendation, if indeed any mistake had been made, which Lord Dalhousie's Government denied, was to cost him seven years of seniority. He made one more effort to get things straight. Pointing out that the effect of Lord Hardinge's order was to put him at the bottom of the lieutenant-colonels instead of the top, and to leave many of his juniors above him, he sent in a formal application

for the antedating of the step. Lord Canning had then succeeded Lord Dalhousie, and both he and the Commander-in-Chief in India supported the application. Nevertheless it failed. Though the Duke of Cambridge, who had now succeeded Lord Hardinge at the Horse Guards, applied on his behalf to the Court of Directors, they once more, and this time finally, defeated the claim. The answer was that as the granting of the request would put my father over the heads of 266 officers, 167 lieutenant-colonels, and 99 colonels, who had now risen above him, the Court submitted whether it would not be advisable to support Lord Hardinge's decision. The Duke, who had behaved very kindly in the matter, could do no more, and thus the Court, making the very magnitude of the original injustice the excuse for not repairing it, finally put an end to my father's prospects of going on military service with a chance of satisfactory command.

I have gone at some length into this matter, at greater length perhaps than such a matter need ordinarily be treated, because it had so much effect upon my father's prospects as a soldier, and did so much to embitter his life, that it seemed necessary to state the circumstances in full. Whether he was right in attributing his failure and supersession to the wilful hostility of the Court of Directors may be a matter of opinion, but he surely had considerable justification for thinking that something of the kind was at work. He knew from one of their own number that there was a "violent prejudice" against him in Leadenhall Street, and he now found his military career practically ruined by the Court when every one concerned acknowledged the propriety of his application. His claims to civil advancement had been expressly admitted, and he had nevertheless been kept out of it for ten years. His claims to military advancement were equally admitted, and this was the result. If there was no inclination to treat him unfairly at the Court of Directors he had at the least been singularly unfortunate, and there was some excuse for his imagining that there was more in it than mere ill-luck.

For fifteen months after his return to India my father remained without civil or political employment, and for the first three months he was without any employment at all. Several suitable appointments were vacant, and the annexation of Oude, a measure which he considered "indefensible," placed at the Governor-General's disposal several more. From Lord Dalhousie, however, he expected nothing, and received nothing. On the 29th of February Lord Canning was sworn in as Governor-General of

India, and my father writes in his journal—"How different my position and prospects from what they were in the same room about the same time fifteen years ago." Well he might say so, for during the last ten of those fifteen years he had gone steadily down hill; and now after eight and twenty years' service, and distinguished service, he was vegetating on unemployed pay. At first it seemed as though Lord Canning were little disposed to do more for him than Lord Dalhousie had done. My father afterwards found that Lord Dalhousie had spoken of him in such a way as to injure his prospects with the new Governor-General; and Lord Canning, obliged at first to trust to the opinions of others, found that in this case Lord Dalhousie's opinion was backed by the opinions of his civil secretaries. My father was said to have refused or resigned everything offered to him; and George Edmonstone, then in charge of the Foreign Office, "did not want him in the political department," which was again being rapidly converted into a preserve for the covenanted civil service.

In April, 1856, seeing no chance of anything else, my father fell back upon a subordinate appointment in the Department of Public Works, that of inspecting engineer of the presidency circle. This necessitated his living chiefly in Calcutta, where he remained with little intermission throughout 1856, leaving only for a short river trip in the autumn to Colgong and Bhaugulpore on business connected with his charge. George Yule, afterwards one of his colleagues in the Indian Council, was then the chief civil authority at the latter place, and the meeting was a pleasant one, though short. But the journey up the Ganges was depressing. On the 13th of August he steamed past Barrackpore, the country house of our Indian Governors-General; he had passed many happy days there in Lord Ellenborough's time soon after his marriage, when everything seemed bright before him and the ball was at his feet, and the sight of the place now saddened him. He writes in his journal:—"The *Chunar* started at 8.30 A.M., morning cool and rainy. At ten minutes to eleven passing Barrackpore. Took a long look through the glass (poor Sanders'*) at our old house, now uninhabited and going to ruin . . . . . How little did I in old days think that in 1856 I should be passing the place on a job like my present one. Heu mihi! Dreams and prospects where are ye?"

* Major Sanders of the Engineers had been with my father in Afghanistan and was killed at Maharajpore.

A few months later my mother joined him, after a separation of a year, leaving us children in charge of a French clergyman near Lausanne. She had always held that her first duty was to her husband, a principle not universally recognized in India, at times perhaps not easy to act upon when recognized, and she would not remain longer away from him. We went down with her to the beach at Ouchy, and there said good-bye. It was the last time we ever saw her, for when he returned to England two years later he was alone, and our beautiful and gentle mother was lying in an Indian grave.

During this year, 1856, my father had opportunities of renewing his acquaintance with several old friends, and of forming some new friendships which lasted to the end of his life. William Baker of the Engineers, Henry Yule, Outram, Henry Lawrence, Charles Allen of the Civil Service, and Dr. Duff, were among those whose names fill the pages of his journal. Dr. Duff, in particular, he now got to know well, and greatly to admire. On the 17th February, 1856, he writes in his journal:—

"Went to the Free Church. Was given a chair close under the pulpit, an excellent place for seeing and hearing, and alongside of a row of native Christians, who very kindly found hymns and chapters and gave me them . . . . . The sermon was by Dr. Duff, who preached admirably, but with an energy and emotion which will shatter his weak frame if too often repeated. He can scarce stand such exertion as that more than once in a way. I have not heard him preach since we were on board ship together in March 1830, nearly six-and-twenty years ago. The native Christians were pretty numerous, and several native women were among the congregation. Here was the living proof of the success of Duff's career. Six-and-twenty years ago he and I were on Dassan Island, or only just leaving it, after being wrecked there. Since that time he has several times been near death's door, gone to England, to America, to the Continent, Greece, the Holy Land, and preferring the work of the mission to being head of the Free Church in Scotland, is back again once more at his post. How comparatively poor and insignificant seems one's own career, poor in fruit, and rich in mental misery and bitterness and disappointment."

Next day he writes—"Dr. Duff very kindly called this morning and took me with him on the occasion of his first visit since his return to the Free Church School, his own institution."

After this they were frequently together, and became close friends —a friendship which was never interrupted until my father's death.

In January, 1857, my father left Calcutta for a tour of inspection down the so-called "Dalhousie Road," a fever-stricken jungle track skirting the east coast of the Bay of Bengal from Chittagong to Akyab. This had been designed to give the Bengal army a land route to Burmah, and thus avoid all questions connected with the embarkation of Native troops, always disposed to give trouble about going on shipboard. The march was rough and trying, and my father found the road to be in every way unsuitable for the movement of troops. The conception was from the beginning anything but a happy one, for the true remedy lay in the enlistment of a class of Sepoy who would do what was required of him, not in concession to the prejudices of our pampered high caste regiments.

In the meantime my father had been able to do some good outside the limits of his nominal duties. Towards the close of 1856 he began at last to make some way with Lord Canning, and to impress the Governor-General with a sense of his abilities. We were at the time on the point of war with Persia, which was again threatening Herat, and various schemes for the coercion of the Shah and the preservation of the "key of India" were being pressed upon the Government. Wholly ignorant of war, and surrounded by men whose experience in this respect was not much greater than his own, Lord Canning bethought himself that my father might have something to say upon the subject; and on the 6th of October, after a long conversation, he asked for a memorandum upon a suggestion put forward by Colonel Jacob, that we should occupy Quetta with a force of 5,000 men as a measure of precaution in case of an advance on Candahar becoming ultimately necessary to check and repel Persian aggression. Two days later the memorandum was submitted. My father was altogether opposed to the measure. After alluding to difficulties of supply, to the probability of our force finding itself involved in hostilities with neighbouring tribes, and to the certainty that such a demonstration would be viewed with much jealousy in Afghanistan,* he wrote :—

* The occupation of Quetta, when it did take place many years later, was undoubtedly regarded by the Amir Sher Ali Khan as a direct threat to himself. His correspondence with his relative Sekunder Khan, found in Cabul in 1879, shows the importance attached to the point by the latter, a very shrewd and travelled Afghan noble.

"Should that greatest of misfortunes for India, a second invasion of Afghanistan, prove inevitable, former experience must not be forgotten. There should be no tentative demonstrations, no piecemeal operations, no drifting into extensive and unpremeditated operations. The advance into Afghanistan should be in as great strength, as rapid and continuous, as may be practicable, with the main condition to reach in as efficient a state as possible the strategical point which is the aim of the expedition. This presupposes great preliminary arrangement on the part of the commissariat, for it must be prepared not alone for the supply of the army near its base, for that is now comparatively easy, but for the supply of the army when distant from its base, yet depending on its base for the means of sustenance. Such an effort is great and costly, but it is the sole condition for a satisfactory campaign to the west of the Indus. An advance under faulty and insufficient commissariat arrangements implies cramped operation, and occasional ill-timed paralysis of force. Delay eats up the country, exhausts baggage cattle, accustoms marauding tribes to the system of a regular force, and shows them its weak side and gives opportunity for coalition and guerilla plundering. Then follow punitive detachments, and petty collateral operations, which harass the troops more than they do the marauders, and do not further the main object of the expedition. The invasion of a difficult mountain country is in one respect like undertaking a siege; time is lost and success jeopardised by a beginning of operations before means and material are adequately provided. An important consideration here presents itself. The Burmese war and the resulting occupation of Pegu has permanently diverted to the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal about that amount of force which formerly constituted the superfluity of troops available for foreign service without positive danger to the internal security of India. The war in the Crimea still further diminished the strength of European force in India; corps of infantry and cavalry were taken, which have not been returned. The Governor-General, therefore, as respects available force for foreign service, is far less favourably circumstanced than former rulers of India when engaged in operations to the west of the Indus; and although our Indus frontier brings up our base to the gorges of the Afghan defiles, and therefore presents a great advantage over the old base of operations, when Scinde and the Punjab were powerful and independent, and lay between our columns and their base, yet this decided advantage is only such when the force available for foreign service, and that can be spared without risk

to the internal peace of India, is fully equal to the task imposed upon it, and can carry it out without faltering or delay, with imposing strength and rapidity. Better abstain from an advance into Afghanistan than strip India too much of troops, and yet send too few above the passes, and those, too, in driblets.

"The term 'invasion' has been used throughout, because whatever the disposition of the Khan, every Afghan and Belooch will take a clear matter-of-fact view of our advance, and will know that once again above the passes and in occupation of Afghanistan it will be a permanent military occupation.

"No allusion has been made to the other alternative mode of hostile action against Persia, namely, up the Persian Gulf, for that is distinct from the consideration of the suggestion at the head of this memorandum."

Lord Canning's answer was as follows :—

"*Barrackpore, October 9th*, 1856.

"I have just received and read your excellent memorandum on Quetta, and beg you to accept my thanks for it. It closes with a reference to action in the Persian Gulf. I did not ask you to put anything on paper in regard to this part of the subject, because it did not occur to me that you would have turned your thoughts to it; but if you have done so, pray let me have your views upon it.

"The following data will serve as points of departure :—

"An expedition of 5,000 men, or thereabouts, including two European regiments and 600 native and irregular cavalry, will be ready to leave Bombay for the Persian Gulf towards the end of the month, when the final orders of the Home Government to this effect may be expected.

"The first object of the expedition is the occupation of Bushire and Karrak. To this the instructions of the Home Government are as yet confined.

"The force is larger than this object, alone, requires. It is made so because there is good reason to believe that the capture of Karrak, and even of Bushire, will no longer be found to be the talisman that it has hitherto been considered to be; and because it will be well to indicate to Persia from the beginning that something more is contemplated.

"Meanwhile the force will establish itself in the rear of Bushire.

"The question remains, what shall the ulterior operations be?

"A march upon Shiraz is the most obvious one. The difficul-

ties are the nature of the country, scarcity of forage and water, and, what applies to any inland operation, scarcity of animals for transport.

"I do not know the extent of this last impediment as yet. Commissariat officers are now in the Gulf investigating it, but of its existence there is no doubt. The uncertain point is the question of time, how long it will take to overcome the difficulty, and to collect a sufficiency of animals at Bushire.

"An advance might be made up the Karoon, but Shuster must be the limit; and once arrived there the country is all open to us, as it would be at Shiraz. To the north, and indeed in every direction towards the interior, it may be considered impracticable.

"As bearing upon the question generally I send you a memorandum by Captain Jones, the Resident at Bushire, an itinerary of routes from Bushire, also provided by him, and a letter from Sir H. Rawlinson to Lord Elphinstone. . . .

"The amount of force to be employed in operations inland will depend upon the operation chosen; but in order to move safely upon Shiraz a larger number of men than is suggested by Sir H. Rawlinson would, I fear, be needed. He speaks of 6,000 or 7,000.

"Pray let me have without any reserve all that it occurs to you to say or to suggest upon the whole question."

A week later my father submitted a second memorandum with the following letter:—

"CALCUTTA,
"16*th October*, 1856.

"I have felt it to be a duty, before expressing an opinion upon the subject of an advance on Shiraz, to refer to the works of Fraser and others, besides looking over the various numbers of the Journal of the Geographical Society in which Rawlinson, De Bode, Layard, and officers of the Indian Navy have given valuable information. From this attentive revision of different writers upon the South of Persia I rise still more deeply impressed with the conviction that the measure urged upon your lordship—an advance from Bushire upon Shiraz—is one fraught with consequences which cannot be foreseen. To call things by their right name, the proposal on the one hand is the invasion of Persia, and on the other that of Afghanistan. With ample reinforcements of naval and military means the conquest of either country may be regarded as a perfectly practicable military operation; but then the real nature of the undertaking must be fairly

faced. Armies seldom have the snowball quality of increasing in size as they are rolled over a hostile country, but they usually labour under the reverse quality of suffering seriously by the mere friction inseparable from an advance over difficult tracts. It seems, therefore, inconsiderate to urge an entry upon great wars with petty and inadequate columns thrust forward into hazardous positions of isolation. The occupation of Karrak and Bushire are definite objects, the consequences of which can be circumscribed; the reins do not drop out of the hands. Pressure on the Herat frontier through the instrumentality of Dost Mahomed Khan and the Afghans is also a mode of action comparatively unembarrassing; but once launch armies into the heart of Persia or above the passes of Afghanistan, and events pass entirely out of your control. According as operations were based on the Persian Gulf or the Indus frontier, your lordship must then envisage and prepare for the ultimate issues—nothing less than the conquest of Persia on one side, or the conquest and permanent occupation of Afghanistan and Khorassan on the other. If anything could grievously enhance the misfortune which either war cannot fail to entail upon India, it would be the entrance upon such wars with inadequate expeditions; for to begin great wars as if they were little ones is an error only ultimately remedied by a sad waste of treasure, and a still sadder waste of the blood of the soldiery. I confess myself surprised at the nature of the advice given Lord Elphinstone, and in penning the accompanying observations I have, in obedience to your wishes, done so without reserve, but really omitting much which, but for the fear of making the paper too long, I should have added respecting the climate of the Gulf, its deadly effects at particular seasons, and the process of replacing losses, which will be a heavy drain."

The memorandum itself is too long to quote *in extenso;* but it was on the same lines. He regarded the occupation of Karrak and Bushire as military operations of no great difficulty; but he disapproved of an advance into the interior, considering the force designated by Sir Henry Rawlinson as "dangerously inadequate to the magnitude of the efforts expected." After a careful analysis of the duties which would fall upon such a force, the guarding of a long line of communication, the protection of baggage and transport animals, and the like, he states the minimum force which could march on Shiraz, after leaving three corps of Native Infantry for the security of the base, Bushire, at 7,500 bayonets, of which one-third at least European, 600 sabres, and 24 guns.

"In the present state of the distribution of troops in India it is not very clear whence the additional European and Native corps could with least inconvenience be spared. Lord Dalhousie, when pressed to furnish additional aid from India for the war in the Crimea, refused to part with a single regiment of British Infantry more than he had already given, stating that none could be withdrawn without danger. Since he quitted India the number of European troops has not been increased, nor the necessity for vigilant strength diminished."

The memorandum then goes on to treat of the questions of supply and transport; and the attitude of the population. It closes as follows:—

"From the descriptions given by all acquainted with the country, the invasion of Persia would be less likely to excite the fanatic hostility of the mountain tribes than to lead them to aid the invading army in the subversion of the Persian Government. Their chronic state of rebellion would probably induce the most powerful of them, if judiciously treated, to co-operate with the British force; and the very necessity of securing his line of communication with Bushire would compel the commander of a small invading force to seek the assistance of the hardy horse and foot of mountain tribes, who, if no great aid in the plains, might prove very troublesome in their passes. The occupation of Shiraz does not, it is admitted, necessarily imply the immediate submission of the Persian Government to our demands. The occupation might, therefore, be protracted, and the necessity for cultivating the organized support and co-operation of the mountain tribes would become the more imperative to a small isolated force. Such a course is synonymous with the dismemberment of Persia; for, even if we ultimately withdrew, the poor vitality of the Government of Persia could not recover from such a blow to its waned authority. If an advance on Shiraz failed in its immediate object, the coercion of the Persian Government, and the army became involved in further operations, is Great Britain prepared for such a contingency, and disposed by timely supplies of men and money to enable India to carry out the contest in Persia to its ultimate issue? Russia will doubtless find a legitimate pretext for doing in the north what we shall be doing in the south, and Persia, between the two powers, must crumble to pieces. Is it desirable to hasten this dissolution?

"With reference to the prospect of extensive military operations on a remote theatre, and the cordial support to be anticipated from

England, it may not be quite irrelevant to note that the last year of the late war in the Crimea showed no remarkable aptitude on the part of Great Britain to meet the exigencies of the struggle with the required supply of men from her own shores. Not only did the recruiting fall short by many thousands of the strength provided for in the estimates, but the last return laid before the Houses showed that of 27,000 men raised in the period it covered, about a year, 12,000 were foreigners, so that the British recruiting had only obtained from the three kingdoms 15,000 men. A simple fact of this kind is calculated to make the most ambitious for the extension of our Eastern influence and Empire pause, at the vista of new, remote, and indefinable military operations. Were the available strength of the military and financial resources of India keeping pace with the ever-widening circles which seem to solicit the employment of these resources, there need be little hesitation; but this is not the case. The balance has not been maintained in the East between rapidly aggregated provinces and kingdoms and the essence of our military strength.

"The gleam of empire is from British bayonets, but if a fixed and a small quantity of these has to cope with ever-expanding and diverging spheres of action, there must eventually come a limit of success.

"The Governor-General may be able to occupy Karrak and Bushire without inconvenience to the security of his position in India, for Bushire, the port of Persia, is almost as isolated from the plateau of Persia as Karrak itself; and although the occupation of Bushire be setting foot on the mainland, yet, in consequence of this isolation, it does not necessarily involve the dismemberment of Persia, and may perhaps suffice to coerce the Persian Government without plunging it into inextricable difficulties. But when it comes to be a question of the invasion of Persia from the Gulf with a force commensurate with the enterprise, it may be doubted whether the Indian Empire can be considered in a position which allows of its embarking, without strong reinforcements of British troops, in distant military operations of such uncertainty and magnitude. An advance on Shiraz may only prove the commencement of a long and arduous struggle, far from our resources, and demanding extraordinary exertions to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. The responsibility of undertaking such great efforts as the invasion of Persia or that of Afghanistan with Anglo-Indian armies rests in the world's estimation with the Governor-General of India; and if in attempting

either, complete success should not crown his efforts, or great and unexpected embarrassments arise, the President of the Board of Control will not have to bear the weight of public opinion, but the Governor-General, with whom rested the decision whether the unreinforced armies of India were equal to achievements pressed upon his consideration with the view of remedying very questionable diplomatic miscarriages, over the course of which he had no control, and which very remotely, if at all really, affect the great empire under his charge.

"Whatever the *casus belli* with Persia, whether as clear and imperative as it seems to be regarded by the British administration or not, the safe course would seem to await the result of the occupation of Karrak and Bushire on the Court of Persia; to encourage opposition to Persian aggression on the Herat frontier by Afghan animosity; and not to embark on such enterprises as the invasion of Persia or that of Afghanistan until the necessity be more imperative, and the British Government, by the despatch of adequate reinforcements of troops and naval means, remove all reasonable cause of apprehension for the security of India, and evince a just appreciation of the possible nature of the contest in Persia or Afghanistan, and the resolve adequately to provide for its emergencies.

"With the Afghans we have no present cause of quarrel; and although a march on Herat would enable us to thrust back Persian aggression without endangering the existence of that kingdom, and would confine her to her own limits without any fear of dismemberment, yet, as such an advance on Herat from the Indus frontier would involve the military occupation of Afghanistan, an act the justice of which could not be defended, the Anglo-Indian Government seems limited to action from this side to the instrumentality of Dost Mahomed Khan. Viewed as a purely military operation, the advance on Shiraz is the more lethal blow to Persia. She must submit or be destroyed, and may be subverted even although she submit. Disaster in either country would be equally injurious to our power in the East. Success in either country equally profitless and exhaustive for India. The conquest of Persia or of Afghanistan is doubtless a perfectly feasible military operation, if undertaken with sufficient means, but it is very startling to find an able and gallant soldier like Rawlinson advocating the invasion of Persia with the force he enumerates, and the President of the Board of Control stating to the House of Commons that if the Persians are at Herat they

must be driven out of it, as if it were a light matter, and to be accomplished without the expenditure of much treasure and much blood."

In the same strain my father wrote to Lord Ellenborough on the 7th November:—

". . . . . It is to be hoped that when the Ministry ordered this war they at the same time prepared for the despatch to India of strong reinforcements; for if . . . . . the capture of Karrak and Bushire fail to coerce Persia, and further operations become necessary, India can now spare no large force for distant operations. What redundancy was once available is now swamped in Pegu; and though, of course, Native troops could be spared, Europeans could not, without great risk being incurred—a risk that few would like to face the responsibility of incurring . . . . .

"I regard an advance from Bushire on Shiraz as synonymous with the dismemberment of Persia, for whoever makes the advance must secure his difficult line of communications by entering into friendly relations with the mountain tribes of Khurgistan. Their chronic state of rebellion against the Governor of Fars will favour such alliance with the British commander, and it will be a death blow to such little authority as the Shah still has in the south. I see no medium between an advance from Bushire and reaching the Caspian, and the Government are bound, after causing such a declaration to be issued, fairly to face what circumstances will force upon them. In 1854 they lost the opportunity of doing that, under favourable conditions, which they may now be forced to attempt under more difficult circumstances. Then was the time, as I told Sir Charles Wood, to officer with British officers 50,000 or 60,000 Turks; and when the season for operations came, these, with 20,000 or 30,000 British troops thrown into Asia Minor, would have driven the Russians to the north of the Caucasus in 1854, and touched the Caspian with their right. In 1855 the Russians would have been forced back on the Kuban and the Kuma, and the Caspian would have become a British lake, and seen the British flag afloat on its waters, whilst France took the Crimea, or acted where and how she pleased, aided by our navy. Now, if they envisage this ultimate issue of the war and make corresponding exertions, an advance from Shiraz to Teheran and the shores of the Caspian is certainly a practicable military operation, but more difficult than would have been the case in 1854, when our right might easily have been on the Caspian along the course of the Kur. But is England prepared for the occupation

of Persia and for the supply of British troops indispensable for so great an achievement?

"To touch the Caspian is to master the very base of Russian aggression in Central Asia. I suspect the Czar would quickly cancel the four years' exemption from conscription granted at his coronation. Still Russia has doubtless come weak and ill out of the late war; and so far the opportunity is not a bad one for showing Persia that England is not to be trifled with, and that she is capable of great and striking operations. The Cabinet, however, if they aspire to such deeds, must not dream that India can do this with the means at the disposal of the Governor-General. We must have men, ships, money, and a head to use all aright. As it is, they seem to me plunging into this war with no very clear perception of its possible contingencies, and with dangerously insufficient means if they expect India, unreinforced from England, to furnish all the requirements of such operations and such a war. The fact which your Lordship's last letter dwelt upon, *viz.*, the shortcoming of Great Britain in the important matter of recruiting the last year of the late war, comes forcibly on the attention when the question of eastern extension of empire and influence is under consideration.

"I wish with all my heart Government had kept out of this war; for whatever its scope, whether limited to the Gulf or expanding to the Caspian, I regard it as entailing sure loss to India. Financially, the credit of the Government has never recovered from Lord Dalhousie's ill-judged measures; and even the most complete success in Persia will drain India of men and money it cannot spare, and throw back all improvement, or rather throw it forward into a very indefinite future."

A month later, war having been declared, my father was again asked to submit his views upon the proper plan of operations, and the measures to be adopted in case of prolonged and extended hostilities. On the 9th of December he writes in his journal:—

"Talbot* wrote and asked me to dine at Government House, as Lord Canning wished to speak to me. . . . . After dinner Lord Canning took me into a side room, and sat down on a sofa, and opened the conversation by thanking me for the papers I had written and sent him, and then entered on the subject of the war and its possible contingencies. He spoke of Herat as fallen, and asked me whether I entertained the opinion of others as to its

* Lord Canning's private secretary.

importance as the 'key of India.' I told him it was the key to nothing, but had been made a great bugbear of, and its fall to Persia would be thought something of in India in consequence of the fictitious importance we had ourselves invested it with."* The Governor-General then went on to talk of an expedition to Herat through Afghanistan, a measure which my father earnestly deprecated. "I told him, too, that I thought the *Friend of India* wrote great stuff about India being defended from the mountains of Afghanistan as well as in its plains; for that an army in Afghanistan was no security or defence for the internal state of India; and that any reverse, or rumour of reverse, when India was stripped of troops and depending on those above the passes for its defence, would quickly show the fallacy of this argument. I quoted the state of the country between the Jumna and Nerbudda in Lord Ellenborough's time, only saved from a general rising by Moore's lucky charge and the fall of the two leaders of the insurrection." After a long account of the interview, my father closes his entry with these words: "I returned home musing on the conversation, and feeling how close we are on a repetition of the folly of 1838-39."

The result was another long memorandum on the subject of the war with Persia. After pointing out the very grave consequences to be anticipated from such a war, the probability of its spreading to the Caspian, and the certainty that Russia, not to speak of other European powers, would view it with much jealousy, he goes on to describe the geographical position of Persia, and the means required for her invasion, and to deprecate, above all, an advance across Afghanistan:—

"The Indus frontier of the empire of India, which lies nearly parallel to the base or eastern frontier of the Persian triangle, also runs through about 12 degrees of latitude. The two frontiers are, however, separated by from 8 to 12 degrees of longitude, and this great area, equal to half the breadth of India between Peshawur and Assam, is occupied by the barren mountain countries of Afghanistan and Beloochistan, regions abounding in desert tracts thinly inhabited by wild fanatic tribes, with whom plunder and violence are habitual, and ignorance, avarice, and ferocity their concomitants. Degrees of latitude convey a very indistinct idea of the

* So also thought Sir Henry Lawrence. In one of his essays, contributed to the *Calcutta Review*, he writes:—"Herat is no more the key to India than is Tabreez, or Khiva, or Kokan, or Meshed. The chain of almost impenetrable mountains is the real key to India."

distances to be traversed in marching armies over such country; and no idea at all of the difficulties to be surmounted where, besides natural barriers, the want of wood, forage, food, and water, perpetually beset an invading force. From Sukkur on the Indus to Herat is seven hundred and twenty miles, a considerable portion of which is over the worst of roads and the most deficient in every necessary. Omitting the all-important moral consideration that the Anglo-Indian Government has no present cause of quarrel with either Beloochistan or Afghanistan, the mere occupation of such a tract of country as that which separates Persia from the Indus is a military operation demanding large means and adequate preparations; for the countries thus overrun as a mere preliminary can yield no other advantage than that of bringing the British frontier up to the Persian. The Indus would remain the base on which the invading army must depend for the supply of almost all its wants; add to which, that once again in military occupation of those poor mountain tracts and barren plains there can be no second withdrawal from Afghanistan and Beloochistan—that is impossible. Of the number of troops needed for such an occupation the operations in 1839 and the following years have given us practical proof; of course more would be required for an advance into Persia, for Teheran and Ispahan may be taken as upwards of eight hundred miles distant from Herat, and the tract of country to be traversed not more favourable or productive than that between Herat and the Indus. Between the Indus, its real base, and the effective points of Persia, the Anglo-Indian army of invasion must traverse between fifteen and sixteen hundred miles, a terrible length for a line of operations over a wretched country. The effort would be a truly gigantic one, and costly in men and money and material before Persia was even sensibly assailed.

"With the command of the sea, the Anglo-Indian Government can avoid the necessity of overrunning, and embarrassing itself with the occupation of, that vast and rugged area which separates Persia from India; and can shun this great burden and difficulty by making the Persian Gulf instead of the Indus the starting point.

"It is true that another class of difficulties here present themselves, namely, those inseparable from the disembarkation of a force on a hostile shore with no means of transport; until these are organized, such a force is useless; and it must be admitted in its fullest extent to be a most grave difficulty. It is one the

strength of which depends on the ultimate objects of the war, and the mode in which it is to be prosecuted in order to attain those objects. If moderate intimidation be the aim, and Persia is coerced by the capture of Karrak and Bushire, the objects of the British Government will be attained at a moderate cost, and Persia will run comparatively small risk of dismemberment from the littoral operations of the Anglo-Indian force. But if the blow fail in its desired effect, and the British Government decide on more extended operations, it can only have one object in the invasion of Persia, namely, to awe and subdue her into entire submission, and to paralyze the influence and aggressive tendencies of that power whose clandestine support instigates Persia to a course which must end fatally for Persia whatever else the issue. The war conducted with this object in view is, in fact, a blow aimed at Russia, and it will exact vastly greater efforts and sacrifices, and will necessitate the putting forth of great naval as well as considerable military means.

"Under this supposition the British Government will be now attempting to do that, under unfavourable circumstances, which they had an excellent opportunity of doing effectually when the war with Russia first broke out in 1854. To have officered 50,000 or 60,000 Turkish troops with 200 selected officers from India, and to have landed such a force with 25,000 British troops where Omar Pasha subsequently operated when too late, would have been to drive the Russians from the provinces south of the Caucasus the first year of the war, and to place the right of the Anglo-Turkish force along the Kur, touching the Caspian. The second year the line of the Caucasus would have been freed from the Muscovite, and the enemy would have been driven back on the Terek. The Caspian would have ceased to be a Russian lake, and Persia would henceforward have proved humble and tractable enough. That opportunity, though the subject was repeatedly pressed upon the attention of the Government, was lost; and now, after Turkey is at peace with Russia and Persia, it will be a very different matter to obtain the same end. In the former case the vast naval means of Great Britain could have been brought to bear in the Euxine, and the Turkish army would have co-operated with our own under very favourable circumstances. Large naval means will be indispensable when the Persian Gulf is the base instead of the shores of the Black Sea; but neither the naval nor the military strength of Great Britain can act with any approach to equal facility on this side of the narrow strip which separates

the eastern from the western seas; and consequently more time for sufficient preparation is absolutely essential for armed action from the Persian Gulf. Time to bring round naval means is an indispensable element of which it will not answer to lose sight."

The proper strength of the invading army is then worked out in much detail, with regard to the numbers and description of the various Persian tribes, the armed force of the Shah, the features of the country, and other points. But the memorandum is too long for further quotation here.

The several papers from which these extracts have been made, supplemented by more than one conversation on the subject, greatly impressed Lord Canning; and fortunately impressed him in particular with regard to two important points—the expediency of avoiding an advance into Afghanistan, and the danger of denuding India of British troops. When it is considered how soon afterwards the great mutiny of the Bengal army came upon us, and how nearly our slender European garrison was overwhelmed by the storm, the value of the service which my father was thus enabled to render can hardly be over-estimated. Lord Canning was at the time distinctly disposed to go the other way. He had in fact written home that he could spare six regiments of European infantry for any operations out of India. These regiments were to have been drawn from our northern stations, mainly from the Punjab, upon the stability of which province, a few months later, so much was to depend. He had also viewed with favour the idea of a march across Afghanistan, thinking we could act upon Herat as the friends and allies of Dost Mahomed, whose position in the country, and the shadowy nature of whose power over the various Afghan tribes, he naturally misunderstood. My father opposed this view, on the ground that our commander could not act in subordinate co-operation with any Afghan ruler, or depend upon him for the maintenance of our line of communication or the provision of supplies; and insisted that the march of a British force into Afghanistan, whatever our intentions, would be thoroughly unpopular, and would infallibly lead, sooner or later, to collision with the Afghan people, and the occupation of the country. In these views he stood for a time almost alone, and it is to Lord Canning's credit that he was able to see their justice, and to act upon them, when surrounded by men in responsible positions who derided any such opinions as alarmist and over cautious. The Governor-General was gradually beginning to gain confidence

and to break away from his leading strings. It is fortunate that he had time to do so before the hour of trial came.*

In the spring of 1857, therefore, my father had been able to express his opinions upon the most important matters then before the Government of India, and the weight of those opinions had made itself felt. But his own prospects were in no way improved. He was still acting in a third-rate charge in the Department of Public Works; and the longer this went on the more keenly he felt the slur upon his reputation which such employment involved. Talbot, Lord Canning's private secretary, had been his friend from the first, and had done his utmost with the Governor-General; but Lord Canning seemed to have no intention of offering him any civil or political post, and my father's old friend, Baker, now at the head of the Public Works Department, feared to injure his chances of a return to the political line by obtaining for him any suitable appointment elsewhere. At last, feeling he could stand this no longer, he asked for an interview with Lord Canning, and put the whole circumstances before him. The result was thoroughly unsatisfactory. Lord Canning would promise nothing, and could see no hardship in the case. He dwelt upon the confidence which he had shown by consulting my father regarding the projected operations in Persia and Afghanistan; and he adhered with something of obstinacy to the argument that the Governor-General had a right to expect an officer returning to India to take employment in his own professional line. As to the first point, my father might have been excused for thinking, though he did not say so, that the advantage of the communications referred to lay rather with the Governor-General than with himself. As to the second, he remarked that the position was undeniable, but that the custom had been to treat officers with some reference to their former employment; and that the services would think it odd if the Foreign Secretary or the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal were made to do duty as deputy magistrates, or if Sir Henry Lawrence were sent to take charge of a field battery in cantonments. His words, however, seemed to produce

* Sir John Kaye writes, in his "History of the Sepoy War," that though the scheme of sending a British force into Afghanistan was discussed, and in some military quarters advocated, "it was never for a moment seriously entertained in the Council Chamber." Nothing can be further from the truth, and I find in the margin of the volume a pencil note in my father's handwriting, which directly contradicts the statement. "This is not the case," he writes, "Lord Canning was more than half inclined to accede."

no effect, and he returned feeling thoroughly hopeless of any change in his fortunes. He had by this time become pretty well accustomed to failure, and took the fresh disappointment more quietly than before; but he was sick at heart from ten years of hope deferred, and the blow told. "This last year beats everything," he wrote, "and I shall tell it to my boys, if I live to start them in life, as a warning of what they may have to expect, if fools enough to be soldiers, after eight-and-twenty years' service. From such folly may they be preserved."

The disappointment, however, was not to last long. Lord Canning apparently meant more than he had cared to promise; and in March, 1857, my father was informed that he had been selected to succeed Sir Robert Hamilton in charge of the Central India Agency. This was one of the most important political charges in India, and greatly coveted, and much interest had been made in behalf of others; but Lord Canning set all recommendations aside, and nominated my father to the post, which was accepted with gratification. Before the end of March he had started for the head-quarters of the Agency at Indore.

This was the turning point in his career. He had afterwards to contend with many difficulties and to suffer much misrepresentation; and his upward progress was slow. But from this time he steadily forced his way; and the very opposition which he met with served to make his name and character better known in India.

It may perhaps be added that the selection of my father by Lord Canning against the opinions of his official advisers, was, as one of those about him hoped at the time it might prove, a turning point also in the career of the Governor-General. When Lord Canning was appointed, Lord Ellenborough had written to my father, and expressed a doubt whether he had "enough of the devil in him to govern India," and at first his action seemed to bear out this view. He appeared to be slow and timid, and unable to make up his mind whatever the subject before him. My father was disposed to agree in the opinion of his private secretary that he would "come out strong in the end," but for a year after his arrival there were not many signs of this. Then suddenly Lord Canning seemed to change. He began to take his own line upon important matters, and to be less under the influence of the last opinion; and in course of time his character,

which had been regarded as weak and sluggish, proved to have in it the elements of rare endurance and determination Naturally slow and cautious, he had been a long time in shaking himself free from the aid of others, and learning to stand alone, but once he did so, he stood firmly.

# CHAPTER VIII.

## 1857—1858.

The Central India Agency—Disaffection in the Native Army—Outbreak at Meerut—Position of Central India—Military force at the Resident's disposal—Importance of securing the Bombay road and the line of the Nerbudda—Alarm at Mhow and Indore—Outbreaks at Nusseerabad and Neemuch—Massacre at Jhansi—Rise of the Gwalior Contingent—Attack upon the Residency at Indore by Holkar's troops—Retreat to Sehore—Maintenance of the line of the Nerbudda—Arrival of Bombay column—Holkar's explanations favourably received—Hungerford at Mhow—Position during the rainy season—Rising at Mundesore—Tantia Topee—Risings at Dhar and Amjhera—My mother's death—Advance of the British force from Mhow—Capture of Dhar—Fall of Mehidpore—Cavalry action at Rawul—Fighting at Mundesore—Holkar's troops disarmed—Sir Robert Hamilton resumes charge of the Agency—Lord Canning's Minute—Companionship of the Bath.

My father took charge of his new appointment on the 5th of April, 1857. I have said that it was an important one, and was accepted with gratification. The Agency in Central India was in fact, what it is still, one of the three great prizes of the Indian "political" service.* Our Resident at Indore had under his charge the eastern, and by far the more troublesome and difficult, half of the great belt of native territory which stretches across India from Sind to the frontiers of Lower Bengal. Twelve considerable States, and a multitude of minor chiefships, were included within the limits of the Agency, which boasted a total area of about 86,000 square miles, and a population of nearly eight millions. Among the larger States were the Mahratta Principalities of Sindia and Holkar,† our ancient enemies, the first of which had opposed us in open battle only thirteen years before. In time of trouble, therefore, the post was likely to be one of special importance, and so in April, 1857, with the mutiny of the Bengal army coming upon us, my father felt it to be.

The post was not, however, in all respects a pleasant one; and before going on to narrate the events which occurred during my

* Central India, Rajputana, Hyderabad. † Indore is Holkar's capital.

father's tenure of the Agency, it is necessary to touch briefly upon certain circumstances which rendered his position at Indore difficult and embarrassing, and from which in after years much controversy has arisen.

I have referred in an earlier chapter of this memoir to the Resident, Sir Robert Hamilton, and the nature of his relations with my father, when the latter, as Political Agent in Bhopal, was under his orders. Before going on leave Sir Robert had been in Calcutta, and had done his best to secure the acting appointment for another officer. He was not by any means satisfied at the nomination of my father, with whom he had never been on terms of cordial agreement. My father felt, therefore, that he was holding the reins temporarily for a man whose views and principles were out of accord with his own, and who did not want him at Indore. Such a position would always have involved something of embarrassment; but it was rendered the more unpleasant from the fact that the Agency staff was a close family circle. Of the three assistants immediately under the Resident's orders, two were Sir Robert Hamilton's sons-in-law, and the clergyman of the station was his brother. "There is an awkwardness," my father wrote, "in the absolute possession of the place which he retains." Finally, he felt that he could not afford to live as Sir Robert Hamilton had been in the habit of living, and that this would tell against him both with Europeans and Natives. "I found all Hamilton's establishment here," he writes to Lord Ellenborough, on the 23rd of April, "a host of servants, some two-and-twenty horses, everything to be maintained during his absence exactly as when he was here. It was always a puzzle to me how he managed to live in the way he did, and it still is so; the expense must be enormous. Lady Canning said that ——— made them feel quite small when dilating on Hamilton's equipages and mode of living at Indore, and that they could not do so. This was said laughing of course. I told her it was one of my apprehensions in coming here, for that I must live far otherwise." As a matter of fact he was obliged to live far otherwise, and the contrast between the ostentatious extravagance of the former *régime* and his very much simpler habits was not likely to add to his immediate popularity. Altogether he went to Indore with some misgivings.

The history of my father's tenure of the appointment is in fact the history of the Mutiny in Central India. Before he left Calcutta there had been signs of widespread discontent in the

ranks of our Native soldiery, and he was not blind to their significance. Fifteen years earlier, when Lord Ellenborough was coming out to India, my father had warned him of the danger to be apprehended from this source, and the warning was taken to heart. I have already quoted in a former chapter Lord Ellenborough's account of the manner in which before landing at Madras he received the news of the Cabul catastrophe. He went on to state in the same speech that the news was a relief to him. He had feared something worse—a revolt of the Bengal army. During Lord Ellenborough's administration my father watched the temper of the Native troops with anxious care, and the partial mutinies which occurred strengthened him in his conviction that we were walking over the crust of a volcano. The great extensions of territory, unaccompanied by any increase of European force, which took place during Lord Dalhousie's rule, seemed to him a further weakening of our position; and in the beginning of 1857 he was fully alive to the imminence of the danger. Before leaving Calcutta he spoke warningly to Lord Canning regarding the state of the Bengal troops, and also, in hopes that this might do some good, to Lady Canning, for whose character and talents he had the deepest respect. Both were struck by what he said, particularly Lady Canning, and she reminded him of the conversation four years later. He had hopes that "the wave of disaffection might die away as it undulated through the army," but he greatly doubted this, and where he could properly speak without reserve he spoke plainly. With others he was of course bound to show more caution, but that he foresaw what was coming, as far as human eye could foresee, is indubitable. I quote here an extract from a letter which was written to me not long ago by an officer now high in the political service, of whose acquaintance with my father I was until then ignorant:—

"It was the Reverend Dr. Duff who introduced me to your father, who was in Calcutta when I landed in March, 1857. We often met in Duff's house in Cornwallis Square, where I was staying, and it was then that your father, without assigning any reason, advised me to eschew the Sepoy army, and apply to join a Company's European regiment. Duff and others had given me just the opposite advice,* and no doubt nothing induced your father to say to me what he did save his prescient knowledge of

* The Native service was, I believe, better paid, and was supposed in all ways to afford a better opening to a young officer of talent and ambition.

the awful storm that was coming. Dinkur Rao was in Calcutta at the time with Sindia, and him also I became acquainted with through Duff. I remember still the expression of Dinkur Rao's face, on my telling him one day in Duff's presence, that your father had dissuaded me from becoming a 'Sepoy officer.' Luckily for me, I took the advice; and immediately on being posted to the 4th Bengal Native Infantry applied for a transfer to a European regiment. Humanly-speaking, this saved my life. I was at Benares at the time. Had I set out for Kangra where the 4th Bengal Native Infantry then was, I would have formed one of a party of travelling 'griffs' who were ruthlessly murdered while halting in a traveller's bungalow near Delhi."

It may be supposed, therefore, that on my father's arrival in Central India he lost no time in ascertaining precisely the position of his charge from a military point of view, and in calculating the means at his disposal in case of disorder breaking out. At the moment it is true there seemed to be no immediate danger. A perilous crisis had just been safely passed. The 19th Native Infantry, goaded into sudden mutiny a few weeks before by the story of the greased cartridges, had suffered itself to be quietly disarmed at Barrackpore, and its fate had provoked no overt expression of sympathy. April brought with it a general hope that the effect of this example, and the soothing assurances conveyed to the troops, might suffice to allay, for a time at least, the prevailing spirit of insubordination and mistrust. In Central India itself, all seemed perfectly quiet; and in writing to the Governor-General's Private Secretary on the 10th of April, my father found no topic of local interest more important than an outbreak of cholera in the city of Indore. But in truth, India was on the eve of a terrible awakening. The storm was gathering to the northward, and it was not long before its first mutterings began to make themselves heard in the territories under my father's charge.

The earliest warning of trouble came from the most distant point of the Agency. On the 25th of April my father received information that a sepoy of the Bengal Native Infantry had been apprehended in the Native State of Rewah, charged with the delivery of a treasonable message to the Durbar. It was at first supposed that the man belonged to the disbanded 19th; but he was found on inquiry to belong to the 37th Native Infantry, then stationed at Benares, and there was reason to believe that he was one of several emissaries sent out by that regiment to try the

temper of the Native Courts. From this time evil tidings poured in fast. A private letter brought the news of the mutinous behaviour of the 3rd Cavalry at Meerut. Then came a report that a regiment of Oudh infantry had misconducted itself at Lucknow, and this was a warning of peculiar significance for Central India, for it showed that the prevailing disaffection was not confined to the regular army. The Oudh troops, like most of the troops in Central India, were a class apart from the regulars. They were, however, more nearly allied to the regiments of the line than were the contingents of Central India. There all still seemed secure; and my father wrote to Lord Canning: "I have no reason to suppose that any of the contingents of Central India have as yet shown any disposition to sympathise with the disaffected movement. Rumours of an uncomfortable feeling existed among the Mhow Native troops I have heard, but nothing definite and nothing to which I attach any importance." This was on the 11th of May. Three days later the calm was over. A series of startling telegrams had come in from the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra; the Native troops at Meerut had broken into open revolt; many Europeans had been massacred; and Delhi was in the hands of the insurgents.

The storm which had been so long gathering had burst at last. Every Englishman knows what followed; how through the long summer months came from cantonment after cantonment the same story of treachery and massacre; how province after province was wrenched from our grasp by our own revolted soldiery; how a Mogul again enjoyed, for a time, the substance of power at Delhi, and a Peishwa was proclaimed at Bithoor; how here and there little clusters of our countrymen stood doggedly at bay, hardening their hearts against tremendous odds; and how at last doubt and disaster gave way to confidence and triumph; and the last of the Peishwas fled before Havelock; and Hodson brought in as a prisoner the last of the Delhi kings; and the shot and steel of our infuriated soldiery dealt out some measure of justice to the butchers of our women and children. The indomitable spirit of the English race gave us victory in the end, as it had so often done before. But it was a life and death struggle, and from shore to shore of India Englishmen had to strain every nerve before our supremacy was restored.

To understand the part which Central India was called upon to play in the great conflict, it will be necessary to examine in some

detail the geographical position of the territories under my father's charge and the circumstances which surrounded him.

The Central India Agency may be roughly described as a great triangle, of which the base, more than 500 miles in length, was formed by a line drawn across the continent of India from west to east. Starting about 50 miles east of Baroda this line followed the course of the Nerbudda river as far as Jubbulpore, and was thence produced to the eastern extremity of the Rewah State, about 100 miles south of Benares. From the terminal points of the line, the sides of the triangle, each over 300 miles in length, sloped upwards to the northern extremity of Sindia's dominions, a point on the Chumbul river about 30 miles south of Agra. Of course this figure was a very irregular one. The Rajputana States encroached on the north-west side of the triangle, and the British provinces below the Jumna encroached on the north-east side, while Holkar's territory fell in a loop over the Nerbudda at the south-west corner. But the description will serve, with the aid of the accompanying map, to convey a general idea of the territories over which my father had to exercise a more or less direct control.

The importance of this great tract of country did not lie mainly in its size. From the southern frontier of Holkar's possessions below the Nerbudda to the apex of the triangle on the Chumbul, the direct road between Bombay and Agra lay through the territories of the Central Indian States. Both as a postal and telegraphic line this road was invaluable, for there was no direct telegraphic line between Madras and Calcutta, and the only circle by which telegraphic communication between Bengal and the Madras and Bombay presidencies could be effected was that by Agra and Indore. It was not less important as a purely military road, for along it troops from the Madras and Bombay presidencies could be brought directly into operation against the north of India. The maintenance of this line of communication, the very backbone of his charge, was therefore from the first the main object which my father had in view. Unfortunately the road was flanked to the westward, though at a considerable distance, by the two military stations of Neemuch and Nusseerabad, both of which were occupied by regular troops not under his orders. To the eastward the position was still more insecure. The great triangular tract of which I have spoken was not all under the direct control of the Agency. It was fairly cloven asunder by the "Saugor and Nerbudda territories," a wedge of country under

British rule, which pushed up through the base of the triangle, throwing off Bundelcund and Baghelcund to the eastward and narrowing to a point at Jhansee, in the very heart of the Agency, where it was met by a southerly projection from the British districts south of the Jumna river. This tract of country and its borders were studded with military stations occupied by regular troops. Jubbulpore, Saugor, Lullutpore, Nowgong, and Jhansee flanked the Bombay road at various distances, closing gradually upon it to the northward. The last-named and most northerly station was perhaps sixty miles east of the road. As this chain of posts completely separated the Agent from the eastern portion of his charge, the only force he could depend upon for the protection of the great line of communications was that at his disposal between the western frontier of the Saugor commissionership and the eastern frontier of Rajputana.

Another most important, though at first a secondary object, was the maintenance of the line of the Nerbudda. The armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay were distinct bodies, having many points of difference; and the general defection of the native troops in Bengal, if it occurred, did not of necessity involve the defection of the southern armies. Speaking roughly, the Nerbudda was the boundary between north and south. The military stations to the north of the river were held by troops from Bengal; those to the south of the river by troops from Madras and Bombay. If Central India remained under control, a strong barrier would be maintained right across the continent, for to east and west of my father's charge lay vast tracts of difficult country through which little intercommunication between north and south was likely or possible.

Finally, it was a matter of importance, putting aside all ulterior considerations, to preserve from anarchy the Native States themselves, and to prevent their armed strength from swelling the tide against us.

The value of the force at my father's disposal did not consist in its European element. With the exception of one battery of foot artillery, which contained a source of weakness in its native drivers, there was not a single European soldier under his orders. The only strong point about his position was the fact that the bulk of the force was not composed of regular troops, but of Native State contingents. It had been the policy of the British Government in many parts of India to raise such forces for the Native States, at their expense, in lieu of the military aid which the States were

bound by treaty to render in time of need. These contingents, though commanded by British officers, and equipped and disciplined after the British method, formed a service apart from the British army. They were as soldiers under somewhat different conditions, and had not much in common with the British line. It seemed possible, therefore, that masses of contingent troops, carefully isolated, might act as a check on the regulars; and that the spread of disaffection among the latter might be prevented by the uncertainty whether sympathy with themselves or the ties of discipline would prevail in the ranks of the local forces. It was at best a precarious chance, but it was the only one; and so long as isolation was maintained the contingents of Central India did in fact remain outwardly loyal.

Besides the contingents there were the State troops proper, generally a rabble, ill-officered and ill-equipped, but raised in great part from the natives of the country, and very unlikely, therefore, to join against us if their chiefs remained loyal. Considerable numbers of these troops were to be found in the several States. They were, however, not all composed of natives of the States, for it had long been the custom for the chiefs to maintain bodies of foreign mercenaries—Afghans, Arabs, and the like—who were greatly feared by the weaker and less warlike people of India, and were a perpetual source of danger and disorder.*

The disposition of the various forces was as follows:—At Mhow, some five-and-twenty miles north of the Nerbudda, and the first military post on the main line of road, were stationed the only regular troops under my father's orders, within the western part of the Agency. These were the 23rd Native Infantry and a wing of the 1st Cavalry, the other wing of which was at Neemuch. At Mhow also was stationed the European battery under Captain Hungerford. It was from this point that trouble was all along apprehended, and it was from this point that the worst of the trouble came. Thirteen miles higher up the road lay Indore, the head-quarters of the Agency. In Indore itself, or rather at the Indore Residency, was a detachment of the Malwa contingent, 200 strong, which acted as a guard for the treasury and other public buildings; while in the city there was a large force of all arms belonging to the Maharaja Holkar. At Sirdarpore, to the west of Indore, about fifty miles distant, was a regiment of

* There are too many of these men still among the Native States, and if ever trouble arises they will again make their presence felt as they did in 1817 and 1857.

Bheels, a wild jungle tribe, having nothing in common with Hindustani troops. Above Indore there was no military station on the line of road for something like 200 miles. But flanking it on the west were the two stations of Mehidpore and Augur, thirty miles apart, and rather more than that distance from the road. Mehidpore was the head-quarters of the Malwa contingent, while Augur was held by a detachment of the Gwalior contingent. Facing these stations, some fifty miles east of the main road, and nearly a hundred miles from Indore, was Sehore in Bhopal, the head-quarters of the Bhopal contingent. Higher up again, in Sindia's territory, and on the road itself, lay Goonah, a hundred and eighty miles from Indore. Some sixty miles further north was Seepree, and seventy-five miles above it Gwalior. These three stations were all occupied by troops of the Gwalior contingent, the head-quarters of which were at Gwalior itself, only sixty-five miles south of Agra.

Mhow, therefore, was entirely isolated. Below it lay the Nerbudda and the troops of Bombay and Madras, while above it overwhelming numbers of contingent and Durbar troops were spread out over the country, and barred all passage to the northward. It would be useless to overload these pages with a statement of the strength of each contingent. The Gwalior force alone numbered 8,000 men. So long, therefore, as the contingents remained faithful, my father could make sure of eventually crushing any attempt at revolt on the part of the regulars at Mhow, and of holding his own against the troops in the "Saugor and Nerbudda territories." But on the fidelity of the contingents everything depended.

Such was the state of affairs in Central India when on the 14th of May news arrived of the great catastrophes at Meerut and Delhi. It was a critical moment, for the treasury at Indore was a tempting prize, and the guard available for its defence was a small one. My father immediately sent out right and left for reinforcements, but these could not arrive before the 20th, and the Mhow troops could hardly be kept so long in ignorance of what was passing. It was impossible to say how they might be stirred by the tidings. The city of Indore itself was full of dangerous classes who would be only too ready to join in any undertaking offering a chance of plunder. The European battery, wholly without supports, could not be expected to do much against the mutineers. Indeed, it seemed only too probable that if either infantry or cavalry plucked up courage for a rush the guns must fall an easy

prey. The danger was narrowly escaped. It afterwards transpired that the Mhow troops had debated among themselves whether they would make a dash for the north *viâ* Indore before reinforcements could arrive. But they were not at the time sure of the contingent or of Holkar's people, and they allowed the chance to go by. On the morning of the 20th of May the attempt would have been too late, for the Bheel Corps from Sirdarpore, 270 strong, about the same number of Bhopal contingent infantry, with two guns, and two troops of Bhopal contingent cavalry, mostly Sikhs, had been brought in by forced marches.

Meanwhile, however, the majority of the Mhow officers had lost all belief in their men, and the excitement throughout the cantonment was alarming. My father had purposely declined to withdraw a man from the European battery for the defence of the Residency at Indore, conceiving it a matter of special importance to keep up the greatest possible show of strength at Mhow; but the presence of the battery seemed to have done little to generate confidence. Colonel Platt, who commanded the 23rd and the station, a ready and resolute officer, was unfortunately out tiger shooting, and in his absence some of his juniors were doing their best to precipitate a collision by a series of injudicious proceedings. When the bad news arrived from Delhi, a large and heterogeneous council, to which even the medical men were invited, was convened to discuss the position. As might have been foreseen, this resulted in the enunciation of some very unwise views, and the increase of alarm. On the 17th of May, Major Harris, commanding the cavalry, a good officer, who had himself objected to the council when it met, came into Indore and described the state of affairs at Mhow. My father at once informed him that the summoning of such an assembly was an indiscreet measure and that it should not be repeated. With regard to the proposals of the officers, which involved a show of mistrust, my father replied that, in his opinion, there were on such occasions only two courses open—undiminished trust, or overt mistrust with its accompanying precautions—that the former was in their power, the latter from want of force not so, and that they should be very careful to do nothing which might precipitate an outburst of feeling on the part of the troops. But the alarm did not subside. The artilleryman Hungerford shotted his guns; measures were hastily taken for provisioning the magazine; and the hesitating natives were encouraged to rise by every sign of perturbation among the Europeans. On the 20th of May my father wrote to Lord Ellenborough: "The effect on the

European officers has been to shake their confidence most completely, and at Mhow, where we have the 23rd Native Infantry, and a wing of the 1st Cavalry, the conduct of the officers has been very injudicious. They have there a battery of nine-pounders, which is European, but their officer seems as greatly alarmed as any one else, and some very foolish things have been said and done." A few days later he writes to Lord Canning's private secretary: "I have had to check everywhere proposals for hurrying ladies and children off no one knew whither; for moving detachments here, there, and everywhere . . . . . The alarm at Mhow among officers and ladies was quite distressing." So it ever was. With my father as with all others in responsible places at the time, one of the great difficulties was to induce men, some of whom proved themselves brave enough in actual danger, to meet the approach of danger with a show of confidence. His incessant advice at this time, advice sorely needed from end to end of the Agency, was that which not long afterwards he gave to one of his assistants:—"My dear H——," he writes on the 13th of June, "don't be alarmed nor alarm others. If you listen to all the nonsensical rumours afloat here or elsewhere, you will have enough to do . . . . . Duty . . . . . often lies in a bold firm bearing, and a little, very little daring." There were not wanting bold and resolute spirits in Central India—some such will never be wanting in a community of Englishmen—but there were too many who desponded from the first, and whose lack of calmness and cheerfulness did immeasurable harm.

For a few days after the arrival of reinforcements at Indore things seemed to be going on better. The regulars in Nowgong and Jhansee were loud in their professions of loyalty. The city of Indore, which from the 15th to the 20th had been in a state of the wildest alarm, began to regain its wonted composure. It was reported from Agra that "the plague was being stayed." The Delhi mutineers, some 3,000 strong, were clinging to the walls, and living by plunder. The "final advance" of our army was about to be made, and it seemed likely that the news of the city having fallen would soon come to confirm the wavering and check the spread of disaffection. But as the month of May wore to a close, this gleam of sunshine was overcast. Disquieting rumours came in from Neemuch and Nusseerabad. A body of the Gwalior contingent cavalry, pushed up, contrary to my father's wishes, into contact with the mutinous masses in the north, deserted its European officer and went into open revolt. General Ramsay, who

commanded at Gwalior, expressed himself doubtful of the whole contingent, and refused to call in any detachments to head-quarters. Nearer at hand, Colonel Travers, commanding the Bhopal contingent, reported that emissaries from the 23rd Native Infantry were tampering with his men. Writing to Lord Elphinstone, then Governor of Bombay, on the 31st of May, my father summed up the position as follows:—"No great reliance can now be placed on contingents any more than on their comrades of the regular army. In Central India . . . . . there is nothing for it but to hold the one in check by the other until some blow struck by the Commander-in-Chief tell as a sedative. Every day's delay is, however, rendering our position here as elsewhere more precarious."

The early days of June brought tidings of a still more serious nature. On the first my father learnt that the Nusseerabad troops had risen and marched off in a body towards Delhi. Five days later it was known that the force at Neemuch had followed their example, and foremost among the mutineers there had been the wing of the 1st Cavalry. It was very doubtful how the Mhow troops would take the news. Colonel Platt was still confident, but the Durbar Vakeel, or representative of Holkar at the Residency, insisted that they were on the point of rising, while from other sources came information that they had been incited to mutiny by the Durbar itself. It was said that they meant to rise on the 9th, to surround and overwhelm the European battery, and then, "with Holkar in their favour," attack the treasury at Indore. But if any rising had been contemplated, it was not carried into execution. The news of the Neemuch outbreak filtered through the ranks and seemed to produce no fresh excitement. The cavalry remained outwardly respectful, and the 23rd volunteered to march against the mutineers. It seemed just possible that all might yet go well; that distrust of the Maharaja's troops and of the heterogeneous detachments collected at Indore might be sufficient to curb the Mhow force. My father was well aware that Holkar's name was being made use of among the sepoys as an incentive to revolt, but he attached little credit to tales of Holkar's disloyalty. "Holkar is with us," he wrote to Lord Ellenborough on the 6th of June; and two days later, "Holkar's fears and interests are on our side, and so far as any Durbar, especially a Mahratta Durbar, is trustworthy, Holkar's seems so. I have seen nothing suspicious." On the 9th my father learnt that the Malwa contingent cavalry, which contrary to his orders had been brought within reach of the Neemuch

mutineers, had murdered their officers and gone off in a body. The defection of this force was peculiarly unfortunate, for the men had many relatives among Holkar's cavalry, so that their misconduct naturally threw suspicion on the latter, and Holkar himself confessed that he was no longer sure of his troops. But there was little further aid available. Beyond calling in Colonel Travers from Sehore with the rest of the Bhopal contingent cavalry, some fifty men, nothing more could be done to make the position secure. Colonel Travers was a brave and capable soldier, and his presence was of special advantage.

Meanwhile more bad news had come in. A terrible massacre of Europeans was reported from Jhansee; the troops at Nowgong were said to have followed suit; and worse than all, on the evening of the 14th of June the interruption of the telegraph between Gwalior and Seepree gave the first intimation that the great main road itself was in danger. Two days later the cause of the interruption was known; the Gwalior Contingent had risen, and Sindia's capital was in the hands of the mutineers. The communications with Agra along the direct road were now cut off; for a hundred miles below the Chumbul the line was gone; and as detachments of the Gwalior Contingent held Seepree and Goonah it seemed likely that the flame of insurrection would run down the line, and that the telegraph would soon be working only upon the last 150 miles above Indore. This apprehension was soon verified. On the evening of the 20th an express from Captain Harrison, who commanded a troop of the contingent at Goonah, announced that the Seepree officers had joined him. Captain Harrison added that he was falling back on Indore. He was ordered to halt his troops at Beowra, 120 miles north of Indore, and to keep up telegraphic communication from there. Letters from Agra and our northern provinces had now to travel round by Jeypore in Rajputana, and even so their safety was very doubtful. Strange missives they were, many of them, scraps of thin paper two or three inches square, covered with close writing, that told too often of disaster and delay, of cowardly massacres, and of unavailing attempts to avenge them.*

* Many Natives could read English, and where anything of special importance was to be told, our officers usually tried to brush up such knowledge of French as they possessed to veil their meaning. Some of the letters written in this language were exceedingly well worded, but some naturally were not, and my father was much puzzled by one in particular, where indifferent French had been disguised in the Greek character.

During the month of June a small relieving column, under the command of Major-General Woodburn, had been moving up to Mhow from Bombay. It consisted of five troops of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons, a battery of European artillery, a company of sappers, and a regiment of Bombay Native Infantry. The 3rd Hyderabad Contingent cavalry, and another regiment of Native Infantry, was waiting at Malligaum to join the advance. The advent of this column at Mhow had been anxiously awaited. It would have kept the Mhow troops in order, and established the fidelity of the contingents which still stood. In all probability it would also have enabled my father to recover the greater part of the lost line of communication with Agra. But his hopes were doomed to disappointment. Just as it seemed probable that he would soon have a trustworthy force above the Nerbudda, the 1st Hyderabad Cavalry, which had been pushed up to take the place of the 3rd, mutinied at Aurungabad; Woodburn's advance on Mhow was checked; and his column was diverted to the eastward to deal with the rising.

At the moment that this unlucky diversion took place worse news came pouring in from the north and east. Jubbulpore was on the verge of mutiny; Lullutpore the same; Saugor was hesitating; and in Bundelcund a rising of the turbulent natives had begun to assume formidable dimensions. Nothing now stood above Indore but a small semi-circle of doubtful contingent troops, and in Mhow itself the temper of the regulars was so uncertain that Colonel Platt dared not risk the punishment of an emissary who had been caught tampering with the 23rd. The man was sent over to Indore to be dealt with, and my father wrote: "Anything more ticklish than the state of the native corps at Mhow, Saugor, and Jubbulpore can scarcely be conceived. Of course there has been volunteering, &c., and 'entire confidence' on the part of commanding officers. But that is all moonshine, and every one knows the real state of affairs."

Nevertheless he did not despair of holding his own. He was resolved at all events that Indore should not fall without a struggle. "On the contrary," he wrote to Lord Canning, "I hope that if attacked we can maintain a hard fight, and I have no intention of throwing up the game here lightly, or without a struggle that shall be costly to those who dare an attack." In the same spirit he wrote a few days later to Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, who was terribly tried by the load of disaster and difficulty thrown upon him: "I can

imagine all your anxieties, but I feel confident that God did not give us this great empire in order that we should be thus ignominiously kicked out of it or massacred by wholesale. As for counsels, you seem like myself better off for quantity and variety than for quality. I really don't know where I should have been by this time had I listened to counsels of timidity and alarm. Please God we shall weather the storm without losing hold here." To his old chief, Lord Ellenborough, he described the situation very fully, and his letter ended as follows :—"I am told the Mhow troops are afraid of rising, knowing that they have an officer in command there of dauntless stuff, and an European battery in no humour to spare; also that they need look to no respect on my part to weak and washy proclamations which smell of fear. Shot and steel shall be my only converse with them if they come here; and if the men will only stand and fight behind the safe cover I have assigned to them, they may beat off five thousand good troops who should try it sans artillery. I hope, my Lord, to tell you that all has kept as quiet in Malwa as it is now; but if not, and anything happens to myself, remember me as your affectionate

"H. M. DURAND."

He wrote also to Lord Canning's private secretary: "If the Mhow troops rise and attack us, they will, I hope, find a harder nut to crack than some of our chicken-hearted people here think. I have two or three men here of right metal—Colonel Stockley, Colonel Travers, Captain Ludlow of Madras Engineers, and Captain Cobbe of Madras Artillery. Our measures, whether of offensive or defensive character, are arranged, and if we can only get our contingent troops to act decently, which please God, if they are not very severely tried, I trust we may, we should be able, I think, to bring off the European artillery battery if it were contending against the 23rd Native Infantry and 1st Cavalry single-handed; or, if suddenly attacked here, defend the treasury and residency with heavy damage to those who attacked." He adds to this letter a postscript about Woodburn's diversion: "This is an ugly complication, and you must show this private letter to Lord Canning. Though I hope to write to his Lordship to-day, still sometimes pressing emergent letters leave me scarce a moment for anything else. Events come so thick and fast, and as yet so unfavourable. I keep bad news to myself, and dare not whisper

a word of this even to my own assistant, so ticklish is everything and so few have nerve for the day."

The copy of this letter from which I quote, and indeed the copies of all letters written by him at this time, are in my mother's handwriting. From her he concealed nothing; and at the worst of times, when depression and despondency were general, her calm courage and self-possession were always to be trusted. Though she knew all, and though the danger was such that a woman's heart might well have quailed before it, not a word of fear or doubt ever escaped her. A soldier's daughter and a soldier's wife, she confronted all with the same unruffled serenity, ever forgetful of self, and ever striving to cheer and comfort those about her. Not only women but men, and brave men, have acknowledged how much they owed to her words and her example.

Until the end of June the fate of Central India was trembling in the balance. For a few days after the mutiny at Aurungabad it seemed as if the crisis might still be safely passed. News came that Woodburn had trampled out the rising, and was again free to march on Mhow, and at the same time my father received information that Delhi had fallen on the 12th. But these good tidings were soon found to be delusive, and the reaction turned the scale. On the 28th Lord Elphinstone telegraphed that Woodburn could not advance, and inquired the probable effect upon my father's charge. The latter immediately replied that he could not answer one hour for the safety of Central India if it should become known that the column was not marching on Mhow. He pointed out that there was no difficulty in its path, and urgently pressed Lord Elphinstone to push on the little force without delay. Lord Elphinstone telegraphed in reply that the advance had not been countermanded; but the message came too late. The contents of the first telegram had leaked out of the signaller's office, and were soon known in the bazaars; and about the same time one of the Indore bankers received bad news from Delhi which he would not communicate to my father. What that news was became only too soon apparent. On the morning of the 1st of July a letter came in from Agra which set all doubts at rest. It was dated the 20th of June, and showed that the former report of the fall of Delhi had been premature. Up to the 17th the British position had been repeatedly attacked; it was all we could do to hold our own; and the general had determined to await reinforcements before venturing on an assault.

About half-past eight o'clock on the morning of the 1st my

father was at his writing table, condensing this information into a telegram for Lord Elphinstone, when a messenger rushed into the room and reported that there was a commotion in the bazaar. The noise rose rapidly, and my father laid down his pen to see what was the matter. He was not long in doubt. A fortnight before two companies of Holkar's infantry and three of his nine-pounders, with ammunition supplied from the Mhow arsenal, had been brought over to strengthen the garrison of the residency. As he came out upon the residency steps these guns opened fire, and sent a shower of grape into the Bhopal contingent lines. At the same time the infantry made a rush for the unarmed Europeans who were scattered about the neighbouring buildings, and endeavoured, with too much success, to cut them off from the residency, which was the appointed rendezvous in case of a rising. The surprise was complete. The cavalry at their pickets had received the greater portion of the discharge, and as fast as the men could saddle and mount they came rushing out, wild with alarm. All attempts to form them were useless. Colonel Travers, who was in command, did the best thing that could be done under the circumstances. Directly Holkar's artillery opened he had hastened to the cavalry picket, which was posted in the residency stable square, and while in obedience to his orders the rest of the troops were getting ready, he led out these horsemen for a charge upon the guns. He hoped by an immediate blow to disconcert the enemy; to delay the development of the attack and gain time for our own men to get under arms; and above all to check the massacre of Europeans and aid the escape of our fugitives. Unhappily treason had done its work in the ranks of the contingent. Three times the picket was formed up; and three times the formation was broken from the rear by a native officer, who was subsequently hanged for this misconduct. To delay any longer would have been fatal, and Travers saw that there was only one chance left. Giving up the attempt to form his men, he called out to them to follow, and rode straight at the muzzles of the guns. His example was not sufficient to stir the blood of the panic-stricken troopers. Five men, all Sikhs, followed him, and got in among Holkar's gunners, but the rest of the picket hung back, and the chance of taking the guns was lost. Holkar's infantry, who were scattered about slaying women and children, came rapidly up to the support of the guns, and against them six horsemen could do nothing. Travers returned, with his horse wounded and his sword slings cut through, chafing indignantly at the misconduct of his men,

while the enemy gathered fresh courage from the failure of the charge. Their guns now moved round unmolested by the left of the infantry lines, and took up a new position in front of the residency, a position they could not have held and would not have taken had they not been sure of the contingent infantry. They were supported by Holkar's cavalry, and by the two companies of infantry which had been posted for the defence of the residency.

The gallant attempt made by Travers had, however, served to gain a little time. My father had written a note to Colonel Platt at Mhow, asking for the aid of the European battery; and had made such arrangements as he could to get the Bheels in order. These men were loyal and obedient, though evidently shaken.

The two guns of the Bhopal contingent now moved forward to meet the enemy's attack; and those of the native gunners who had not made off, fourteen in number, did their duty well under the direction of two European sergeants, Orr and Murphy. Captain Cobbe, of the Madras Artillery, had at first tried to take command. Though so prostrated by illness that the Agency Surgeon told him it was as much as his life was worth to move, Cobbe managed to crawl to the guns; and there he remained for a time, too weak to stand, but showing a noble example of soldierly spirit and courage. The guns meanwhile were admirably served, and one of the enemy's pieces were soon disabled, and his supports driven off. Once more a forward movement on the part of our cavalry might have decided the day in our favour. But nothing would induce them to seize their opportunity. They were mostly Sikhs, and my father, who knew of old how Sikhs could fight, had fully relied upon their courage. He was miserably disappointed; for though Travers had at last succeeded in forming them, they broke almost immediately and dispersed in a panic. A portion galloped off to their homes at Sehore, where they arrived incoherent with terror, spreading the report that every European at Indore had been massacred; while the rest gathered in a shapeless heap to the rear of the residency, loyal but useless.

The behaviour of the infantry was still worse. The men of the Bhopal contingent, some 270 strong, instead of moving out to the support of their own guns, levelled their muskets at their officers and drove them off. The Mehidpore Contingent infantry, of whom about 200 were in the lines, refused to obey orders and remained sullenly aloof. The Bheels were so far manageable that they allowed themselves to be formed; but fight they would not. By incessant exertion their officers succeeded in making them keep

their ranks; but Colonel Stockley reported them too unsteady to be thrust into action, and all thoughts of an advance had to be given up.

One last chance remained. My father's note asking for the European battery had been despatched by the hands of a native trooper. If this man had galloped into Mhow, thirteen or fourteen miles, and if the battery were able to come, and had moved out at once, two or three hours more should have sufficed for its arrival at Indore. A stand might possibly be made until this time, or at all events until the receipt of an answer. The Bheels were therefore thrown into the residency in the hope that they might pluck up courage under cover, and do something to punish the attacking force. The hope was a vain one. Holkar's guns had now moved round to their original position, where they had more shelter, and were pouring a well-directed fire of round shot and grape into the residency building itself. This did little harm, beyond breaking a few panes of glass; but the Bheels were completely cowed by the storm, and could not be induced to discharge their pieces even from the comparative security of the residency windows. The whole work of defence was left to the fourteen faithful gunners, and it soon became clear that even if Hungerford's battery were able to leave Mhow, it would arrive too late to do more than cover a retreat. The attack was no longer a tentative one. Encouraged by the impunity with which the guns had for nearly two hours cannonaded the residency, Holkar's troops in the city came pouring up to their support, and the lines were rapidly emptied. Holkar was known to have a powerful force. Besides the three guns which were firing on the residency, he had nine good English six and nine pounders, with some fifteen or twenty others of various calibres. His cavalry numbered 1,400 sabres. His infantry was at least 2,000 strong: and was backed by the armed rabble of the city. To make matters worse nearly 500 mutinous contingent infantry were biding their time within the residency lines.

At this juncture Captain Magniac, the officer commanding the Bhopal Contingent cavalry, came up for the third time with a message from his men. They intimated that they were about to consult their own safety, further resistance being hopeless, and begged that this last chance might be taken of saving the women and children. Some of Holkar's guns and cavalry were already moving round to cut off the retreat, and they implored us to make their escape before it was too late. At the same time the gunners, seeing that they were deserted by

began, naturally enough, to lose heart; and some of them left their guns and sought a place of shelter.

To fight longer with any chance of success was impossible; for the flight of the Bhopal horse would have cut away even the faint show of strength which remained. All the Europeans who had not been murdered were now in the residency, and the last hope of saving them was to retreat while retreat was possible. To cling to the residency was to pronounce the doom of the little company. To retire now while the remnant of a force hung together was the course dictated by every military consideration. At half-past ten the order was given. The mutineers had cut off all the horses and carriages; but the ladies and children were mounted on the artillery waggons, which were drawn by bullocks; and thus, with the Bheels and cavalry covering the rear, the little force moved slowly off under the fire of Holkar's guns. For the time at least it was not pursued. Small as it was it was yet sufficient to command a certain amount of respect; and Holkar's troops, shrinking from a hand-to-hand fight, or satiated by the slaughter of our people who had been cut off outside the residency, turned to the more congenial occupation of plundering the treasury. In this they were joined by the men of the contingents. In the fight itself our loss had not been heavy. A few Bhopal contingent horsemen, a few Bheels, and some bullocks were killed; and one of the European sergeants was wounded. These were the only casualties. As the force retired one of our people, a half-caste clerk, had his head carried off by a roundshot, but the ladies and children escaped untouched.

The line of retreat chosen was of course that on Mhow; for it was possible that the battery might be on its way, and that a junction might be effected, or at all events that the fort might still be in our possession. But the hope, if hope there ever was, of reaching this place of safety was very soon over. To begin with, the first portion of the road was in the hands of the enemy, and in the second place the Bhopal cavalry could not be persuaded to follow; their fears of the Mhow troops were too vivid, and the [illegible]nt had to be given up. The next best course was to circle [illegible]how and make Mundlesar, on the Nerbudda, which had [illegible]ed by my father's orders, as a point of refuge for our [illegible] the Mhow troops rose. Mundlesar was situated on [illegible], about twenty-five miles south of Mhow, and was [illegible]ine of Woodburn's advance. The force was [illegible] the east of the Mhow road, with the view

of crossing the intervening hills by the Simrole Pass. Unhappily this plan also failed. When the force arrived at Tillore, about ten miles from Indore, some villagers came up with the information that four guns and some cavalry of Holkar's had gone on in advance the day before and had occupied the pass. This information was corroborated by a Sikh trooper, who stated that he had seen the guns go by when on picket upon the Mhow road. It was decided upon this to force the pass, and descend on Mundlesar; but once again the fears of the cavalry stepped in. They steadily declined to obey the order, and intimated in the plainest terms that if the attempt were persisted in, they would detach themselves from the force, and leave the Bheels to follow alone. Their officers were in no position to enforce obedience; and the value of the Bheels for fighting purposes had been sufficiently demonstrated; so that there was nothing for it but to give up the Mundlesar route. The only chance of keeping together the semblance of a force, and of effecting an orderly retreat, was to humour the cavalry, and march eastward on Sehore. As I have already stated, this place was the head-quarters of the contingent, and the cavalry were disturbed by fears for the safety of their families, the Mussulmans distrusting the Sikhs, and the Sikhs distrusting the Mussulmans. The change of route was a serious one, for it took the little force away from the only strong place within reach, from the chance of joining the European battery, and from the line of Woodburn's advance; it greatly increased the distance to be covered; it invited pursuit; and it involved much hardship to the women and children. However, there was nothing else to be done; and as it turned out the retreat was safely effected. Pressed on in rapid marches by the cavalry, whose ungovernable fears made them careless of the exhaustion of the unmounted men, the remnant of the Indore garrison marched into Sehore on the 4th of July, bringing in its guns, and every European who had reached the residency on the morning of the outbreak. For the time the contingent remained loyal, and the troops of the Bhopal State behaved well. My father's old friend, the Sekunder Begum, was still at the head of affairs, and she succeeded in keeping down the gathering spirit of revolt. A braver heart and a cooler head than hers did not exist in Central India, and though in the end the Bhopal force also mutinied, her loyalty was never for a moment called in question.

After a day's stay in Sehore my father struck down to Hoshungabad on the southern bank of the Nerbudda, whence he hoped to get into communication with Woodburn, and to bring his people

round to Mundlesar, or, if such a course seemed possible, to Mhow. Of course any attempt to reach either place by the northern bank of the river through Holkar's territory, unattended even by the contingent, was impossible. When he arrived at Hoshungabad he learnt that the Mhow troops had risen on the night of the 1st July, and after murdering three of their officers had gone off to Indore. The European battery was safe in the fort, neither pressed nor threatened; though without supports, and crippled by the defection of its native drivers, it had been powerless to check or punish the mutineers.

The whole of the great main line of communication from the Nerbudda to the Chumbul had now passed out of our hands. But below the Nerbudda all stood firm so far, and it needed only the rapid advance of Woodburn's column to stay the spread of disaffection and to maintain our position at all events up to the river line. To delay any longer was to risk the loss of the river itself, and the fall of the only barrier which yet stood "between the blazing north and the smouldering south." Unfortunately neither General Woodburn nor the civil authorities had grasped this fact. While my father was at Hoshungabad he heard with indignant surprise that the commissioner of Nagpore was doing his best to throw up the line of the Nerbudda, and to divert Woodburn's column from its advance. The officers commanding the military posts upon the northern line of the commissionership had been directed to fall back if the Indore mutineers threatened to march southwards; and the commissioner had written to General Woodburn begging him to march eastward on Nagpore. It is hardly necessary to point out the consequences of such a move. It would have lost us a strong military position, thrown back our frontier perhaps 150 miles, and afforded a great incentive to the southern troops to revolt. Moreover, it was unnecessary, for Nagpore was strong in European and Madras troops, and the mutineers could not cross the river if the posts were held. But it is only fair to add that Mr. Plowden was at the time under a misconception as to the results of the rising at Mhow. He believed that every European there had been put to death.

Directly the news of the mistake contemplated by the Nagpore authorities came to my father's knowledge he did his utmost to prevent its commission. He addressed Mr. Plowden and the Government of India, pointing out the serious military error of the move; he informed General Woodburn that he entirely disapproved of Mr. Plowden's advice, and of the instructions issued to

the military posts; and he authorized the officers commanding those posts to disregard the orders they had received, taking upon himself the entire responsibility of their so doing. This, however, was not enough to secure the line of the Nerbudda. Woodburn had left it uncertain whether he meant to advance or not, and my father knew that the effect of his representations must be at best doubtful. There was no time for a protracted correspondence on the subject. Woodburn had already wasted a fortnight at Aurungabad trying mutineers by court-martial when he ought to have been making long marches. It was now near the middle of July, and a dry July in Central India was very unusual. If the column were not on the Nerbudda before the rains set in, and the roads over the "black soil," so common in these districts, became impassable, it could not be there for several months; and as the line was held by native troops it was impossible to say what might happen. My father could of course do no good by joining, without any accession of strength, the little garrison in Mhow fort. So he determined to go down to Aurungabad, or, if necessary, to Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, and to force up the column by the weight of personal argument. Accordingly on the 14th of July, after satisfying himself that Mhow was safe for the present, and making arrangements for the transaction of any political business which might require attention during his absence, he started southward. Happily his doubts were soon at an end. On the 17th he learnt that his urgent requisition for the advance of the column had been effectual. Woodburn had been forced by ill-health to resign the command, but his successor, Stuart, was pushing on, and had orders to march direct for Mhow, by way of Asseerghur. To Asseerghur my father proceeded, with the view of meeting the column and hurrying on its advance. After this there were no further delays, and on the 1st of August he stood again at Simrole in the guise a British agent should stand, independent of the good-will of any native chief, and ready to enforce his orders. On the following day the column marched into Mhow. It had been brought up just in time. The first shower of rain fell on the night of the 1st, and the black soil was in such a state next morning that the European battery took fourteen hours to cover the nine miles' march. However, the column was there, and the line of the Nerbudda was saved. A few days later the force was strengthened by the arrival of 250 bayonets of H.M.'s 86th Foot.

In the meantime the Maharaja Holkar, whose troops had attacked the residency, was doing his best to show that he himself

was innocent of all participation in the outbreak. Until his troops rose my father had never expressed, nor as far as I can find entertained, a doubt of this chief's loyalty. On the contrary, he had more than once refused to credit the stories against him. "I have no doubt," he wrote on the 8th June, "that designing people try to embroil matters by making use of Holkar's name," but he insisted upon it that Holkar knew his own interest too well to be disloyal. He therefore treated the Maharaja with perfect confidence. Holkar was at his own desire supplied with ammunition for his guns; his troops were invited to aid in the defence of the residency; and, through his confidential vakeel in attendance upon the British representative, he was kept accurately acquainted with the progress of our arms in the north. The communication between the residency and the palace was close and constant; and in every way trust was openly shown. Only a fortnight before the outbreak my father wrote to Lord Canning: "The chiefs are all true as yet, and Holkar running very heartily with us." On the 1st of July this confidence naturally vanished. For nearly two hours before our people retired Holkar's guns had been cannonading the residency, which was only three miles from his palace. His windows commanded a view of it, and if he looked out from them he must have seen the smoke of the guns as well as heard the firing. His troops, "horse and foot with additional guns," to use the words of the official report, "came crowding down to support the attack," followed by a large mob of armed men from the city. During this time, though my father had sent a messenger to him with a letter, not a word came from the Maharaja, while some of his officers were prominent among the insurgents. Finally, when the retreat began, our people were informed that Holkar's guns and cavalry had been sent on in advance to occupy the passes in their rear. The inference naturally drawn from all this was that Holkar had turned against us, and this inference was strengthened by certain circumstances which until then had not been allowed to discredit him. Before the 1st of July it had been reported that he was in constant communication with the disaffected party in Gwalior; that he had received and entertained a messenger from the Mahomedan emperor at Delhi; and that he was intriguing with the Mhow troops. My father was therefore led to believe that Holkar had declared against us, and to this view he gave open expression.* But in the meantime Holkar, as I have said, had

* It appears from Kaye's account of the Mutiny in Central India that this was the view taken by the smaller Chiefs to the west of Indore.

been doing his best to show that he was innocent of the treachery imputed to him. It is not easy to ascertain from the conflicting accounts which have been given upon this point what his behaviour was immediately after the outbreak, or what services he rendered;* but there was no doubt of his anxiety to stand fair with the British Government and to repudiate all responsibility for the action of his troops. In this sense he wrote to my father and to Lord Elphinstone. My father received his assurances with the necessary caution. He informed the Maharaja that the Governor-General would doubtless be gratified with his Highness's proceedings after the outbreak; but he pointed out that native chiefs must *primâ facie* be held responsible for the conduct of their troops, and courteously requested the Maharaja to submit any observations he might wish to make with regard to certain points connected with the insurrection; particularly with regard to his silence during the cannonade, his despatch of guns to the rear of the residency before the attack, and the fact that he had retained some of the mutineers in his service, and supplied carriage and provisions to others who had marched northwards. Holkar replied that the confusion during the attack had been too great to allow of any communication being made, and that the moment he learnt what had happened he prepared to start for the residency, but was stopped by the news that all was over. With regard to the troops, he said, he was powerless to punish or control, having no one on whom he could rely. It was true that he had supplied carriage and provisions to the mutineers who marched north, but they were plundering the city, and this was his only chance of getting rid of them. As to the guns, they had been sent to Mahesur, south of Mhow, in anticipation of disturbances below the Nerbudda, and the smallness of their escort showed that they were not meant for offensive purposes.

This explanation was received by my father with every disposition to give Holkar a full opportunity of clearing himself, and it was forwarded to the Government of India with a letter which reviewed the circumstances in a manner far from unfavourable. My father observed that before the rising Holkar had candidly expressed mistrust of his troops; that a marked distinction was to be drawn between the Maharaja and his durbar; that whatever

* It seems clear that he behaved with kindness to some fugitives who sought refuge in his palace; that he did his best to rescue Lieutenant Hutchinson from the hands of the Amjhera mutineers; and that he forwarded some supplies he had promised to aid the advance of Woodburn's column.

might be thought of the conduct of those about him, there could be no doubt of his Highness's anxiety to separate his own name and fame from the guilt of participation in the rising; and that in his case the plea of helplessness was certainly not a mere excuse, his only means of saving Indore from the prolonged stay of the revolted soldiery being to find them supplies and facilitate their departure. As to the guns, it was observed that there had been no concealment about their despatch, and that some time before the rising the durbar vakeel had talked of sending guns to Mahesur. My father added that the Maharaja proposed appointing a commission for the trial of the guilty at Indore, but that this measure seemed useless, for Holkar could not enforce its sentences even should they be honest, against armed bands who had set at defiance alike the authority of their own sovereign and that of the supreme government. This letter was accompanied by one to Lord Canning, in which my father wrote: "Personally I am disposed to think Holkar sincere." Pending the receipt of orders upon these communications my father continued to treat the Maharaja with friendliness, but he declined to commit himself to any act which might seem to anticipate the decision of Government upon the question of his Highness's responsibility.

In the meantime, however, others had not been so judicious. After the outbreak at Mhow, Captain Hungerford of the artillery had assumed command of the fort. The mutineers had retired unmolested in the darkness. In spite of the fact that incendiary fires had been blazing in the cantonment from sunset until 10 o'clock on the night of the 1st of July, and that a rise was momentarily expected, Hungerford had made no preparations for rapid action. Until then the artillery horses had been kept at night ready harnessed, but on the 1st they were tired by their movement towards Indore, and the precaution was set aside. When the rise came therefore Hungerford was not ready to meet it. The battery turned out eventually, but too late to do any good. Colonel Platt and his adjutant, Fagan, who went on in advance, were shot down;* and when the guns arrived, there was no enemy to be

* Platt and Fagan died nobly. When the 23rd rose the officers who were with them escaped to the fort, where the European battery was quartered. Platt was not with the regiment at the time, but hearing what had occurred, he mounted and rode up to the fort, and ordered out the battery. He then called upon the officers to come out and do what they could to stop the outbreak. Fagan knew it was hopeless, for he had been obliged to run the gauntlet of the men's fire; but he at once responded, and mounted his horse, remarking only that it was too late. Platt replied, "You are the man I always took you for," and the two rode on to the

seen. A few round shot were fired at the Native lines on the chance of somebody being in them, and the battery returned to the fort. Next day there was not a sepoy in sight, dead or alive, and for the time Mhow was safe. It was, however, perfectly clear that if any enemy should come up, Hungerford might find himself in difficulties, and that at the utmost he could only cling to the walls of the fort, for he had no supports of any kind, and his battery was, moreover, immediately crippled by the defection of its native drivers. Under these circumstances, the prospect of an advance on the part of Holkar's troops was disquieting; and so Hungerford felt it. Believing himself to be "threatened by an attack from the Raja of Indore," Hungerford therefore wrote to his Highness pointing out that Holkar's interests lay on our side, and expressing his confidence that Holkar was not blind to the fact. It need hardly be said that the answer was satisfactory. Holkar had not openly thrown in his lot against us; and therefore, whether he were in fact loyal or disloyal, it was clearly to his advantage to anticipate a deliberate review of the circumstances attending the insurrection. He assured Hungerford that he had never dreamt of deviating from the path of friendship, and that he was ready to do anything to prove his devotion. Hungerford was, of course, ignorant of all that had passed at Indore, and of the many suspicious circumstances connected with the attack on the Residency; and, altogether, he was in as bad a position as he possibly could be in to judge of Holkar's loyalty. But he did not see the indiscreetness of committing himself to an opinion which he was not qualified to form. Assuming Holkar's loyalty from Holkar's assurances and behaviour after the outbreak, and relieved from apprehension by the success of his diplomatic effort, he "took political charge," and wrote asserting the Maharaja's innocence to Lord Elphinstone at Bombay. I have already shown what my father was doing in the meantime—upholding the line of the Nerbudda, and forcing up Woodburn's column. But he had not devoted himself to any lengthy exposition of his views on the comparatively unimportant question of Holkar's loyalty; and the protestations of the Maharaja, backed by the advocacy of the Mhow officers, were accepted by Lord Elphinstone at Bombay and Lord Canning at Calcutta. I have no wish to assert, or to imply, that Holkar was guilty; but, under the circumstances attending

infantry lines, where they soon fell pierced with bullets. Harris, of the 1st Cavalry, had also tried to control his men, but they shot him down, and then cut him to pieces with their sabres.

the attack on the Residency, it was injudicious on the part of the officers in cantonments to assume his innocence without further enquiry; and the dangerous nature of the precedent thus created was afterwards fully recognized.

From the time that my father arrived at Mhow with Stuart's column the main political difficulty of the position was the disarming of Holkar's troops. The Durbar could never make up their minds whether they did or did not want the aid of the British force. From the very first this vacillation showed itself. While the column lay at Simrole, waiting for the artillery to close up, Holkar's ministers asked whether help could be afforded. They were informed that if Holkar wished it, the column would march on Indore direct, instead of Mhow. But their fears had abated as suddenly as they had risen; and the answer was that as the troops were at present quiet, they did not require assistance. So it went on. When their fears were upon them, urgent cries for help were sent to my father at Mhow; but when they had to face the consequences of his advance, they drew back and declined his assistance. They feared that the march of the Mhow troops might precipitate a crisis; and they shrank from the unpopularity attendant upon measures of punishment, and from the loss of dignity involved in the disarming of the State troops in the State capital by a British force. In this way the disarming of the mutinous regiments was deferred from week to week, and from month to month; and my father, who wished as far as possible to respect the Maharaja's feelings, and had strong military reasons for not pressing the matter during the rains, so long as the troops remained quiet, exerted no authoritative interference.

Shortly after his return to Mhow, my father summed up in the following words the state of affairs in Central India:—

"The means of coercion at our disposal are extremely inadequate to the restoration of order and to the stay of anarchy wherever that exists. The Gwalior contingent has wholly gone from our colours, and is now with its well-equipped artillery in Sindia's hands, and of course at his disposal. It may act against us—it never can act for us. The Malwa contingent has lost all its cavalry, a body of 800 good horse, and its infantry so misbehaved at Indore that it is impossible not to hold the whole body in suspicion, though the artillery and infantry are still together at Mehidpore under its European officers. The Bhopal contingent, after its disgraceful and treacherous behaviour at Indore, is now in open mutiny at Sehore, and not likely to hold together long.

The Bheel Corps is in course of re-assembling, but with its character and influence deteriorated, and having to be thinned of many native officers and men whom the utmost latitude of commiseration cannot permit to remain in the ranks. At Nagode, up to the latest advices from Major Ellis, the 50th Bengal Native Infantry still stood and was dutiful; but, with that single exception, from north to south of this charge, there is not a gun, there is not a sabre, there is not a musket, which can be called in aid of the maintenance of order and British supremacy, except Brigadier Stuart's weak column at Mhow, consisting of one battery of European artillery thoroughly effective; one battery of European artillery paralyzed by loss of drivers; 230 Dragoons of Her Majesty's 14th; 250 of Her Majesty's 86th; the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, details of Bombay and Madras Sappers and Miners, and the 3rd Nizam's Cavalry. The total of this effective force may amount to 700 Europeans of all arms, and 1,200 Native troops of all arms, giving a grand total of 1,900 men. This force may for the present be considered in observation of Holkar's force at Indore, composed of 30 guns of various calibres, about 1,400 horse, and five battalions of infantry, besides a city which has shown itself hostile and seditious."

Such was the condition of affairs in the middle of August. It could hardly seem much worse; but worse was to come. As the rainy season wore on, one Firoz Shah, of the Delhi family, calling himself the Shahzada Humayoon, raised the Mussulman standard at Mundesore, near the Rajputana frontier, about 120 miles north-west of Indore. He was joined by a portion of Sindia's troops, and by all the turbulent Afghans and other foreign mercenaries in the neighbourhood. The force under his orders rose rapidly, until at last it was estimated at no less than 20,000 men, and threatened to overrun all western Malwa. To the north-east the outlook was even more threatening. It seemed only too probable that the Nana's forces, broken by Havelock about Cawnpore, might strike southward into Bundelcund, and gathering to themselves the Banda and Gwalior mutineers, pour down upon Central India, where there was nothing to stay their advance but the small column at Mhow. The Nana's agent, Tantia Topee, was known to be intriguing at Jhansee; and throughout the great stretch of Mahratta country from Gwalior southward, the advent of the "Peishwa" was eagerly awaited. Meanwhile, immediately to the east of Mhow, a body of foreign mercenaries, "Velayutees," menaced Nimar; while immediately to the west a strong force of

Afghans and others rose and occupied Dhar and Amjhera. From this position they communicated by their left with the Mundesore army, and threatened with their right the Bombay road below Mhow.

All this time the little force at Mhow was chafing in helpless idleness. It could not attempt to enter on a campaign during the rains. Its strength lay in cavalry and artillery, and until the "black soil" was dry, there was no possibility of using these arms with effect. The roads themselves were, in most parts around Indore, execrably bad at this season, and off the roads there was no firm ground whereon to deploy and act. The infantry by itself was too weak to do much; and, moreover, the exposure of the men in the open, when carts, baggage, and commissariat stores could not follow, was to ensure the ruin of the force from wet bivouacs and want of supplies. Swayed partly by these considerations, and partly by others of a political nature, my father decided to keep the column stationary at Mhow until the rains should cease, and the surface of the country should become sufficiently hard to admit of rapid and effective movement. In this course he was supported by the Bombay Government, who feared for the security of their frontier, and objected to the employment of the column at any distance from Mhow.

Meanwhile, apart from the natural difficulties and anxieties of his position, my father had had much to try him. In former years he had been exposed to much injustice and misrepresentation, both from his official superiors and from the Press, but until the outbreak of the mutiny there had been one point, his reputation as a brave and capable soldier, upon which no one had ever ventured to cast a doubt. That at least seemed to be beyond question; for his personal gallantry had more than once been conspicuously displayed, and every chief under whom he had served had borne witness to his talent and capacity. Now even his reputation as a soldier was to be attacked. Not long after the retreat from Indore, the Bombay Press began to publish anonymous letters, written by persons on the spot, which reflected upon his proceedings from the time of his arrival in the Agency, and attributed to his carelessness, and want of energy and decision, the misfortunes which had occurred. The slow and orderly retreat from the residency was denominated a "flight;" and it was more than insinuated that the post had been needlessly abandoned. These letters, of course, attracted attention outside Bombay, and were noticed by the Press in India and in England. From internal evidence it

was pretty clear where they had originated, and my father had little difficulty in tracing home one or two of the most malevolent. These came from English officers whose conduct before the rising he had been obliged to condemn and rebuke. They called forth at the time indignant rejoinders from some of those who had behaved liked soldiers, and who could appreciate soldierly conduct in others. Travers, who had then left India prostrated by illness, and who afterwards received the Victoria Cross for his conduct on the 1st of July, wrote out to Bombay protesting with characteristic vigour and generosity against an account of the affair which magnified his own services at the expense of his brother officer. Cobbe, who had also set a noble example during the fight, now added his testimony to that of Travers; and Ludlow of the Madras Engineers did the same. In the end the attempt failed, for the charge bore falsehood on its face; but for a time it did harm, and caused my father the annoyance which any honour-loving soldier must feel at such aspersions upon his character. And after his death the charge was brought up again by the historian Kaye, writing in close and constant communication with Sir Robert Hamilton.

If the attacks of my father's anonymous slanderers were annoying, the silence of the Government was still more so. Harassed at this time by overwhelming work, and by anxiety as to the course of affairs in the north-west, Lord Canning could find no time to spare for the affairs of Central India, the importance of which he probably did not realize. All references to Headquarters, therefore, remained unanswered; and my father had to act for months entirely without orders, and without any knowledge of the views of his Government.

All these troubles, however, were of small moment in comparison with the great sorrow which now fell upon him. Throughout the dangers of the rising at Indore, and the trials of the subsequent retreat, my mother's courage and constancy had never faltered. When the guns opened on the morning of the outbreak, she had brought him his sword; and throughout the two hours' cannonade she remained as cool and self-possessed as the bravest man there, utterly careless of the danger, and expressing only disgust at the cowardice of our troops. After the retreat began, she narrowly escaped a soldier's death; for Holkar's artillery was firing steadily, and a round shot from one of the guns crashed through the woodwork of the waggon in which she was seated. The next few days were a time of excessive hardship. Making long marches without

tents, baggage, or servants, the little party of ladies and children suffered terribly from want of rest, and often of food, from exposure to extreme fatigue, to heat, to rain, to every conceivable discomfort. Against all this, though weak and ill, she bore up without a word of complaint, thinking only of others. Not long afterwards one of my father's friends wrote to him: "We have seen ———'s letter to her parents giving an account of your journey to Hoshungabad; in which we read with delight, unmixed with the least surprise, how 'Mrs. Durand's courage supported the other ladies through it all.'" And the same story was told by more than one of those who accompanied her. When my father went on from Hoshungabad to meet the Bombay column, she insisted on going with him, though the journey involved further hardship and danger; for the intervening districts were disturbed, and the only available escort consisted of a few Native horsemen whose fidelity was doubtful. Such was the condition of the country that one of my father's subordinates openly stated that if ordered to join the party he would resign his appointment rather than obey. She was told of this, and was begged by my father to remain in the comparative security of Hoshungabad; but her answer was that if there was such danger it would be death to her to let him go alone. Believing her, my father gave way, and allowed her to accompany him; and she found no rest until at the beginning of August the force marched into Mhow. A month later her sufferings were at an end for ever. A severe attack of fever, coming upon her when least able to bear it, rapidly sapped her strength; and after a few days' illness she passed quietly away, dying as she had lived, in the thought of others, and in a calm reliance upon the love and mercy of God. Her child, born shortly after her arrival at Mhow, had died before her. She was borne to her grave on a gun carriage, a fitting hearse for one of her intrepid spirit; and my father laid upon her coffin his favourite sword, the one she had brought him on the morning of the outbreak. It had been given him by Lord Ellenborough when he was married, and it was, he wrote, "an emblem of her courage, for she was as true and brave as steel."

The blow was a terrible one; and his private journal and letters written at this time are very sad to read, full of the deep and passionate sorrow of a nature that was as tender as it was strong. For fourteen years, almost all years of failure and disappointment, she had stood by his side, comforting and supporting as only a true woman can. Now that the clouds were clearing, and that

his career was about to be brightened by some measure of success, she was taken from him. Even in the first agony of his grief he bowed humbly to the stroke, acknowledging that he had never been worthy of the great happiness vouchsafed to him; and praying for strength to bear his loss without complaint; but it took the light out of his life. He went back to his duty sick at heart; and though in after years he found some measure of peace and happiness, the shadow that had fallen upon him was never wholly removed.

As the rainy season came to a close, the little column at Mhow made ready for an advance. There were some difficulties to overcome before it could take the field; for the Bombay Government still wished to retain it at Mhow, and the Saugor authorities wished to cripple it by borrowing half its artillery. To both these suggestions, however, my father declined to listen; and strengthening himself by calling up some of the Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry, which would otherwise have been kept inactive below the Nerbudda, he set his face to the northward. But it was no easy matter to decide in what direction the force should deliver its first blow. It was of course very desirable to disarm the Indore insurgents, and dangerous to leave them in the rear. On the other hand, their position was strong; an attempt to disarm them would probably involve a good deal of street fighting, which for a force weak in infantry was the thing above all to be avoided; and if they should prefer to retreat before the column could close on Indore, the only result of an advance in that direction would be to swell the Mundesore insurrection, already sufficiently formidable. It was finally decided that the best course would be to move on Mundesore first, *viâ* Dhar. The dispersion of the Shahzada's army would, my father thought, have a most salutary effect. His rude "Velayutees," as the western mercenaries were called, were dreaded by the natives almost as much as Europeans, and with justice. The defeat of these hardy fighting men would probably take the heart out of Holkar's troops, and their disarming would be easy. If the latter should take advantage of the northward march of the column to attack Mhow, they would of course cause temporary embarrassment; but they seemed unlikely to undertake any offensive operations, and it was necessary that something should be risked. In the middle of October, therefore, the column moved out of cantonments. The plan of the campaign, briefly stated, was as follows:—The insurrection which had broken out in Dhar and Amjhera was the first to be put down; the force was then to march

north against the Shahzada and disperse the Mundesore army; after this it could either swing round on Indore, or, if necessary, strike across the main road above Indore, and drive back the Nana to the north-east.

How this plan was carried out will be found described at length in Malleson's History of the Indian Mutiny. On the 22nd of October the British force, reduced to about 1,500 men by the necessity of leaving a garrison in Mhow, arrived before the fort of Dhar. The garrison, composed of Arabs and other foreigners, came out boldly to meet it; but they were overthrown with the loss of three guns and driven into the town, our troops, European and Native, behaving admirably. None behaved better than the 25th Bombay Infantry and the Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent. Doubts had hitherto been felt about the loyalty of these corps; but led by two good officers, Robertson and Orr, they did their duty well, and from this time there was little further fear of their turning against us. The 3rd Cavalry charged home with fiery energy, and one of Orr's troopers was found lying dead with five of the enemy slain around him. Our loss was insignificant.

Immediately after the fight the fort of Dhar was invested. It was a place of considerable strength; the walls, which are built of red granite, and some thirty feet high, rising from a mound of the same height above the plain. To capture this fort by a *coup de main* was impossible, and a regular siege had to be commenced. This lasted until sunset on the 31st of October, when our battering guns had made a practicable breach. A storming party was then told off to assault the place at daybreak; but during the night two sapper sergeants who had been sent to explore the breach, ascertained that the fort was deserted, the garrison, some 700 strong, having slipped out under cover of the darkness. They succeeded in making their way through the line of our cavalry pickets, and got off with little loss, eventually joining the Mundesore force to the north-west.

Dhar having fallen, a detachment was sent to Amjhera, some miles further west, to free the flank and rear of the column as it marched northwards. Amjhera was occupied without opposition. Before our troops arrived the garrison had fled to Mundesore, and the Bombay road was free from insult.

In the meantime my father had been joined by some reinforcements from the Hyderabad Contingent, and it was his hope that the Shahzada's rebels might come down to meet our column in the open field. At first it seemed as if this was their intention. On the

8th of November a body of Velayutees attacked Mehidpore, where a portion of the Malwa Contingent still made a show of standing faithful. Little resistance was offered, and the enemy carried off a large supply of ammunition and some guns.* Their success, however, did not last long. Major Orr, who had pushed on in advance of the force, with three hundred and thirty-seven sabres of the Hyderabad cavalry, came up with them on the afternoon of the 13th, near the village of Rawal. His men nobly justified my father's confidence. The Velayutees made a hard stand for their supplies and guns, but Orr and his troopers were not to be denied. Forcing their way across a muddy nulla or ravine, behind which the enemy had drawn up in position, our people charged the guns; and after a desperate hand-to-hand conflict, which lasted until sunset, the Velayutees gave way. Our loss was heavy, for an English officer and nearly a hundred men were killed or wounded: but the enemy left a hundred and seventy dead on the ground, while seventy prisoners, eight guns, and the whole of the stores taken at Mehidpore, fell into the hands of the victors. This action, in itself most gallant and successful, was doubly satisfactory from the fact that it finally dissipated any lingering doubts as to the loyalty of the contingent. The escape of the Dhar garrison had revived some suspicion in the minds of the European part of the force, and it was of the greatest importance that this feeling should be removed.

My father now pushed on to the Chumbul, which was crossed without opposition on the 19th and 20th of November; and on the 21st the column was within striking distance of Mundesore. As in the case of Dhar the Shahzada's Velayutees here showed good courage; for on the approach of our force they at once marched out of Mundesore and advanced to the attack. It is said that they believed our troops had been repulsed before Dhar, and expected to meet a beaten and dispirited enemy. If so they were rapidly undeceived, for the fire of our powerful artillery

* Mrs. Timmins, the wife of the commandant at Mehidpore, was unable to escape when the cantonment was taken, her horse having been shot under her. She was, however, concealed by a faithful servant, and eventually rescued after living for some days in a native hut. A letter written by her to my father on a piece of coarse rice paper was among the letters he brought away from Central India; and it is impossible to read it without a high admiration for her courage. From the place of her perilous imprisonment she wrote describing the fight, giving him information as to the enemy's movements, and pressing him to advance, not for her own rescue but to "take vengeance on Mehidpore." There is not a word savouring of complaint or fear from beginning to end.

soon shook their line, and our cavalry charging home sabred a number of them and drove the rest into the city.

The next day my father crossed the Mundesore river and encamped to the west of the town, in order to prevent the junction of the two bodies of the enemy, one of which, about 5,000 strong, had been besieging Neemuch. On the 24th he closed with the Neemuch force at the village of Goorareea, and a stubborn conflict ensued, during the course of which the Mundesore force again sallied out and attacked our rear. They were driven in after a sharp encounter, and the enemy in front were also forced to fall back; but the latter clung with tenacity to the village, and when night fell they had not been dislodged. Goorareea was stormed the next day, though not till our guns had almost destroyed it. The defence had been most gallant, and had cost us a considerable loss in men and officers; but on the 24th alone over 500 of the enemy were left dead on the field, and many were slain in the village on the 25th, while more than 200 men surrendered. In the meantime the remains of the Mundesore garrison, consisting of some two thousand Afghans and Mekranis, evacuated the place. Our cavalry, worn out by four days of hard work, could not pursue with any effect; but the rising was at an end, for the Shahzada's force now scattered over the country, and never again came together. The blow had been completely successful, and all the western portion of Malwa up to the frontier of Rajputana was now clear of the enemy.

My father then proceeded to carry out the remaining object of the campaign. The Nana had not come down upon Central India, so that there was one complication less than he had anticipated, and he was free to turn round upon Holkar's troops. Accordingly, leaving some cavalry at Mundesore, the column marched for Indore *viâ* Oojein on the 2nd of December. While on the march my father wrote to inform Holkar that he should be at Indore about the 15th. It was added that ample time had been allowed for the punishment of the troops and people concerned in the attack on the residency; that only one man had, in fact, been punished; that now, if the Maharaja could deal with the guilty, their punishment would be left to him, but that if he could not, force would be used rapidly and summarily. Holkar intimated in reply, that if the column would halt outside the city, a mile from the cavalry lines, he would disarm the troops himself. This was done, and on the 15th the mutinous regiments quietly laid down their arms. The heart had been taken out of them by the

defeat of the Mundesore troops, and the mere presence of the victorious little force, though considerably inferior to them in numbers, sufficed to bring about their submission.

Such were the facts, briefly stated, of my father's administration in Central India. Without the aid of any European force, he had succeeded in maintaining himself at Indore for six weeks after the outbreak at Delhi, by isolating the contingent troops and playing them off against the regulars. When, contrary to his wishes, the two were allowed to come into contact, the fidelity of the contingents gave way, and gradually the circle of insurrection closed upon Indore. At last, driven out of the residency by a combination of treachery and cowardice, he made good a soldierly retreat in the face of overwhelming masses, veiling his weakness by a show of force, and marched into Sehore without the loss of gun, standard, or other trophy. Thence he proceeded to Hoshungabad, and resolutely holding, in the teeth of orders, the great natural barrier of the Nerbudda, he forced up Woodburn's hesitating column to Mhow. Using that column compactly to deal heavy blows, he took a strong fort; gained three actions in the open field; captured more than forty guns; crushed a formidable insurrection; and dispersed or disarmed forces far exceeding his own in numbers.*

During the short campaign in Western Malwa our troops behaved as British troops well led will always behave. Among the Europeans Woolcombe's battery of artillery and the wing of the 14th Dragoons under Gall specially distinguished themselves. Gall was a typical cavalry officer, cool and daring. Though disabled by a wound received in the Punjab, and without power to use his sword, he was always foremost in fight; and it is hardly to be wondered at that his men would have followed him anywhere. The regiment had been under a cloud since Chillianwalla, and the men felt it keenly, constantly inquiring whether their conduct in Central India would go to their credit, and wipe out the stain. My father assured their officers that it should not be his fault if the services of the corps were forgotten, and he did his best for them; but men's minds were engrossed by the progress of events in the north, and the Malwa campaign attracted little attention. Major Robertson of the 25th Bombay Infantry, Major Orr of the

* It is hardly necessary to point out that the reconquest of Western Malwa cleared the way for Sir Hugh Rose's campaign in Central India, the proper objects and course of which my father foresaw. *Vide* Malleson's "History of the Indian Mutiny," vol. iii. p. 85.

Hyderabad Contingent, and Major MacDonald of the Quarter-Master-General's Department, were among the other officers who specially distinguished themselves. The Native troops without exception fought admirably.

My father also received cordial and effective assistance from some of the civil officers under his orders, from none more than Captain Keatinge, afterwards Colonel Keatinge, V.C., Chief Commissioner of Assam, whom he brought up from Nimar to the north of the Nerbudda. Before the outbreak at Indore, Keatinge had controlled his own district with courage and energy, and when the spread of disaffection unsettled Central India, my father found it necessary to employ him in the north. Some of the Indore assistants were not altogether the stamp of men required for service in troubled times. One, whom my father wished to send out to a post of danger, excused himself on the ground that he had been suffering from attacks of fever, and that the country was unhealthy. Another demurred to the composition of the escort assigned to him. With Keatinge there were never excuses or delays; and during the operations of the Mhow column in Western Malwa he rendered valuable service by raising and managing some Native levies in the small States north of Indore.

Of the Native chiefs, none rendered more conspicuous service than the Mahomedan rulers of Bhopal and Jowrah, the latter of whom co-operated with my father in the most cordial and open manner from beginning to end at considerable risk to himself. There was never a doubt as to his loyalty; and his conduct was an example to all.

In the meantime Sir Robert Hamilton had arrived in India to resume his appointment as Governor-General's Agent at Indore; and after a visit to Calcutta he had come round, towards the end of the year, to Bombay. There he remained for some little time until Sir Hugh Rose marched up to Central India with a column of troops. It was a coincidence that Hamilton's advent was heralded by various paragraphs in the newspapers announcing, amongst other connected matters, that my father's action in Central India had been disapproved, and that he was, therefore, about to be removed from his charge. At the same time it was understood and given out by Sir Robert Hamilton's friends at Mhow and Indore that my father's functions had been suspended, that his political assistant was to open all official letters, and that orders were to be taken from Sir Robert himself. I do not know

how these reports came about, but this much is certain that Sir Robert Hamilton was sufficiently ill-advised to attempt interference with my father's orders before he took over charge of the Agency. As an instance of the kind of treatment to which my father was exposed, this incident deserves a passing notice. While still in Bombay, or near it, Hamilton telegraphed to one of his sons-in-law, who was at the time officiating as "First Assistant" in the Agency, that is, as my father's immediate and confidential subordinate, to the effect that a detachment of the Hyderabad Contingent, then in Mhow, was on no account to leave the place. My father's orders to Captain Hare, the officer commanding the detachment, were to the contrary effect, and they were communicated through the "First Assistant." When communicating them, the latter showed Hare Sir Robert Hamilton's telegram. Hare very properly refused to pay any attention to it, and at once reported the matter. Nor was this the only instance in which interference was attempted. My father wrote to Lord Canning about these proceedings, and added:—"I informed Sir Robert Hamilton and Captain Shakespear that had Captain Hare disobeyed my orders he would have had to stand a court-martial. Captain Shakespear excused himself by saying he only showed Captain Hare Sir Robert's telegram. Hamilton himself said nothing, but looked foolish, so I left them, wishing them farewell."

This was on the 16th of December. Hamilton and Sir Hugh Rose had then arrived in Indore, and my father's functions were at an end. Before making over charge he had had an interview with Holkar, who seemed greatly relieved at the disarming of his troops, and had impressed upon his Highness the necessity for the punishment of the guilty. Holkar professed his anxiety to make full inquiry into this matter, and the interview then terminated. By this time, however, my father had lost his former confidence in Holkar, and he left Indore under the impression that justice would not be done. I have already shown that my father had a few months before written in this chief's favour to Lord Canning, and had been inclined to consider him sincere in disclaiming participation with the mutineers. Nevertheless, he had felt some doubts on the subject, and they had been confirmed by one or two circumstances which occurred during the rainy season,*

* For example, by finding that while professing the utmost fear of their troops, the Durbar were importing a large quantity of pig-lead for musket ammunition. The lead was seized and lodged in Mhow fort.

by conversation with various natives of the country, and by the additional information which he had acquired regarding events at Indore before and during the rising. So far as I have been able to make out from the several references to this subject scattered through his letters, he did not consider that Holkar had actually gone against us or instigated his troops to rise. But he gradually came to the conclusion that Holkar had been trimming and trying to stand fair with both sides, and that he had known a good deal more than he had told. "Holkar's waiting game," he wrote to Lord Ellenborough in February, 1858, "was spoilt by the leaders of the Indore insurrection hurrying his troops and people into untimely action. He felt that their precipitation had hopelessly ruined him unless he could patch up matters with us." My father's opinion was greatly strengthened by finding that Lord Elphinstone, who had at first written strongly in favour of Holkar, was afterwards inclined to take the same view, and this upon information gained independently in the Bombay Presidency. The question of Holkar's loyalty has been so much debated, and always in connection with my father, that it is necessary to put clearly on record his views regarding it. I would most willingly avoid the whole matter, which has already been productive of endless controversy, and of the most shameless attacks upon my father's character, but to do so would now be equally impossible and useless.

On the 21st of December, after a brief visit to Mhow, my father marched for Bombay, whence he went round to Calcutta. The nine months he had spent in Central India had been far from happy. He was conscious of having done good service under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, but he had not received one word of encouragement or notice from the Government of India. "They can praise men" he wrote "whose columns are all or nearly all Europeans, but not a word for mine, fighting against great odds, surrounded by great odds, and ridiculously weak in European infantry." This want of support had, he felt, exposed him to unnecessary annoyance on the part of the Press, and of those who worked the Press against him. Finally he had suffered in his private life the greatest blow that could have fallen upon him. "The last day of a year of great bitterness and woe," he writes in his journal on the 31st of December. "I must fight on alone in a world which has from my birth been my enemy, and in which she alone rendered life bearable. She was its great blessing, its light—all is gone now."

On arrival in Calcutta he found that the silence of Government had not arisen from disapproval, but from Lord Canning's characteristic deliberation. The Governor-General was in fact wholly satisfied, and said so. "He spoke very warmly, for him," my father wrote, "of the issue and conduct of affairs under me in Central India, expressing his satisfaction and approval of all I had done." Eighteen months later, when he had received much fuller information on the subject, and had considered the various letters directly impugning my father's proceedings, which Sir Robert Hamilton begun to submit immediately after his return to Indore, Lord Canning recorded a minute upon the services rendered by certain officers during the mutiny. With regard to Central India he wrote—"The first thanks of the Government are due to Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, C.B., who at the time of the outbreak was officiating as the Agent of the Governor-General. Colonel Durand's conduct was marked by great foresight and the soundest judgment, as well in military as in civil matters. He had many points to guard, and the trustworthy force at his disposal was almost hopelessly small; but by a judicious use of it, and by the closest personal supervision of its movements, Colonel Durand saved our interests in Central India until support could arrive."

My father had received for this service a Companionship of the Bath; and he was now I believe recommended by Lord Canning for a higher class of the Order.

With this account of what occurred in Central India during 1857 I would willingly leave the subject. Indeed I should have omitted, had it been possible to do so, a good deal of the personal matter upon which I have touched. But so much discussion has taken place regarding this episode of the mutiny, and my father's proceedings in connection therewith, that it is necessary to enter into the question, and at some little length. Therefore, though I do not propose to interrupt the narrative of his life by taking up the controversy here, I have devoted some pages to an examination of the attack made upon my father's conduct; and any one who may feel an interest in the subject will find a full statement of the case in the second appendix to this volume.

## CHAPTER IX.

### 1858—1861.

Return to Calcutta—Letters to his Daughter—Appointed to collect Opinions and prepare Reports on the question of Army Reorganization in India—With Lord Canning at Allahabad—Correspondence regarding Reorganization—Sent to England as Special Commissioner from the Government of India—Feeling in England against Lord Canning's proposals—Appointment to the Secretary of State's Council—Efforts to prevent Amalgamation and protect the Rights of the Indian Armies—Second Marriage—Residence at East Sheen—Formation of the Indian Staff Corps—Offer of the Foreign Secretaryship—Return to India.

AFTER his arrival in Calcutta in January, 1858, my father remained for some time without an appointment. His first desire had been to ask for employment in the field with Sir Colin Campbell; but Lord Canning, immediately on their meeting, had expressed himself so freely and cordially as to the prospect of soon finding work for him, that he thought it proper to leave the matter in the Governor-General's hands. He contented himself therefore with replying that he was ready to serve in any capacity, military or civil, and refrained from making a push to join the army.

He afterwards had reason to believe that the appointment to which Lord Canning contemplated nominating him was the Chief Commissionership of Oude, which Sir James Outram was about to vacate for a seat in the Governor-General's council. The arrangement, however, was not carried out, some of Lord Canning's *entourage* objecting to the appointment of a military man of his rank on the ground that there would be senior military officers in Oude commanding troops, and that the chief commissioner's authority would be weakened. My father, therefore, remained in Calcutta, unemployed, and this state of things continued until the end of April, by which time he was chafing greatly at the enforced inaction which prevented him from seeing further service as a soldier.

It was at this time that he received the news of his being

nominated a Companion of the Bath. "I wish," he wrote to Lord Ellenborough, "that the Government of India, who have twice recommended me for the rank to which I am entitled .... had taken this opportunity to insist a third time on justice being done me, and my proper place in the army secured to me. That would have been of some use and value, whereas to have recommended me for a C.B., which many a man gets for taking a battery or a regiment into action, appears to me to be a very niggardly acknowledgment for crushing a formidable insurrection, securing the line of the Nerbudda, and disarming Holkar's troops .... Had Lord Canning been able to take an impartial view of what was done at a distance from the great foci of attraction, Delhi and Lucknow, he would hardly have acknowledged my services in a manner which would have been suitable enough had I taken a battery or a regiment into action and nothing more. I may be wrong, but I think I did more, and I shall tell him so." Soon afterwards, however, he learnt that the decoration was not due to Lord Canning, who in point of fact had not yet sent home any recommendation at all, but to Lord Ellenborough and Sir George Clerk, who had of their own accord interested themselves in his favour and had done what they could for him.

Meanwhile, having little to do, my father found more leisure than usual for private correspondence; and I quote the following extracts from his letters to his eldest daughter written during the year:—

"CALCUTTA,
"*7th March*, 1858.

"I have just been to the cathedral, and heard a sermon preached by a very good man, Dealtry, the Bishop of Madras; yet I think I heard a better sermon last night, between eleven and twelve at night. The bishop was preaching in behalf of the poor of Calcutta, and the District Charitable Society for their relief; but, though, no doubt, a good discourse, I was more struck by the one which at the late hour I mentioned, one of our guests gave us. It may perhaps, interest you too, as a fragment of true history as well as a lay sermon; and I dare say if you will tell it to my other darlings, they, too, will think that the sermon was not a bad one. Yesterday, Captain Yule,* with whom I am living, had several guests to dinner. The lady guests and all the gentlemen, except one, left us at eleven; and the one who did not leave us

* Colonel Henry Yule of the Engineers.

we stopped, and asked him to sit down again, and Yule and he took cigars. This gentleman was Dr. Fayrer, who has not been long in Calcutta, and was Residency Surgeon at Lucknow. He, of course, had gone through the whole siege, and had been acting in the twofold capacity of medical officer and commandant of a post; his own house being one of the military posts defended, and entrusted to himself. Well, both Yule and myself were anxious for particulars of that famous defence, and I was deeply interested in the fall of my old acquaintance, the man under whom the defence commenced, Sir Henry Lawrence.

"Long years ago I knew him as a lieutenant of artillery, senior to Nelly's godfather, Eyre. Lord Ellenborough thought well of Lawrence and his services, and made him Resident in Nepal—that was his first charge of eminence; subsequently he was ruler of the Punjab, then Agent for Rajputana; and when Outram was sent to command in Persia, Lawrence was Chief Commissioner in Oude. His career I had watched with interest throughout; so, when at eleven at night the surgeon who had watched his end began to speak about the close of that career, you may imagine I was attentive, though having no cigar in my mouth. When the mutinies began, Lawrence acted with great vigour, and for a while curbed the spirit of revolt; but at last the mass of the Native troops in Oude, regular and irregular, revolted, and marched in great force upon Lucknow; and Lawrence, after an unsuccessful attempt to act on the offensive, was forced to content himself with acting on the defensive. He had about 500 Europeans, that is, English soldiers; about 150 European officers, civil and military, who had sought refuge at Lucknow; about 500 women and children: and about 300 or 400 sepoys who had remained loyal.

"Beleaguering him were from twenty to twenty-five thousand men, if not more. Lawrence made such arrangements as he could, and stoutly kept hold of the residency and some adjacent buildings. Your illustrated paper will give you drawings and accounts of all, I dare say; so I need not say more than that, in spite of heavy and continual fire, every post was bravely held, and the enemy failed to take them, though he killed and wounded many of the weak garrison. Lawrence lived during the opening of the beleaguer at the residency. One day an 8-inch shell burst in the verandah close to his room door, and filled the room with smoke, but did him no damage. Another day, however, an 8-inch shell burst in his room, and a large fragment broke his hip and thigh-bone high up. Dr. Fayrer had him carried to a corner of the

verandah in his own house, which was less exposed to shot and shell than the residency; and there Lawrence lived two days before the wound proved fatal. He made good use of the time thus given him; for he sent for those to whom he entrusted the charge of affairs and the command of the troops, and gave them full instructions as to what he wished done, the points they should pay attention to, and the measures they were to adopt for the relief of the garrison. All this was duty; and Lawrence, though so terribly wounded, did not fail to fulfil his duty to the Government he served, and the garrison he commanded. He did more than this, which many in his place would have thought quite enough for a mortally wounded man to accomplish. Lawrence sent, and called to his bedside the officers in whom he felt interested, whom he had known in private life, and towards whom his friendly and kind feelings were engaged. He seemed to think that his last moments could not be better spent than in giving parting advice and warning to each whom he sent for. Earnestly he entreated them to consider the vanity of earthly things, and the importance of living unto Christ whilst time and life were granted them. He exhorted them not to set their hearts on the transitory pleasures or honours or riches of this world. He pointed to himself as a man held to be most prosperous, in high position, and as having what many coveted; now, what was it all but vanity? Struck down suddenly, and about to leave earthly things, he made his own death-bed his text, and exhorted his friends, young and old, to look to Him who at that moment was his own stay and hope. Shot and grape were sweeping through the other, the exposed, end of Dr. Fayrer's verandah; and those who listened to Lawrence's farewell advice and warnings had accompaniments to the words of their mortally wounded leader which must have increased the effect of his discourse. Lawrence begged that no inscription should be put upon his tomb. He spoke most humbly of himself as having failed to do what he ought, though he had tried; spoke of himself as unworthy, and died, I hope and trust, a humble, good Christian, none the worse for being a soldier of the centurion's stamp, who did not deem himself worthy that our Lord should come under his roof.

"Will Lawrence's sermon to his friends, preached from his death-couch, and when pain had its rough and merciless grip upon him, prove efficacious? Will it awake any not before awakened to the truth? Will God prosper the soldier's sermon? God alone knows, for He alone sends His spirit to blow where He

listeth, where it pleaseth Him. But if a friend or two reckoned their wakening to the truth from that last scene of Lawrence's, he in eternity will value those last moments of life in a shattered frame more than years of comparative ease and pleasure. He did much good from his catholic charity of heart and liberality, which knew no stint. He fought and died nobly, and, please God, from all accounts, died Christianly. George Herbert, in his 'Church and Porch,' says:—

> 'If soldier,
> Chase brave employments with a naked sword
> Throughout the world. Fool not; for all may have,
> If they dare try, a glorious life, or grave.'

"Lawrence had both, a glorious life and grave; and this episode, if fully and well told, will ever be one of the jewels of the Lucknow defence. I hope they will obey his wish, and put no inscription upon his tomb."

"18*th March*, 1858.

"You make a sweeping remark when you say 'in general I hate all that is slow, that is the truth.' There are some slow things that we most of us love. However, I quite understand what you mean; but it often arises from one's own impatience in finding slower people surer in what they do know and say. Pitt, the minister of England, used seldom to read more than a page or two at a time of a work. Then he thought over what he had read. I dare say you would have thought Pitt a bore, and that you saw the end of a chapter or work far sooner than he did. Now I dare say he saw the conclusion as soon as any one, but it was not that he dwelt upon. He wanted to examine whether the arguments, the train of thought by which the conclusion was reached, were sound and right, or fallacious and false. You are not old enough yet to be a Pitt, and are not likely to be Prime Minister of England, so I won't ask you to read at his pace. I quote him as an instance that a slow reader may be a wonderfully able person. When we travel by rail in an express train, and shoot by and through town and country, do we see as much or know as much of either as when you and mama and the children, and long papa, wandered over the fields and hills near Charlton, strayed into those charming woods, and returned home laden with flowers; or sauntered quietly over Tewkesbury Abbey and its tombs, listening to the slowish old verger, and thinking of those who fought and fell at Tewkesbury? I think I know a

child of mine who, with all her express-train speed of reading, would prefer to an electric telegram a saunter quietly through fields or woods or abbeys with her ever affectionate

"FATHER."

"22*nd April*, 1858.

"Many thanks for your offer to send me a hymn-book of mama's, but keep it yourself, darling; for I have two which were on her dressing-table at Mhow . . . . . God will hear and answer your prayers, Marion, and you are quite right not to pretend to love reading your Bible if you do not really find pleasure in so doing. But it is a duty, not necessarily a pleasure; God can render it a pleasure, and He alone. I have read it all my life, and in times and places as different as the feelings and moods in which I opened and read God's word. It is His, and we must hear and listen as we do to His thunder and to the soft airs of heaven. May His spirit of love and blessing lie upon you, darling child."

"4*th May*, 1858.

"You ask me if I object to your writing letters on a Sunday. I do it myself, and though the fact of my doing so would not render that right which was wrong, I must tell you why I do not consider it wrong. Except in cases of necessity I pen no official letters on a Sunday, because that is week day work, and the Sunday's rest and freedom from work I consider should be, where practicable, maintained. . . . . But . . . . . we must observe the Sunday in Christ's spirit and that of our own church, which only aims at obeying Christ, not in the spirit of the Scribes and Pharisees. I don't think many people, even grown-up people, are able to occupy their minds and hearts the whole Sunday with prayer, contemplation, and the perusal of the bible or other religious works. I am certain that young people cannot, and that it is very undesirable to teach them to pretend to do so. Among healthy, mentally healthy, recreations letters written to relations seem to come naturally; and provided your letter writing was not made the business of the Sunday, but only taken as a recreation, provided your mind and heart was not absorbed by letter writing to the exclusion of the spiritual culture for which Sunday affords the opportunity, I should not object to letter writing. But here, dear child, as in so many other instances, the question lies between God and our own conscience. If we love God, we should not find

it difficult to settle the question. Wherever we love anybody, the heart and mind find no difficulty in measuring what amount of time or attention we shall pay them. It comes naturally. . . . . God is love, and the love of Christ brushes away all cobwebs by its wisdom."

15*th June*, 1858.

"Aunt M——— writes that you were very happy when she told you that you were to be with her . . . . . and that both of you promised to be industrious at lessons. I am sure of this, because you will obey her from love and affection. . . . . I am sure, too, you will bear in mind that it is culture which renders one person mentally superior to another in acquirements. I do not care about superiority. I am not ambitious that you should display unusual acquirements of any kind. All I wish is that you should never feel yourself uncomfortable because comparatively ignorant. I care far more for the heart training; for habitual consideration for others of every degree; for the patience and self-control which a Christian lady should show; for that wisdom of thought and word and manner which God can confer on those who seek it. In fact, though ignorance and vulgarity are repulsive, an unfinished or unformed character is even more so. We all need to *labour* at this, and should labour in the right way and narrow path. It will not make any one gloomy or less happy, but far the contrary."

"30*th June*, 1858.

"A year ago mama and I were at Indore, passing the last day we were to have together at that place. . . . . I little thought that on the morrow we were to be driven out by the treachery and cowardice of our own troops, as much as by the treachery and attack of Holkar's. Mama was sitting quietly about this time, copying letters for me; and surrounded by the comforts and conveniences of the residency. On the morrow, with nothing on her head but a brown straw hat, she was to be exposed to a burning sun, and would have been so all day but for the kindness of Captain and Mrs. Cobbe.* Your dear mother had gone through a trying time of suspense—six weeks of ill news upon ill news—yet she and I hoped to ride out the storm at Indore, and never for an instant had her noble courage failed her. Knowing the worst, for I never concealed anything from her, no one at the residency

* Mrs. Cobbe had a covered bullock cart into which my mother moved after some hours on a gun waggon.

would, from her countenance, ever have known whether good or ill news had reached us. When I think of those six weeks of bad news upon bad news; of the timidity and alarm which men, officers, displayed; of the coward advice some actually gave; and then remember that sweet and calm brave look of your mother's, and the contemptuous smile with which she heard a timid counsel, and the wise remark, as full of courage and of truth as of wisdom, with which she put down the arguments of the fearful; and remember, too, how she would think and talk of you all, and come and stand by me now and then in my writing room, knowing well that her very footstep was music to me, and the sight of her, even for a few moments, a joy and refreshment; Marion, what would I give for one visit from her now? It was only a short year ago that she was by my side, and I never dreamt of losing her unless we both fell together. But God willed otherwise. . . . . I wish I could see her in my dreams as you say you do, dear Marion. Some time or other we shall all meet again, please God."

"3*rd August*, 1858.

"I have been in great luck these two days, for I have no less than three sets of letters from my children; among others, one from yourself, in which you give me a piece of Longfellow's, which I know well, and which we shall all feel if we meet again. But on the subject of poetry, and your admiration for Walter Scott, I think Aunt M——— must take care that you don't swallow too much of the 'wine of demons,' as some of the pious old authors styled poetry. It is rather intoxicating if too much indulged in; and there is such a thing as living in a dream-land of one's own, terribly unlike the world in which we must all plod on, quietly and honestly and usefully; not without its poetry, too, but of a different kind from your paladins of romance. I am glad you say that you will, as a duty, always read, every day, a portion of scripture. God can alone make that duty both a pleasure and a profit to you, my darling child. . . . . You tell me that you don't like people talking religion to you, except myself. . . . . I think it is not every one who can wisely and properly talk upon religion; and that often those who are in earnest about it themselves, or else think themselves so, are not gifted with tact or wisdom of speech. That is a great pity when it happens; but often it is that the subject is unwelcome to our hearts and minds, and then we are like children taking physic; it must be put into sugar to induce us to take it without making too many wry faces,

the sugar of the voice and looks of those whom we love . . . . . I have no right to take you to task in this matter, for I am often impatient, though I may not show it, but repress it, when religion is obtrusively talked; and over a slow, dull, indifferent sermon in this country I often am fighting against sleep all the time instead of profiting by its dulness. But we must all, old and young, try to combat anything which, if we search our hearts, is found to be irreverent disaffection to Him in whom we live and move and have our being. It often surprises me, to whom as one of the blessings of my life God gave a great and a never-failing enjoyment in the beauties of nature, how seldom the heart or mind turned naturally to Him, the maker. It required an effort. I never found my heart or mind with that full possession which seems the very life of all David's beautiful imagery and poetry, and turns all to the honour and glory of God. It should not be so. There cannot be a doubt but that the only real, truthful, high poetry is that which flows from a poet like David, whose thoughts and feelings are everywhere interwoven with a sense of the presence, the power, the love, of the great Creator. This I take to be the reason why the old fathers to whom I allude called poetry the 'wine of demons;' because usually it descends to much lower objects, and invests them with a beauty, and gives them an adoration, which mislead the mind into a sort of idolatry. Now I don't mean to call my long Marion an idolater, or to quarrel with your admiration for Longfellow; . . . . . but I feel that there is a necessity for qualifying the reading of a little poetry with a good deal of prose. The imagination must not be given the reins; otherwise, like a runaway horse, he drops you in the mud somewhere or other, and people laugh at you. It has a great charm for young people, and particularly where there is a good deal of incident, as in the Lady of the Lake, Marmion, and others of Scott's; but I think your old passion for history much more wholesome and profitable, because nearer life, and a better mental preparation for the struggle and the disappointments of life. I read with great interest lately the life of the old French potter, Palissy; it refreshes me to contemplate the fortitude of such men. So, too, in all history there are many noble characters. In poetry there is always the feeling that they are not true, but purely ideal. What more beautiful than the love of Jonathan? What more stirring than the death of Saul, told in that simple, truthful way of scripture—falling on his own sword rather than suffer the disgrace of life and defeat—so true to nature though so wrong?

These are from the scripture you don't much relish, though some day you will."

These letters have been grouped together for convenience sake; but long before the last of them was written my father's time of leisure was over. It came to an end early in May. Lord Canning was then at Allahabad, and Sir J. P. Grant was acting during his absence as president in council at Calcutta. The latter offered to make my father his private secretary, and this offer he would have accepted but for the fact that he received, at the same time, a letter from Lord Canning which turned his thoughts in another direction. A few months earlier, the Court of Directors had suggested, to the Government of India, the appointment of a commission to enquire into and report upon the reorganization of the Indian army, which the great catastrophe of 1857 had rendered necessary. When the suggestion was made, and for some time afterwards, it would have been impossible to assemble a commission possessing sufficient weight to command respect, for all the principal officials in India had their hands full, and could not have been spared. Lord Canning was forced, therefore, to give up this idea; but, as the question was one of pressing importance, he had cast about for some alternative plan. He now proposed to break ground by circulating to all whose authority would be most valuable, civilians as well as soldiers, a series of questions and propositions so framed as to elicit their opinions upon all the most important points involved. The opinions, when received, were to be collated and digested, and any new question arising out of them was to be followed up. If eventually it should be found possible to assemble a suitable commission, the materials for a report would then be in great measure ready to their hand. "This is the scheme," he wrote to my father, "which I desire to carry out. I wish it carried out from my own head-quarters, but not through the Secretariat; and there is nobody in whose hands I would more gladly and confidently place it than your own. The work will need to be conducted by one who has had general and varied military experience, and who knows something of Native States as well as of our own provinces. If from the sketch I have given you think it will be congenial to you, let me know by return of post, and join me as soon as you can conveniently do so." The offer was backed by an assurance that my father's appointment to this duty would not be allowed to interfere with his selection for any permanent post which might fall vacant.

Lord Canning's plan was rather a cumbrous one, and my father did not altogether approve of it, thinking it would involve a very much longer delay in the work of reorganization than we could afford. But it was not easy to suggest a better arrangement; and feeling that he would be able to do good work, and that on joining the Governor-General he might perhaps have opportunities of pushing to a point at once one or two of the matters which called most urgently for decision, he accepted the offer. The country was then disturbed even below Allahabad, and it took him a week to get there; but by the middle of May he had received his instructions from Lord Canning in person, and soon afterwards he was hard at work framing and issuing his circulars. For the next four months he remained at Allahabad, carrying on a correspondence with the various authorities whom Lord Canning wished him to consult; and a mass of very valuable information was collected and examined.

In the meantime he pressed upon the Governor-General's attention, with success, some points which he regarded as being of immediate importance with regard to all three arms of the service. In the first place he was anxious that the authorities at home should be urged to push on the recruiting vigorously, and on a scale suited to the wants of India. This was essential, for our European troops had suffered terribly by the friction of the campaign; and people in England, after our first successes, seemed to think all danger was over. In June, 1858, the 84th Regiment was returned as having twenty-five men fit for duty, and four hundred and fifty sick; and at the same time Sir Colin Campbell, then Commander-in-Chief, informed my father that he was already being asked whether he could not send back regiments from India, as there was some apprehension at home on account of the attitude of France. Considering that fighting was still going on all over northern India, this was sufficiently startling, and the prospect was not improved by the news which came from the Punjab. Our Native army in Bengal was now actually stronger in numbers than before the mutiny, owing to the raising of fresh levies in all directions. Of the total number no less than 80,000 were Punjabees, and an unruly spirit was now beginning to show itself among these people, especially among the Sikhs. Some of those who knew the Punjab best predicted an immediate rise, and a simultaneous one all over the province. With special reference to such a contingency, my father pressed upon Lord Canning as a measure only second in importance to vigorous recruiting in

England, the rapid strengthening of our artillery. We had done away with our native batteries; and no one would have wished to restore them; but they had left a deficiency which we could not afford to permit. In case the Sikhs rose they would have little artillery, and that little bad. Their superiority in numbers might therefore the more easily be counter-balanced by strength in that arm, the effect of which upon a brave and stubborn enemy my father had seen nine years before at Goojerat.

Another matter upon which my father laid special stress was the constitution of our European cavalry corps. Some 4,000 newly raised men were then in process of formation into five regiments of dragoons. He regarded a cavalry regiment of 800 men and horses as unmanageable, and advocated a strength of 400 as in every way better. The larger body he said was too large for one man to look after properly, and the effect upon the security of the country of ten regiments of 400 men would be much greater than the effect of five regiments of 800. Of course the larger corps could be split into wings, but this offered obvious disadvantages. In these views he was supported by the opinions of several distinguished cavalry officers, among them Neville Chamberlain, Gall of the 14th Dragoons, and Sir J. Hope Grant. There was one connected point however upon which their opinion was not unanimous. He had seen a good deal of cavalry work, and had thought much about it; and the conclusion he had come to was that our cavalry should move and act in single rank, especially in India, where we rarely had to meet good horse. The second rank with cavalry was he thought about as useful as the third rank in the French infantry formation, and the fighting strength of a corps would be much increased by discarding it. On this point he wrote to Lord Ellenborough a few weeks later:—"The advantage which Sir J. Hope Grant notes is a great one, *viz.*, covering an equal front with half the number of men; but he omits to mention the still greater accompanying advantage, *viz.*, that with the same extent of front occupied by half the number of men the other half are available for supports and reserves, so that with an equal number of men in the field you have double the chance, or even treble, of a successful issue. Cavalry scrapes almost always arise from want of supports and reserves, at least with our people in India.

"The necessity of occupying an immense extent of territory with a minimum of military means, which is invariably our dilemma, renders this technical reformation of cavalry of such

great importance, in my opinion, to the Government of India, that I make no excuse for urging it upon your attention. It has many minor advantages in action which in the days of improved artillery and rifle practice need no exposition."

With regard to this proposal there was as I have said some difference of opinion, and it was not pressed; but in other respects Lord Canning accepted my father's recommendations, and he wrote to England urging them upon the attention of the home authorities.

My father's personal views upon the general question were also submitted not very long after his arrival in Allahabad. In the spring of 1858 Lord Ellenborough had returned for a time to his old place at the Board of Control; and his first thought had been for the reorganization of our armies. He had written to my father on the subject, and his letter arrived just as the latter was entering upon his new duties. On the 9th of June my father embodied his views in a sketch memorandum which he sent to England, and a copy of which he gave to the Governor-General. As his views were not very greatly altered by the evidence subsequently collected, and as the memorandum formed the basis of the recommendations afterwards laid before Her Majesty's Government by Lord Canning, I give here its general plan, and some extracts.

The memorandum was divided into three parts, under the heads of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, with a few general remarks at the end. Under the head of Artillery the main recommendation was that for the future there should be no Native artillery whatever, the whole power of this important arm being concentrated under British control, and that European batteries should contain no native drivers. The latter point was important, for in any difficulty the defection of native drivers crippled a battery completely, as the mutiny had shown. Hungerford's battery in Central India for example had been completely helpless until manned by volunteers from the 14th Dragoons. My father proposed that the strength of the Bengal artillery should be fixed at 72 batteries, the former strength, European and Native, having been 78 batteries. He omitted horse artillery, "because its cost is excessive, and its influence in the field not compensatory for its cost."

Regarding Cavalry he recommended in the first place that there should be no Native regular cavalry in Bengal. "The service is not congenial to the native; and whereas in the irregular cavalry

the horseman has a stake, from the horse, arms, and equipments being his own, the native regular cavalryman has no stake whatever, but walks off with a valuable government horse, and superior arms and equipments, on every opportunity presented him by the course of a year of revolt." My father considered that there should be ten regiments of European dragoons, each of 400 troopers, which would give about 500 sabres of all ranks. The European cavalry would therefore demand 5,000 men. To each of these dragoon corps, for which he advocated single rank formation, he proposed to attach an auxiliary corps of Native irregular cavalry, 400 strong, which would be officered from the European regiment, and would be the light horse of the dragoons, saving the Europeans much exposure in the performance of ordinary duties.* Besides these auxiliary corps he thought there should be thirty corps of irregular cavalry of the same strength. With the five regiments of European cavalry of the line stationed in India this force would be sufficient, and in fact Her Majesty's regiments might in time be reduced to three.

In regard to Infantry, it was pointed out that the Bengal Native infantry had ceased to exist, one hundred battalions having gone; and that there were then some forty-five English battalions in Bengal proper, besides the European regiments with Sir Hugh Rose's force in Central India. For some time to come, my father wrote, the force of European infantry required for Bengal would not be less than 60 battalions. After the restoration of order and confidence this force could be reduced to 50 battalions, or even to 45, but this would not be for a few years to come. Of the total number, 30 should be local, Her Majesty's regiments being gradually withdrawn as these were raised. The necessity for rapid recruiting for the 30 Indian corps was specially insisted

* This idea, however, was apparently taken up rather in deference to the weight of authority than of his own accord, for not long afterwards he writes to Sir John Lawrence :—"I entertain great doubts myself on the auxiliary notion, for it has always seemed to me that the tendency to bring everything to Hyde and Green Park muster has proved very prejudicial to our Indian armies.

"The authorities have often lost sight of the fact that a great deal of training is requisite to turn a civilized European into a good skirmisher, whether horse or foot. A semi-barbarian often needs no teaching for 'la petite guerre'; he lives in it, and it is his nature. You easily make him an irregular soldier, but easily unmake him too by a quantum suff. of what you designate 'formula.'

"Even if irregular horse were attached to dragoon regiments as auxiliary corps, they must be on the irregular horse system, and in no way copy or be inoculated with the dragoon 'formula.'"

upon. The system of auxiliary sepoy battalions had lately been advocated as applicable to the infantry. This my father thought held out less prospect of advantage than the association of Native irregular horse with European dragoons; but he considered it worth a trial. He proposed therefore to have 30 auxiliary battalions, some of which should be composed of Sikhs and Punjabees. "These auxiliary corps should be recruited from distinct districts, and not permitted to recruit out of those districts, and should remain associated with the same European corps, and not be liable to change from one European corps to another." In addition to these auxiliary corps it was proposed to have 30 more battalions of infantry, some of which might be foreign mercenaries. "Both the auxiliary and the non-associated battalions should be enlisted for general service, on land or sea, and with a distinct covenant binding the recruit to the execution of all work or labour imposed upon him." In the non-associated battalions it was proposed to have no Native commissioned officers, but an English sergeant and two corporals to each company. Finally, a corps of European sappers and miners was to be formed, with an auxiliary corps of natives. These were to be officered by engineer officers, having no Native commissioned officers, but a very full complement of European and Native non-commissioned officers. "The object of this organization would be to furnish intelligent non-commissioned officers for the independent battalions; to furnish detachments of European and auxiliary engineer soldiers to field forces, and camps of exercise; and to keep the whole infantry of the army in training to field works, such as trenches, batteries, &c. At present our armies in these matters are as helpless as children, and this just as much on account of the officers as the men."

"The infantry in Bengal would thus consist of 110,000 men, of whom 50,000 would be English, and 60,000 native or foreign, with about 2,000 sappers and miners." This however assumed that besides the regular troops there would be a militarily organized police, "capable of guarding civil stations, jails, &c., and dispensing with the necessity for petty military stations of single corps or wings." My father's remarks under the head of Infantry closed with the following remarks:—

"The whole system of 'half mounting' should be altered, and the equipments of the soldier be furnished by Government, recoveries from pay being confined to wilful destruction or neglect. The dress of the native and foreign mercenary should not be a close copy of whatever is in vogue at the Horse Guards. Parade duties

in the climate of England, and field service in Europe, are one thing, service in India another, even for European troops, and no advantage has been gained, but much unnecessary irritation caused, by the passion for dressing the sepoy as if he were destined to mount guard at St. James's Palace.

"The native of India has no nationality of feeling in the European sense of the word. He has strong local feelings, for his public in his native village and its neighbourhood. Regiments recruited from districts would have more *esprit de corps* than regiments recruited from unlimited areas, for the narrow local feeling would come into play in support of the *esprit de corps*. Pride of corps always has place, more or less, even with the high caste sepoy and the Mussulman, but pride of corps wedded with local feelings would be more operative, and elicit more corps rivalries; there would also be greater isolation of feeling among native corps thus raised—local rivalries and animosities often run very high. To give an extreme instance, the Madras and Bengal sepoys regard each other with feelings more akin to enmity than to anything else. This feeling is not so marked in the Madras cavalry, which is nearly all Mussulman, and very bigoted. The feeling existed long before the mutinies of 1857, and the revolt has not augmented, though it may not have much diminished this old animosity."

The total estimated cost of these charges was small, some £625,000 per annum.

From the "General Remarks" with which the memorandum ended I extract the following passages:—

"It will have been observed that the reorganization of the Bengal army has been treated throughout upon the plan that there must be a local army, European as well as Native, even though the Government of India be administered directly under the Crown.

"The reasons for advocating a system which may seem less simple than if the whole of the European force were part of the regular army of the Crown are:—

"1. That a great empire like India should be free from the danger of being stripped of European troops on the occurrence of war in Europe; a local army goes far to ensure that indispensable precaution.

"2. Service in India is peculiar, and requires that men and officers be acclimated and accustomed to the country and the people.

"3. Moreover officers can only acquire by residence and experience that practical sagacity which measures the exact value of an enemy such as in India our forces usually meet. Our reputation suffers almost equally whether officers over or under value their enemy. Both errors arise from a want of that incommunicable practical sagacity which a thorough knowledge of people and country can alone yield.

"4. Residence and local experience can only be secured by local corps and seniority promotion. Purchase promotion and frequent reliefs would deprive the empire of an adequate supply of experienced officers.

"5. A very minor consideration is the difficulty of devising a mode of amalgamation which should not be equally injurious and unjust to the officers of the Bengal army of all branches of the service.

"India being the only great school of soldiering which England possesses, a part of the European force should always be composed of corps from Her Majesty's regular army. The scheme here proposed would seem to secure this amply.

". . . . The fact is that although the simple transfer of the armies of India to the Crown is a measure involving small practical difficulty, the amalgamation of the armies of India with those of the Crown is full of thorny and complex difficulties. . . . Amalgamation would leave only a local native army; but amalgamation involves very radical changes and, as before remarked, considerable expense. It would very greatly increase the patronage of the Royal army; would also largely add to the supply of officers accustomed to divisional commands, and the operations of forces in the field; and would therefore place at the disposal of the Crown a larger list of experienced officers; and it would effectually remove the jealousy and heart-burnings which are inseparable from distinct services and systems; but in times of pressure and difficulty the interests of India would run great risk of being wholly sacrificed to the requirements of European warfare, and the emergencies of the moment in England. There is little enough that is stable in our Anglo-Indian rule, and the country certainly derives advantage from the comparative permanence of the local Indian armies, and from its being felt and known that these are not subject to fluctuation, whatever the turn of military operations in Europe. This fact has a political value in our hold of the country which, now that natives study the English newspapers, should not be ignored.

"The distribution of the force has not been entered into, for in the present exceptional state of affairs it is not easy to foresee the exact future distribution. But the proposal provides sufficient force for the Bengal presidency, not including Pegu, under ordinary circumstances, with a margin for a couple of movable columns or one considerable force in the field. Upon this head should be observed that the troops should be concentrated in as few cantonments as is compatible with a proper military grip of the country, that at each cantonment there should be the means of lodging treasure, sick, and women in safety, and of securing that safety with few troops, and that the bulk of the troops should always be thus available for the field.

"Large civil treasuries should be in these military cantonments, and habitually in the place of security, whatever that might be. This is a question of technical detail not here necessary to discuss.

"The radius of constant effect of a cantonment on the surrounding country may be taken at from 100 to 150 miles, because four or five forced marches will bring cavalry upon any point of such a circle as that radius will embrace; and troops are or should be always equal to a spring of that kind; where stations are more remote the country should be kept under the consciousness of military control by the occasional movements of light columns. The old custom must be reverted to; troops in cantonments need not be fixtures, nor the smooth parades of cantonments their only exercise grounds. More care should be taken by officers to have their camp equipage ready and efficient, than to have well-furnished houses; and the commissariat organization should be such that a portion of the force of every cantonment should be movable with six hours' warning, or even less, and the whole movable in a reasonably short space of time."

In forwarding this memorandum to Lord Ellenborough my father wrote:—

"Under the heads of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, with a few general remarks at the end, I have endeavoured to lay before you my present views as to the reorganization of the Bengal army. Further consideration and fuller information might modify these views, and I am ill off for means of reference or detailed statements; this endeavour therefore to meet with as little delay as practicable the call made in your letter of the 26th April last must be regarded as open to revision and modification.

"For instance, no advertence is made to the great effect which

the completion and extension of the Indian railroads must produce. The lines are at present all backward, and practicable only in discontinuous sections. The ultimate military expenditure of our Government in India really depends a good deal upon the rapid and effective outlay of capital on railroads, a capital which beyond the guarantee of a certain interest should cost the Indian finances little or nothing, and yet may enable the Government to reduce its military expenditure by one-fourth as soon as a tolerable system of rail communication is complete, besides augmenting the internal trade of the country, and therefore making a corresponding improvement in the financial returns of the Government. I am not much alarmed at the increase of charge which the reorganization of the Bengal army will cause. It is of course considerable, though not so overwhelming as many suppose; and if capitalists can only be encouraged to complete for India a few lines of railroad, and to perfect our lines of water communication, Bengal would quickly show a fair balance sheet.

"I have told Lord Canning that he will have to act long before his plan of questions and answers is worked out. In reality, levies of all kinds are being formed in every direction; and when once the European basis is fixed, and its constitution fairly in train, there will be some embarrassment in bringing these various levies and irregular corps into any kind of system. From all I hear the Sikh element is likely to cause trouble as soon as there is more leisure and less plunder. I esteem it a matter of the gravest moment that the recruiting for India begin at once on a proper scale, and that your lordship decide whether the European augmentation necessary for India shall take place with a local European force in view, or an increase to the same amount of the Royal army. The stability of our power in India appears to me to depend on the issue of this question. After what I have seen of the thorough ignorance and indifference of members of both Houses to this great empire, I have no confidence in the exercise of a comprehensive policy with regard to India, and think India would be sacrificed to minor, let alone pressing, emergencies occurring nearer England. Repentance would come afterwards, but when too late; and when this great fabric had fallen with ruinous disgrace to England and her statesmen. A local army is an element of stability in my opinion. It may be Royal, but it should be local."

Before this letter could reach England Lord Ellenborough had resigned office, and soon afterwards my father learnt from him that

a commission was about to be formed in England to consider the reorganization question. It then occurred to my father that the best arrangement would be for him to go home, with the evidence and opinions collected in India, and represent to Her Majesty's Government, before any decision was arrived at upon the report of the commission, the views and wishes of the Governor-General. To this idea Lord Canning assented, and in the middle of September he received official instructions directing him to proceed to England in the capacity of special commissioner from the Government of India.

In the meantime he had received numerous replies to his enquiries,* and had submitted separate memoranda upon various points of detail, upon the question of recruiting, upon artillery organization, upon the existing military code and rules of discipline, upon the comparative advantages of seniority and merit promotion, and other matters. And shortly before leaving Allahabad he handed in to Lord Canning a final memorandum containing his general remarks upon the replies and information which he had collected. This memorandum proceeded generally upon the lines of the sketch memorandum referred to before, but it dealt to some extent with the whole army of India instead of the Bengal army only, and it diverged in some particulars from the opinions my father had previously put on record. The reorganization of the Bengal army, which had mutinied, was however still treated as the primary question, and the remarks about Madras and Bombay were comparatively few and slight. The chief points upon which the second memorandum differed from the first were as follows:— As regards the Artillery, a slightly larger strength was recommended, 78 batteries for Bengal instead of 72. As regards the cavalry, it was now recommended that the auxiliary regiments should not necessarily be attached permanently to particular corps of dragoons; but that the two bodies should be kept together if a friendly spirit arose. As regards the infantry, there was a considerable difference between the former proposals and those now presented. The European force required for the permanent occupation of Bengal was fixed at 45 battalions, of which 30 were to be local and 15 corps of the line. With reference to the Native infantry it was now proposed, on the suggestion of some of the officers

* One of the best of these was a very valuable paper of answers sent in from the Punjab by Sir John Lawrence in conjunction with Neville Chamberlain and Herbert Edwardes. But it is a remarkable fact that Sir John Lawrence then advocated the cession of Peshawur and Kohat to the Afghans.

consulted, that there should be 50 active service battalions and 50 linked battalions of police, the latter being stationed in the districts from which the active service battalions were recruited, and transfer from one body to the other being under certain circumstances possible. "Such a system would give an effective military police and a very effective service battalion; would be popular with the natives; and would make the European officers acquainted with the homes of their men, and influential. It would bring the magistracy into connection with the commanding officers of the 1st and 2nd battalions, and with the officers attached to the 2nd battalion, and the officers charged with recruiting; and it would greatly strengthen the hold of Government over the men in its ranks by the greater knowledge European officers, civil and military, would have of their men." At the same time it was added that the organization of military police must not be overdone. "Independently of the danger of arming too large a mass is the fact that the civil magistracy will lean more and more upon this material force, and less and less upon the village police of the country; that the people will *pari passu* cease to identify themselves with the police in its military stamp and segregation; and that the institution of the country, the village police, will soon become inefficient and neglected. The system works effectively enough in Native States, and is in accordance with the feelings and habits of the people. If crushed entirely it will be vain to endeavour to revive it, and we shall end by finding all India much in the same unsatisfactory state as to internal police as Bengal proper. It will be well to identify, as far as possible, the people of a district with the police, for of the two it is a less evil to have the people identified with the police, even if somewhat too much so for the ideal of a pure administration of justice, than to have them indifferent and hostile, regarding the military police as a body of foreigners."

Of the 50 service battalions it was proposed that 30 should be on the irregular system, officered from the 30 regiments of the local European force, which would also officer the linked police battalions. The remaining 20 service battalions were to be regular, with a full complement of officers, who would also officer the 20 linked police corps. In these 20 regular battalions it was proposed to try the experiment of substituting two European warrant officers per company for the Native officers; one of such warrant officers being from the sappers and miners "for the Native infantry must in future be taught and trained to military labour, *viz.*, throwing up batteries and intrenchments, cutting brushwood,

making fascines, gabions, etc., etc. All these must form part of the regular drill, and it must be seen that the officers understand it as well as the men. . . . . Mere coolie work it is not desirable to put a small army of native troops to execute." . . . . . "There would thus be 50 active service battalions and 50 police or second battalions. The former purely for military duty, and always brigaded with European troops; the latter taking the duties of jail guards, of police guards, escorts, and a variety of duties which would break up the active service battalions into small detachments, if permitted as heretofore fo fall upon them."

As to recruiting it was pointed out that though the Bombay and Madras armies had not gone *en masse*, they were not free from taint; and that the events of 1857 had clearly shown us to be unpopular everywhere. There had been instances of loyalty among all classes, but as a general rule the population had shown hostility, passive or active according to circumstances. This was natural, and must be counted upon. There was therefore no great stratum of well-affected people from which to draw. Nevertheless something might be done by taking advantage of creed and caste, and also of provincial prejudices and antipathies. "During the late revolt we have owed much to the comparative isolation of the Bombay and Madras armies, and still more to the old animosity of the Sikhs and Punjabees to the men of Hindustan. The result indicates that our armies should be provincial, and that they should be kept as distinct and separate as possible, though all enrolled for general service by sea or land, and occasionally employed beyond their own natural boundaries to maintain the habit of general service.

"With this object in view it may be desirable to restrict the recruiting of the three presidencies to their own limits, and the foreign frontiers touching their own boundaries. The Bengal army would from its great size, and from the geographical position of its races, be naturally divided into two sections—the Punjab and the Hindustan corps. These two practically distinct armies might still remain under one commander-in-chief. If the Indus line were constituted into a Lieutenant-Governorship, the Punjab Native force to include Sind. The Hindustan force to furnish troops for Bengal as usual.

"Districts to be assigned to particular corps for recruiting grounds, and the recruiting to be carried on under the superintendence of an officer selected for the duty.

"Whether corps were homogeneous throughout, or composed of two or three classes in homogeneous companies, or composite

throughout, having all mixed up together, to depend on the district, and the classes it contained fit for military service. But no corps to be allowed to recruit out of its own district."

Finally, it was added in connection with this point that the southern armies should under ordinary circumstances be kept below the Nerbudda; Mhow and Jubbulpore being the two doors by which the Bombay and Madras troops respectively could be brought into operation to the northward in case of emergency.

The Native State contingents which had revolted, my father did not consider it desirable to revive; their place was to be taken by locally raised police battalions. The old contingents had been recruited mainly from the same districts as the old regular army, and were therefore untrustworthy when the regulars became disaffected.

As regards the general disposition of our military forces when ready, the memorandum contained the following remarks:—

"The key points of the country and magazines must be held in force at all times; and the buildings cannot well be too perfect and permanent. But the empire is in a transition state from the old modes of communication to the new or railroad system. The latter when complete and in full operation must influence the position of our cantonments; for the present therefore barracks of a temporary and cheaper kind are preferable to a costly and permanent structure which may have to be deserted hereafter, or will tie us to unsuitable cantonments.

"By key points are meant such as Allahabad, which next to the base, Calcutta, is one of the most important. Also a few great political centres, as well as military key points, such as Mhow, commanding the heads of the passes to the plateau of Malwa, Lucknow, Delhi, Lahore; near to such great centres railroads are usually carried, so that permanent public buildings are not likely to be sacrified hereafter when constructed on well chosen sites at such positions. But until railways are finished the secondary cantonments can only be regarded as temporary, for hereafter the position of our forces will depend in a great measure on the lines of rapid motion.

"Every exertion must be made to expedite the tardy and unsatisfactory progress of Indian railroads.

"Except for the occupation in force of key points it is a general rule not desirable to concentrate the troops in large cantonments. In order to maintain tranquillity in this vast empire it is essential that the presence of our troops be everywhere felt,

and that no large area of country be secure from a sudden and sharp visitation of our armed power. Moderate but well balanced forces at points not too remote from each other are therefore the best adapted to overawe the country, and to facilitate the instant punishment of any emeute. Concentration for great strategical operations can always be effected when necessary, which should seldom be the case, as we have reached the natural boundaries of our empire. The danger, indeed, is that we have overstepped them, and brought on revolt by over extension without proportionate increase to our European strength. This we are now forced to correct, but to do so with no aggressive policy. When railroads are complete concentration will become still further facilitated."

Simultaneously with this memorandum my father submitted another upon the future position and character of our European officers. He had long been of opinion that a great mistake had been made in reducing too much the powers of regimental officers in command of native troops, and had pointed to this as one of the causes of the late revolt. Power had been too much centralised, and the men had been taught to look beyond their commanding officers in matters even of small importance.* The sudden dislocation of routine caused by the mutiny had necessarily for the time remedied this defect; and he thought the wider powers then in the hands of our officers should be continued to them. But, on the other hand, he felt that the action of Government in this matter had been brought about by cases of abuse; and that if for the future commanding officers were to be entrusted with greater powers, the principles of selection and removal must be freely, though carefully, exercised. To prevent hardship in this respect, and on all accounts, it was most important to secure a

* Sir Thomas Munro, one of the greatest men whom England has ever given to India, had noticed the approach of this evil many years before. "After the commander-in-chief," he wrote, "there is no officer, it is of so much importance to uphold as that of * the regimental commanding officer of the Native corps; for on the respect which he can maintain rests the subordination of the Native army, and the very existence of our dominion in India. The authority he once possessed has, with the view of checking abuses, been so much divided, that there is too little left anywhere to command respect. Part of his former power should be restored to him."

* *Sic.*

Though half a century has passed since Sir Thomas Munro's death, his life and writings are to this day full of instruction to every Indian officer, civil or military, who has his heart in his work. Perhaps no more interesting or useful book, relating to India, was ever published than Gleig's "Life of Munro."

thoroughly efficient class of officers. In order to do this he recommended that Indian cadets should no longer be brought out as half educated youths, but that in the first place a higher scale of education should be required from all candidates for a cadetship, and that when nominated the cadets should be kept in England and thoroughly trained before entering upon their career.

With regard to officers withdrawn for civil or political employ, he thought the "seconding" system better than a staff list. The former system was an encouragement to regimental officers, and reserved to the Government many advantages, and did not disturb the organism of the service.

He added—"The Government of India should always have the power of remanding officers to their regiments from staff, civil, or political employment, as also for service with their corps in the field. From having usually much knowledge of the people, and being more accustomed to responsibility and administration, they often prove among the best and most useful officers in a campaign. Men seldom forget the military training of the first five or ten years of their lives, and service until old age disqualifies them for active service. Major-Generals Sir William Mansfield and Sir Hugh Rose have not proved the worse soldiers for their diplomatic employment in Europe, nor has Sir J. Outram for his in India, nor in the olden times were Ochterlony or Malcolm found unfit for the field."

Finally, he argued that the Governor-General should continue to possess the fullest authority over the local army. "The Governor-General has been practically, and should remain practically, whether so designated or not, captain-general."

All the papers from which the foregoing extracts have been made were carefully considered by Lord Canning: and his conclusions were embodied in a lengthy memorandum which my father was instructed to deliver to Her Majesty's Secretary of State. This memorandum was founded almost entirely upon my father's recommendations, the bulk of which were in fact embodied in it almost word for word, Lord Canning differing only in regard to the question of linked military and police battalions, a question upon which my father had himself felt some doubts. He had thus the satisfaction of representing opinions with which he was in complete accord, and upon which he felt that he could speak with knowledge and conviction.

On the 25th of September, bearing his instructions and records with him, my father turned his back upon India, and began to

think once more of seeing his children and the shores of the old country. He did not go direct to England, for some of us were still in the Swiss home our mother had found for us, and he struck out of his course to spend a day with us at Lausanne. His arrival was completely unexpected, and we were small children, to whom the three years he had been absent seemed a century. I remember stepping back in surprise and momentary doubt as his towering figure entered the doorway, and the ring of pain in his voice as he said "My boy, don't you know me?" The doubt was soon over, and the pain too perhaps, but it is one that many a man must have felt, and felt bitterly, after years of Indian exile. He left us next day, and the house seemed very desolate without him.

On the 4th of November he was in England, and after an equally brief visit to his elder children, in the Isle of Wight, he went up to London. Lord Stanley was then at the India House, and from the time of their first interview my father formed the highest opinion of his capacity and power of work. The good impression was I believe reciprocal, and during the time that my father remained in England he received from Lord Stanley a cordial courtesy and support which it is a pleasure to acknowledge. It is not every English statesman who has sufficient sense and good feeling to avoid an assumption of superiority in dealing with a comparatively unknown Indian official, or to appreciate plain speaking and the value of local experience.

At this time London was, of course, empty, "and among the few people in town," my father wrote to Lord Canning, "the interest in Indian affairs seems already sunk to zero." But he soon found that on the question of army reorganization the interest was keen enough in certain quarters; and, unfortunately for himself, that a strong feeling existed at the Horse Guards and elsewhere against the most important of the measures which he had come to England to advocate. The idea of a local European force was out of favour, and the evident desire was to extinguish the Indian armies altogether by amalgamation with the line. This had been advocated by Lord Elphinstone in India,* and the probability that the same view would commend itself at the Horse Guards had been early foreseen by Lord Canning and Lord Ellenborough, both of whom had expressed their apprehension that the

* Lord Elphinstone had, however, insisted very strongly upon the necessity of leaving the Indian Government complete control over the armies in India, whatever they might be.

Indian armies would suffer from the prejudice against them which was known to exist. It was soon shown that this fear was not without foundation.

My father was in more respects than one specially qualified to give a fair opinion upon this question as a whole; for some years before, as I have shown in a former chapter of this book, he had devoted much attention to the question of transferring the Indian armies to the Crown. This was at the time of the Crimean war, and he had then argued, in opposition to the view taken in Parliament and by the Court of Directors, that the Indian armies ought to be Crown armies, and that their services ought to be available on the occurrence of a grave emergency in Europe. He had, therefore, considered and argued the question from the imperial point of view, and now that he was called upon to look at it from the other side, that is from the Indian point of view, he had the advantage of clearly realizing both aspects of the case. But, even in 1855, he had foreseen the difficulties which would lie in the way of actual amalgamation, and had in his correspondence expressly objected to the word, substituting for it the less sweeping term "transfer to the Crown." Now that he had gone into the question in greater detail he was confirmed in his objections to amalgamation, and his convictions on the subject were never afterwards shaken.

On the 25th and 26th of November and again on the 8th of December he was examined before the Reorganization Commission, and his evidence fills some thirty-five pages of the Blue Book. He found that his views were by no means palatable to the majority for the commissioners, and they were subjected to rather stringent criticism; but he knew his subject and spoke with conviction and weight. He insisted strongly above all upon the necessity for a local army, arguing as he had argued in his memoranda, that the existence of such a force would tend to prevent the Government at home from too suddenly stripping India of troops to meet any difficulty or danger in Europe; that it would be an element of stability in India, which we greatly needed; and that it would give the Indian Government a valuable body of officers for civil and political employment and miscellaneous duties of all kinds.* He added that we should not be acting fairly in

* This was a very important point, for numbers of civil and political appointments have always been held in India by military men. Those who favoured amalgamation were inclined to think that such appointments could be equally well filled by officers drawn from regiments of the line, but having regard to the frequency of relief and other matters it seems unnecessary seriously to discuss this view.

keeping a large European force of the line in India simply to meet European emergencies; and he further dwelt upon the advantage of having for actual service in India officers and men who knew the country and were acclimatised. As an instance he quoted the behaviour of the 14th Dragoons in Central India. They were old troops, and had been long in the country. "These men were worked, and did the work, as if they were natives; that is to say they were exposed and worked incessantly just as hard as the Nizam's cavalry who were alongside of them. But I am perfectly convinced that if you had attempted that with any new regiment, you would have foundered and destroyed the regiment in the course of the first fortnight." My father also urged that the local army should not be under the Commander-in-Chief in England, but, as before, under the Governor-General, whose power and authority it was most desirable to preserve intact. "Direct action from England," he said, "would be full of danger." He insisted strongly upon keeping the presidency armies distinct; upon the necessity for increasing the powers of commanding officers with native troops; and upon the fact that higher educational qualifications must be required from officers entering the service. As regards the last point he was met by the enquiry whether any difference could be made in this particular between the local army and the line? His answer was that it would be no disadvantage at all to the latter if its officers on first entering were of higher qualifications. "I never could understand why the military profession was not to require much higher qualifications at starting than it does."

There were some further points touched upon which it is unnecessary to notice at length. He gave his opinion against the necessity for native courts-martial; and he advocated as a rule that particular corps should be confined to particular districts for recruiting purposes. He also considered it desirable that exchanges should be permitted between the local army and the line, under certain conditions, as a means of keeping up the status of the former, though he thought such exchanges would be rare. About the retention of Native commissioned officers he expressed himself doubtfully, thinking it difficult both on military and political grounds to do without them anywhere, and impossible in irregular corps.

During the course of his examination he was considerably assisted by Lord Stanley, who always came forward with a few sensible remarks to disentangle matters and clear the ground when

other members of the commission had got into difficulties. Seeing himself the many obstacles in the way of amalgamating the Indian armies with the line, he was able to appreciate and often to sum up in two or three pregnant sentences the drift and meaning of my father's evidence, and to stop short a good deal of irrelevant discussion.

The result of the enquiry was not such as to afford Her Majesty's Government much help in deciding the main questions involved, for the report of the commissioners showed that they were divided in opinion upon the fundamental point whether there should be a local European army. The majority, composed of officers of the Royal army, were in favour of amalgamation; and the minority, composed of Indian officers, were in favour of a local force. The latter were, however, backed by the weight of evidence, for almost all the authorities consulted who possessed any Indian experience were on their side. The list included Lord Canning, Lord Ellenborough, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Madras, the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram, and many other persons of note.*

Under these circumstances the Government was for a time uncertain as to the course to be adopted, and some conferences ensued before Lord Derby at which the matter was discussed. My father was invited to attend these conferences, and was called upon to express Lord Canning's views and his own. The last of them took place in May, 1859. No definite conclusion was then arrived at; but the arguments in favour of a local force seemed on the whole to have prevailed, and the question had become narrowed to a consideration of the extent to which the authority of the Horse Guards would be exercised over that force. As regards this point my father wrote to Lord Canning—"I need not add that I supported strongly and uncompromisingly the general views and arguments in your Lordship's letter, ..... concluding my own part of the discussion by stating that the real question at issue seemed to me whether it were advantageous to the power and hold of the Crown over its Indian Empire to diminish the influence and derogate from the position of the viceroy of Her

* It may be remarked that the officers of the Indian armies had much to gain by transfer to the Crown, supposing such transfer to be effected with a due regard for their rights. The Company's service had been looked upon in England as an inferior service, and the removal of the distinction was an evident advantage to its officers in various ways.

Majesty by lowering his authority over the local European forces, and by exposing him to the chance of collision with the military authorities."*

In the meantime my father had been elected to a seat in the Secretary of State's Council. The idea of becoming a candidate for this appointment had not at first occurred to him, but early in 1859 Lord Stanley had written to inform him that there was a vacancy, and to suggest his sending in his name. The following is an extract from Lord Stanley's letter:—

"I have heard a wish frequently expressed that a Bengal officer should be found fully competent to represent that branch of the Indian service. I have also heard the expression of this wish coupled with a mention of your name.

"Only applicants can be chosen, and it is doubted whether you would accept the post of councillor if elected. I think if you choose to come forward, your chance of success would be very good, and I am sure your presence here would be of material service to me. As I said before, I cannot interfere, but I do not think I am going beyond my duty in giving you this hint. You could be of great service in the work of military organization, which will be slow. The election is next week."

This letter reached my father in Ireland, where he had gone on a visit to his old friend George Thompson. On receipt of it he sent in his name, though with small expectation of success, for others had been actively canvassing. He was, however, elected. This was a matter of much satisfaction to him, for it was a marked recognition of his services, and the more so, from the fact that he was the first member chosen by the votes of the Council themselves under arrangements lately introduced. He accepted the appointment and entered upon his new duties in January, 1859. Among the many cordial congratulations which he received on his occasion was one from his old chief Lord Ellenborough, who wrote as follows:—

"SOUTHAM,
"*January, 19th*, 1859.

"MY DEAR DURAND,—My heart was gladdened this morning by a letter from Sir F. Currie informing me of your appointment to the Council of India. I congratulate you most sincerely.... You

* It may be remarked that collision, or at least a conflict of opinion, has since then occurred on more than one occasion. It is notorious that this was the case at the beginning of the late Afghan war.

will have the satisfaction of knowing that you are doing good, and will have your family about you.

"You have had much to distress you and a good deal to annoy you, and you deserved some amends. I trust you will live long to enjoy the good Providence, I will not say fortune, now sends you.

"Yours most sincerely,
"ELLENBOROUGH."

My father's satisfaction in the appointment was, however, chastened by regret for the loss of a military career. I quote from a letter written to one of his relatives at this time a passage which, though he rarely permitted himself to speak in a similar strain, was the expression of his innermost thoughts. It ran as follows: "Perhaps I need scarcely add that a feeling of duty to my children had some influence in leading me to send in my name. It was not without a regret when success came that I felt severed practically from the chance of further military service—the life-long passion bubbled up.... It is a strange feeling that *pride* of the sword, free from ambition, free from covetousness, free from hate, but still define it as you will there it is, making the tramp of armed men music, and conflict the pulse of life, its heart. It is not the pomp and circumstance of war but the earnest struggle of force, will, and head, and the feeling that the game is earnest ..... and the fate of hundreds or of thousands on the issue.

"Farewell, I suppose, to the life-long passion, right or wrong the noblest mere earthly passion, and henceforth the Leadenhall Street work, very interesting and necessary and useful, *but* not the old music."

I have said that my father rarely spoke in this strain. To all but one or two he was shy of opening his heart on the subject, and the letter from which I have quoted ended with a request that it might be burnt. But it was preserved, and it is one of the few papers now in my possession which remain to show the feeling always at the bottom of his heart. Before all he was a soldier.

My father was not long in finding that his seat in Council had also cost him what he would have preferred to it, the Foreign Secretaryship in India. A few weeks after his election he received from Lord Canning a letter, of which the following is an extract:—

"I heard of your prospects of election to the Council a few

days after receiving your note regarding the Foreign Secretaryship.

"That post I had already reserved for you, not as a matter of favour, for until I got your note I was very doubtful whether it would be congenial to you, but truly because I know no man so well qualified to fill it as yourself.

"I am sincerely sorry that it cannot be as I intended; but I well understand, judging by all I hear of the Commission and the Horse Guards, that you would have been ill-spared at home; and and if it is on the whole more agreeable to you to drop your anchor for good in England (and I can easily conceive that it should be so), I cannot grudge you your success."

In the meantime the Foreign Secretaryship had been offered elsewhere.

This was a keen disappointment, for the post was in all ways one of the best in India; and in thanking Lord Canning for his intentions my father expressed his regret that he had not earlier been made aware of them. His letter closed with the following words:—

"The last twelve years of my service in India have proved a period of so much loss, suffering, and vexation, that it would have been extremely gratifying to have been afforded the opportunity of filling the highest post in the department in which I have so long served."

His regret was increased by the fall of the Derby Ministry, and the succession of Sir Charles Wood to Lord Stanley at the India Office. Under the new régime it soon became apparent that his prospects of success in advocating Lord Canning's views were much decreased, and though he continued to argue the matter in letters to Sir Charles Wood, and in other ways, the tide was evidently beginning to turn strongly against him. The desire of "improving the Indian armies off the face of the earth," to use the words of Sir William Mansfield, was gaining ground; and with it a disinclination to respect as scrupulously as my father thought they should be respected, the rights as regards "pay, pensions, allowances, and privileges," which had been secured to those armies by Act of Parliament. The publication of the Commission report, which showed the views taken by a large and influential party in England, followed by months of uncertainty, had caused much excitement and discontent in India. This had been increased by the fact that the Line were obtaining the greater portion of the subordinate staff appointments hitherto held by the

Company's servants; and the discontent culminated in some acts of misconduct, and eventually in the withdrawal of 12,000 seasoned soldiers who preferred taking their discharge to entering the service of the Crown.

The ostensible and immediate cause of this exodus was the refusal of bounty when the Company's army came under the Crown, a concession that could not properly have been made once the troops began to demand it as a right, which legally it was not. Much use was made of the unfortunate occurrence by the opponents of the Indian armies, but the real causes of the discontent lay much deeper, the confidence and contentment of the men having been effectually shaken before the claim to bounty was ever advanced. This my father pointed out, strenuously defending the Indian armies from the aspersions cast upon them, and striving to demonstrate the true source of the discontent which prevailed. In a similar spirit he stood up for the military character of the late Company's officers, indignantly repudiating the charges advanced against them by men of the Mansfield school, and pointing to their achievements during and before the mutiny. "It would be invidious," he wrote, "to draw personal comparisons, but when the officers of the Company's troops are spoken of disparagingly as unfit to command or form European troops, it is impossible not to revert to the various disasters which have occurred during my own career, and to observe that no signal reverse has taken place with forces under Company's officers, and that after disasters they have been repeatedly selected and sent to retrieve affairs. On the field of battle, when victory seemed wavering, and the issue for a while uncertain, the conduct of the Bengal artillery and European infantry snatched victory out of the hands of the enemy on one memorable occasion;* and to turn to later events, whether it be Eyre with a small force at Jugdispore, or Wilson before Delhi, or Outram at bay before Lucknow, or Napier in pursuit, making the most brilliant cavalry affair of the whole war, we do not find wherein the Company's officers have fallen short of their duty or shown their inferiority to officers of the Royal army." The paper from which this extract is taken contained also a refutation of the theory that the mutiny was due to the inferior discipline of the Indian army. That great convulsion he ascribed to very different causes; the great expansion of territory under Lord Dalhousie, unaccompanied by any propor-

* Chillianwalla?

tionate increase of European force; the consequent denuding of the whole Gangetic line to meet the wants of the Punjab and Burmah, our forts, magazines, and treasuries being entrusted to native troops; the natural antagonism of race, creed, and colour, and our unpopularity as foreign conquerors; the widespread apprehension excited amongst interested classes by the progress of European knowledge and civilization; the action of successive commanders-in-chief, who were rarely if ever Company's servants, in depriving commanding officers of all power over their men; the alternate timidity and injudicious changes and measures in the treatment of the sepoy introduced by those commanders-in-chief; the confidence and self-reliance gained by the Bengal Native army during the course of its late campaigns, and their newly acquired feeling, due to events in Cabul and the Punjab war, that European troops were not invincible. These he said were the true causes of the mutiny. He added that one of the most dangerous consequences of the revolt was the race hostility which it had engendered; and that the best way of keeping up this feeling was the abolition of the local armies, whose permanent attachment to India must perforce make them less ignorant of natives, and more tolerant towards them, than constantly changing troops of the line.

It would be useless to overload these pages with an enumeration of the points upon which my father endeavoured to advocate the rights and interests of the Indian armies, and as he believed the true interests of our empire in India. But his uncompromising attitude upon the whole question, and the exceeding plainness of speech with which he expressed his views, soon caused him, as Lord Stanley told one of his friends, to be regarded by the amalgamationist party as "the very incarnation of the opposition." His relations with Sir Charles Wood became somewhat strained, and he was even given to understand that his exertions in this matter, which, whether rightly directed or not, were certainly conscientious and unselfish, had brought upon him the displeasure of his sovereign. I do not know how far this was true, but he believed it to be so.

On the 19th of May, 1860, appeared a Gazette in which the honours given upon Lord Canning's mutiny despatches were announced. "Of course," my father writes in his journal, "I am altogether omitted." He had, he knew, been recommended for a K.C.B., but the recommendation was set aside, and he adds "Sir John Lawrence told me the real reason of my omission was the opposition I had given *in re* amalgamation."

About this time I find him writing to Lord Ellenborough in favour of the Indian Council. The usefulness of this body has so often been made the mark of adverse criticism that it may not be out of place to quote his opinion on the subject, which was strongly in favour of the continuance of existing arrangements. "The more I see of home establishments," he wrote, "and of Secretaries of State, the more convinced I am that the affairs of India would be speedily mismanaged without the check of a Council.....As for the armies of India, but for the unanimity of Council, the Horse Guards would have been Lords paramount of those armies, and of the financial expenditure of India, months ago."

Lord Ellenborough, who having been more than once President of the Board of Control, had enjoyed very unusual opportunities of forming an opinion upon this matter, and who was by no means disposed to appreciate any check upon his own powers, entirely agreed, and disclaimed emphatically the intention, which had been imputed to him, of casting any reflection on the Council of India.

In May, 1860, it was finally made known to the Council that Her Majesty's Government had decided not to maintain any local European force, and soon afterwards it was proposed to suspend recruiting for that force. This led to the recording of some strong, though of course useless, opinions against amalgamation, and the measure was then carried to its legitimate conclusion by discussion in Parliament. The Bill evoked an eloquent and feeling speech from Lord Ellenborough, which closed with an assurance—"the heartfelt assurance—" of his "undiminished respect and continued gratitude to the Indian army;" but there was little effective opposition, and the Bill passed into law. Then followed the elaboration of the "Indian Staff Corps." To this scheme also my father offered a strenuous opposition, and though he could not bring about any material change in the principle of the measure, many of his objections produced their effect. He condemned the whole plan as unpractical and unjust, and recorded his opinions with his usual uncompromising directness and plainness of speech. The majority of the Council were no longer with him, and he was left to protest almost alone. Nevertheless he felt it his duty to go on at all costs. In November, 1860, he writes to Lord Ellenborough—"I certainly never sought the position in which I find myself placed, but as it seems the will of God that the duty should fall upon myself in the India

Office to strive that justice be done to the men and officers of the Indian armies, the duty shall be done to the best of my power and ability, both of which are small save in fearlessness." In India his unselfish efforts were appreciated, and this to some extent consoled him for the unpleasantness of his position.

About this time he heard from Sir Charles Wood that Lord Canning wanted him out in India to replace Sir James Outram, then in the Governor-General's Council, whose health was failing. Lord Canning had wished him to come out before, at the beginning of the year, either as a Member of Council or as Foreign Secretary, but circumstances then precluded a distinct offer being made to him. At the close of the year there was some idea of changing the constitution of the Indian Government by the formation of a Secretariat Council; and Lord Canning wished to have him for the double appointment of Member of Council and Military Secretary. The proposed alteration, however, was not carried into effect, and he never received the definite offer of Outram's place, which was not in Lord Canning's gift. In writing to Lord Canning on the subject he intimated his readiness to go out, but he added that he doubted whether some one would not be selected whose views on army questions were more acceptable than his. In this expectation he was right, for Outram was succeeded by my father's old friend Sir Robert Napier, whom Lord Canning had also named, and he remained in England.

The close of 1860 found him in low spirits, for the year had brought him a crushing affliction. He had married in the autumn of 1859 the widow of the Reverend Henry Polehampton, whose courage and devotion during the siege of Lucknow had made her name a household word among the sorely tried garrison. Unhappily the first child born of this marriage was blind; and by mother and father alike the blow was terribly felt. By the end of the year it had been ascertained, after consulting English and German oculists, that there was no hope. On the 31st December my father writes in his journal: "It has pleased God to give me a poor blind boy this year. I accept it as a mark of God's wrath for great sin, and pray that his anger may be turned away from those dear to me.....It has also pleased God that my conscientious advocacy of the rights of the Indian armies, assured to them by Parliament, has worked to the great apparent prejudice of my worldly interests. Lord Canning's repeated proposals and requests that I should be sent back to India with a seat in the Governor-General's Council have been put aside.....For my children's sake,

and specially poor blind Charlie's sake, I regret the ruin of my career."

It was during this part of my father's life that I saw most of him. Upon his election to Council he brought over his younger children from Switzerland, and for the next two years, first at Ryde, and afterwards at East Sheen, we were all together. We learnt then to know him thoroughly, and to understand the strength and simplicity of his character. I do not think any father was ever better loved, or better deserved to be loved, by his children. Very stern in rebuke for anything he considered dishonourable or ill-natured, he was as tender in heart and in manner as the gentlest of women; and we were certain of finding with him the readiest sympathy and comfort in all our troubles. His intensely keen sense of fun too made him the pleasantest of companions. He entered with thorough enjoyment into our amusements, knew all about our school friends and enemies, and could hold his own with his boys at anything. Many a time I have seen him laughing till he cried over some school story of fun or mischief, and he had plenty to tell us in return. He took as much pleasure in our games I think as any one of us; and in the summer evenings when his work was over for the day, he was almost always ready to stretch his long legs at rounders or prisoner's base, or whatever else might be proposed. At the same time we knew there were some subjects upon which he would stand no joking. Tolerant and broad-minded as he was in matters of religion, his deep belief in Christianity made him exceedingly severe against anything that savoured of flippancy or disrespect; and we never ventured to rouse his anger in that way, for though we loved and trusted him entirely he was not a man to be trifled with. One of the most striking traits about him was his punctilious and old-fashioned courtesy towards women, of whatever rank or class. It was a part of the chivalry and tenderness of his character. Women and children all seemed to take to him at once; and no one who saw the beautiful gentleness of his manner towards them could wonder at their doing so.*

* I think I never saw him so angry as on one occasion when he believed I had been guilty of insolence to a lady. We had taken our seats in the dining-room for family prayers, and he was about to begin reading, when he looked up and told me not to turn my back to the ladies. I glanced over my shoulder, and seeing only one of my sisters, a child of eight, who was sitting close beside me, I half turned my chair, saying at the same time with a smile of brotherly disrespect, in a tone which I intended to reach her only, "She's not a lady." My father did not answer, but

During the early months of 1861 he continued, though he knew it was hopeless, to record his views very freely upon the subject of the staff corps. Sir Charles Wood's original scheme had been subjected to a good deal of what my father described as "tinkering—the bad mending of a bad thing," but it was still in his opinion thoroughly objectionable. It had the merit of attempting to provide the Indian Government with a body of local officers knowing something of the country and the people, instead of leaving that Government to depend entirely upon the rapidly changing officers of the line, but there he thought its merits ended, and this attempt was made in the clumsiest manner. However his efforts were effectual only in mitigating the hardships and correcting some of the crudities of the original scheme, and on the 8th of January, 1861, he writes in his journal—"Council. Resolution, warrant, and accompanying despatches were passed with only three dissentients—Willoughby, Prinsep, and myself. So end the Indian armies, deserted by the Council itself." His own final dissent was as follows:—

"I dissent from the resolution, the warrant, and the despatches brought before the Council by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India on the 8th January, 1861, for the following reasons:—

"1. Because the Bill passed last session for carrying out the principle that 'it is not expedient that a separate European force should be continued for the local service of Her Majesty in India,' does not authorise the creation of a monster staff corps as a means for the extinction of the regimental organization of the Indian Native forces, and for the arbitrary alteration of the relative position of every officer in the Indian armies. Such dislocation of an organization sanctioned by Parliament, by long usage, and by the example of the British and of all foreign armies, being not only unnecessary, costly, and contrary to the recommendations of Her Majesty's Viceroy in India, but incompatible with a *bonâ fide* fulfilment of clause 56 of 21 and 22 Vict. c. 106, and of the pledge with which the Bill passed last session closes.

the moment afterwards I knew from his face, and from his voice as he began to read, that I had made some horrible mistake; and when I turned to kneel down at the end of the chapter I saw that my sisters' governess had been seated behind me. Directly prayers were over he told me to follow him, and I left the room with my heart in my throat. He had taught us always to speak the truth to him, and after a time he believed me; but at first he was so angry that he would accept no explanation, and I narrowly escaped a flogging which I should have remembered for many a day. It was the only one he ever threatened me with.

"2. Because the Bill which stops recruiting for the local European forces, so far from annulling section 35 of 21 and 22 Vict. c. 106, as in effect is done by the warrant and despatches, is careful to secure the fulfilment of its considerate provisions in behalf of the sons of persons who have served the State in India.

"3. Because the Bill in question does not sanction the obliteration of the vested rights of officers, authoritatively sanctioned by the letter of the Court of Directors, No. 20 of the 14th February, 1837, and which for above sixty years have had free action. The hard earned savings of many officers have been invested in purchasing out senior officers, with the reasonable expectation of profiting, in their turn, when they retired. To many the obliteration of such vested rights must prove ruinous, and where not ruinous, it will deprive many officers and their families of a provision which they would have enjoyed but for the change now introduced by Government, without the due notice promised to the Indian armies.

"4. Because the warrant, by dividing the army in India into two great bodies, the 'staff corps' on one side, and the European troops on the other, makes the line of demarcation between staff and regimental duty broader and more invidious than ever; introduces a system less elastic than that which it supplants, and not so well calculated to supply the special requirements of the public service in India.

"5. Because an army officered on the irregular system, that is with six European officers to a regiment of infantry, has an organization which, whatever else it may be fit for, has been proved at Delhi and Lucknow in 1857, besides in numerous other prior instances, wholly unequal to the strain of continuous military operations, and dependent under such circumstances for its efficiency upon a large available reserve of officers. Under the scheme to be introduced no such reserve will exist. European corps cannot on service be stripped of their officers, and any small aid derivable from this source will not only be inadequate, but ignorant of the Native troops. If for a short littoral expedition like that to China, Lord Canning thought twelve officers necessary for each native corps, manifestly six officers, even if none were sick or on furlough, must prove too few for the wear and tear of an ordinary campaign in the East, where it is our policy to throw as much of the friction of the war as possible on native troops and their officers. In the event of repeated actions, or of siege opera-

tions, experience as to the loss of European officers, and the multiplicity of duties in which their services are essential, proves the inadequacy of such an organization for its object, namely, war efficiency. It has, however, the further objection of being avowedly intended to increase the authority and influence of the native officers; which, from the paucity of the European officers and the inexperience of the greater part attached to native corps under the proposed system, will be an increase of power and habits of command on the part of native officers at the expense of the real influence and authority of the European officers. The impolicy of such a placing of power and influence needs no reference to past events. The mutiny of 1857 was more easily surmounted, because a contrary policy had been the rule.

"6. Because the warrant and despatch deal differently with officers of the line and local armies. The former, when they obtain commissions in the staff corps, are not to bar promotion in the regiments they leave; whereas Indian officers, given commissions in the staff corps, are to remain in the roll of their regiments, and the promotion of their juniors is to be regulated by their own in the staff corps. As promotion in the staff corps depends on two elements, service in India and on the staff, the promotion of the regimental officers is made to depend on that of officers holding commissions in another corps, and obtaining promotion under other conditions than those which regulate the seniority rise of the regimental officers. The legality as well as the equity of such an arrangement are as doubtful as the preferential treatment of line corps furnishing officers to the staff corps will seem invidious to the regimental officers of the Indian armies.

"7. Because the despatches convey no assurance to the officers of the artillery and engineers that the eligibility to divisional brigade commands, to which they are now entitled under the practice and regulations of the Indian armies, will be continued to them. The contrary is understood to be the practice, if not the regulation, in Her Majesty's British army; so important a privilege and advantage, incidental to the ordnance officers of the Indian armies, cannot therefore be passed *sub silentio* without creating apprehension as to the fulfilment of the Parliamentary pledges.

"8. Because the operation of holding out inducements to join the 'staff corps,' and to volunteer for the new line corps of cavalry and infantry, and for the Royal artillery, will, besides leading to complications and difficulties too numerous to detail, embarrass the Governments of India with residuary bodies of men and officers

whose positions may be so affected as to render the measure, to them, a complete breach of the Parliamentary pledges.

"H. M. DURAND."

This was his last official utterance on the subject while he remained in England, and it remains to be seen whether in the case of any severe and protracted fighting the organization then introduced will stand the strain. The number of combatant officers with each regiment has already been raised, first to seven, and then to eight. However this may be, there is no doubt that twenty years' working of the staff corps system has resulted in its being very generally discredited in India; and further that Sir Charles Wood's measures inflicted much loss and suffering upon the officers and men of the Indian forces, and created enduring discontent.

In May, 1861, the battle of the staff corps being over, my father received from Lord Canning a letter offering him the Foreign Secretaryship, and pressing him to come out at once. Two years before he would have accepted the offer with pleasure, for the Foreign Secretaryship was an honourable and interesting appointment, and it placed its possessor practically at the head of the Indian political service. It would, therefore, have been in his case the most marked recognition in Lord Canning's power of the value of his work in Central India, which had brought upon him so much misrepresentation and annoyance. Nevertheless, he now hesitated to take up the appointment. He felt that it was an opening to distinction, and to higher posts, and also that he owed much to Lord Canning, who had continued to select him for employment when any recommendation in his favour was evidently not acceptable in England. On the other hand, his family was large and increasing. If he went out to India he would have to break up his home and keep two establishments, one in India and one in England. Most of his children would again be left to the care of others; and this condition of an Indian career had always been most painful to him. Moreover, he was weary of thirty years of exile, and disinclined to leave England again. Finally, there was the risk of his health breaking down; and the further risk that he might find himself without any appointment at all, for the Foreign Secretaryship had always until then been held by an officer of the Indian civil service, and it was doubtful whether Lord Canning could legally nominate to it any one not belonging

to that service.* It was improbable that the point would be ruled against him, but it was possible, and he had to answer at once before any final decision in this respect could be arrived at. Under these circumstances it was necessary to weigh the matter seriously before committing himself, and his first conclusion was against acceptance. On the 27th of May he wrote to Lord Canning accordingly, declining the secretaryship. This first conclusion was, however, soon set aside, mainly I believe in consequence of a letter from Lord Stanley, who wrote urging on public grounds that he should return to India; and in the beginning of June he withdrew his refusal. It was, I think, characteristic of him that he was to a considerable extent influenced in this matter by the desire of making room at home for Outram, who was about to risk his life by taking up his appointment in Calcutta,

On the 4th of July my father sailed for India, and six weeks later he had taken charge of the Indian Foreign Office.

* About twenty years before Lord Auckland had contemplated the appointment of a well-known political officer, Colonel Sutherland; but he gave up the idea, feeling convinced that the nomination would be disallowed by the Court of Directors.

# CHAPTER X.

## 1861—1865.

The Indian Foreign Office—Durbar at Allahabad—Cawnpore and Lucknow—Offer of Chief Commissionership in Mysore—Offer of Hyderabad Residency—Lady Canning—The Adoption Sunnuds—Native Members in the Legislative Council—Lord Canning leaves India—Lord Elgin—Affairs in Afghanistan—Income Tax in India—Our relations with the Native Chiefs—Fayrer—Mayne—Durbars at Benares and Agra—Proposed change of the Seat of Government—Social relations with the Natives of India—Illness and Death of Lord Elgin—Sir John Lawrence appointed Governor-General—Correspondence with Lady Durand—Differences with Sir John Lawrence—Bhutan War—Visit to Burmah—Appointment to Council.

THE appointment which my father was now called upon to take up was one of the most interesting and important in India. The work of the Indian Foreign Office is exceedingly varied in its character and wide in its scope. The control of our relations with the feudatory States of India, which comprise one-fourth of the entire continent, and contain a population of nearly sixty millions, is in itself a weighty task, and requires for its effective fulfilment much firmness and tact, much knowledge of the history and circumstances of the several States, and much sympathy with the feelings of their rulers and people. Such qualifications are rare, more rare than purely administrative talent, and they should be possessed by an Indian Foreign Secretary, for as regards this important branch of our Indian policy he is in fact the responsible adviser and right hand of the Viceroy. The members of the Viceroy's Council have not, as a rule, any special knowledge of the Native States of India; and where such knowledge exists, the Foreign Secretary is not thereby relieved of any substantial share of labour and responsibility, for ever since the time of Lord Canning it has been the custom of successive Governors-General to reserve to themselves the work of the Foreign Office, and there is not, as in other cases, any member of council specially charged with the supervision of the department.

But besides controlling the feudatory States, the Indian Foreign Office has to direct our diplomatic relations with the neighbouring foreign powers. It has European agents in Burmah,* in Aden, on the coast of Africa, in Biluchistan, in the Persian Gulf, in Turkish Arabia; and correspondence pours in upon it from almost every Asiatic country between China and the Mediterranean. The conduct of this correspondence, which often involves questions of great difficulty and imperial interest, and the watching of the "great game" beyond our north-western frontier, towards which, whether for good or evil, Russia is steadily advancing, are duties of no light weight and importance.

Nor can the work of the Foreign Office be completely discharged without some administrative and judicial aptitude. The officers of the Indian "political" or diplomatic service, which is under the orders of the Foreign Department, are often called upon, during minorities or for other reasons, to assume for a time the actual administration of Native States; and their proceedings have to be checked and controlled. Moreover, there are tracts of territory, not belonging to Native States, or to our regulation provinces, which the Foreign Department administers. And, as regards judicial work, there are a variety of ways in which British political officers are obliged to exercise judicial powers; and the Government of India in the Foreign Department has at times to discharge with respect to them the duties of a court of confirmation and appeal.

Finally, all the ceremonial work of Government, the management of durbars, the reception of Native chiefs and gentlemen, the duties connected with the various orders of knighthood, and the like, are regarded as part of the work of the Foreign Office. Out of India such duties would more properly be performed by special officers; but in this country, where matters of ceremonial are of special importance, often involving delicate questions of precedence between Native chiefs, and other difficulties of a similar nature, the existing arrangement is apparently unavoidable.

It is natural that, under the circumstances stated above, the Foreign Secretary should enjoy, in the estimation of the natives of India, a very responsible position. Indeed, it would hardly be too much to say that, by the bulk of the Native chiefs, his office

* British Burmah. There is now no British Agent in Mandalay itself. But our relations with the kingdom of Ava are close and complicated.

is regarded as second in importance only to that of the Viceroy. Nor is this feeling confined entirely to the natives of India. The Foreign Secretaryship has, as a rule, been filled by the ablest men at the disposal of the Indian Government, and it has been, and still is, regarded as the blue riband of the civil service. It is greatly coveted for its own sake, and is an almost certain stepping-stone to the highest posts in the empire.

This being the case, it was not to be wondered at that my father's appointment to the charge of the Foreign Office should at first have been viewed with some disfavour by the civil service of India. That service had been accustomed to regard the appointment as peculiarly its own, and Lord Canning had been guilty of a startling innovation in giving it to an officer of Engineers. Yet, I believe I am safe in saying that when it was vacated after four years' tenure, there was no dispute as to its having been ably filled. Decidedly opposed to the sweeping annexations of Lord Dalhousie, which, while they weakened our military position, had also unsettled the minds of our Indian feudatories and sown fear and distrust broadcast; as decidedly averse from the retrograde non-interference views of Cornwallis and Bentinck, and alive to the responsibilities which had devolved upon us as the supreme power in India; my father was well suited for carrying out the wise and conciliatory policy of Lord Canning—a policy which he had had no small share in forming. With the ignorant pseudo-tenderness which made a certain class of political officers treat Native States in India as foreign powers, and foster the obsolete pretensions of the greater chiefs at the expense of their neighbours and subjects, he had, indeed, no sympathy. He always felt for the peasant as much as the prince; and he was determined that if he could prevent it, no native chief, however important, should be permitted to question the supremacy of the British Crown, or encroach upon the rights of the smaller states. But native rulers who ruled well and were loyal had no truer friend; and they knew it. His views on this important branch of Indian policy were expressed by himself in an essay contributed to the *Calcutta Review* in 1865, and I cannot, I think, do better than quote it here. After commenting upon the inapplicability of international law to the relations between the British Government and the Native States, and upon the folly of fostering notions of independence which could not fail to prove destructive to the States themselves, he wrote:—

"These remarks are made in no other than the most friendly

feeling to Native States, and from the conviction that the course most conservative of their permanent interests is that which prevents their rulers from entertaining chimerical notions of their footing with respect to the supreme government. A just apprehension of their real position will show them the wisdom of avoiding opposition to the onward start which India is at length making under British rule, and the expediency of identifying themselves and their states with the progress now effecting around them. By thus making common cause with the British Government in its beneficent exertions, their own abiding interests will be far better fostered than by the indulgence of empty pretensions. The English Government neither wishes to curtail their honours or their possessions..... The only thing which can now be fatal to them is gross misrule, and its consequent isolation from the policy of the Government of India, namely the rapid improvement of India and its races. The days of the annexation policy are passed, and nothing but gross and obstinate dereliction from the obligations and duties of their position can henceforward endanger them; but they must honourably discharge the trust devolved upon them. ..... If the days of annexation are gone, so too are the days of gross cruelty and tyranny: for British supremacy can neither tolerate nor cloak such abuse of administrative powers under the ægis of its protection."

The views here expressed were in perfect accord with those of Lord Canning; and Lord Canning's rule in India, closed all too soon, marked the starting-point of a new era in our Indian feudatory policy. It is true that others before Lord Canning had held much the same views: but it was not until this time that the British Government formally accepted them, and sealed its acceptance by entering into engagements from which for the future there can be no withdrawal.

My father's clear comprehension and acceptance of Lord Canning's views was not his only qualification for the post Lord Canning had given him. His knowledge of Indian history was remarkably deep and accurate,* and his attainments as a linguist were also considerable. Natives have often remarked to me upon the fluency and correctness with which he spoke Hindustani, and he was at home both in Persian and Arabic.† Further, he had

* Mr. Talboys Wheeler, whose researches in this branch of study have given him an European reputation, told me not long ago that he had never met any one as deeply read upon the subject.

† I might say that his attainments in this respect were more than considerable.

enjoyed special opportunities of gaining a varied experience of Native States, both within and without our frontiers; he had for more than two years administered a British province and familiarised himself with judicial and revenue work; and he had devoted much care and attention to the question of our policy in Central Asia. In regard to this question, and to our external policy in general, he was steadily opposed to everything that savoured of hasty violence or aggression. Keenly jealous of the honour and reputation of England, he held that the tendency to bluster and to take offence or alarm unnecessarily, was the best possible way of compromising the one and the other. Lord Elgin once remarked, with characteristic shrewdness, that "your rising Indian official is always in favour of a good row." In my father's case, at least, the remark was inapplicable. He had seen too much of war not to appreciate its miseries; and though he advocated striking, and striking home, when there was real cause for so doing, no man was less inclined towards a policy of needless interference and "mischievous activity." To strengthen ourselves thoroughly within our own frontiers, and to leave our neighbours in peace, neither injuring nor threatening them, was, in his opinion, the course of policy which would most surely conduce to the interests of England and India. It was with these views and aims that he took up the Foreign Secretaryship in the autumn of 1861.

When he landed in Calcutta all was quiet. There had been an outbreak of cholera in the Punjab, which cost us more than four hundred European lives; and Calcutta society was disturbed by a violent controversy between the official classes and the indigo planters of Bengal; but within and without our frontiers affairs were at rest, and there was no immediate cause for anxiety. On the 18th of August he wrote to Gerald Talbot, Lord Canning's former secretary:—

"Our voyage was on the whole a favourable one. . . . . Lord Canning sent a note to Madras, asking us to stay at Government House on arrival, and we have, since the evening of the 12th, when we landed, been living in this, the coolest and best house in

Putting aside the languages most immediately useful to him in the Indian Foreign Office, he knew French, German, and Italian as few Englishmen know them, and he had some acquaintance with Hebrew, Burmese, and Spanish. To the end of his life he retained his love for classical authors, particularly the Greek poets. I remember when he was last at home, in 1868, being surprised and humbled by his familiarity with Greek poetry, and the perfect ease with which he read it. His own Bible, which he studied daily, was in Arabic.

Calcutta, and most kindly treated by Lord and Lady Canning. I have not yet got a house, but hope soon to find a hole of some kind or other into which to run our heads.

"Lord Canning looks pale, but well, and has I think rather improved his fine face and head by a short pointed beard, such as one sees in some old Spanish pictures. Lady Canning looks thin, but well and bright. I gave your messages. . . . . My first council day was on Friday last, and when I entered the room Lord Canning put into my hand a short and hurried note from Sir C. Wood informing him that Lord Elgin had been nominated his successor. I wish it had been Lord Stanley. . . . . The weather is called unusually cool, but if so, my years in England have spoiled me for what satisfies people here, for I found it hot and very oppressive, and yearn for East Sheen. . . . . ."

It was natural that on his return he should find himself regarded by the unfortunate officers of the Indian army as peculiarly their champion; and he was accordingly subjected to a heavy fire of visits and letters on the subject of Sir Charles Wood's recent measures of reform. But he felt that this matter so far as he was concerned had been fought out, and that he was not justified in carrying his opposition any further. "I carefully abstain," he wrote to Lord Stanley, "from any expression of opinion upon, or interference with, the amalgamation affairs; but these are in terrible confusion, the feeling among the local officers most bitter. Do not accept the '*Times*' flourishes on this head. Officers of every branch and standing have come to me for advice. I cut short all communications by saying that I have no opinion to give on military matters unless the Governor-General ask me; that he and he alone is entitled to my advice if he seek it, but that to every one else I, in my present position, must maintain silence on military matters." It need hardly be said that Lord Canning did seek his advice on military matters; and in fact, during the short remainder of Lord Canning's Indian career, he had probably as much to do with the state of the army as with the affairs of his own department; but except to Lord Canning his mouth was closed on this subject

The first important duty upon which my father was employed in his own office was in connection with the great Native State of Mysore. This principality had for many years past been administered by the British Government, owing to the incapacity of its chief; and as there were no heirs it was understood that the State, which was of our own creation, would lapse. This had

been the view taken by the chief himself, and it was in accordance with the condition upon which the State had originally been granted. But, hurt by finding his State transferred to the control of the Madras Government, and worked upon by others, His Highness now began to talk of heirs and successors, to claim the privilege of continuing his line by adoption, and to agitate for the restoration of his own powers during his lifetime. Lord Canning felt that the granting of the last request involved the granting of all; and he was opposed to any concession. My father had not taken altogether the same view, but he was now called upon to draft a despatch to the Secretary of State expressing Lord Canning's opinion, and he afterwards felt that Lord Canning's opinion had been a right and logical one. It is needless to follow up this question in detail. After much controversy at home and in India, in which the logic of facts was unquestionably on the side of Lord Canning, Her Majesty's Government came to the conclusion that the Native State should be continued; and in the beginning of last year, 1881, the final transfer to native rule took place. Mysore, with its million of revenue and five millions of population, now constitutes another and a striking example of the singular generosity with which the Native principalities of India are treated by the British Government.*

Another matter with which my father had to deal at the beginning of his term in the Foreign Office was the newly established Order of the Star of India. He had foreseen and pointed out when in England that some of the conditions of this Order would not be palatable to the Native chiefs, especially the Mahomedans, and on his arrival in India he found that his pre-

* It would be extremely interesting, in face of all that has been talked and written by ignorant enthusiasts or paid agitators in England, to work out this question. There is hardly a great Native State in India which has not, strictly speaking, lapsed to the Crown; and under any other Government but that of England the majority of these States would long ago have been absorbed. By the English Government their existence has been artificially prolonged, and their revenues have been handed over intact to any distant relative whom we could discover and elevate to the rank of a Native Chief. Not to speak of smaller States, the great principalities of Gwalior, Indore, Jeypore, and Baroda are now ruled by Chiefs whose connection with the former ruling family is very slight. Drawn by the British Government from complete obscurity, and raised to a position of almost unbounded wealth and honour, these chiefs ought to be grateful to the power which has placed them where they are. There is not one of the four who could have claimed the chiefship as a right.

dictions had been verified. Objections were raised by some of those first selected for investiture; and for a time Lord Canning was somewhat disturbed at the prospect of things going wrong. "It was very nearly a missfire and a scandal," my father afterwards wrote to Lord Ellenborough; "the chiefs seem to think they confer rather than receive a favour when they accept the Order." However, all difficulties were gradually got over, and they have never again been raised. The Star of India, which at first, like all new things, was misunderstood by the chiefs and alarmed their prejudices, is now greatly prized and eagerly sought after, except possibly by one or two of our feudatories whose constant endeavour it is to avoid everything like an admission of the supremacy of the Crown; and whatever opinion may be entertained regarding the expediency of multiplying decorations of this kind for European officers, there can be little doubt that the establishment of the Order has, in regard to the natives of India, been popular and successful.*

On the 20th of October my father started for Allahabad, where the first ceremony of investiture was to take place. The following extract from a letter to Lord Ellenborough, written immediately before his departure, will serve to show the very varied nature of the duties which he had, in the meantime, been called upon to discharge:—

"I have had a great deal of work since I came here, and more is to be put upon my office, for we are to have the Emigration, Electric Telegraph, Police, and Survey Departments put under the Foreign Secretary. The Home Department is to be thus relieved, and is to take from us all educational and all purely judicial business. The exchange is by way of equalizing work, but I think the beam will show that the balance will be trimmed favourably for the Home Department. They wanted to put all the judicial work upon the Foreign Department, but I did not think that either fair or advisable."

He adds in the same letter:

"In the rage for reduction the committee had directed the reduction of all the newspapers taken in by the Foreign Office.

* As an instance of the manner in which the native princes regarded the Star of India at first, my father mentions in a letter written at this time that one of them, a chief moreover of secondary rank and importance, remarked by way of criticism upon the outward emblems of the Order that the "*chuprass*" was not so bad, but the "*pertullah*" was mean. Any one who has been in Indian will understand the significance of the allusion.

To this I demurred, and Lord Canning approved of my views; and the very thing you mention was started in the office from the time I took charge. Not only are the native newspapers watched, and extracts of anything important brought before Government, but the English newspapers, now much used by the natives, are also carefully observed, more especially those known to be in the hands of the natives and under their paramount influence."

This action was proper and necessary; and it shows the importance which he attached to the Press, and to its effect upon the natives of India. In his personal dealings with the fourth estate he was always very reserved. He considered that there should be thorough independence on both sides, and held with Lord Londonderry that "a man who newspapered himself was never to be trusted." There have been few men in India more fiercely assailed by the Press, and few who have had less fear of it. But he never professed to despise it, or underrated its power; and he regarded it even in India as a most valuable check upon the acts of Government.

On the 26th of October my father was at Allahabad, where a camp had been pitched for Lord Canning near the fort. There are few sights, perhaps, more striking than a great durbar in India. "The scenic splendour of the pageant," writes Wyllie,* "constitutes its humblest charm. That might be rivalled or surpassed in other lands; but, except perhaps at an imperial coronation in Moscow, nowhere else can be found so harmonious a combination of the distinctive types of Europe and the East, so vivid a revelation of all that can best symbolize the wonders of comprehensive empire. On one side there is the disciplined might of England, represented by a gathering of picked troops—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—capable, as they stand, of making a victorious promenade throughout the length or breadth of India, though half the country should be in arms against them; on the other, the fantastic pomp of Asia, impersonated in an array of luxurious princes, who, by the lustre of their jewels, the bellicose aspect of their motley followers, the bulk of their elephants, and the costly caparisoning of their horses, convert the act of homage to their common master into an occasion of emulous display—each striving to outshine his peer. In some sense it is an Oriental edition of the Field of the Cloth of Gold. The vast plain all round the city of rendezvous is white with innumerable encampments. Every camp clusters round the flag-staff of a separate authority,

* Essays on the External Policy of India.

and at every staff, save one, the drooped flag denotes subordination to a superior power in the vicinity. A long, broad street of marquees, tenanted by the various members and attachés of the supreme government, leads up to the palatial mass of canvas forming the viceregal pavilion. The feudatory chief whose turn may have come to approach the 'Lord Sahib's' presence, is greeted at the mouth of the street by a salute of guns in number apportioned to his rank. Up the street his *cortége* slowly moves through lines of British troopers, whose sabres flash welcome in the sunshine. A fanfare of martial music announces his arrival at the entrance of the pavilion; secretaries and aides-de-camp receive him as he alights, and see him doff his shoes; the infantry guard of honour presents arms; and so, between two rows of clashing weapons His Highness is conducted to his allotted place in the assembly. The throne under the central canopy is vacant for the Viceroy. Right and left of it in horse-shoe fashion chairs are arranged; these for the native potentates and those for British officers. Behind the latter, and drawn aside, as having no proper status in a purely Eastern ceremony, gleams a small and select *parterre* of English ladies. All present are seated, and a growing stillness indicates the hour for the Viceroy's advent. All rise as he appears, heralded by a royal salute, and with a brilliant staff around him. Proceeding to the canopy he stands motionless below it, the whole conclave also standing in silence until the last of the twenty-one guns, which recognize the majesty of India's absent Empress, has ceased. Then he mounts the throne, and the business of the durbar begins."

There is always a good deal of preliminary show and pageantry on these occasions—processions of elephants, and state visits to and from native chiefs—and though such ceremonies become fatiguing and wearisome enough after a time, and cause much expense both to Government and to the Native States, they are in accordance with the customs of the country, and, when not too frequent, doubtless have some good effect. Not the least of their advantages is the fact noticed by Wyllie, that they afford Government an opportunity of gathering together considerable bodies of troops; and many a native chief on occasions of this kind must have felt that there was a deep meaning in it all, as he sat by the Viceroy's side at the closing review, and watched under the clear blue of an Indian cold weather sky the glittering lines of British bayonets and sabres, and the even muzzles of our guns, sweeping past the British flag.

The first investiture of the Star of India went off well. Lord Canning had shrunk with something of horror from appearing in the brilliant robes of the Order, and there was a certain amount of irregularity in the proceedings of others in this respect; but the chiefs seemed pleased with the general effect of the ceremony. Among those invested was my father's old friend the Begum of Bhopal, who, he wrote, was "quite delighted at the interest displayed about her, and at being surrounded after the investiture by a throng of ladies, all anxious to speak to her, look at the star and collar, &c., and congratulate her on her being the first lady knight."

From Allahabad my father went on to Cawnpore and Lucknow, where Lord Canning wished to meet the assembled talukdars, or local nobility of Oudh, and to encourage them in a movement which had lately been set on foot for the suppression of female infanticide. From Lucknow my father wrote to Mrs. Durand on the 4th of November:—

We arrived here at 6 P.M. last night, and were very kindly and hospitably put up by Colonel S. Abbott. Early this morning he took me to the residency, and to the burial-ground; and from thence we went through all the palaces, &c., which are within the sphere of the defensive works; so that we got through a good deal of Lucknow. The part which interested me most was the church and burial-ground about the church. Of the church but the lower part of the buttresses and walls remain; it is a ruin; but the tree at the end of the church, and the mosques in your sketch, showed me the spot where you must so often have sat. . . . Yesterday I also found time to make you a slight sketch of the Cawnpore Well. It is very different from what it was when you saw it. A garden is laid out around the well, and that scene of butchery has lost the desolate air which the place had in 1857–58. The well is filled in, and capped with a stone head, which is to be surrounded by a gothic sort of rail. I must say that the feelings which arise at standing on that spot are not such that the taste of the memorial affects them in any way. . . . The interest is in that terrible spot of cruel and needless slaughter, and I confess that it threw a black cloud over my mind and heart; and the thought arose, that if ever troops had to be nerved in action against the natives of India, 'the Wel of Cawnpore' would be the simple words I should utter. Here, too, as I gazed on Henry Lawrence's tomb and its simple epitaph, 'Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty. God have

mercy on his soul!' and on the spot where so many brave and good hearts were laid when they ceased to beat, there came back to me the old burning feeling that I fear neither time nor age can ever tame. It has been a series of occasions stirring up within me the bitter feelings of the past. Poor Mayne, at whose coffin-side I walked, bearing the pall, was borne to his grave on a gun-carriage. The last time I attended a funeral in India he was there; and the one borne on a gun-carriage to her grave was my own darling Annie. I could not help, whilst standing over his grave, thinking of that burial in the Mhow burial-ground, and of the group that stood there. Then came the Cawnpore Well, and now the scene of your own great sufferings and loss. The result is, that I am made to feel what I always knew was a constitutional element. I may keep down, and on principle overrule the boiling wrath which eat so deep into one's heart in 1857; but I can no more get rid of it than I can of the burning, because suppressed rage with which I learnt our military disasters in 1841. Time seems only to go on deepening such feelings; working them down and down more into the depths of that strange and evil thing, the heart of man. The brain can't forget; and the heart neither. Beautiful as this city is, I am far from sure that I should like to live here. In places not marked by the events of 1857 I might come to regard natives with the same feelings, practically, as animated me before the mutiny, but here it would be a hard discipline to walk unmoved, Cawnpore the same, Mhow and Indore the same. . . ."

After the reception of the Oude talukdars, Lord Canning returned to Calcutta, halting only for a few hours at Benares on his way; and by the 12th of November my father was once more at the Foreign Office.

In the meantime he had been offered by Lord Canning the Chief Commissionership of Mysore, a more lucrative appointment than the Foreign Secretaryship, but one which he was not disposed to accept. He writes in his journal:—"Lord Canning offered me the Mysore appointment, saying that he did so because I had a right to have the offer, not because he should be desirous of the secretariat being in other hands; that my proper place would have been the council or a lieutenant-governorship; that my present post led to both; and that Mysore was out of the way and of sight, &c." Under these circumstances my father at once refused the appointment, saying that he considered the Foreign Secretaryship superior to anything of the kind, and Lord Canning entirely approved of his choice. Not long afterwards he similarly

refused the Residency at Hyderabad, perhaps the most important political post in India, which would have added some £1,200 a year to his pay.

Almost immediately after the Governor-General's return from the Northern Provinces all India was startled by the news of Lady Canning's death. During the five years that she had been in the country Lady Canning had gained the admiration and love of all who had come under the spell of her gracious presence, and watched the calm courage with which she confronted the dangers and difficulties of that troubled time. To my father she had from the first been a warm and constant friend, and on his return to India her unassuming kindness to his wife and daughters had completely won his heart. He was deeply shocked and distressed by her death, and in after life he never could speak of her without emotion. She was buried in the park at Barrackpore, at a beautiful spot close to the river bank, which during her lifetime she had specially loved. I find him writing from there one Sunday afternoon in November, 1862:—"To-day I have made a couple of sketches of Lady Canning's grave. The view I wanted to have taken I could not; there being too much wood and vegetation around. The last time we were here was when Lady Canning was the pervading spirit of the place; and it was sad to think how completely all is now changed. I miss her continually, and the whole place looks as if without its mistress." Before this letter was written, Lord Canning was also gone; but in India at least his loss was never felt as hers was; and to this day, among those who were privileged to know her, her memory is cherished with an abiding warmth of affection, which is the best testimony to the beauty and nobility of her character. She had suffered much, and her face bore the impress of a lifelong sorrow; but she had done her duty to her husband and to her country as few women would have done it, and she was mourned as few women have been mourned. Men spoke with wonder and pity of the terrible cry of anguish which the news of her death had wrung from the cold proud nature of Lord Canning, but in truth there was little room for wonder. He would have been more or less than human if the loss of such a wife had not, for a time at least, broken down his hard reserve.

During the remainder of the year 1861 my father remained in Calcutta, working in particular at the very important question of the adoption of successors by Native chiefs. Owing to a variety of causes the failure of lineal heirs in the ruling families of

Native States is exceedingly common; and if advantage had been taken of every such failure to declare a State escheated to the Crown, the feudatory principalities of India would now be few. Under Lord Dalhousie the British Government had shown a strong inclination towards a policy of this nature; and the chiefs had been greatly alarmed for the extinction of their houses and States. Lord Canning perceived this fact very clearly, and realized the danger which it involved. He determined, therefore, to reassure the chiefs by every means in his power, and especially to grant them the priceless right of continuing their States, on failure of lineal heirs, by adoption or nomination. Accordingly, in 1862, almost all ruling chiefs received sunnuds or warrants, under the signature of the Viceroy, which ran as follows:—

"Her Majesty being desirous that the Governments of the several Princes and Chiefs of India who now govern their own territories should be perpetuated, and that the representation and dignity of their houses should be continued, I hereby, in fulfilment of this desire, convey to you the assurance that, on failure of natural heirs, the adoption by yourself and future rulers of your State of a successor according to Hindu law and the customs of your race will be recognized and confirmed.

"Be assured that nothing shall disturb the engagement thus made to you so long as your house is loyal to the Crown and faithful to the condition of the treaties, grants, or engagements, which record its obligations to the British Government."*

The issue of these sunnuds, which my father worked out in communication with the Governor-General, formed a new starting-point in the history of our feudatory policy. Henceforth every Native chief has the power, whether childless or not, of perpetuating his State and name. It is impossible to imagine a more complete and binding renunciation of any desire on the part of the British Government for the acquisition of fresh territory in India, or to overestimate the effect of such a declaration of policy upon the minds of the chiefs. From this time they felt that they were safe, and with a thorough confidence in our intentions, it may be hoped that there has arisen a very general interest in the maintenance of our power. The promise contained in Lord Canning's sunnuds has since at times been con-

* Of course the form differed slightly for Mahomedan Chiefs. In their case it was announced that on failure of natural heirs "any succession to the Government of your State which may be legitimate according to Mahomedan law" would be upheld.

strued in a wider sense than he intended; and relying on the principle involved rather than on the promise itself, some Native chiefs have neglected to exercise the power conferred upon them. This is in some respects unfortunate, for the due exercise of the power of adoption is very useful in preventing the troubles and intrigues of a disputed succession; but it is difficult to check the mischief without doing harm, and the matter need not be considered here. The grant of the privilege which the sunnuds announced was a wise and statesmanlike measure, which no one will repent who has studied the history of the British rule in India.

The year 1862 opened gloomily for all. In England the death of the Prince Consort and the apparent certainty of war with the Northern States of America had caused widespread depression: and in India the shadow caused by Lady Canning's death had not yet passed away. To my father the opening months of the year were peculiarly sad, for in February another blind child was born, and he felt the blow most grievously.

At this time he was watching with interest the working of the new experiment under which Native members had been appointed to the legislative council of the Governor-General. Like all experiments of the kind in India, this measure was at first productive of some curious anomalies, and was not understood by the selected councillors or by the native public. Those members who were ruling chiefs were adjudged to have lost dignity by being associated with Sir Dinkur Rao, one of the most distinguished ministers India has produced, but not in his own right the ruler of a State. One member of council made the length of his attendance depend upon the advice of his astrologers, and was anxious to get his term of duty over in order to make a pilgrimage to Juggernath. The thing in fact was an exotic, and it did not at once strike vigorous root or promise a very satisfactory result. Nevertheless my father always felt that the principle which had led to the measure was in itself a right one, and that a great deal was to be gained by studying the opinions of men who understood native feeling and modes of thought as Englishmen could never hope to do, however much those opinions might clash with our own. For example, he attached much weight to Dinkur Rao's views upon taxation. Some of the minister's suggestions, he wrote to Lord Stanley, were crude enough from the European point of view, "yet, the ideas which form the groundwork of his propositions, *viz.*, that indirect taxation is more

popular in India than direct taxes, that the income-tax is odious and a failure, and that luxuries should be taxed and the salt duty lowered, are put clearly enough; as also his horror of a complicated system of taxation like that of stamps, which hampers all the ordinary transactions of business. As he expresses it—'They are requested to buy stamps in every transaction of life, and at every step of every proceeding,' neglect exposing them to penalties of different kinds, and yet scarce any of them having the opportunity to master the Stamp Act. His paper suggests more than it actually says, and though his remedies, *viz.*, taxes on tobacco, betel, and on stamping cotton, won't place him on a very high pedestal in the opinion of Indian financiers, yet few know better than himself where the natives feel the sorest with respect to the British system of taxation."

It was in this spirit that he always dealt with natives of India, trying to enter into their modes of thought, and to take advantage of their knowledge and experience. From Dinkur Rao especially he learnt much, and he was never tired of his conversations with this astute Deccanee Brahmin, who knew more of Native States and Native feeling generally, and could talk more shrewdly on the subject, than any man of his acquaintance. Sir Dinkur Rao is still alive, and he has repeatedly expressed to myself and to others his sense of my father's keen interest in native thought, and of his good-will towards the chiefs and people of India.

Before Lord Canning left India my father took an opportunity of asking whether there was any truth in one of the reasons advanced for his being refused the K.C.B. two years before, namely, that Lord Canning's private key to his despatches had omitted my father's name. Lord Canning told him that there was not a word of truth in the statement; and my father so informed one or two of his friends in the Secretary of State's Council who had urged him to make a push in the matter. "I assured him," he wrote to Sir John Lawrence, "that I never believed it had, for that every one saw the real reason. Where subservience is the path to honorary distinctions I fear that my chance is small, and having learnt on that occasion that subservience, and not service, was the qualification for the spurs, I have never dreamt of again mooting the question. I only asked Lord Canning because something he said gave me the opportunity of ascertaining, without forcing on the subject, whether the 'private key' was a bar or not to myself, and he absolutely denied that it was, which was all I cared to know."

On the 12th of March Lord Elgin was sworn in, and my father's connection with Lord Canning came to an end. He had formed, as was natural, a high opinion of the retiring viceroy. Lord Canning was, he thought, somewhat wanting in originality and slow in arriving at a decision; but, on the other hand, my father admired the firmness and courage which he had shown in time of trouble, his "magnanimity and justice," and the loftiness of his aims. Lord Canning's thorough independence also greatly impressed him; and he considered that, when given time, Lord Canning's judgment was as a rule remarkably sound. Lord Elgin was a completely different character, but my father's first impressions of him were exceedingly favourable. He said there was a dash of self-sufficiency about the new Governor-General, "as there was in Lord Ellenborough," but that in other respects he had few faults. On the 20th of May, after Lord Elgin had been more than two months in India, my father wrote to one of his former colleagues of the Indian Council:—

"Lord Elgin gets through work rapidly, and is not fond of long writing himself, which is all in favour of despatch of work.

"Lord Canning has by this time been welcomed to England by a reception which must prove gratifying to him. He and Lord Elgin are very different men in every way, and the contrast often amuses me. Lord Elgin appears to me to know how to manage his Council very well; so did Lord Canning, but the way of doing so is as different as possible. Lord Elgin has had more to do with men, and colonial governments, and he has an easier and less stately mode of transacting the Council business. He is quicker in his decisions than Lord Canning, and does not elaborate a subject so minutely and indefatigably; but he seizes the main points of a matter, and has a good deal of the practical acumen which experience in affairs and men can alone give. He pays much less attention than did Lord Canning to the expressions used in his orders or notes; these are usually concise and to the point, and in as few words as possible. When he chooses, however, he can pen things at greater length, and with a perspicuity which shows thought, that the subject has been well thought over before putting pen to paper. Though a man who would not run counter to those above him, and might not perhaps be as independent as Lord Canning in his views when they touched those of the home authorities, Lord Elgin is, I think, a bold man, and his opinions sound and practical when free and unbiassed by considerations which he is too canny a Scot to put aside. He will, I think, make

a very good Governor-General; and if troubles arose, and the responsibility of decision and action came upon him, he would, unless I am much mistaken, come out uncommonly well, and add much to his fame. I see as few faults in him as were in Lord Canning; each have their faults, as we all have, but the ministry have, I am confident, given India a good Governor-General."

This opinion in the main my father entertained to the end, though he had once or twice differences of opinion with Lord Elgin which ended rather disagreeably. The latter at times permitted himself to say things which needlessly hurt the feelings of those about him. He had laid up for himself a fund of unpopularity in India by his sneer at the "blanched cheeks" of the Calcutta public in 1857. In the same way he did not shrink from expressing very plainly, in the midst of a community where the military element is strong, his dislike to the army and his low opinion of military men in general. His view was that they were too cautious, and always raised difficulties; and he used to say that in China whenever he wanted anything done which required pluck, he sent a civilian. This was touching my father on his tenderest point, for he would not stand a sneer at the cloth from any man on earth; and any remarks of the kind on the Governor-General's part were certain to elicit a pointed reply. On the 30th of March, 1863, for example, he writes in his journal:—"With Lord Elgin at 1.30 P.M. Had some sharp words with regard to his remarks on military men." However, Lord Elgin had sufficient magnanimity to overlook any such differences of opinion, and on the whole their relations were pleasant and even cordial.

During the whole of 1862 the Government of India remained in Calcutta. There was not very much going on, so far as the Foreign Office was concerned, except that Afghanistan was passing through one of its periodical phases of disorder and bloodshed. In April my father wrote to Sir Charles Mills:—

"Lord Elgin will, I fear, have the question of a trans-Indus policy forced upon his attention. The Herat ruler has taken Furrah, and Dost Mahomed's lieutenants have fallen back on Girishk, on the Helmund, to cover Candahar. There may be many vicissitudes in this Afghan struggle, and our wise course would seem to await in quiet strength the further development of these conflicts for countries not worth the holding; but I don't know how the Home Government may view matters, and what line they will take when their minister at Teheran reports, as he will probably

do, the threatened advance of the Perso-Herat frontier to Candahar."

Three months later he writes again on the subject, this time to Sir John Lawrence:—

"I was greatly in hopes that the Home Government would not have ordered any intervention in the contest now going on between Dost Mahomed and Sultan Jan, and would at the same time have discountenanced any pretensions of Persia to be the arbiter of the question whether Furrah belonged to Herat or not. It appears to me, however, that acting on the representations of the Persian *employés*, and on the dicta of Persia, the Home Government are forgetting that Furrah has been in the hands of Candahar and Cabul ever since Yar Mahomed died, that is since 1852; and that at all times Furrah has for long centuries been a bone of contention, those holding it who, for the time, could manage to take it. The injunction to dissuade the Ameer from hostile movements against Herat territory, including therein Furrah, came rather too late, as Furrah was already closely besieged by the advanced corps of the Afghans, and if the Dost take it, he will do so before anything from hence could reach him. We may be able to advise him against giving Persia umbrage by an attack on Herat, but if we do so, he will probably act as may seem to his advantage at the moment; if exhausted by the attack on Furrah, he will make our interference a convenient excuse for refraining from a march of 140 miles north with a serious siege at the end of it; but if he feels strong enough to take Herat, he will probably reply that Sultan Jan attacked him, and threatened Candahar after seizing Furrah, and will demand whether the treaty with Persia means impunity to Herat whatever provocations its ruler may give to the other Afghan States.

"That Treaty of Peace signed at Paris is about as loose and vague a production as can be drawn up by any tyro at treaty-making, and probably the Home Government felt hampered and forced to do something; but as Herat had been the aggressor, and the Ameer was only acting to repel invasion, and as neither the Dost nor Sultan Jan had trespassed on Persian territory, our minister at Teheran should have pointed out to Ferookh Khan that Persia was positively infringing the treaty by seeking to interfere, or to find a pretext for intervention, when no cause of difference between itself and either Herat or Cabul had arisen. As it is, the effect of the treaty according to the Persian construction accepted by Alison, is to bind us to interfere at the discretion

of Persia; and if our 'good offices' fail under such peculiar circumstances, as must, ten to one, prove the result, then our failure affords Persia a pretext for armed intervention. If this is the scope of the treaty, we have made an exceedingly stupid use of our war with Persia. The Dost asked us for nothing, was attacked, and proceeds to thrust back the aggressor, a protégé of Persia; with what face can we ask the Ameer to respect the territory of his invader? I should leave them alone, and should point out to the Home Government that Alison and Persia read the treaty through Persian, not English spectacles."

The end of the matter was that Dost Mahomed stormed Herat some months later, and that our intervention became unnecessary.

I extract from the same letter to Sir John Lawrence a passage showing my father's opinion upon a much debated question to which he had given a good deal of attention and thought, the expediency of an income-tax in India. He had, from the first, when a member of the Secretary of State's Council at home, been disposed to view such a tax with disfavour; and he had been confirmed in this opinion by the result of many conversations with natives, and by watching the measure in operation. He now wrote:—

"So Laing and Sir C. Wood are at loggerheads again, and instead of a surplus we have a deficit. I am sorry for it, as the sooner we can be rid of the income-tax the better for our rule. Practically it works even worse than I predicted, and is loathed by the people of all classes. For corruption and knavery it beats all that has preceded; in application it is worked very arbitrarily, and appeals to overworked collectors are moonshine. . . . . But I was rather astonished to learn that in Calcutta income-tax is levied on prostitutes, whilst in the mofussil it is in some places levied on the illicit profits of the omlahs, who are taxed not on their salaries, or legitimate receipts, but on their supposed success in extortion. Both instances seem carrying matters rather far, and not quite according to Exeter Hall principles."

In the same sense he writes to Lord Stanley a few weeks later:—"Here, in India, the Press are all on Mr. Laing's side in his budget dispute with Sir Charles Wood. Laing certainly speaks the truth as to the income-tax of Wilson's imposition being a failure; but it is worse than that, and for the sake of our hold on the people of India it cannot be too soon taken off. It is working great disgust to little countervailing financial advantage."

This was, in fact, the view he held to the end of his life. Though he more than once acquiesced in the necessity for the im-

position of an income-tax, he regarded it as thoroughly unsuitable to India, and to be justified on the plea of necessity alone.

In the course of this year my father found himself obliged to protest against the tone which was being assumed by some of the Native chiefs in the Punjab and elsewhere in their dealings with the British Government. Lord Canning's exceedingly liberal treatment of them, and the lavish rewards which they had received for services rendered in the mutiny, were entirely in accordance with my father's suggestions and his opinion of what was right and politic. But Lord Canning's policy undoubtedly had the effect of turning some of the least firmly balanced heads among them; and a few of them early showed signs of greatly over-estimating their own services and importance. The tendency was encouraged by some of the local officials, who began at this time to write of even secondary chiefs as "kings," and to treat them in a novel and very injudicious manner. In more than one Native court the adoption sunnuds were covertly resented, as involving a declaration of supremacy; and the larger chiefs began to encroach openly upon the rights and possessions of their weaker neighbours, and to claim something very like a position of equality with the British Crown. Against all this my father set his face. One of the Central India chiefs wished to write to Her Majesty as her "affectionate friend and ally," and my father objected to this "*egalité fraternité* style of subscription." "Your Excellency, however," he wrote to Lord Elgin, "is better versed in what would be a becoming and suitable mode for the Native princes, subjects of Her Majesty, to subscribe themselves than I am. I only judge with reference to Her Majesty now holding the position of the Emperor of Hindustan, and the reverential and humble manner in which those Native chiefs, acknowledging the supremacy of the emperors, would have addressed them. Scindia and Holkar were never kings; they were feudatories of the Peishwa, and acknowledged both his suzerainty and also the sovereignty and supremacy of the emperors. Both were subjects of the Company with respect to their Deccan possessions."

Not long afterwards he writes to Lord Stanley:—

"Davidson's death at Hyderabad leaves that important post to be filled up. So long as I am Secretary I shall do my best to uphold the policy of Lord Canning to Native chiefs, which, in fact, is nothing else but a reversion to the policy which preceded Lord Dalhousie's administration. I think, however, that Sir C. Wood is disposed to put a wrong construction on Lord Canning's policy

and to be misled by Sir R. Hamilton. It was never Lord Canning's policy to allow any infringement of the treaties of 1818-20 in Central India with the view of countenancing the propensities of Holkar and Scindia to absorb the old Rajput and Mahomedan aristocracies of Malwa. He knew better than with one hand to create and support Native aristocracies in the Punjab and Oudh, and with the other to permit those having agreements with us to be crushed in Central India. If I were designing the early extinction of Scindia and Holkar, I should give them rope enough in this direction; and before ten years were over, or even five, their territories would be convulsed and our *disinterested* interference necessary; but you may depend upon my doing my duty so long as I remain here with respect to Native chiefs, great and small, and on my protecting them against shortsighted friends, or, what is far less dangerous, open enemies."

He adds in a later letter:—

"It is curious to contrast the conduct of the Native chiefs with our own. . . . . Whilst the policy of the day is for the British Government to form and support Native aristocracies, that of the leading Native chiefs is to gobble up all the small fry whenever they can find or invent an excuse for so doing." However, this inclination received an effective check. His knowledge of the history and circumstances of the Native States, especially in Central India, and of our dealings towards them, enabled him clearly to realize what was going on, and to expose improper pretensions; and in the course of the next two or three years the Native chiefs learned to understand that, with every consideration for their legitimate claims and interests, he was not to be tricked or trifled with. To the loyal and well-intentioned majority the knowledge was grateful. If it was unpalatable to some, they had only themselves to blame.

In the beginning of 1863 it was evident that Lord Elgin was beginning to suffer from the effects of the climate of India, always quick enough in searching out the weak points of a man who first faces it at his age. He had found in the summer of 1862, and he found again in the following spring, that he gained considerable benefit from trips to Bhaugulpore, a station on the bank of the Ganges, some 250 miles from Calcutta. Bhaugulpore is one of the favourite districts in Bengal. Lying between Bengal proper and the North-Western Provinces, it is in great measure free both from the damp oppressive heat of Calcutta, and from the fierce sirocco blasts of the north of India; and the station itself is

pretty, built on rolling ground, and close to the river side. But Lord Elgin required something more bracing to restore his strength; and in the beginning of the year it was settled that the coming hot weather should be spent in the Himalayas.

In the meantime my father had made some firm friends in Calcutta. The two names I find most frequently in his journals are those of Fayrer and Maine, and in course of time he became very intimate with both of them. Dr. Fayrer* was a medical man of distinction, who had done good service during the siege of Lucknow, and was now holding an appointment at the presidency, where my father had made his acqaintance four years before. My father had always taken a keen interest in medical and surgical work, which may have had something to do with strengthening the intimacy; but he found in Fayrer a great deal that was attractive besides professional talent, and at this period of his life they were much together. Sir Henry Maine was then the legal member of the Governor-General's Council. Of his writings it is unnecessary to speak; and his wide knowledge and powers of conversation made him a very pleasant companion. During his term of office in Council, India owed much to his ability and the soundness of his judgment, displayed not only in his own particular line, but in the general work of the administration. During 1863 the most effective counterpoise to the financial vagaries of Sir Charles Trevelyan was to be found in Maine's clear head and cool good sense; and the services which he rendered were in many other respects of exceptional value.

The quiet which had lasted throughout 1862 seemed likely to continue in 1863. The year opened with a petty war against the savages in the Jyntcah hills, and rumours of Dutch encroachment in the Straits were becoming frequent; but there was nothing which threatened material danger to the peace of India, and in the meantime we had been successfully negotiating with the Court of Burmah for the ratification of a commercial treaty which was to open up the Irrawaddy to British trade, and bring the south of China into connection with Rangoon. The only matters which my father then regarded as involving any prospect of difficulty were a proposed mission to Bhutan, and another to the northern provinces of Siam. "The power and authority of such States," he wrote to Lord Stanley, "is something just at the capital, and becomes more and more evanescent at the frontiers,

* Now Sir Joseph Fayrer, K.C.S.I.

which is exactly the point where, coming into contact and conflict with our rule, they had need to be strong in the ability of controlling their subordinates. Our officers in Assam and on the Tenasserim coasts are pressing for missions to Bhutan on the one hand, and Zimmay on the other; but I am very sceptical of any permanent results from such missions, and they sometimes lead to embarrassment."

On the 5th of February my father started for Benares, where Lord Elgin was to hold a durbar; and from there the Governor-General's party went on to Agra, where there was, as usual on these occasions, a state entry and a gathering of the Native chiefs. The ceremonies were not in any way of peculiar interest, but they gave Lord Elgin an opportunity of seeing something of India, and of our feudatories. "As there was no special reason for calling these durbars," my father wrote to Lord Stanley, "except the progress of the Governor-General to the North-Western Provinces, there was of course very little to say except the usual wholesome generalities. At Cawnpore *the* Well and its Memorial were consecrated, and at Agra the meeting of chiefs was the largest yet held. There was, of course, some push about precedence, but all acquiesced in the position assigned to them. . . . . For good sense and unconventional conduct, with a dash of sincerity, the Begum of Bhopal was pre-eminently the most interesting chief present, by far the most politic and best man of business in the country."

From Agra the Governor-General's camp marched up to Delhi, and my father had an opportunity of going carefully over the military position of 1857 under the guidance of Colonel Norman,* who had served during the famous siege. Between Delhi and Umballa the road lay through ground which he knew well, and he examined with much interest the progress of the canal works upon which he had been employed thirty years before. At Dadoopore, Colvin's "cottage" was still standing, and he found still lying there a mass of fossils which he and the other members of the canal staff of 1834 had gathered in the Sewaliks. On the 7th of April he was in Simla.

As the summer wore on the state of affairs to the westward became less satisfactory. Dost Mahomed took Herat, but died immediately afterwards, leaving his sons to fight for power in Afghanistan—a state of things which always involved some risk

* General Sir Henry Norman, K.C.B.

of Persian interference and consequent trouble. At the same time Beluchistan fell into complete anarchy and disorder; and Persia began to threaten the possessions of Muscat; while immediately beyond the Indus a colony of Mahomedan fanatics from Hindustan began to assume a threatening attitude and to stir up against us the neighbouring hill tribes. There was for the time no actual aggression; but it seemed hardly possible that we could long avoid coercing them, and the prospect, though not alarming, was somewhat serious, for these frontier troubles are apt to end in a combination of tribes and to assume considerable proportions. Moreover, my father felt that we were wholly unprepared for war. In July he wrote to Lord Stanley:—

"It is fortunate we are at peace, and I sincerely hope that we remain so, for nothing can be worse than the present condition of army matters. The staff corps is an absurdity, an injustice, and a failure so far as the Royal army is concerned, who won't have anything to say to it. Sir Hugh Rose complains that his Native troops are so harassed and overworked, that the sepoys are taking their discharge to an alarming extent; and he throws the blame upon the heavy reduction of police, which is left not strong enough to fulfil escort and other duties. When the Native army was reduced to its present strength, the police was to discharge a large part, in fact all such duties. Whether the unusual dislike of the sepoys to the service is due to this cause, or to others which could be mentioned, the fact is indubitable. But I was a good deal struck by a reference from the Military Department to the Foreign Department in which some Sikh native officers, who have done meritorious service and been continued in employment with a promise that on honourable retirement small jagir grants of lands would be made them, pressed that sunnuds should be given them in anticipation; and assigned as a reason for this request that the way in which the European officers of the army had been treated made them afraid that the promises made to them might not be fulfilled. This was plain speaking, at any rate. Such speeches are not made by Native officers unless very strongly entertained by the whole body. There has, I think, been a great want of practical wisdom in carrying out the "amalgamation." The desire to force on the new order of things without much care as to how far the rights and expectations of men were trampled upon was not judicious. What surprises me is that the very officers in whose interests all this was done, namely, Queen's officers of the regular army, speak just as ill of this

whole business as do the late Company's officers. I do not know why, but the hatred of the Natives to the officers of the Queen's regiments, and all now are Queen's, is greater than ever. I am not much astonished at the tone of the European officers, when I hear what some of the general officers here say of India. The mass of officers will take their tone from their superiors; and when that tone is in contempt of everything in and connected with India, it will be echoed by the many who follow the cue given them by their seniors. At the same time, bearing in mind what a bore everything Indian is considered in England, it cannot be matter of wonder that general officers sent out by the Horse Guards to make a purse on the staff out here, and as deeply imbued with the idea that everything Indian is a bore and a nuisance as are their friends at home, should seem to have no other interest in their duties or the country than the amount they can save whilst in India, not the highest possible view to take of their calling."

During this time my father's letter-books are very voluminous, and represent an immense amount of daily labour. In India, as probably elsewhere, private, or as it is called here, "demi-official" correspondence, is very necessary to supplement official letters; and the Foreign Secretary, especially if he is personally acquainted with the Native States and the officers of the political department, has a great deal of his time taken up in this way. My father's books show many hundreds of letters written about this period to the various political authorities and other officials upon matters of current business. These books, however, do not contain very much of general interest; and it is rather from his correspondence with persons in England that his views on general questions are to be gathered. With Lord Stanley in particular he kept up a close and interesting correspondence. His old chief, Lord Ellenborough, was now advanced in years, and had to some extent lost touch of contemporary Indian affairs; but Lord Stanley was well up in the subject, and was an appreciative correspondent. I quote from a letter of the 27th June the following passage regarding a point upon which Lord Stanley had touched, and which at the time was creating some discussion:—

"This brings me to another question, viz., whether there is any prospect of Lord Elgin taking up the subject of a change of the seat of government. Trevelyan at one of his first sittings in the Council brought the question forward in a desultory way, but at great length, and ended by proposing some site in Central

India, though he could not exactly say where. Except in this form I am not aware of Lord Elgin having had the question formally in consideration. It is a very grave one from every point of view. Calcutta is certainly far from an agreeable climate, though better in my opinion than many others in India. As the seat of government it has the advantage of being in easy and safe communication with the sea; of being amid a quiet and inoffensive people, and equally secure from external and internal foes; and of being in the richest province in India, and thus commanding resources which would enable us to recover India from Bengal as our base if, as in 1857, we were elsewhere temporarily overpowered. Bombay might perhaps be made as secure from insult, and its proximity to England is a great advantage; but it is in a poor province, and too remote from the great Gangetic plains, the hold and control of which is the empire of India. To place the seat of government anywhere in Central India on the Nerbudda is absurd. Perhaps the best plan would be to regard Calcutta as the permanent head-quarters of the Government of India, but to facilitate the latter being, what the last act evidently contemplates, peripatetic. With this object in view there should be suitable accommodation for a Governor-General at other places than Calcutta. Agra might be one, Simla another, the Neilgherries or Mahableshwar a third. When railways are completed, as in four or five years they ought to be, there should be no difficulty in the movement of a Governor-General. Camps and their great expense would usually be avoided, being unnecessary except when it became advisable for a Governor-General to visit tracts untraversed by railways; this could seldom be the case. All the requirements would be met by having three, or at the most four, well-selected points in the empire where suitable accommodation existed, so that he should never feel shackled by minor considerations; costly palaces would not be necessary, but it ought to be good and suitable accommodation. The expenditure on their construction would be saved in camps, and the enormous cost of moving the seat of government bodily would be avoided."

About the same time he writes to Mr. Maine on the very difficult question of our social relations with the natives of India:

"Your remarks as to the difficulty of gaining any real acquaintance with the actual every-day habits and ideas of the natives are very just. The difficulty arises from various causes; but where there is no social intercourse there can be no real knowledge of a people; and social intercourse is well-nigh impracticable, so

antagonistic are English and Native modes of thought and feeling. There is no sympathy, no common ground on which the two races meet; and the native, whether Moslem or Hindoo, is always reserved and on his guard with a European functionary, civil or military. It takes far longer to gain their ordinary confidence than the chop and change of the service usually allows to any European. Missionaries are stationary, live among them, are not feared, not courted, and enter into discussions with them which an official cannot touch upon without danger of misrepresentation; very few officials see anything but the surface, the under currents of thought and feeling are a sealed book to them. We are, in fact, on the surface of those millions; and have no root in the acquiescence, let alone the affections, of the people. How can it be otherwise when every bond of humanity, language, thought, religion, manners and habits, colour, physical attributes and constitution, instead of tending to favour the gravitation of the races to each other, operates as a repellant force? They neither understand us, nor we them. It would be a step gained if they understood us, but that they are very far from doing; they cannot but view us as we do them, through the coloured media of their own mental optics. What the solvent may be that shall alter this state of matters, if indeed it is to alter, remains to be seen. I am convinced that the change must be something radical which can bring into tolerable harmony the antagonism at every point which now bristles between the races. Christianity might be the solvent if the pre-occupation of the mental territory by the deism of the Moslem, and the polytheism of the Hindoo, were likely to be temporary and pass away; for Christianity would subvert pretty nearly all that forms the insuperable bar between the races; but even then much would remain which, though not insuperable, is next door to it. Colour alone is a bar, climate is a patent one. Our peculiar English prejudice in favour of everything English is another. We are pretty nearly as stereotyped and unelastic in our ways as they are in theirs. Dr. Duff knows a good deal of the natives. . . . . Our political officers are seldom seen in Calcutta; but among them men occur who have had considerable opportunities of becoming acquainted with natives, and have made use of their opportunities. But among other things it must be rembered that natives differ much; in Bengal, Hindustan, and the Punjab, you deal with distinct peoples. As a rule, you will find not only that the missionaries know the people better than any one else, but know and can use the languages better than the

oldest and ablest officials. A phenomenon which I attribute to the intercourse of officials being limited to an official vocabulary, whether legal or fiscal; whereas the missionary, in order to deal with the subjects which he must discuss, must command a far larger and higher and finer range of language than suffices for the cutcherry. The consequence is that a missionary of a very few years' residence in the country is often a better linguist than an official of four times longer residence."

On the 19th of October, 1863, my father left Simla for Lahore, to which place Lord Elgin was also making his way by a different route, beginning with a march through the hills. It was the Governor-General's intention to assemble his council at Lahore for a short legislative session, and to proceed himself to Peshawur, in order to be close to the frontier. The Sittana fanatics had by this time gone from threats to acts of aggression; and their coercion having become absolutely necessary, a force had been assembled under the command of Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain to break up this hornets' nest, and free our border from the annoyance which they were causing.

Unhappily Lord Elgin was not destined to carry out his views. A week after my father left Simla he heard that the Governor-General was seriously ill; and for the next month he remained encamped at Lahore, receiving daily more and more unfavourable accounts, which very soon became hopeless. It was in every way a most untimely calamity; for Chamberlain had been met by a formidable combination and could hardly hold his own, and it seemed probable that the border might catch flame from end to end. The temporary paralysis of government at this juncture could not fail to have a serious effect, more particularly from the fact that Lord Elgin's measures for the coercion of the Sittana fanatics were disapproved by the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities in general, who were in favour of a regular campaign on a large scale. "I feel much afloat as to our future," my father wrote on the 30th of October. "Work is at a dead stand, and I am forced to do all sorts of things on my own responsibility without really having authority for what I do." India, in fact, was being governed by the secretaries, none of whom were with Lord Elgin; and it was very undesirable that this state of things should continue or become generally known. However, it was not to continue long. On the 20th of November my father writes to Mrs. Durand:—

"Yesterday Lord Elgin retained perfect consciousness, and in

the morning gave his orders as to what he wished written by this mail to Sir C. Wood. He also desired Thurlow* to convey to me, in my private capacity, the expression of 'his last affectionate farewell.' Thurlow says, 'These were his own words, which he made me repeat to him, as a proof that I had heard correctly.' Thurlow also adds, that Lord Elgin dictated some days ago a farewell letter to his colleagues in council and to the Secretaries to the Government of India, which he signed, and which, as soon as all is over, Thurlow is to send me a copy of for official communication to those to whom it is addressed. The original is to be *handed* to Sir R. Napier. . . . . ."

On the same day Lord Elgin died. My father sincerely regretted his loss. "Lady Elgin," he wrote, "has probably the only real comfort, of a sustaining religion. . . . All admire her conduct, and write very warmly about her. She will meet with all attention and sympathy from them and everybody else—poor woman." And not long afterwards his feelings as to Lord Elgin's death were expressed in a letter from which I extract the following passages :—

"I had hoped that it would have been otherwise, and that India would for a far longer period have had the advantage of the experience in affairs, and of the wisdom in their conduct, which marked the administration of Lord Elgin. His rule promised to be the viceroyalty under which much that is new in the government, and which has to take form and stability, would have received a practical inauguration; the rule under which, after the disturbing causes of 1857–58 had happily quieted down, much that is indefinite and in a transition state would have crystallized into shape; and under his sound sense and vigiliant caution would have done so in a right direction, both as respects the rights and status of the people in this country, and as regards the power and control of England. Had Lord Elgin been spared, he was eminently qualified for presiding over the administration at a period which must be contemplated as the seed-time of our future India, and therefore a most important period. Though not one of conquests and accessions of territory, it is one of consolidation and of progress; and Lord Elgin's just appreciation of the point which India has reached, and of her future requirements, would have laid a good foundation by the adoption of measures thoughtfully and carefully adapted to India's present and future necessities, and by a policy having consistently for its aim peace and economy. All this is, so

* Lord Elgin's Private Secretary.

far as Lord Elgin is concerned, cut short, and Her Majesty's Government will quickly enough feel the nature of the loss caused by this sudden and unlooked-for event. I told Sir Charles Wood he had sent out a very good Governor-General; I have had to tell him, and I am sorry indeed it should be so, that the Viceroy is no more, and that I trust whoever is selected by Her Majesty may be ordered to maintain the policy and carry out the measures of Lord Elgin.

* * * * *

"I regret it from a private point of view, as well as a public; for personally there was a great satisfaction in being in constant intercourse with a superior who, in the despatch of business, was ever ready, quick, and of perfect temper, and thus rendered the discharge of duty a pleasure."

In the meantime my father had done what he could to ensure that Lord Elgin's policy and proposed measures should not be affected by Lord Elgin's death. To this point he attached much importance; and he took upon himself to write strongly on the subject, both to Sir Charles Wood and to Sir William Denison, the Governor of Madras, who had been appointed provisionally to the viceroyalty. The following is an extract from his letter to Sir William Denison:—

"Lord Elgin had made arrangements for assembling his council for purposes of legislation at Lahore in January next, in accordance with the provisions (section 9) of the Indian Councils Act of 1861. He contemplated installing the Maharajahs of Jhind and Jeypore as Knights of the Star of India, also opening the Punjab Exhibition; but of still more importance than all these in reality was the control of the military operations now in course of execution against the Sittana fanatics on the Indus-Hazarah frontier. . . . . .

"I am myself very strongly of opinion that the death of even a Governor-General should not be allowed to affect the course which the Government of India had determined upon. It is exceedingly inexpedient that in these parts, or indeed anywhere in India, the march of the administration should appear to depend on the life of any one man, even the Viceroy's. . . . . Moreover, it is far from impossible that unless the Governor-General be on the spot to control affairs in this quarter the sphere of military operations may be extended to a much more serious expanse than was intended or is desirable. I am, therefore, of opinion that there should be no departure from the original arrangements; and that conse-

quently the Governor-General in office, even though he may only prove to be temporarily so, should lose no time in making his way to the Punjab."

My father's views, however, did not find favour in Calcutta; for on his arrival at the end of November, in obedience to a summons from headquarters, he found Sir William Denison strongly opposed to Lord Elgin's measures, and disinclined to move northwards. During the first fortnight of December my father remained in Calcutta, working as he said "from morn to dewy eve," and anxious about the state of affairs on the frontier, where Chamberlain's force had received some severe checks. "One thing," he writes to Lord Stanley, "comes out very remarkably in this petty affair; after what are really only a couple of attacks on piquets by hill tribes, but indifferently armed and ill commanded, Chamberlain is forced to send for an immediate supply of officers. Three are killed and three are wounded, and of course his regiments, on Sir Charles Wood's system, are inefficient; so officers are despatched from hence at a moment's notice to proceed by mail-cart, and drop into regiments, of which they neither know, nor are known by, the men." However, the anxiety was not to last much longer, for on the 16th December a telegram came announcing that our force had advanced and defeated the enemy, and soon afterwards the expedition came to a successful close. But it had cost us severe loss in men and officers, and had not raised our reputation on the frontier.

My father was of course much interested at this time in the question of a successor to the Governor-Generalship. On the 18th November he had written to Lord Stanley:—

"Just now a good administrator is wanted; for although there is nothing in the shape of a crisis, and I trust no probability of such, yet, under the new order of things now arising, the rights and status of the people, European and Native, are crystallizing; and it is all important that in this quiet but transition period, matters should take the right direction and form. I regard the work done or left undone in the next few years as calculated to make a lasting impression, and mould to a certain extent the future of our rule. New codes, new governments, new councils, and a new and more elastic and peripatetic supreme government are barely inaugurated; almost everything has to be licked into shape. Education is a field not touched by a Governor-General for the last six or seven years; everything one looks at is crude and awaits forming. There is ample scope for the action of mind,

the more original the better, if they can only secure the services of some one with mind, strength, and will to do the work."

As time went on his interest in this matter did not diminish. Both on public and private grounds the question was an important one, for he felt that the change came at a very inopportune moment for himself. Not long after reaching Calcutta, he ascertained beyond a doubt what he had before believed to be probable, that Lord Elgin had intended him to succeed Sir Robert Montgomery in the Punjab*; and of course it was probable enough that a new Governor-General might take a different view. "The next man," he wrote to his wife, "may have Sir Herbert Edwardes, or some one else to serve; and I think that with my usual luck of narrowly missing everything worth having it will end in that way." . . . . . "The tussle will not be on my part. I canvass no one; if anything come it will be without solicitation on my part. . . . . I am likely enough to close my career with small cause of gratitude to any in authority. I have never been a courtier, and am not likely to alter my walk in life at this time of day." This was written on the 30th of December. On the following day he heard that Sir John Lawrence had been nominated as Lord Elgin's successor. "I cannot say," he writes, "that I think the appointment a fortunate one for myself. Lawrence is out and out for his Punjab friends, and you may be sure that when Montgomery goes, it will not be myself who steps into the Punjab. . . . . He and I have always been good friends, and all the better that we were on a footing of equality. I am not so sure how this will last when he is the superior. . . . . ." But he was determined that he would not permit any feeling of this kind to interfere with his own discharge of his duty. "Lawrence and I," he writes a little later, "always got on well when we were side by side in council, because there we were both far more independent than most of the others, and our views often agreed. It may be the same here, but we shall be in different relations entirely. There we were equals, and equals often combining against Wood's arbitrary sort of procedure. Here we shall not be equals. I shall not care for that at all, but shall treat him with all the respect and the cordial support that I would have given to Lord Stanley in his place." He adds on the 4th of January:—"To me it has been a year of disappointment out here, and at home. What the next will be

* Believing this to be probable he had, nevertheless, advised Lord Elgin to extend Sir Robert Montgomery's term of office.

remains to be seen; but your love and that of my children is a blessing, and we must work on trustfully and bravely."

During this time my father was alone in Calcutta, and his letters to his wife are full of passages showing how keenly he felt his separation from home and its pleasures. Such letters are the real indication of a man's character, and I shall therefore make no apology for inserting the following extracts:—

23*rd December*.—"How I hate this separation and long to be with you. This writing is such sorry work, yet I take it to be the only real pleasure I have. I am at unrest until I have imparted to you what I have been doing.

25*th December*.—"Christmas morning, but I am so far from all dear to me that it will be anything but a merry day to me. I hope to yourselves and to my darlings in England the day may be a joyous one. Here I am rather sick of the maidán,* the secretary's walk, the band, &c., and I wish heartily that we were all together again at Sheen.

26*th December*.—"As this should reach you on the last day of 1863, I must wish you and all with you a happy wind up of the old year, and a happy beginning of the new. 1864 promises to be hateful to me, however, as being one of solitude and separation, isolation from everything I care for, and that for an indefinite period.

29*th December*.—"The only conclusion I arrive at is that if much longer away from you, I shall have embodied myself in half-anna paper, and that if any one wants a record of so wretched a person, they will have to seek it in a file of half-anna paper big enough to enable me to do suttee."

In the meantime Sir John Lawrence had arrived in India, and on the 13th of January, 1864, my father writes:—

"The *Celerity* having taken a fancy to have one of her boilers out of order, Sir John Lawrence came up in the *Nemesis* and was about an hour overtime . . . . . We nearly came to grief at the Chandpal Ghat, Lord Elgin's horses not admiring the salute from the fort; but after a while they recovered their equanimity, and we reached Government House all safe and right, Sir John Lawrence receiving a very cordial and enthusiastic reception from the assembled multitude, black and white. Our meeting was very friendly, and I had some chat with him. He has not made up his mind as to going up-country, and seems disposed to wait a couple

* An open plain which surrounds Fort William except towards the river.

of months or so in Calcutta, so as to get through the legislative work here, and go up in April."

This was in fact the course adopted, and the government remained in Calcutta until the middle of that month. I quote some further extracts from my father's letters to his wife which show something of his inner life and thoughts during the interval. He was always hard worked, for an Indian secretary's berth is no sinecure, but he found time in the evenings for some reading and writing outside his official duties; and the first letter quoted, though little more than a quotation itself, is indicative of one of his peculiarities, a liking for old writers, whose quaint language and ideas had always a great charm for him.

*Calcutta, 9th January.*—"Extracts from the 'Mirabilia Descripta' of Friar Jordanus, written about 1330:—'In this Turkey be the seven churches to which wrote the blessed John in the Apocalypse, who also ordered a sepulchre to be dug for him in Ephesus, whereinto he entered, and was seen no more. But I will tell one very marvellous thing concerning that excavation, as I heard it from a certain devout religious person who was there, and heard it with his own ears. From time to time is heard there a very loud sound, as of a man snoring, and yet is the sepulchre void.'

"Though having some little experience that men in the body snore, I never had reliable information that spirits snore; please enter the passage in that valuable collection of yours.

"But listen again to Friar Jordanus. Here is the result of all his wanderings in Turkey, greater and lesser India, Cathay, Tartary, &c. 'One general remark I will make in conclusion, to wit, that there is no better land or fairer, no people so honest, no victuals so good and savoury, dress so handsome, or manners so noble, as here in our own christendom; and above all, we have the true faith, though ill it be kept. For, as God is my witness, ten times better Christians, and more charitable withal, be those who he converted by the preaching and minor friars to our faith, than our own folk here, as experience hath taught me.'

"By way of a full and accurate description of a country, take the following:—

"'Here followeth concerning the land of Aran:—Concerning Aran I say nothing at all; seeing that there is nothing worth noting.' So much for Haran of the scriptures. Of India the greater, after giving some curious accounts of sundry things, beginning with the elephant, he remarks, 'What shall I say then?

Even the Devil too there speaketh to men many a time and often in the night season, as I have heard.' Speaking of one of the islands, Sumatra apparently, the good Friar says—'In a certain part of that island they delight to eat white and fat men, when they can get them'—not a bad proviso. But the following was current in this country in his day: 'The pagans of this India have prophecies of their own that we Latins are to subjugate the whole world.' I dare say you have enough of the Friar for to-day; so I conclude with a benedicite."

18*th January.*—"Bare justice, dearest, is not what I have had meted out to me through life. I speak of man, not God. I confess to being more disgusted, if possible, than yourself, at the uncertainties of our position. You know how often I used to tell you how I hated our separation; it was from the dread of the unknown and unforeseen eventualities which experience had taught me to expect in the period we were to be apart, and which yet no human forethought could anticipate. They came thick and heavy, knocking on the head every arrangement and plan. How many more there may be, God alone knows."

21*st January.*—"From Government House I went early, as I had, as a steward, to receive Lawrence, who came to the ball. Of course the ball was most crowded; all new faces but a few, so that I was quite afloat, and not of much use as a steward in presenting people to partners. I left that to younger stewards. I scarcely spoke to any one; and Fayrer came up to me and said, 'Well, Colonel, you do look awfully amused.' He was quite right, the effect of the whole thing was simply very depressing to me. I dare say that if I had got into a talk with any one I liked that would have gone off; a room full of people one don't know is not interesting." . . . . . .

24*th January.*—"You hear everything in my long and frequent letters, which really form a fuller journal of my life than any I have ever kept. Try the experiment of copying one of mine, if you please, in order to compare your 'open ranks' with my 'close order' epistles . . . . . I feel so *restless;* and only make an approach to contentment when I take up a pen to write to you, and am engaged in so doing. The consequence is that the moment I sit at my writing-table, if I don't take up work, I begin a sheet to you, and neglect reading. I went just now to the cathedral, and heard —— preach, of course in his usual style. The finest part of the service was the prayer and singing; though when we were walking out, and the organist struck up a fine stirring piece

of music, I almost felt disposed to think that the best portion, and that, at any rate, it dismissed us from church in good humour, in spite of the sermon.

"I picked up by chance a book which I am reading with the greatest interest, and shall send you when I have done it; it is the autobiography of Lutfullah, a Mahomedan gentleman. . . . . He touches on points that are contrasts between Mahomedan and Christian morals; but it deals with so many places, times, and people I have known, and it is so admirably written, that you would enjoy it; and it gives such an insight into native ways and modes of thought. . . . . .

"You must read the autobiography of Lutfullah right through, it is exactly what I have so often wished to see more of, and could not get. I asked the Bhopal Begum to write her own memoirs, but she either would not, or did not, understand what I wished. One such work gives a better insight into native life than a hundred European accounts. I am only sorry that the editor curtailed the work, and omitted some of the stories, as better suited to Eastern than European tastes. You will be amused with his violent objection to the liberty granted to English women; and the contrast he draws between wedded happiness on the Eastern and on the English system. I was talking with Deo Narain Sing yesterday afternoon about the Hindustani language, and he told me that Lucknow is the place in which it is spoken in the greatest perfection; and that before some Nawab of Lucknow, a friend of his, he was almost afraid to open his mouth. He added that the Muhalah, that is, the Hindustani spoken by the Khannees, or ladies of Lucknow, was quite different from the ordinary man's Hindustani, far more subtile and fine; and that these begums had, in fact, adopted and learned it from the nautch women, who are far the cleverest part of the female sex, and have a command of language, and wit and cleverness in its use, which is one of the secrets of their power and influence over the men. In self-defence, apparently, the begums have had to acquire some of this fluency and piquancy of language, and master its niceties and the skill of using it as an instrument of repartee and badinage. He said that men with several handsome wives are often found entirely in the hands of an ugly black nautch woman, whose arms are really her wit and language; that he could not attempt to spar with them, that they would shut him up, or quiet-going Hindoos like himself, in a trice. . . . . Lutfullah quite suppresses any advertence to such influences as prevalent, unless he

classes them among hand-maidens. It is a munshee's life, but a very interesting one, from its changes and vicissitudes."

31*st January*.—"One month gone of this year, a month of letter-life. A life of letters may be agreeable enough in the customary sense, but it is a tiresome one in my sense. A letter-life such as we are living, exchanging thoughts five days old, and which when they do reach may find the receiver in an unsympathetic mood, is not very joyous under any circumstances. . . . . If ever there be a jar between the tone of a letter of mine, and your own humour and circumstances at the moment, put it down to my want of the clairvoyant faculty, and don't ascribe it to any absence of real sympathy. I say this now, because there is nothing whatever which has led to it, except my own desire that not even by chance should I cause you a shade of regret; though at the same time being sure that you prefer my writing just as I feel at the moment without reserve or cloak, and throwing myself fairly on your heart's generosity, I have not the remotest intention of being more guarded or foreseeing. You must consider yourself as a sort of father-confessor, as I have before told you, before whom I make revelation of everything, fully counting on plenary absolution, however, for all offences."

1*st February*.—"You scarcely realize how I value your concurrence in anything I do. I think I must be of Finnish descent, from the sort of superstitious reverence I have for a wife's advice; they made them diviners . . . . . With me it really arises from the conviction that women's hearts are worth a great deal more than men's heads in real wisdom, which consists more of the heart work than of the head work. Where a matter does not concern myself, your judgment would be accepted by me as almost imperative; where it concerns myself, I make allowance."

9*th February*.—"Lawrence sent off for Dr. Tonnerre yesterday. It was doubtful whether Lawrence would make his appearance at the ball, but he came out, evidently thinking the formal march into the ball-room, headed by A.-D.-C.'s, an intense nuisance and absurdity; spoke and bowed to two or three people, and plunged into the crowd to speak to those he knew, and then walked off quietly to bed. He did not look well."

15*th February*.—"I don't think Lawrence at all strong for work, but if he spend the hot weather and rains in the hills, and the cold weather in Calcutta, he ought to be able to last; for he will be combining two excellent climates. Work, head-work, I don't think he can stand much of, however, and that cannot be

avoided in his position. . . . . I often regret that I ever left Sheen, and that you had not said a word to keep me there; but I must try to be content with the uncertainties and disagreeables of a position which has as yet been very profitless to my family, and, in fact, detrimental to their interests. What in the end it may prove, God alone knows. I wish you were with me; for there is so much in which your advice and wishes are not only a comfort, but a rule to me."

21*st February*.—"This evening I went to the cathedral—the first time I was ever there of an evening. C——— preached, and oh! such a sermon. He took for his text Adam's excuse for eating the apple . . . . . But anything so slow, stupid, and common-place, with a sort of stage effect pauses before bringing out the merest platitudes, I have never heard. Dickens and I were sorely tried. I could have laughed outright, but for God's house being the arena for such witless, solemn humdrum . . . . . The cathedral was very ill filled; and I am not surprised. Thinking, as I honestly do, that no service or form of worship is so really unexceptionable on the whole as that of our Anglican Church is, I do wish there were some way of selecting the clergy. Surely the ministry of God's word is as important (and infinitely more so in verity) as mere worldly callings, yet in these there are tests and selections; why not for the Church? With ——— to mouth and misread the prayers, and ——— to preach, I can understand people going anywhere else in Calcutta but to the cathedral. I can conceive nothing less impressive than what I saw this evening. The life of worship and real solemnity was absent. You will perhaps say it was my own want of true spirituality that gave rise to such feelings. This may be true in part, but only in part, for mentally I craved for more of the life and reality of hearty worship."

6*th March*.—"Maine mentioned some native having remarked 'that India must have sunk in the estimation of our Government, for that the last Governor-General sent had been a man of royal descent, whereas now they sent a collector to be Governor-General!' I rather doubt any native having the pluck to say this, even if he thought it. I suspect it comes from some of the civilians, many of whom don't particularly like Lawrence or his appointment. . . . . Kiss the poor boys for me. I long to see whether poor Charlie will know my voice again, or Reggie."

12*th March*.—"I was at the University Convocation yesterday, and heard Maine deliver his speech, which was a very excellent one, and beautifully delivered. He told the Bengalees some

home truths; and I only hope his speech may be properly reported, and will induce some of the richer Bengal baboos to come forward with benefactions to the University. Maine made very honourable mention of Dr. Duff in the course of his speech. I can't say it was very impressive, however, seeing the Mookerjees and Chatterjees and Dutts made Bachelors and Masters of Arts. The whole thing was an exotic, and had all the air of being such. I saw the Fayrers there and Mrs. Pratt, besides a number of other ladies. What a guy I must have looked! When I put on the square cap, my bearer could not retain his gravity, and turned away to have an honest laugh! Well he might."

*21st March.*—"I am weary of dancing attendance as secretary, with yourself at one extremity of India, my children in England without a father when most required, myself slaving here, and to no useful purpose either for myself or my family. If I were making money, and storing up for all dependent upon me, I should not care; but I am doing very little in this way, as you know. My coming out has been a dead loss, and a disappointment in every single respect. . . . . I don't canvass, or seek any support from any one, and have only one bitter regret, that I ever placed myself in the false position in which I am and must remain until I get my off-reckonings. . . . . Not one single thing I wish ever comes to pass, private or public, official or non-official; it's all alike. . . . . For upwards of twenty years I have had no other experience, and now move and work with a stoical indifference to anything but doing what I think right and true, and with no other expectation but disgust in the issue here."

*1st April.*—"You cannot be more irritated than I am at my being kept away from you.

"I had a letter from Lord Stanley, who closes his letter with—'Don't be distrustful as to your own prospects, it is impossible you should remain long where you are,' but he does not know that it is extremely possible."

*4th April.*—"Of the correctness of Lord Stanley's idea about the impossibility of my remaining long where I am, the present mail brings out a curious corroboration. Wood has appointed Mr. Taylor, whom you may remember as staying with the Stracheys last year a day or two, provisional member of Council; this, of course, cut off all chance of my getting into Council. I have written to Lord Stanley and concluded with saying that I was not a fair judge of Taylor's appointment as provisional member of Council, as I felt being repeatedly passed over."

*7th April.*—"I do hope we are not doomed to more of these separations, I cannot endure them, this one surely will suffice until the end of my days. Nothing compensates for the disruption of one's home-life. These half-anna substitutes for *vivâ voce* intercourse are poor make-shifts, though one is thankful enough for the daily line."

*12th April.*—"The mail last night brought me a letter from C. Mills, who tells me that Wood appointed Taylor, saying with regard to myself that he could not put two military men into Council. One would think that the Foreign Office was a military appointment. It cuts me out completely until Napier goes, which may not be for another year and a-half."

On the 14th of April, 1864, my father left Calcutta, and a few days later he rejoined his family at Simla, where he remained throughout the summer. The year was one of heavy work for the Indian Foreign Office. Afghanistan and Beluchistan were disturbed by civil war, and their affairs required constant attention, while to the eastward a serious complication had arisen. My father's apprehensions of embarrassment from a Bhutan mission turned out to be only too well founded; for in the spring of 1864 our envoy was grossly insulted and compelled to sign a treaty which made extravagant concessions to the Bhutan government, and it was found necessary to retaliate by a series of measures which were tantamount to a declaration of war. For the time actual hostilities did not break out, but it was evident that they could not be long delayed; and when the Government left Simla towards the close of the year, all was in readiness for a measurement of strength between our advanced columns and the Bhuteas.

In the meantime my father's relations with Sir John Lawrence had not improved. He had now nothing to do with the military measures of government, which was in some respects fortunate, for the working out of the army reorganization scheme had, as he anticipated, proved to be full of difficulty and complication; and his views with regard to this entire question were by no means in accordance with those of the Governor-General. But regarding the affairs of his own department he had to express his opinions; and though he concurred generally in the foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence, these opinions were at times very unpalatable. There was never, I believe, any personal breach between the two, for both at bottom appreciated each other's character and abilities; but their official relations became somewhat difficult. That this

should have been the case is hardly to be wondered at. They had been three years before on a footing of equality; and though my father was too much of a soldier not to acquiesce loyally in their altered positions, he was a man of decided views, and he had always been in the habit of expressing his views in the clearest language. I think Sir John Lawrence, feeling his own position to be in some respects peculiar, may perhaps at times have been inclined to resent such a course of action more than another viceroy would have done. However this may be, there arose, as I have said, some unpleasantness in their official relations; and before the end of my father's time in the Foreign Secretaryship, the Governor-General went to the length of ordering that all Foreign Office work should be submitted to him without note or opinion. He was soon forced to rescind this order, for he found it impossible to do his secretary's work as well as his own; but for a time it was carried into operation.

The natural result of this state of things, coupled with Sir John Lawrence's pardonable predilections in favour of his old friends of the Punjab, was that my father's chances of succeeding to the rule of that great province were not increased. Sir Robert Montgomery's time was nearly up, and my father was very generally designated by the Indian public and Press as Sir Robert's successor; but he had now little expectation of such good fortune himself, and he was not surprised when he found that he had lost the appointment. On the 1st of November, after a grand durbar at Lahore, he reached Calcutta; and in the course of the following month it was announced that his old schoolfellow, Sir Donald Macleod, of the Civil Service, was to have the lieutenant-governorship. "So ends," he wrote in his journal, "the only chance I had of doing anything by my return to India . . . . . I am disappointed, though I long expected the issue."

In the meantime my father's conduct and character had been fiercely attacked in England. Mr. John Dickinson, an English pamphleteer, had at this time entered into a close connection with the Maharaja Holkar; and the result was a work full of violent misrepresentations on the subject of the Native State of Dhar. It is unnecessary for me to enter into this controversy. The source and value of Mr. Dickinson's statements were effectually shown up at the time, and no one is likely to read them now. Not long after the Dhar controversy my father received warning that he was likely to be attacked also by the historian Kaye, who was then engaged in writing his work on the "Sepoy War." But Kaye's

action is fully discussed elsewhere,* and this matter also may for the present be set aside.

The year 1865 opened with an unfortunate check to our arms on the Bhutan frontier. My father's views on the Bhutan question had been opposed in some respects to those of Sir John Lawrence, and he had from the first objected to the occupation by small bodies of our troops of certain posts on the edge of the line of hills. One of these posts, Dewangiri, being suddenly attacked by the Bhuteas, was abandoned with the loss of two guns; and it became necessary to push up reinforcements and to threaten a general advance on the Bhutea capital. Both Sir John Lawrence and Government of Bengal were at first disposed to submit to the check, and to leave Dewangiri in the hands of the enemy; and it was, I believe, in consequence of some rather indignant expression of opinion upon this point that my father's official relations with the Governor-General became finally disturbed. He writes at this time:—

"One fact always comes out prominently now whenever our Native regiments take the field, viz., the want of European officers consequent on the 'irregular system' of organization; it collapses under the pettiest strain, as was seen a year ago in the Umbeylah Pass, and now again at Dewangiri. It was with difficulty that Lawrence assented to the strength of troops employed to carry out Beadon's programme in the general instructions to the Military Department; he thought the columns I suggested unnecessarily strong, the military authorities made them somewhat stronger. If I had been directing affairs, I should have had a reserve in the shape of a column ready to support in case of unforeseen accident, and such a mishap as that at Dewangiri would have been speedily rectified. So confident, however, was the Bengal Government, and so unwilling was the Governor-General to employ more troops, that it was no use speaking of a reserve. The mischief is that the Commander-in-Chief is always for gigantic operations and great campaigns. The disposition of lieutenant-governors and of a civilian Governor-General is all the other way. Between the two the just medium is difficult to attain, and the ordinary course of events is that operations are undertaken with a force barely adequate if all go well to secure the objects arrived at; and if things don't go well, but a hitch occur, then the affair recoils into the other phase, viz., a costly and untimely quadruplication of force

* Appendix II.

under the pressure of a combined scream from the Press, and the Commander-in-Chief, and the military. This is the phase Government is being urged into just now. It is a phase pretty sure to recur, as war is always open to petty failures when least expected whenever at first adequate means are not employed. There ought always to be a margin for accident, especially in hill-post affairs."

In the beginning of March, 1865, my father's health, tried by hard work, and by thirty-five years of Indian service, suddenly gave way; and finding that he was seriously ill he determined to follow his doctor's advice, and try the effect of a fortnight at sea. He had long wished to revisit his old haunts in Burmah; and the opportunity had now come to him. Accordingly, about the middle of the month he handed over charge of the Foreign Office and sailed for Moulmein; and the voyage, though it stirred up some painful memories, did him good, both mentally and physically. I quote the following extracts from his letters to his wife written during his absence:—

"You asked me to keep a letter on the stocks, and to send it you when the opportunity came. I expect no earlier one than our own return, which the captain is anxious to accomplish by the 1st of April. It appears that the French Messageries have chartered the vessel to take passengers, &c., to Suez; and as it takes a few days to discharge and get ready again for sea, the *Burmah* is to be in Calcutta by the 1st. I rather regret this, as the more of the sea and of rest I can get the better, but it will, I dare say, prove enough . . . . . .

"At Akyab we took in a Chinaman, who is a first-class passenger and eats his meals at table with us. He uses his knife like a chop-stick, and shovels up the food with marvellous rapidity; it is quite a new dodge as to the proper use of a knife, if I can only take a lesson, I shall astonish you all. We reached the Akyab lighthouse too late to go in on Friday night, so we anchored all night, and ran in at daylight. Well aware that there was nothing to see, I did not land. The day was hot, and M——— and S———, who landed, soon came back again to the steamer. We steamed away at 4½ P.M. yesterday, and have had a charming day on the blue water, with service by Mr. V——— to keep us in mind of Sunday. We shall be off Cape Negrais and the Alguada to-night, and at Rangoon about 4 or 5 P.M. to-morrow. Mr. S——— came to Moulmein when I was Commissioner there, and he is now a very wealthy man. He gives me full information about all the

people whom I remember at Moulmein. He tells me no Commissioner has ever gone over the provinces as I did, which I had heard before. His trip to Calcutta was in pursuit of an Israelite debtor who had absconded, giving all his Moulmein friends the slip. He caught him, however, in Calcutta, and made poor Moses disgorge. I have not much to tell you except that M——— and I smoke a cigar together after dinner; and that I have studiously done nothing but idle ever since I came on board .....

"I indulge in salt-water bathing of a morning on deck, sleep well for me, have a good appetite, but a squeamish digestion, so now you have one sheet full; adieu till the next.

* * * * *

"We reached the mouth of the Salween, and anchored off the Reef at 7 P.M. yesterday, and lay at anchor all night. At 7½ A.M. the tide served, and we steamed up to Moulmein, where we anchored off the main wharf at 10½ A.M. Colonel Phayre and Colonel Fytche* came on board, and the latter very kindly took M——— and myself up to his house. Phayre is putting up at the circuit-house, my own old darling house, which I built when here, and inhabited for about a year, or a year and a-half. I asked Phayre to take me in, for I longed to be in it once more, but he said I should be too uncomfortable, as he had no bed, &c., to give me. I am dying to see it again.

"When I went down to the steamer to sleep on board, I found the decks crowded with deck passengers, chiefly Burmese, but also a very considerable addition to our cabin passengers. Strange to say, when we started in the morning from Rangoon, I found that we had taken on board a very old acquaintance of mine, one who was Tseekay or 'Judge' when I was the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, and who was then a very ugly old man. Twenty years had not improved his looks, nor added to his strength. He was much bowed, and looked his age, eighty-nine; but had his sight, hearing, and faculties perfect. We got into conversation, for the old gentlemen, hearing I was there from Mr. S———, managed to get up from his chair, and to walk to the side of my chair. I was engrossed in reading, and did not observe him until his head was close to mine. It was rather a surprise, for having no shoes on, his feeble steps had made no noise; he thus anticipated me, for I purposed speaking to him, but thought he was resting.

* Colonel Phayre was Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, and Colonel Fytche Commissioner of the Tenasserim Division.

We had some conversation through Mr. S——— and Mr. V——— and the old Tseekay sent for his youngest daughter, a very nice child of nine years of age, of whom he was very proud, and introduced her to me. He married again, it seems, at eighty, and this was the fruit of the octogenarian wedding. After some talk, for I had put him in a chair alongside me, he ran over the former Commissioners whom he had known, six in number besides myself, four of them dead. Speaking of his own age, he said, 'We shall not meet again,' and asked me why I had come over to Moulmein, which I explained. He has had his young daughter taught to read and write. I made her write her name in Kaye's book with my gold pencil, which she did very nicely. You will laugh when I tell you that I bethought me of the circular box of chocolate, and when she was seated with her mother among other female relatives, I took the box to the child, opened it to show the contents, and offered her it. She took out a couple of the wafers, and at once put them into her mouth, after which I shut the box and gave it her. They then looked at it, and finally the child went up to the old Tseekay, and he too tasted them; evidently the chocolate box was a success. After this, one of his granddaughters, a pretty little thing, younger than the nine years old girl, was brought by her mother; and after some talk, the little thing recited something with much action and no inconsiderable grace. I could not, of course, make out what she said, nor could either S——— or V———; but it was a pretty piece of acting for so small a creature, and I showed her that I thought her admirable as an elocutionist. We were on the best terms, for whenever she saw me the wee thing smiled complacently, as much as to say, 'Did not I do well?' I bid the old Tseekay good-bye this morning as I left the ship; and it is but too probable that 'we never meet again.' He had been counting his beads, and saying his prayers, and was preparing for his own descent from the steamer, when we shook hands, Phayre telling him that I wished him adieu. V———, whom I have mentioned as interpreting, is the son of the late Mr. V———, the Karen missionary, whom you may have heard me mention. He has succeeded his father in the charge, though a very young man ..... He said he remembered me, and that his earliest recollection was a large skull under my house; he did not recollect what skull, but that it was very large. I distinctly recollected what he alluded to, viz., a large fine rhinoceros skull which long hung under the house, in order that all trace of any sort of smell should be evaporated from it, a skull I brought in from one of my tours,

when it was all that the Karens could spare of a fine rhinoceros which they had killed and eaten up. V——— left us at Amherst.

"Fytche's house is but a few minutes' walk from the circuit-house, which is the one I built and lived in. At sunrise I went there, and entered all the rooms, loitered about and around it, and walked to the high point just at the end of the grounds from which I took a panoramic view you may remember seeing in England. The house was very little changed, and has lasted remarkably well. Need I say that it was with a mind and heart full of the remembrance of Annie that I looked at everything around me. She helped me to select the spot, to plan the house, and when it was finished she was its light and blessing. They were days of bitter trial to myself; and often of an evening, after my work was over, she and I walked up and down, solaced by the view around us, but knowing that the machinations for my removal were sure to succeed, and preparing ourselves for the losses and discredit which that would entail. What a support that noble-hearted woman was to me none but God who gave her me knows. How clear and sharp all came back to me you may imagine. Whilst I was at the house a man came to me, knelt down, and presented a paper. I found it was a certificate which I gave him on the 30th of December, 1846, of his having served three months as a khitmutgar. This must have been given him the day before we left, when we were parting with all our servants. It was strange that he should be there to show me this, at the very house in which he got it given to him. He had kept it carefully. Phayre was standing by at the time, and remarked upon the circumstance. He had lately taken the man into his service, but without knowing that he had been in mine formerly.

"We weighed from Moulmein at 10½ A.M. of Saturday, and reached the mouth of the Rangoon river at night, so we cast anchor, and had to wait until 9 A.M. the next morning ere we had the tide suitable. We then ran up the river, and cast anchor at 1 or 1½ P.M. There was the usual number of deck passengers, and among them a very fair and rather pretty Malay lady, the wife of some rich Chinaman at Rangoon. The rest were Burmans, Moslems from Surat, and Madras coast people, some 250 or 300. At Rs. 5 a head these steamers make a good deal by these passengers. I pity the women, though all seem happy, and no quarrel or altercation of any kind took place on the crowded deck, either in going to or returning from Moulmein. The Burmans, especially the women, are a good-tempered race.

"I must revert to the fair Malay, whom I saw smoking cigarettes made as I had seen the Malays make them when I travelled with them at the Pak Chan. I asked her to show me one, for hers were a trifle different, but evidently made in the same way. She was very civil, and took a handful out of her box and sent them to me. Afterwards the captain asked her to make some for him with his own tobacco, which she did. I asked her to let me give her some cheroots, and presented her with a handful of very good ones, which she accepted, and giving some to the people with her put the rest in her box. Afterwards I took her some oranges, and so ended my exchange of civilities with the fair Malay lady, for lady she was in everything she did, and received the deference and respect of those about her as a matter of course, with a quiet dignity and gentleness which struck everybody."

On the 1st of April my father was once more in Calcutta, and he found awaiting him the news of his appointment to the Governor-General's Council, in place of Sir Robert Napier, who was to go to Bombay as Commander-in-Chief. He had heard some time before that this was probable, but repeated disappointments had made him sceptical on the subject of further advancement, and I think he had now got to the point of caring very little about it. A fortnight after his return he left Calcutta again, this time for Simla, where he was to be sworn in as a member of Council. His last important work in the Foreign Office, like his first, was the preparation of a despatch on the Mysore question, which was still being debated in England. Sir John Lawrence was anxious to answer fully the arguments adduced in favour of the continuance of the State, and made it a special request that my father should prepare the despatch before leaving the Secretariat. This done, he started for Simla.

On the 5th of May he writes to Lord Stanley:—

"Sir W. Mansfield and I were sworn in at this place on the 27th, and I imagine that it must have been about the first instance that the old formula, 'under a salute from the ramparts of Fort William,' had to be modified."

"I feel that I lay down the Foreign Office Secretaryship having, so far as rested with myself, advocated a policy conservative of Native States, though at the same time maintaining the due and wholesome supremacy of the British Government. Lord Canning saw the necessity, as did Lord Elgin, of bracing up the relaxed authority of the supreme Government, shaken by the events of

1857, and in some degree by the liberal way in which Lord Canning over-rewarded rather than under-rewarded those who had done, or were supposed to have done, any service. . . . . Lord Elgin was fully alive to the inexpediency of encouraging Native States and chiefs in a false view of their real position. Lawrence, though indifferent to the conservation of Native States, feels equally the danger of a contrary course; and if I could only give you a full account of a very remarkable conversation which I had with Dinkur Rao, the astute ex-minister of Scindia, and one of the first Native members of Council of Lord Canning's appointing, you would be surprised. . . . . A shrewder gauger of the Native chiefs than this deep Deccanee Brahmin it is difficult to conceive. I am in hopes that the result of the Azam Jah movement in Parliament will check the presumptuous and insubordinate spirit which he said was dangerously cherished, and from which he foreboded the ruin of the Mahratta rulers. It is too long to write all he said, and an abstract would not do justice to the substance of his remarks; but they confirmed me in the opinion that, however inadequately it may have been done, the policy of bracing up our authority was essential in favour of protracting the life of Native States, and that Dinkur Rao felt keenly that a more vacillating and timid line would bring on conflict and ruin more expeditiously than was anticipated. My conscience is clear in this matter, and I hand over the Foreign Secretary's post with the satisfactory feeling that the thinking men, like Dinkur Rao and others of the same stamp, deprecate a weak exercise of the supremacy of the Crown, and look to a firm and just exercise of the sovereign functions of the British Government as the only safeguard for the prolonged existence of Native States incorporated in our dominions.* Sir R. Palmer's and Sir C. Wood's speeches I read with pleasure. They are timely, and will do good, and my friend, Dinkur Rao, spoke before he had seen them."

"I have entered upon the work of the Military Department. The Bhutan campaign is over for the present. I hope for good and all, but that remains to be seen. At Dewangiri the storm of the stockade was an occasion on which three engineer officers had

* A writer in the *Quarterly Review* of April, 1878, quotes a remark to the same effect made by the well-known minister, Sir Madava Rao :—"If left to themselves they will wipe themselves out."

to make good their footing unsupported for a while by anything but a bugler and four sepoys. Four-and-twenty men fell before the revolvers of these three officers. Trevor* was wounded, but not dangerously. . . . . Dundas was wounded, Garnault, the third, was untouched. It is seldom in war that three men have to make good their footing as it fell to these officers. Dundas, though himself struck down from the top of the stockade by a heavy stone blow on the head, was again up, and in time to save the life of Trevor, who was first in, but struck down and blinded by blood, was just about to be despatched by a Bhutea, whom Dundas shot. The whole thing was as gallantly done by these three men as possible; fortunately the Bhuteas had no revolvers."

About the same time my father wrote to Sir Charles Wood, who was still at the India Office:—

"Sir W. Mansfield and I were sworn in on the 27th April, and the Governor-General has directed me to take the work of the Military Department. In entering upon this I need scarcely repeat the assurance that it will be my aim to secure, so far as dependent on myself, the smooth and harmonious working of the Government with the Commander-in-Chief. I have met and known Sir W. Mansfield in former years, and though both he and Sir J. Lawrence, as you are well aware, are men of independent thought, not inclined to form or to hold loosely their opinions, yet I am under the impression that Sir J. Lawrence will find it much easier to get on without serious differences with Sir W. Mansfield than with Sir Hugh Rose."

"I shall continue to take great interest in the department with which I have been so closely connected for nearly four years. My first work in it under Lord Canning in 1861 was a Mysore despatch embodying his views. My last in 1865 is a Mysore despatch which has passed the Council unanimously, and will, I hope, meet with your approval and support.

"I congratulate India as well as yourself on the issue of the Azam Jah debate. You may judge how timely it is when I mention that Dinkur Rao, Scindia's ex-minister and one of Lord Canning's first native members of the legislative council, spoke to me at Allahabad in very plain terms on the danger which he apprehended to Native chiefs from the false views they

* Colonel Trevor, V.C., is now Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Public Works. His two gallant companions are no longer living. Dundas, a man universally honoured, as gentle and modest as he was brave, died a soldier's death at Cabul in December, 1879.

were entertaining. It would make too lengthy an epistle were I to give you a sketch of his remarkable conversation, but he said distinctly 'Your agents have ceased to have weight and influence; they are afraid even to advise, as their most moderate interference even with advice is resented; and the chiefs have ceased to care for your government here, and look to their intrigues in England. Before long their presumption on this and on other points will bring them into conflict with your government, and then they will be ruined.' He said much more, but this may suffice to indicate his views. During the time I have been Foreign Secretary, from the very first, my aim has been to brace up the authority of the British Government over the Native States; the events of 1857 had greatly relaxed it, and there was an overweening idea of their services and importance spread among them by the very generous and liberal way in which the smallest shadow of a service had been recognized by Lord Canning. Both Lord Canning and Lord Elgin saw the necessity of the bracing-up policy, and Sir J. Lawrence, I need scarcely add, perceived it too. Matters would have been much worse than Dinkur Rao somewhat (I hope) exaggeratedly represents them had not from the first, *i.e.*, August, 1861, the tone of the Foreign Office been as I mention. It was refreshing to read your speech and that of Sir R. Palmer; and if, as I hope, the failure of the Azam Jah case leads the House of Commons to be more wary in the entertainment of appeals from Native chiefs, it will be the saving of those that remain, as it will damp the growing sentiment of insubordination which Dinkur Rao has observed, and will tend to teach them their proper status as dependent chiefs under the sovereignty of the British Crown."

I may remark, in conclusion, that during my father's tenure of the Foreign Secretaryship he was singularly fortunate in his subordinates. Of the three Under-Secretaries who served with him, one, John Wyllie, died young, but not before he had earned for himself a brilliant reputation. The others are now Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Charles Aitchison. Mr. Talboys Wheeler also held at this time an appointment in the Indian Foreign Office.

# CHAPTER XI.

## 1865—1870.

The Indian Council—Correspondence regarding Military Reorganization and other Matters—Proposed Establishment of an Indian Moniteur—Oudh Talukdars—Voting in the Legislative Council—Necessity for an Indian Navy—Bishop Cotton—Futtehpore Sikri—Proposed Advance to Quetta—Russia and England in Central Asia—The K.C.S.I.—Abyssinia—Sir John Lawrence and the Press—Income-Tax—Correspondence with Lady Durand—Deafness—Visit to England—Lord Mayo—Reception of Ameer Shere Ali Khan at Umballa—Barrack Expenditure—Punjab Tenancy Act—Horse Artillery—Railways in India—The Secretary of State and his Council—Visit of the Duke of Edinburgh—Offer of Amalgamated Agencies of Central India and Rajputana—Appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

THE constitution of the Indian Viceroy's executive Council is tersely described in the opening page of Wyllie's well-known essay on the foreign policy of Lord Lawrence. "The Government of India," he writes, "is divided into six great departments—Foreign, Home, Legislative, Military, Finance, and Public Works. Every order issued from any of these departments runs in the name of 'the Governor-General in Council.' And in the earlier days of the Anglo-Indian Empire, when all cases used to be submitted for the collective consideration of the Governor-General and each member of his Council, this formula was a correct description of the mode in which the machinery of Government actually worked. But as time advanced, bringing with it additions of territory, improved administration, and better means of communication, it became impossible for so cumbrous an organization to bear the strain of the enormously increased correspondence. At length Lord Canning remodelled the council into the semblance of a cabinet, with himself as president. Each member of the Government now holds a separate portfolio, and despatches the ordinary business connected with it upon his own responsibility, only reserving matters of exceptional importance for the opinion of a colleague, or the decision of the assembled council."

This description, however, hardly does justice to the amount of labour which falls upon the Viceroy personally; for his share in the ordinary business of the administration is by no means limited to the charge of the single department, the Foreign, which all Governors-General, since Lord Canning, have reserved to themselves. On the contrary, work flows in upon him from all sides, and if he does his duty there is no harder worked official in India. To quote another writer *—"The supreme council now practically forms a cabinet, the premier of which, however, besides holding a much higher official and social position than the other members, takes a much more active share in the direct administration and superintendence of the various departments than is the case in any other Government. Perhaps the position may be more accurately likened to that of an absolute monarchy, where the king rules through responsible ministers, but yet rules himself." This simile, as Chesney remarks, puts out of sight the controlling power of Her Majesty's Government, but so far as India is concerned, it is approximately correct. It should be added that the Commander-in-Chief in India has by custom a seat in the Council, though this is not legally a necessity. The members of the executive council hold their seats for five years.

The Legislative Council for India consists of the members of the executive council, together with certain additional members, official and non-official, who hold their seats for two years only.

A member of the executive council receives a handsome salary†, and his position as one of the five or six officers selected by Her Majesty's Government to aid the Viceroy in the administration of the Empire is one of much responsibility and independence. It is true that the weight of the council in the control of affairs depends not only upon the individual capacity of its members, but upon the character and policy of the viceroy for the time being. The constitution of the Indian Government is rightly such as to throw into the hands of the Governor-General very great personal power; and the influence of the council rises or falls with almost every change in the viceroyalty. An autocratic viceroy possessing the confidence of his party in England can ignore or override his council to an extent which is hardly realized in India. Nevertheless, the definite constitutional rights of the council are such that an able and outspoken member of that

* Chesney. Indian Polity. † Nearly £7,000 a year.

body can make his presence very distinctly felt at all times: and it is to the ability and independence of the councillors of the future, here and at home, that India will have to look for its main safeguard against the evils of the English system of party government, a system which must now in the nature of things exercise a more and more direct influence upon the conduct of Indian affairs.

When my father vacated the Foreign Secretaryship in 1865, and during the five years which followed, the Indian Council was perhaps more powerful and influential than it has ever been before or since. A large proportion of its members during that time were men of unusual mark. The opinions of Sir William Mansfield, Sir Henry Maine, and others whose names are almost equally well known, necessarily carried great weight; and throughout Sir John Lawrence's tenure of office his colleagues were fully consulted on every point of importance. Indeed, my father was inclined to think that the Governor-General threw too much into the hands of his council. Not long before his own appointment he wrote to Lord Stanley: "We have gone back in the conduct of business to the state of affairs which Lord Ellenborough found on his landing, and which in the course of a couple of months he corrected. Council meets at 11 A.M., and sits until 6 P.M., and even then secretaries have often been disappointed of their 'innings.' Now, considering that we are in profound peace, and that the work thrown on the Government is lightened by the Lieutenant-Governors and chief commissioners taking so much off which fell on a Governor-General in Lord Ellenborough's time, who besides had the Afghan and China wars on his hands, I regard this as a very retrograde move. . . . . Work is neither done so well nor so quickly as heretofore. Lawrence on principle is averse to being separated from his council, except in case of great emergency, and he circulates a great deal more to the council than was the case formerly. The result is that the area of discussion is vastly increased, and the wheels of Government correspondingly clogged. There is a heavy drag put upon the disposal of very simple questions—some of the council being blessed with a fund of prolixity even on unimportant matters."

However this may have been, the work thrown upon the several members of council during the viceroyalties of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo was exceptionally heavy; for though the empire remained practically at peace throughout, matters of great and lasting importance were constantly under the consideration of

Government. Our foreign policy in connection with Afghanistan and Central Asia assumed a definite form under the pressure of events beyond our frontier; the reduction and reorganization of our Native army, consequent on the action taken by Her Majesty's Government in 1861, were gradually carried out, not without much friction and labour; serious financial difficulties had to be met, and a radical change in our financial system was conceived and brought to a point; the operations of the Public Works Department became the subject of much discussion; and a variety of legislative measures of grave moment were introduced and elaborated. It was inevitable that among a number of men of marked character and individuality there should be upon many of these points decided differences of opinion, and such was the case. These differences of opinion, moreover, occasionally led to a somewhat fiery passage of arms; and many of the debates of Lord Lawrence's council, and in a minor degree of Lord Mayo's, were enlivened by a freedom and directness of speech which makes them very interesting reading. Whether these conflicts were always necessary, or calculated to facilitate the conduct of public affairs, may be a matter of doubt; but a number of men of strong and divergent views can hardly be expected to meet day after day without occasionally striking fire.

The work with which my father was specially connected was that of the Military Department, and the military branch of the Department of Public Works. Strongly opposed as he was to the principle of the staff corps scheme, and to other measures of reform lately introduced, his position was in this respect one of some difficulty. It was not improved by the fact that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Mansfield, and the head of the military secretariat, Colonel Norman, were among the most prominent exponents of the opposite school, and held on numerous matters opinions exactly the converse of his. Upon one point in particular, during this year 1865, he spoke and wrote strongly. The Madras army had not hitherto been reorganized, or as he considered it disorganized, on the irregular system; and he tried hard to prevent this measure, which was not necessitated by orders from home, and was opposed by the Madras authorities. It is unnecessary to go into his objections in detail, for they were similar to the objections he had previously urged against the irregular system elsewhere. He considered that system to be wholly unsuited for real warfare. "To all who know the Madras armies," he wrote, "it is indubitably a fact that the infantry are

equally ill-adapted with the cavalry to a system which strips them of the firmness due to the presence of European officers in the ranks, and leaves the command and lead of companies like that of troops to Native officers . . . . . This measure completes the inefficiency of our coast armies for service beyond seas . . . . . However undesirable operations beyond seas may be, they are sometimes unavoidable, and for such expeditions our dependence for Native troops lies mainly on the two coast armies. Officered on the irregular system, they may be in some sort a guarantee for the maintenance of peace, for they will be even more unfit for such expeditions than for war on our frontiers, and in this light there is an advantage in the new organisation; but if armies are meant for war purposes, both our coast armies will now be unequal to the strain."

His efforts, however, were unsuccessful. This also was the case on other points of military policy where the views of the Commander-in-Chief, backed as they were by Sir John Lawrence, generally prevailed. I quote here some extracts from letters written to friends in England in the course of the year 1865. They deal partly with non-military questions, but bear chiefly upon the points to which I have alluded.

*To Lord Stanley, dated 1st June.*

"There is a very prevalent opinion that the Governor-General will resign, but I have seen nothing indicative of such a purpose, and I do not think that the slap on the face which Sir C. Wood has administered to the Government of India by disallowing the export duties falls so severely on Sir J. Lawrence as on Sir C. Trevelyan,* and this, I think, the Governor-General perceives. He is very sore, however, at the general tone of the Press, which is more and more hostile in spite of endeavours to smooth it down, and is very severe in its mistaken criticisms on the Bhootan affair. He is also exceedingly put out by Lord Ellenborough's remarks on the Bhootan operations, and the present condition of the Native army, and he has asked Sir W. Mansfield to draw out a defensive statement for the Government. I think he had much better have let the matter rest, for it does not follow that all may agree with Mansfield's statement, and as the people at home have

* Sir Charles Trevelyan was at that time the Member of Council in charge of the Financial Department.

by this time forgotten Dewangiri, it may only serve to raise a discussion which is unprofitable.

"Sir W. Mansfield has begun by gaining Sir John's good will on the point of military reductions and economy, going diametrically in opposition to Sir H. Rose and Sir R. Napier. This was a sure way to win the Governor-General, who thanked God every day of his life for the departure of Sir H. Rose, and who is as disposed to be parsimonious in military as lavish in civil expenditure. By a diminution of the rank and file of Her Majesty's European cavalry and infantry it is proposed to the Secretary of State to effect a saving of between £250,000 and £300,000 per annum. This can be done with safety so long as we remain at peace, but if reduction be pushed further, and to the extent of placing the infantry on the English peace establishment, which when the Suez route arrangements are complete Sir W. Mansfield thinks practicable, we shall make a grievous blunder, for peace in India is armed vigilance, whereas peace in England is a very different thing . . . . . As our hold of India depends more than ever entirely on the European force, there is a point below which the reduction of the strength of regiments becomes even in peace unsafe. If our proposal be allowed we shall have reached that point; for an establishment strength of 750 privates will scarcely ever turn out more than from 400 to 450 effectives, often less. What the Horse Guards will say I don't know; but the military charges are increasing so much on almost every item that the £250,000 will barely counterbalance the aggregate of increased charges in all the presidencies during the last three or four years. Even mules in the Punjab are 30 per cent. dearer now than they were a short time ago; nothing seems to escape the rise of prices, and the status of subalterns of the army and low salaried officials is completely altered from what it was, so far as the rate of salary to what it should procure is concerned.

"Meanwhile Trevelyan's farewell measure of knocking off the income tax and putting on export duties, which are disallowed by the Secretary of State, leaves the Government in a queer dilemma. The Act imposing the export duties being law is in force until the official disallowance of the Bill reach India, and the income tax is on the point of expiring. Trevelyan has left Massey, whom he never consulted before issuing his budget, a fair prospect of a very considerable deficit . . . . . "

*To Lord Ellenborough, dated 9th June*, 1865.

"I am hard at work with the Military Department business which the Governor-General made over to me, that is, subject of course to the control of the Governor-General in Council.

"There is a good deal that is now important pending in this department; for affairs have not shaken down, and the amalgamation has raised and left many questions far from easy of solution. The dilemma is rather an awkward one, for justice must be done to staff corps officers as well as to local officers, and it is not easy to reconcile these conflicting interests; nor have the measures hitherto adopted proved successful. As far as I can as yet judge the two classes of officers are about on a par in discontent. The late division in the House of Commons, which was against Sir C. Wood, will of course excite the hopes of the local officers, who are speculating on the fruits it will bear; whilst the confidence of the staff corps officers is shaken both by the measures adopted, those anticipated to be possible or probable, and by Cust's divulged opinion that the staff corps cannot last ten years. Your Lordship's speech on the present organization of the Indian army, made in connection with the Dewangiri affair, was a bitter pill to the advocates of the irregular system, and produced a sensation in India on both sides. It was not at all palatable to the Governor-General or Sir W. Mansfield.

"The latter is an able man in many respects, but his tendencies are, I think, rather dangerous; for ignoring the fact that peace in India is not the same thing as peace in England, he is disposed, in pursuit of military economy, to reduce our European force almost beyond a safe minimum. Great as may be the urgent necessity for economy, both civil and military, there is a point beyond which we cannot safely pass at present. The Madras army is apprehensive and uneasy; and the Bombay army not a whit more happy or contented under the introduction of the irregular system than is the Bengal Native army.

"Sir W. Mansfield in his desire to establish a reputation as a military economist requires watching, and the more so that it jumps with Lawrence's humour, which lies all on the side of civil expenditure of a liberal kind, but is not averse to any degree of parsimony in military expenditure.

"With regard to Simla, which is becoming the regular seat of government for six months of the year, the theory is that as the whole government moves up there is no need for a branch of it

being left in Calcutta. The late Act was framed in contemplation of a peripatetic government, but it seems disposed to settle down into two moves, viz., from Calcutta to Simla and from Simla to Calcutta. This entails practically the loss of a couple of months out of the twelve, as during each move it takes about a month before the offices are all ready for the transaction of ordinary current business. On the other hand, as all departments know well that they can get little done whilst the government is in a state of motion, they reserve their references until the government is at work fairly either at Simla or Calcutta. Practically there is no great inconvenience under ordinary circumstances, but the times are very different from those of your Lordship's administration. I cannot help thinking Simla, as a hill seat of government, not so favourable a situation as others that might be selected, for it is the loss of twelve hours' post at least, generally of twenty-four hours' post. On the other hand, Simla is made, and to create a new hill station purely for government would cost money. Printing has been brought much more into use than it was on the offices in 1843-44. The archives of government still remain in Calcutta, and papers are sent down thither for record and for the volumes of proceedings, which are brought up monthly and despatched to England much more regularly and quickly than was formerly the case with manuscript volumes of proceedings. There is a Government Press up here, so, one way and another, what with the arrangements in the offices, the whole government being here, the *India Gazette* cut away from the Calcutta one, and printed up here, and the aid of the Government Press establishment at Simla, work is far from flagging or being delayed, excepted now and then when papers of old date have to be called for from Calcutta, which rarely happens, and may be said to be confined to historical questions in the Foreign Office, though now and then in other departments also.

. . . . . .

"I expect to hear that Edward passed out of Sandhurst in May, and hope he may have obtained a free commission in some regiment in the Bengal presidency. It is a bad profession for a very poor man, and the more so that even if he work for the staff corps and employment in India the whole tendency is to cut away the field of employment from the army, and to replace the military element by the purely civil. All Lawrence's measures aim steadily at this; civil servants won't work on the salaries with which military men are content; hence it is held politic to eliminate the military civil element and to equalize salaries wherever civilians

are to be employed; but where, as in Burmah, Assam, the Central Provinces, and the South-Western Frontier, *i.e.*, the Hazaribagh part of Bengal, military civilians cannot be replaced by civilians of pure blood, there is no talk of raising salaries. It is wonderful how logical it seems that the one class are entitled to high pay and the other to low for doing precisely the same work; but your Lordship may remember this of old."

*To Sir Charles Wood, dated 16th June*, 1865.

"Sir J. Lawrence's strong objection to having a commander-in-chief as Minister of War for India has a practical basis. Though often very inconvenient to have the Commander-in-Chief in Council arguing and defending his own acts and measures *over again*, still he does so with less weight than if he were Minister of War for India, and his subordination to the Government is better maintained. It is, however, very advisable that the Commander-in-Chief should, as a rule, always be with the Governor-General, and in his own place in Council, and that the Commander-in-Chief's absences should, when they take place, not be too protracted. This secures an habitual sense of responsibility, and tends to make the machine work more smoothly, as when the Commander-in-Chief feels himself but one of six, unless he succeed in leading the Council, which can seldom happen, in opposition to the Governor-General, the latter not only keeps his proper ascendancy, but the Commander-in-Chief is by force of circumstances more amenable to reason.

"In point of fact the Governor-General must, in last resort, be your Minister of War in India; and this is an object better attained by having one of the ordinary Members of Council in charge of the military department work. Such ordinary member, having no command over the army, no patronage, and no outside influence, is simply what he is called, a counsellor to the Governor-General, and cannot trench upon his authority or influence, nor really lighten his responsibility. Unless there be a very strong alliance and co-operation between the Commander-in-Chief and the military member of Council, assuming in its action the form of steady opposition to the Governor-General, the latter remains virtually what he must and always ought to be, your Minister of War for India.

"For instance, I opposed lately Sir W. Mansfield's proposal that lieutenant-governors should communicate directly with the

Commander-in-Chief in the first instance about military questions and operations, because this would practically take the initiative out of the hands of the Governor-General. I had no objection to matters of detail being thus dealt with, but affairs of importance would come with very different weight when the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commander-in-Chief concurred than when it was a simple proposition from the Lieutenant-Governor taken on its own merits. Sir R. Montgomery wanted to disarm Hazara, and also to engage in the Sittana affair a year before it took place. Both projects were negatived by direct communication at once from the Governor-General to the Lieutenant-Governor. But the matter would not in either case have been so easily and summarily disposed of had the Lieutenant-Governor's propositions come up backed by the concurrence of a Commander-in-Chief who was also Minister of War. I gave this as my reason for supporting Lawrence's view of Sir W. Mansfield's proposal.

"Again, I lately supported Lawrence's disinclination to adopt some stringent propositions as to unemployed field officers of the local army, not because I thought Sir W. Mansfield's proposals altogether unreasonable, but because I was convinced that if carried out at the present time, they might cause very heavy pressure to come on the Secretary of State, and irritate, if not exasperate, Parliament.

"I mention these instances to show you that had the Commander-in-Chief been Minister of War for India, both proposals would, in all probability, have been carried in Council, as an ordinary member, not in charge of the work of the military department, would scarcely have felt warranted in opposing a Commander-in-Chief who, being Minister of War and in charge of the military department, would advance every proposal with double weight and authority.

"With a clever man like Sir W. Mansfield there might be less present mischief done than with the common run of Commanders-in-Chief, but there would, from another aspect, be more real harm eventually. For a successor to the power and authority of a Commander-in-Chief, intensified by the functions of Minister of War, might, if not a very wise and moderate man, give a Governor-General endless trouble and difficulty, and it would be an exceedingly delicate matter to withdraw the office of Minister of War after it had once been combined with that of Commander-in-Chief. More than once I have heard the Military Secretary to Government complain that the Commander-in-Chief should have a seat

in Council at all, where he sits in judgment on his own proceedings; and no doubt there is some inconvenience in this, especially with a Commander-in-Chief who may chance to be a wrong-headed, obstinate man, but the inconvenience of the arrangement would be greatly intensified were the Commander-in-Chief also War Minister.

"I have written thus plainly because I am not afraid that you will suspect any personal motive on my own part, and your remark on this subject seemed to invite my own opinion.

"As regards France, the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War is much more in the position of secretary to the emperor than what we mean by Minister of War. The Emperor is his own Minister of War, just as the Governor-General must be in India. The French minister holds his portfolio at the will of the Emperor; not so the Commander-in-Chief in India, who is the representative of the Horse Guards and very independent both of the Governor-General and the Secretary of State, who are alone responsible to Parliament and the country for the state of affairs in India. If you ever have a real Minister of War for India in the Governor-General's Council you will have to separate the appointment from the command of the forces, and to give him a different commission from that held by the Commander-in-Chief, and one carefully drawn in subordination to that of the Governor-General; and this will be difficult unless you make the Governor-General *ex officio* Captain-General."

*To Lord Stanley, dated* 15*th July*, 1865.

"The army muddle is so thick that Mansfield is bent on cutting knots instead of untwisting them. The staff corps arrangement does not work smoothly, and difficulties of various kinds beset it. Mansfield finds the rules what he calls "inelastic," talks of apprehending a crisis, and advocates Government putting their own construction on the rules, and stretching them to suit the purposes of the moment. This, however, is out of the question, as every removal of a staff corps officer, or appointment of one, has to be referred to the Secretary of State. . . . . ."

*To Captain Eastwick, dated* 15*th July*, 1865.

"The feeling of discontent and dissatisfaction to which you allude as so painfully prevalent and forcing itself upon attention at home is no doubt very great, and extremely prejudicial to the

public service. It is a consequence of men, both in the civil and in the military services, feeling that there is absolutely no certainty whatever now in their prospects. I cannot account for the civil servants having or pretending to have this feeling; for in proportion as the military service deteriorates and is excluded from the share of the good things of India, the Civil Service profits, and that positively and largely. With the military it is more comprehensible, and the feeling pervades all, and is quite undeniable, the more the pity.

"I am certain now, as I always have been, that the so-called irregular system will fail on the first tension; in fact, it has already failed at Umbeylah and in Assam, and that on a very trifling trial indeed. Gradually its friends are trying to patch it up. Mansfield has just come in for a seventh officer to Native corps, so that already they have risen from three to seven. Mansfield feels the staff corps a very shaky institution, and anticipates a crisis, which he is trying to fend off by propositions which are tantamount to a remodelling of the whole thing, and involve very grave questions of fair play and justice to those who have joined it, and to those who have not. My only wish is to confirm our safe hold of this great empire, and to keep smooth water in and out of the Government. But it will be no easy matter to get things to shake down at all comfortably anywhere."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 31st August, 1865.*

"I can scarcely hope to convey to you an idea of the military muddle which is the resultant of this so-called amalgamation. When I mention that Sir W. Mansfield proposes as the only remedy to the rank complications, *that brevet promotion according to the provisions of the staff corps warrant be made applicable to all branches of Her Majesty's army wherever serving, the same being made retrospective to date of institution of the staff corps*, you may conceive the hopeless state of muddle into which things have fallen. What the Horse Guards will say to this proposition I don't know, but they and the home Government will probably be surprised that the Royal army, all over the world, in all its branches, is to be re-modelled as to rank in consequence of the creation of the three Indian staff corps. The proposal is almost tantamount to extending the muddle we have fallen into all over the British empire, wherever an officer holds a commission. Mansfield acknowledges he does not see his way out of the com-

plication, and proposes this mode of cutting the knot. I see no way through the difficulties created that would be likely to be acceptable, and instead of adding to the imbroglio by suggestions of my own, shall leave the matter to the home authorities to arrange; it will offer pleasant occupation for another Royal commission if they please to appoint one."

At the end of October, 1865, my father left Simla. He notes in his diary of November 2nd—"Reached Delhi at 11.15 A.M. Put up at Hamilton's Hotel, Skinner's old house, which adjoins his mosque. Saw the old hummam in which, with Skinner's permission, Napier and I when young men were scrubbed down in company to our great amusement." On the 6th of November he reached Calcutta.

One of the first matters that occupied his attention in 1866 was a proposal which had at this time received considerable support at head-quarters, for the establishment of a government paper after the model of the French *Moniteur*. The conclusion of the Bhootan war, without an advance upon the capital, and the terms granted to our assailants, were unpopular; and Sir John Lawrence, always extremely sensitive to press criticism, had of late been subjected to some very unfair attacks on the part of the Indian newspapers. Under these circumstances it had occurred to him that the establishment of a moniteur to expound the views and actions of Government would be desirable; and the idea had been taken up by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Mansfield, who wished to see either a single government organ established at head-quarters, or a number of minor moniteurs, one at the seat of each local government. To this proposal my father at once demurred, and his minute on the subject closed for the time a controversy in which at first he stood almost alone. After pointing out that a moniteur would provoke opposition from the greater and more influential newspapers, and command no great confidence with the people of India; that the system would embitter and render more unseemly the occasional conflicts between the supreme Government and the local administrations, and might be productive of grave embarrassment in England; that a moniteur might go with a mistaken majority, and be afterwards discredited by Blue Books and party discussion; that the services would be exceedingly sensitive to every personal remark hazarded by such a paper, and would be constantly appealing to the law; that the High Court and its counsel would thus, in fact, come to review in public the executive proceedings of Government; that

Messrs. Sumner and McGuire,* each, two hundred and fifty-five thousand; to Colonel Caillaud, two hundred thousand; to Mr. Culling Smith and to Captain Yorke, one hundred and thirty-four thousand each. Three days after the signature of the treaty Mír Kásim set out for Murshidábád. Two days later Mr. Vansittart followed him. A week or two later Mír J'afar was on his way to Calcutta as a pensioner, and Mír Kásim reigned in his stead. This was a revolution, and revolutions rarely calm the passions. This one, in particular, had had the effect of confirming the view, introduced by the corrupt transactions with Mír J'afar previous to Plassey, that the special use of a Súbahdár of the three provinces was to supply the members of the Calcutta Council with private funds as they might require them.† A circumstance came, shortly after the transaction with Mír Kásim, to prove the truth of this theory. In a previous chapter‡ I have mentioned how Clive and his Council had commented most strongly, in a letter, dated 29th December 1759, on the conduct of the Court of Directors. The reply to this remonstrance had been a letter, dated 21st January 1761, dismissing from the service Messrs. Holwell, Playdell,

* The members of Council mentioned in a previous page, Messrs. Amyatt and Playdell, had been nominated to other appointments. Mr. Amyatt subsequently, however, returned to Calcutta.

† This was the view stated a little later by Mr. Scrafton, a very able man, who took a considerable part in the negotiations immediately preceding and following Plassey.

‡ Page 331.

Sumner, and McGuire. Before this despatch, however, reached Calcutta, Mr. Holwell had resigned. The three other gentlemen were now removed. Others, Mr. Ellis, a man of very violent temper, Mr. Smyth, Mr. Verelst, and Mr. Warren Hastings, filled the vacancies. By this change the party in opposition to Mr. Vansittart obtained the majority in the Council. Indeed, from this time, it was they who ruled, Mr. Vansittart being supported only by Mr. Warren Hastings.

Meanwhile Mír Kásim had begun to put in practice the policy by which he hoped to secure practical independence for the country he had been called upon to administer. The war in which he, as an ally of the English, found himself engaged with the Emperor was brought to a conclusion in June 1761. No sooner had his territories been evacuated alike by the supporters of the imperial authority and by the English, than Mír Kásim took the first step in his long-meditated project. This was to remove from power all the subordinate governors who had shown either partiality to the English or hostility to himself. The reasons he put forward for the removal were of a less political character. The men removed were said to have embezzled State moneys, to have taken bribes, to have misgoverned. Their places were filled by men of character and ability devoted to the new Núwáb. To be further away from the surveillance which the English had exercised over Mír J'afar at Murshidábád, Mír Kásim then removed his capital to Mungér (Monghyr), three hundred and seventy miles by the river

*Journal, dated 12th January*, 1866.

"Dinkur Rao called and had a long talk. He told me of Lawrence having asked him what was the real cause of the mutiny, and that he told Lawrence it was only a pretence, the greased cartridges, &c., and that the real cause was the discontent of the people, reflected only by the army as alone able to show and give force to its feelings; that our 'kanoon' and laws and regulations were the true cause. He told me roundly that in all quarters our rule was hated and unpopular, though the people never had had, and never would have, such a government. He blames our police as the source of much evil, and of filling the jails."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 16th May*, 1866.

"The Amir has recovered Ghuzni, and probably, by this time, Cabul. Azim Khan will not be able to hold his own there against the Amir. I should be glad to see some sort of consolidated power in Afghanistan, and without binding ourselves by any special treaty obligations, we may, I think, if the Amir recover Cabul, lend him some countenance and a friendly hand. Four or five thousand common muskets and accoutrements would be acceptable to him, I have no doubt, to replace the losses of his campaign. This Lawrence proposes to give him, as also presents to some Rs. 20,000 worth.

"Late events in the Persian Gulf, at Muscat, and Aden prove the impolicy of having abolished the Indian navy. Our influence will very rapidly be destroyed if a speedy remedy be not hit upon. Our trade with the Persian Gulf is rapidly on the increase, and if we had but an effective small squadron available for the protection of our interests in those seas the improvement would advance steadily. But Admiralty orders won't allow the single vessel that now and then looks in at Bombay and Muscat to remain on the Arab coast; by April they are off to Trincomalee. What is absolutely necessary is some effective substitute for the Indian navy. Half a dozen good gunboats, carrying each a couple of heavy guns, and having a small complement of European sailors, with the bulk of the crew picked lascars, would be quite enough. They should be good sea boats, yet not draw too much water, and should be fast when under steam. They might be commanded by lieutenants of the navy, but should be under the orders of the Government of India, and paid by India, and whatever the Admiralty may promise no other system will answer; there must be a

special service under the orders of the Government of India, otherwise the labour of a half century and more will rapidly vanish, and the maritime Arabs, who are now becoming alive to the fact that we cannot protect our traders and commerce, will soon resume their old ways. I cannot conceive anything more unbecoming our position than what has lately happened, viz., that the Governor-General in Council should tell our native merchants that if they return to Muscat, &c., they must do so at their own present risk, because Government has not the means to protect them and their commerce.

"We have had among the cattle slaughtered for the troops in the Punjab much good beef rejected because it was found infected by the cysts of the worm which is considered so dangerous when once developed in the human system; my suspicion is that it has been good beef thrown away, for that the cooking destroys the vitality of the cyst, otherwise I am confident we should long ago have had many cases of the dreaded worm, for the disease cannot be new in the Punjab. It affects all the best and fattest cattle, when it exists at all. Fortunately it does not seem generally prevalent, and the sheep and goats being free from it, their flesh was substituted. But as the supply of sheep and goats is very limited, it is lucky that the number of infected cattle is diminishing."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 2nd June*, 1866.

"Much to my amusement I find the very citadel of army disorganization, the Adjutant-General's office, now turning against the new system in its every phrase. S——— told me frankly, the other night, that they could not find fit men for the posts they had to fill, that the staff corps would never work, and that there must be a reconstruction. Meanwhile, so long as the officers of the old army remain available, this failure is not so palpable, and Mansfield wants to make captains and majors adjutants of Native corps, quoting the Prussian system as an example; but he forgets that a Prussian regiment is composed of three battalions, each as strong as our regiments, and that, in fact, a Prussian regiment is what we should call an infantry brigade, for which a brigade-major is proper enough as its staff officer. He will ruin our regimental system if he has his way in this matter, the main object of which is to veil over for a while the staff corps failure to draw young men, whilst those who entered from the Indian army are fast becoming field officers. We shall soon arrive at a curious stage,

having a plethora of field officers, pretty good store of captains, but a dearth of subalterns.

"We shall never get on without some effective substitute for the Indian navy, so as to be able to maintain the maritime police of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. It is quite miserable the petty shifts and devices to which Government are forced to have recourse for the security of their telegraph stations, and the protection of commerce bids fair to be abdicated in favour of any other Power who will take the trouble off our hands. This is simply suicidal shortsightedness on our part. We have more need to maintain our maritime supremacy in the Gulf of Persia and in the Red Sea than Russia has to secure the full command of the Caspian. She does it, whilst we talk and do nothing."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 16th June, 1866.*

"Since I last wrote the state of the money market at Bombay has gone from bad to worse, and the Bank of Bombay shares have fallen to Rs. 16 discount. The collapse of the Agra and Masterman Bank will not have improved matters either at Bombay or anywhere else, for there was so general confidence in that bank that many connected with India will be severe sufferers. Fortunately the Bank of Bengal has been firmly and wisely managed, and no bank could be in a better, sounder, or stronger position than it is at the time I am writing. It is in a position to pay off all claims demandable on call, including the treasury balance, except 42 lakhs, and these 42 lakhs are covered by 50 lakhs of Government securities, and 11 lakhs in cash held on its account by the Bombay Bank. I wish the latter were in as sound a position; but they had not the courage this time last year to reduce their share loans, if a loss had to be sustained; and they have consequently found themselves in June, 1866, even in a worse position than they were in June, 1865, in fact, almost precisely in an identical position as to liabilities and assets, but with a most lamentable depreciation of the private securities they largely hold; the result of course being that though in account the balance sheet is very much the same, virtually the affairs of the bank are worse and more critical. Both in Calcutta and Bombay confidence is at so low an ebb that bills of exchange have no market at all, and remittances are difficult. We have, I fear, not seen the end of all this monetary disturbance, and must await the month of August before the full action of the cotton question be ascertained.

"By telegram from Peshawur we are told that the new Amir, Afzul Khan, under the influence of the Akhoond of Swat, has declared a war against infidels, *i.e.*, against us, and that our moonshee is likely to be bound to leave. If true, which is doubtful, it proves that Afzul Khan is not sure of his position, and still dreads Shere Ali; and that he plays what he thinks his strongest card, namely, to operate on the fanaticism of the Afghans, in order to draw them to his standard, knowing that unless our frontier is insulted we are not likely to trouble ourselves much about this threatened war against infidels.

"Lawrence has been rather puzzled how to act with two Amirs in the field, with one of whom, Shere Ali, we had entered into amicable relations, but until one or other prevail, it would be folly to enter into positive engagements. It is a fratricidal civil war in the worst sense of the words, and time and accident and treachery will bring it to some solution or other without our active interference."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 30th June,* 1866.

"A whole brigade of Royal Horse Artillery, the batteries of which are at Meerut, Umballah, Lucknow, and Lahore, is pronounced as 'soon not able to move' in consequence of the utter failure of the Woolwich carriages. We shall, of course, patch up the brigade as fast as it can be done, but Woolwich carriages are of no use in India. Our magazines have been reduced too low in the matter of small arms, and we are not fit for any great exertion, such as putting into the field armies of the strength that Lord Ellenborough, Lord Hardinge, Lord Dalhousie, and Lord Canning found it necessary to assemble. I hope that a general war in Europe, if it arise, may be waged without India being at all affected, for we ought to be better prepared than we are if any part fall on India, but that of looking on. Militarily speaking, we are out of joint in everything except our European infantry, which, too, has fallen far below strength."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 16th August,* 1866.

"Lawrence and Mansfield are very much put out by Lord Napier's minute on the Madras army, and by the minutes of his colleagues, and the report of the commission of general officers and of the Commander-in-Chief, Lemarchant. Mansfield and Lawrence

ascribe the state of feeling in that army to the conservative opposition of the European officers, and pronounce the reports exaggerated, Napier and his colleagues misled, and eulogize the irregular system as in every way perfect. From a variety of independent sources I learn, however, that the Madras authorities only write what is the fact; the truth may be unpalatable to Lawrence and Mansfield, but I cannot blame Lord Napier and the others for their honesty. What is more, I am sorry to say that I hear quite as unfavourable accounts of the Bombay Native army, and not much better of the Bengal; even Mansfield was forced to come up to Government lately acknowledging the dissatisfaction existing among the irregular cavalry in consequence of Sir H. Rose's orders of 1863. We have had to put these aside and to revert to the old style of Native dress, &c.

"I am glad that the Foreign Office is in your hands, for if any one can keep us out of Continental complications it will be your calm independence of any other influences than consideration for the real welfare of England. Nevertheless, arm your infantry with the best and most rapid breech-loaders, your artillery with the best guns, and 'keep your powder dry.'"

*To Lord Ellenborough, dated 16th August*, 1866.

"At the same time that your letter of the 8th July reached me came the first despatches signed by Lord Cranborne; as he had but just taken up the reins we can form no judgment of our new minister. He will have much to learn, and the bequest of the greatest army muddle that ever a minister of State had to face. I hope this ministry may stand, for we have had enough of the Whigs; but I was greatly in hopes that both Lowe and Horsman would join the present Government, and your Lordship mentions your own wish that Lowe had been attached to the ministry. I still look to a coalition, for many will not refuse to join Lord Stanley should he become Premier, and this does not seem a very unlikely event.

"The war in Bohemia is brought to a conclusion, and the preliminaries of peace signed, before we have had any account other than by telegram of the battles fought. I cannot comprehend, unless there were distrust in the Austrian ranks, why Benedek did not crush the Prussian columns one by one ere they effected a junction. He was admirably placed for so doing. I do not think that a great empire like Austria can long submit to the excessive

humiliation this short campaign has brought upon her, and I regard the so-called peace as merely a truce. I think Lord Stanley will do all in his power to keep England clear of continental strife; yet I do hope that no time will be lost in putting into the hands of our infantry, and our volunteers, the best and most rapid breech-loaders, and of our artillery the best of field guns. We are much too slow in military movements."

*To Sir George Clerk, dated 16th September*, 1866.

"I was glad to see your well-known handwriting, and have to thank you for all expressed in yours of the 15th of last month. I cannot say it was any disappointment to me that my name was omitted from the Star of India.

"I have, however, never forgiven the insult passed upon me in 1859, when my name was struck out of the K.C.B. on the plea that the 'key' to his despatch sent home by Lord Canning did not support the recommendation of the honours commission, who being members of the Secretary of State's Council had no right to propose one of themselves. As to the 'key' excuse, I asked Lord Canning pointblank when I returned to India at his request in 1861 if there were truth in it, and he said not a particle of truth as respected myself. Mine has been a curious career; the best years of my life were passed in unmerited ill-treatment, because, as Lord Ellenborough could not be reached, it was gratifying resentment to make me suffer vicariously for the hatred borne him; and the latter part of my career has been marked by equal ill-will, because I opposed the folly of disorganizing the Indian armies and perpetrating great injustice to the 5,000 British officers who had but few to stand up for them except myself, Willoughby, and one or two others, yourself included. I think the result has shown who were right. Lord Cranborne's despatches just arrived are admirable. He has done the only thing that could really get rid of this endless petitioning on grievances; and I shall do all in my humble power to work out his scheme in the spirit in which it is conceived and ordered, and shall do so with the conviction that it will succeed, and staunch a chronic state of mischievous agitation."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 20th September*, 1866.

"So completely is the staff corps breaking down in the matter of young officers, whilst rapidly growing into a corps of field

officers and captains, that Mansfield himself yesterday acknowledged that the reserve was wholly used up, that they had not subalterns available for the duties for which they were wanted, and that consequently he was in favour of a project which the Governor-General's military secretary had moved, viz., to admit young officers from the Queen's army under a relaxation of the staff corps rules. Now, if this were allowed in favour of applicants from the Queen's regiments, who are not properly qualified, I can see no earthly reason for not admitting the lieutenants of cavalry and infantry on the *general* list, and it would have many advantages. The time is not far distant when half the staff corps will be field officers, and unless something is devised, there will be a dearth of subalterns. The controller-general, who is investigating the cost of the staff corps, says it is enormous, and will grow more so, and that no government can stand the expense of such a system. Be this as it may, neither the efficiency nor the contentment of the Native army is secured. The pay of the sepoy remains what it always has been. Whilst all other classes are receiving higher wages, the sepoy has ceased to be what was the case formerly, much better paid than agricultural labourers, artizans, and servants. The link between himself and the European officers is far less than ever. The work is harder; and though the pay of the Native officers and their position may be said to be improved by the new organization, the man in the ranks prefers the old one, in which the welfare of the private was in the hands of the impartial European regimental officers in charge of companies. The first rough touch of war will crumble this organization to pieces, and the whole will have to be re-cast again."

About this time he writes in his diary:—

"Reading Miss Eden's letters up the country. They will have one bad effect, viz., to show how little Lord Auckland and his sisters cared for the country and its services—no sympathy from such people with the men who do the work in India." And on the following day—"Reading Miss Eden's letters; no mention of Ghuzni except in a fête at Simla, but a long lying extract from M—— as to the entry of Shah Shuja into Candahar. The storm of Ghuzni was evidently a disappointment to the military promenade theory which sent us into Afghanistan."

"Colonel —— called. . . . . He went home with Lord Auckland, and mentioned that for some time Lord Auckland shut himself up, but Miss Eden got him out and devised a game of pitching

Spanish dollars into a tin pot with sand in it and circles marked. Lord Auckland took great delight in this."

Then follows an entry in his letter-book:—

"Wrote to Lord Stanley announcing that from two different quarters the death of Bishop Cotton had been announced, drowned at Kooshteea in passing from the 'Koel' steamer to the bank. The river is said there to run with great velocity, and it is supposed that the Bishop fell off the plank laid from the steamer to the shore; but the telegram gave no particulars, except that he had been consecrating the cemetery at Kooshteea. In writing to Lord Stanley I spoke of Bishop Cotton as a very able and wise man, one who combined with breadth and depth of intellect a disciplined intellect and great literary powers; that he knew India and his diocese well; that on the last point no new man could replace him; and that on other qualifications the Government would not find it easy to replace him by a successor worthy of so eminent and excellent a predecessor. I concluded by saying I was more sorry at this loss than at any which had occurred since my return to India."

*To Sir Charles Mills, dated 21st December*, 1866.

"Many thanks for yours of the 8th of November. Lord Percy wrote to counsel me against refusing honours, if offered, but did not mention that he had written to Lord Cranborne on the subject. I don't think they are likely to try me, and now that stars and ribands can do me no good I am utterly indifferent whether they do or not.

"In 1858 the case would have been different. Had I then been made a K.C.B., to which my services fully entitled me, they could not have kept me four years, from 1861 to 1865, out of a Lieutenant-Governorship or this Council. I should by this time have been thinking of a return to England, and should have been in a position to answer your question as to my views with regard to election for the Secretary of State's Council, by saying that it would suit me admirably to be re-elected. But the four years passed as Foreign Secretary proved, except in experience, wholly unprofitable; nay, more than that, a disastrous loss to my family, for, being out of the Secretary of State's Council, I could not take advantage of the opportunity of claiming one of the increased

pensions, and the bonus of my corps. Now I must try and work out my period of Council, and endeavour in some degree in the course of the next four years (or rather three and a half) to make up for this dead loss. My return to India has proved in many ways very unfortunate to myself, and what I feel much more, to my family; and if granted health and strength, I must work on for their sakes. If I consulted my own wishes alone, I should like to find myself again at work in the India Office, where, say what they like, it depends on the good sense of the Council to act as the fly wheel of our Indian home administration, and keep it steady and free from party crotchets and impulses. If I live to return to England there is nothing I should more desire than to be again *elected* to the Council; but, circumstanced as I am now, I cannot afford to throw up my seat in the Governor-General's Council."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 22nd December*, 1866.

"We shall have a rather unfavourable budget, and Massey proposes to borrow a million a year for the next three years in the English market, to aid us in the outlay of ten million which we are forced to incur on barrack and hospital accommodation for the European troops. Upon the local governments is to be thrown the duty of raising £800,000 by a license tax. Stamps are to give an increase of two or three hundred thousand pounds, and a small addition to the export duty on grain is to give £150,000. Massey is thus to make up the two million; and if the license tax fail to do what is expected, the re-imposition of the income tax will be a necessity, and one which the public would admit was forced upon him by circumstances.

"However, before next year opium may again rise (for it is that which is depressing now so heavily our estimated receipts), and there may be no need for an income tax. I was against the addition to the export duty on grain, but it is light, and can stand augmentation, though I think it rather objectionable. Lawrence wanted to have the income tax as well as the license tax; but as the amount he proposed to raise by the former was small, it scarcely was advisable, by putting to work two forms of taxation, to incur a maximum of irritation with a minimum of result . . . . . .

"Lawrence . . . . has recommended an addition to the strength of the Civil Service and a decrease of the uncovenanted and militarily derived Civil *employés*. I don't think this either liberal or wise, and

I have opposed it. The monopoly of India for the Civil Service is all very well up to a certain point, but one great encouragement to Army Service in India was that it opened some field of general employment to those who qualified for the purpose. Now in the Royal Army, where there is a fair sprinkling of liberally educated men, who after a while get tired of the dull routine of military life, and might be tempted by a tolerably open field to embark on an Indian career, it seems a pity to place them on so different a footing from the Company's officers, and to bar India from them as a field that offered chances of general and higher employment. Is it quite good policy to shut them out, and to say in such an empire as this that military men are to be and can be nothing more than the helots of the Civil Service? Will that render Military Service in India more popular than it is becoming? I doubt it."

On his way to Calcutta, at the close of 1866, my father had stopped at Agra; and from Agra he drove out to Futtehpore Sikri, where he remained for several days. The place is a strange one—a deserted city of the time of Akbar, built upon a ridge of sandstone rock near the Bhurtpore frontier. Most of the city is now in ruins, but some exquisite buildings remain, and there is perhaps no spot in India which contains within a narrow compass so much that is interesting and beautiful. To my father it was always a delight, and the quiet days that he now spent reading and sketching among the silent courts and cloisters of the Moguls helped and refreshed him more than he could express. But it had been to him a year of much sorrow, for his blind boys, to whose care and teaching his scanty leisure was devoted, had suddenly ceased to make progress; and from this time, notwithstanding all his efforts, they began to fall back. "I have had to bear a great affliction," he wrote, "one fortunately that few people can enter into, for it is seldom laid upon any to have two boys born blind, to watch them showing at first every sign of intelligence, and then suddenly to find them retrograde, as if, in despair at their dark lot, they could sympathize with nothing and no one around them . . . . . Both, after at one time beginning to speak, learn, &c., suddenly broke off, evinced unwillingness to say anything, and gradually ceased from the attempt to repeat or imitate . . . . . No one can conceive the strain it has been to watch this process of retrogression . . . . . The calamity has been a heavy one to bear—all these years of painful watching and labour, when I had a trifle of leisure to give the blind boys; and it is sadly intensified by this

result." It was with a heavy heart, therefore, that he returned to take up again the burden of official work; and to the end of his life the sorrow weighed upon him more and more.

At the beginning of 1867 the old project of an advance to Quetta was once more under consideration. It had been mooted by Sir Henry Green, of the Sind Horse, the pupil and successor of General Jacob, and had received some support from the Government of Bombay. In the Council Chamber at Calcutta, however, the proposal met with scant countenance; and my father's emphatic expressions of disapproval were hardly needed to ensure its rejection. He had opposed the occupation of Quetta in 1856, and he now opposed it again, as unnecessary and likely to embroil us with the Belooch and Afghan tribes. The rapid and thorough completion of our Indus frontier communications was, he said, all that was then required. He could easily conceive circumstances which might in the future necessitate our advance beyond that frontier, and he had no fear of the result. "I know," he wrote, "that we could again seize Afghanistan, if it were advisable or necessary, and that with our Indus frontier complete in its communications, parallel and perpendicular, no power on earth could shake us out of that country. I know, too, that with the Afghans friendly and cordial we could, without the actual seizure of the country for ourselves, organize its defence in a most destructive manner against hostile invasion. But neither alternative is at present imposed on us as of the smallest necessity . . . . . It will, I think, be all that political and military considerations demand, if our lines of rail and river communication on the Indus frontier are rendered as perfect as it is easily in our power to make them; so that, without our at present incurring the risk of complications with Afghan and Belooch tribes and politics, it may yet be in our power rapidly to mass and securely to feed and support our forces, whether intended for operations above or below the passes . . . . . If our position on the Indus frontier be one of unmistakable strength, it will long paralyze aggressive presumption." It was on this point, the completion of our frontier communications, that he constantly dwelt during his term of office in the Governor-General's Council; and had his advice been followed, our line of railway would have been complete from Lahore to Peshawur long before the outbreak of war in 1878. He also insisted upon the necessity for joining Sind to the Punjab, and thus getting rid of the conflicts of policy, and the military inconveniences, which resulted from the subordination of Sind to the Government of Bombay. "One

government, one policy, and one command, should watch over the frontier from the sea-board to Peshawur."

It should be added that, though in the main he supported Sir John Lawrence's views of non-intervention in Central Asia, he was by no means indifferent to the eastward progress of the Russian arms. The following is a letter to Sir John Lawrence, written in March, 1867, which shows his opinions upon this subject:—

"My dear Lawrence,—It is difficult without a knowledge of the precise nature of Amir Shere Ali's overtures to say how I think they should be met, but I understand that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab apprehends the probability of Amir Shere Ali throwing himself into the arms of Persia, and even Russia, in order to obtain support in the struggle for power in Afghanistan, which he is now waging against Afzul Khan and Azim Khan; and it is possible that Shere Ali may do so to a certain extent, or attempt to do so.

"Hitherto the policy of the Government of India has been to maintain absolute neutrality with respect to the contending factions in Afghanistan; and the Amir Afzul Khan was only lately, after the defeat of Amir Shere Ali, addressed as Amir of Cabul and Candahar, care being taken at the same time to reiterate the intention of pursuing the same policy in future, to recognize Amir Shere Ali as ruler of Herat, and to reciprocate relations of amity with Shere Ali.

"Under these circumstances the reply to Shere Ali's overtures seems prescribed by the professions of neutrality on one hand, to which the Government of India has over and over again pledged itself, and by the terms of the treaty with Persia of the 4th of March, 1857.

"If the Amir apply for aid in men, arms, or money, the answer may consistently be that in pursuance of the neutrality so faithfully observed by the Government of India towards both parties, neither men, arms, nor money can be granted to Amir Shere Ali any more than to his opponents, the Amirs Afzul Khan and Azim Khan, and that so long as nothing is done on either side to forfeit our amity, there is no purpose of departing from the policy of neutrality. But if there be any infraction of the treaty with Persia, which by its sixth article binds the Shah to abstain from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and recognizes the independence of Herat, then the Government of India

would consider itself free to relinquish the policy of absolute neutrality, and at liberty to pursue any course which might seem advisable. For that the Amir who was instrumental in courting and enlisting foreign interference would be regarded as thereby forfeiting all title to the amicable neutrality and forbearance hitherto scrupulously observed by the Government of India, and must accept as due to his own shortsighted act any consequences that might result, however unfavourable to his own interests, from the Government of India pursuing such course as might seem best calculated to secure the independence of Afghanistan and its rulers from foreign interference.

"Further than this I would not at present go, for I am not in favour of being in any hurry to subsidize the Cabul ruler with either money or arms. A subsidy of money vamps up their pride and pretension, is never applied to the purpose for which it is given, nor, indeed, to any useful or healthy purpose, but stimulates their insatiable avarice, and is regarded as a tribute extracted from our weakness and apprehensions. Aid in arms is less objectionable, but even in this form of affording help to the Cabul ruler, it is hardly expedient to be forward in pressing such assistance on his acceptance. Neither Afzul Khan nor Azim Khan are as yet securely established; and provided in this contest for power Shere Ali respect the independence of his country and abstain from invoking the active support of Persia or any other power, we should hardly be justified in throwing ourselves rather precipitately into the scale against him. A supply of arms is really the most valuable assistance that can be given to an Afghan ruler, and would be generally understood as a very decisive mode of ranging British aid on his side.

"The Secretary of State for Foreign affairs will probably have heard, from our Minister at Teheran, whether any overtures have been made to Persia by either of the Afghan factions; but under existing circumstances it might be advisable to intimate firmly to the Persian Government that any departure from the obligations of article six of the Treaty of Paris would not, at the present juncture, be viewed with indifference by Her Majesty's Government, and that Persia was expected to abstain from all interference at this crisis with Herat affairs, or those of other parts of Afghanistan. If in accordance with the policy of Her Majesty's Government, a timely warning of this kind might prevent future misunderstandings and awkward complications.

"You are aware that I do not regard with indifference the

progress of Russia in Turkistan. For years there has been no relaxation in her aggressive policy except such as was essential to afford time for the construction of her military posts, for the perfecting in a military sense of her lines of communication, and for some consolidation of her administrative arrangements over her new acquisitions. She has moved as fast as was consistent with sound military considerations.

"These are the measures of her advance towards her goal, which assuredly is not the trade of the poor countries of Turkistan. I am aware that colourable causes are adduced, which, however, being really the results of her own policy, as step by step her advanced posts come into contact with those who feel that it is their turn next to be swallowed up, are too transparent to impose upon anybody, or veil the real aim and character of a progressive and laboriously secured advance along a carefully selected strategical line. It is true that Russia is still at some distance from the Afghan frontier, and that she may have a good deal of trouble with her Turkistan acquisitions, but she enjoys an immense advantage over such a government as our own, for nothing diverts an autocrat power like Russia from the continuous prosecution of great schemes of aggrandizement, whilst with us it is idle to expect any persistency of policy or conduct, even when our policy has ceased to be aggressive, and is conservative and defensive. But accepting as a fact the utter uncertainty of our future policy, there is one thing which we can do, and which underlies all action, and suits any policy, and which will secure us an incalculable advantage both in peace and war, and that is the timely completion of the line of railway communication from Kurrachee to Lahore, and from Lahore to Attock. This, coupled with making the most of the navigation of the Indus and Punjab rivers, makes us, if we know what we are about, indisputable masters of Afghanistan, whenever, if ever, it suit our purpose to stay a wave of invasion from the westward. If there be only that degree of a persistent policy on our own part, whatever the value of the navigation of the Syr Daria and the Russian posts upon it, we are and shall remain masters of the Afghanistan and Indus frontier. No consideration should lead the Home Government to delay putting our Indus frontier in perfect and thorough order."

Before leaving Calcutta for Simla in 1867 my father had been made a Knight Commander of the Star of India. He had not coveted this honour, and it now brought him little gratification. He felt that it came too late, and he could never forget his

exclusion from the K.C.B. list in 1859. The several letters of congratulation which he received served to strengthen this feeling; for one and all they were couched in the same strain, commenting upon the tardiness with which his services had been recognized. However he accepted the honour as it came, and in April, 1867, he went up to Simla as Sir Henry. I quote the following extracts from letters written before the migration:—

*To Lord Stanley, dated 8th February*, 1867.

"A rather stiff letter has been written to the King of Burmah, but do what we will the day will come that the half of the cherry left unbitten by Lord Dalhousie must be swallowed too. Colonel Phayre is about to be relieved by Colonel Fytche. Phayre goes to England, and can enlighten the India Office on Burmese affairs and prospects. No one knows the country better than he does. I shall be thankful if the annexation of Burmah can be staved off for four or five years, for then I shall be clear of this Council before the event takes place; but I have misgivings whether the rotten pear can hang so long without dropping.

"Shere Ali has been beaten, and is gone to Herat, whilst Candahar has fallen into the hands of his opponent's retainers. Afzul Khan, or rather Azim Khan, for he is the real man, is now therefore in the ascendant in Afghanistan. No confidence exists, however, that a stable government can be formed in that country until the greater number of the rival chiefs have cut each other's throats, or some one chief succeeds in effecting this delicate operation for his brothers and cousins. As a mere question of humanity it is open to doubt whether a prolific ruler in such a country as that had not better drown his young puppies before they can do mischief. Afghanistan cannot support so many chiefs, but the people do not seem to know how to get rid of their plague; and as soon as one overgrown family has managed to get extirpated, polygamy builds up another, so that the process of having to get rid of superfluous chiefs is endless."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 23rd March*, 1867.

"Massey is a little sore at the way his license tax has been received, and regrets he did not follow my advice, viz., not to render the Bill essentially false and contradictory by introducing the clause which taxes all official servants, and renders it a quasi-

income tax. He says the opposition boiled up originates in these classes, whom Lawrence, &c., taxed out of deference to the *sentiments* of the public, as they termed it. The public has gone against the tax, notwithstanding the deference shown to its sentiments. I once put it to Massey and the council whether for £500,000 it was worth while incurring the unpopularity of the measure. Lawrence and others insisted. Massey would, I think, have dropped it if I had received any support. Massey means next year to exclude the official income tax, and confine the Bill to its proper object, *viz.*, a license tax on trades and professions. I don't think it reaches the rich at all adequately, but this is a difficult point.

"We have had a very bad Bill before the Council. When discussed in the executive council I pointed out how objectionable the Punjab Outrages Bill must be, but Lawrence and the Punjab Government were in its favour, and I had to give way. Much better have had none, and indemnified frontier officers when an assassin, red-handed from the deed, was tried and hung. The Bill was in its original conception intended to legalize a summary process of trial and execution for assassins of the kind peculiar to the frontier. When the frontier tribes make a raid, as they often do, into our territory, we cut them up and disperse and punish them. When two or three or one single man perpetrates the assassination of an European officer from the same motive that he makes a raid I fail to see why he is to be treated like an ordinary culprit of our own population. Except from our proverbial respect for the ordinary course of law, the man is guilty of an act of hostility. . . . . Our officers, however, are getting timid, not only on that frontier, but everywhere else, from the overflow of legal trammels, which cripple and manacle our executive, and are mere cobwebs against the tiger masses the executive has to deal with. . . . . We cannot hold the country by barristers and High Courts and laws. The people neither read nor understand, and it is ruining our executive administration in its efficient action. . . . .

"I am in hopes, if the Secretary of State approve of the measure, and the shareholders of the Bengal and Bombay banks in England concur with those in India, that by incorporating the Bombay bank and having one State bank, Bombay affairs may be rallied, and the Government rescue a large amount of stock they hold in the Bombay bank from peril. Nothing else will do it. Whatever may be done hereafter, Government should not at the present time withdraw from being shareholders and directors in these banks, or,

if they become one, in the State bank. If this be done, it will at once destroy the confidence now felt by the natives and the services in these banks of Bengal and Madras. I hope Sir S. Northcote's views formed on English theories will not prove hostile to what suits the very different state of things in India."

*To his Daughter, dated 5th April*, 1867.

"Under Mrs. Fayrer's wing I broke out last night into a visitor of the circus. Some of the acrobat feats were good, and some of the riding. Jim and Harry were absorbed, and will probably be teaching ——— how to hang by a leg on the rocking horse, &c., all to-day; but they were all rapt attention last night. I applauded the lady performers and the men, too, and did the duty of a pleased auditor well enough. I have seen better performances of the kind, and was not overwhelmed like Jim and Harry, but that's the difference between five and eleven times five! Alas!!!

"Where or when this will reach you I don't know, but as to-day you are or ought to be at Kurnaul, I may as well send it on to Simla, for there is small hope of its finding you *en route* anywhere else short of Simla. I miss you all a *wee bit* of course; but I am not sorry I kept no one to do penance, for the heat is waxing sharp and decided even here; and sitting as I am doing, without a punkah and with all open in my writing room, the heat and glare is considerable, and my head feels as if it wanted the *soothing* of a cheroot to check its *swimminess*. I have sent A—— his 5,000 cheroots, and think I have got him good 'weeds' and at a moderate price, but think of *me*, of all men in the world, being asked to execute such a commission! There are very few for whom I would have tried and smoked weeds but A——; I think it's an episode in my life the boys had better not know. I hope to hear that the trip from Delhi has been a favourable one; I own to feeling very like a sneaking shirk and deserter to leave you all to fight your own way as unprotected females to Simla."

Shortly after his arrival in Simla in the spring of 1867 my father's life was very nearly cut short. He had had more than one narrow escape in the course of his career, but none perhaps narrower than this; for the house in which he was living, "the Observatory," a high and exposed building, was struck by lightning during one of the heavy storms so common in the Himalayas, and he was partially stunned, one of the walls of the room in which he was standing being destroyed. The effects of the shock,

however, passed off in a few hours, and he suffered no inconvenience beyond a heavy pain in the head. A few paces to one side, and he must inevitably have been killed.

A similar accident occurred in the same house some years later, when it was occupied by Sir Henry Norman, my father's successor as military member of the Viceroy's council, and the much abused Public Works Department is said to have incurred some ridicule on this occasion by hurriedly providing the house with a lightning conductor which began and ended on the roof. However, the mistake was remedied after a few more thunderstorms, and Sir Henry Norman lives to tell the tale.

During the remainder of the year my father's work was exceedingly heavy. The late famine in Orissa; the progress of events in Central Asia; the condition of our military force in the country; the extension of our Indian railways, upon which so much depended and still depends; recent failures in trade, and the measures adopted by Government with regard to the presidency banks; the great scheme of financial decentralisation, which was gradually taking shape under the hands of the brothers Strachey; finally the prospect of an Abyssinian war, gave the Viceroy's council ample occupation, and led to the recording of a great number of minutes, good, bad, and indifferent. My father's contributions to the discussion will be found elsewhere, but I continue to quote his letters.

*To Lord Stanley, dated 17th June*, 1867.

"At Lawrence's request I have given him a memorandum on the subject of an expedition to Abyssinia. He wanted it for the Secretary of State, who had forwarded a memorandum by Coghlan on this matter. I am afraid I cannot get a copy of my own memorandum in time to enclose it, but the substance of it may be shortly stated as being, that, since in 525 A.D. the ruler of Abyssinia could march to the coast 50,000 men, embark them, cross over and take Yemen, and retain the conquest for 50 years, during which time there must have been constant communication, reinforcements, &c., the features of the country cannot be so much altered as that we cannot send up a small well-equipped column, the strength and composition of which I have suggested; but that to my mind the difficulty of such an expedition is not the advance to the plateau of Abyssinia, but the withdrawal

of the force after a temporary occupation, and the completion of the objects for which it was sent.

"The power of Theodorus has dwindled down to a low ebb, and provided we avoided appearing on that field as allied with the Turco-Egyptian powers, the alienated chiefs and people would not be likely to ally round Theodorus; but in a semi-savage country of that kind, now in a state of thorough anarchy, no mortal man can predict the effect of the advance of a British force, or of its withdrawal after it had accomplished its mission."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 2nd July,* 1867.

"To the progress of Russia in Central Asia the only reply to make was the rapid completion of the Indus frontier lines of railway; for practically that would have been synonymous with our having in our power, whenever compelled to put forth our strength, the whole of Afghanistan; and the railways would have been of great commercial importance. I read with deep regret that influenced by Lawrence's preference for the Rajpootana and other lines, the Secretary of State has settled to shelve the Indus group of railways. India and England, too, will some day repent the decision, I fear.

"The issue at Cabul, if it is settled by the close of the hostile armies, has not as yet reached us. It must soon, for the forces were too close to stand at half-cock long.

"The king of Burmah stopped his mission to France, and seems more disposed to try and strengthen himself by the support which cordial relations with us would insure for him than to pursue a contrary policy. But he feels very insecure, as the spirit of rebellion is rife among the princes, as they are called. One of these he lately executed "pour encourager les autres," the king being not at all like-minded with your cabinet in its lenity to the Fenian leaders. Captain Sladen, however, saved the lives of two youths of fifteen, who had been taken to execution at the same time.

"The cholera attack at Peshawur has been very severe, but is now over. All over the country it has flashed up here and there in a way that shows pretty clearly that as yet little or nothing is known about it. Much has been attributed to the flux and reflux of the pilgrims to Hurdwar; and in the Punjab, wherever a pilgrim has in perfect health passed through a village, and the village a fortnight or three weeks after has been attacked by

cholera, the pilgrim is given the credit of bearing the cholera with him. Lawrence is for ploughing up and sowing with grain parade grounds and encamping grounds, so that vegetation may consume the cholera virus. The idea emanates from Dr. Farquhar, his medical attendant. Another doctor, at Peshawur, scrapes all the walls of barracks and hospitals; but no one hears of the people employed in scraping the infected buildings being victims to cholera. I wish we could lay our phantom as easily as you have disposed of the compound householders and the difficulties of household suffrage; ours won't be exorcised."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 18th July*, 1867.

"I enclose a copy of a second memorandum in continuation of the first, a copy of which I have previously sent. It will be seen by the accompanying memorandum that I think it would be worth while to search the Portuguese writers from whose works the account of Abyssinia contained in Volume 12 of the 'Universal History' was compiled. Here there are no such works to be had, but in London they are doubtless to be found; and any Portuguese scholar of the Foreign Office, who had the leisure, might perhaps hit on very useful information, not alone on the special point I have noted, viz., what led the viceroy Stephen de Gama to prefer the route by which Christopher da Gama and his four hundred men advanced straight from Zeila to Lake Dembra, but on other important points connected with the practicable character of the country in a military sense. If the prisoners are to be saved at all, whatever is done should be done without delay. I should be very glad if to your late successes in the settlement of two very important foreign questions you added an effectual vindication of the honour of England by the liberation of the Abyssinian captives and the coercion of Theodorus. At the same time I know both the dangers and the difficulties of an expedition which might arouse some European jealousies; but the case is so strong and the insult to the Crown so great, that there is to my mind less to fear from these western jealousies than from the discredit of acting, as we are charged in the East, with pusillanimity where our national honour is at stake. Even the West would allow the grievous character of the provocation, and of the outrages committed; though it might watch with jealousy the result of operations in Abyssinia. I have no expectation that by the middle of August Theodorus will have done anything satisfac-

tory, and am afraid there will be no escape from a positive decision, either to abandon the captives to their fate, or to organize an expedition. The former course is too disgraceful to be thought of; the latter course needs prompt action, as much has to be done to secure success."

*To Sir Charles Mills, dated 3rd August*, 1867.

"Lawrence tells me that Sir R. Napier wants 20,000 men for the Abyssinian expedition. I am certain that I would do the work, if it can be done at all, much more surely and rapidly with the force I stated as sufficient in a note on the subject which Lawrence sent to the Secretary of State. Imagine the cost and difficulties in the matter of shipping alone where 20,000 men are to be moved, provisioned, &c. I don't believe Napier has made any such recommendation until I see it in black and white.*

"Who is Northcote's adviser on Indian affairs? He asks such curious questions that I cannot think he consults his council before making them. He had much better do so, however, for as all the Council here, except Yule and myself, are in heart with his political opponents he affords men who are not at all his friends more to criticize and sneer at than is good for his reputation. Of course I mention this to yourself in confidence."

In the following November my father left Simla, and a few days later he writes to one of his children: "Thanks for your remembrance of that which it is time for me to forget, for there is nothing agreeable in reaching one's fifty-fifth birth-day. It is then the hour to think of another kind of day, viz., that of exit. My yesterday's work was, however, not a bad one for so aged an individual. I walked up from Dhurrumpore by the cart-road, which was a blunder, to Sanawar, only taking the last mile in a jampan. Mr. Cole kept me about three hours on my legs going over the Lawrence Asylum, and then I walked down from Kussowlee to Kalka." He was always fond of these long walks in the hills; and on one occasion, three or four years before his death, walked up from the plains to Simla, a rough up-hill day's march of over forty miles. Not many men of his age could have done it in an Indian climate without ill-effects; but his sound

* Before Sir Robert Napier's appointment to the command of the force my father had entertained some slight hopes of being himself selected. His strongest wish, then as ever, was for a chance of commanding an army in the field. But he never grudged his old friend the success denied to himself. "Napier," he used to say, "has *le feu sacré*, there is no truer soldier alive."

health and great bodily strength remained almost unimpaired to the end of his life, and the one thing which seemed to try him was want of exercise.

The close of the year found my father as usual in Calcutta. This year also had brought him sorrow, for his youngest daughter, a child two years of age, had been attacked by illness on the journey; and unable to remain away from his duty he had been forced to leave her with Lady Durand at Cawnpore. Before the beginning of 1868 it was almost certain that she could not live many weeks; and he worked on with a heart full of grief and anxiety, trying in vain to hope against hope, and mourning for the sweet child face he felt he should never see again. At the end of January he was summoned to Cawnpore by telegram, but it was too late. He saw her indeed, but the voice that used to welcome him was silent, and "Tiny" lay "encircled with white roses, and with her hands folded as in prayer, looking out of her clear blue eyes as if in fixed rapt devotion." Very few men I think had his intense love and tenderness for children, and he felt her death as very few men would have felt it.

At this time he was in some doubt whether it would not be wise for him to retire from the Governor-General's Council. So long as any portion of the seats in the Council of the Secretary of State in England were elective, he was sure of being immediately chosen by the members whenever he might send in his name. But in 1868 there was some prospect of a reconstitution of this body, and of the withdrawal of its elective privileges; and he felt that if appointment were to depend upon the will of a Secretary of State his chances would be very different. Some of his friends advised him to take advantage of the opportunity offered by impending vacancies, and not to risk the eventual loss of the moderate pay and position in England for the sake of another year and a half of Council in India. Among others his old friend Sir Charles Mills wrote to him: "Do consider well whether you would wish to come and be again elected. I would take care that there was no doubt about it." Under these circumstances he had at one time serious thoughts of throwing up his career in India. In the end, however, he decided to remain.

My father's relations with the Governor-General had not improved. He thought Sir John Lawrence wanting at times in consistency and strength; and in particular he regarded with something very like contempt the Governor-General's sensitiveness to the power of the Press, and his constant endeavours to disarm its

opposition or secure its support. It is to this peculiarity of Sir John Lawrence's that we owe the best of Wyllie's "Essays" on the external policy of India; but in other respects the result was not so fortunate, and the most powerful of the Indian papers possessed at this time an amount of influence which was both dangerous and improper.

One point upon which my father and Sir John Lawrence had at this time some rather sharp words was the question of the Simla migration. My father had always disapproved of Simla as a regular summer residence for the Government of India or the Viceroy. He thought the Viceroy should move about India as much as possible, and that the chief officers of Government should do the same; instead of sitting above the clouds for the greater part of the year and losing touch of the masses below. None loved the great hills more than he did, and no one knew better than himself that both the Viceroy and the principal officials worked hard in Simla; but he thought work might be misdirected, and that there was serious harm and danger in the want of practical acquaintance with the country and its services which such a system entailed. For these and other reasons he objected to the Simla move. At the same time he was of opinion that if the system was to continue Government should liberally indemnify its officers. The cost of the double move every year from one end of Bengal to the other, and of keeping up two houses, one at each end of the line, fell very heavily even upon the more highly paid officials; and to the majority of officers on low pay, and of the clerks in the Government offices, the move was the very reverse of a boon. The Viceroy with his "Government House," both in Calcutta and Simla, felt nothing of this; for him the Simla migration was unmixed gain; but it became less and less of a gain the lower one went in the official scale; and my father considered it his duty on more than one occasion to bring the facts of the case clearly to notice.

In the early part of 1868 the discussion waxed rather hot, the Governor-General having taken up the question of the tour charges, which were attracting the attention of the Press, and having in consequence circulated a note which my father regarded as very offensive. On the 15th of February my father notes in his journal:—"The Governor-General sent a final minute on our tour charges controversy, in which he sent back my minute, withdrawing his own also. I agreed to the arrangement. This may not be the end of the matter, as he will, no doubt, renew it,

but in another form. Still it finishes *pro tempore* an ugly quarrel." All this kind of thing was exceedingly disagreeable; and so my father felt it, but his sentiments on the subject of the Simla migration were so well known that he could afford to speak without much fear of his motives being misconstrued, and he spoke out accordingly, with considerable effect, both on this occasion and afterwards.*

* Since this was written, my attention has been drawn to certain passages referring to my father in Mr. Bosworth Smith's "Life of Lord Lawrence." Some of these passages are not altogether accurate in their statements of fact; but the point which calls for notice here is the description given of my father's course of action in official matters during Lord Lawrence's viceroyalty. It would appear from Mr. Bosworth Smith's remarks that my father had set himself deliberately to thwart the Governor-General and to oppose, as a matter of course, every measure in which he was interested. I do not think any one who has read the story of my father's life will accept this view; nor do I believe it would have commended itself, in his calmer moments, to Lord Lawrence. But the fact is that Lord Lawrence was not accustomed to opposition, or patient in dealing with it; and he expected from his Councillors an amount of deference to his wishes and opinions which was not always consistent with the duties of their position. In one of the letters quoted by his biographer he writes:—"I am persuaded that the Governor-General is not by any means sufficiently strong. He is practically responsible for all which occurs, and yet his power is by no means commensurate with such responsibilities. He can be bearded and thwarted by a Councillor, while he can neither select them nor in any way affect their interests." This passage, the closing words of which somewhat overstate the case, seems to me a good indication of the views which Lord Lawrence is known to have held upon the question. He would have had his Councillors in a position of simple subordination, and he was inclined to resent their comparative independence. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that he should at times have found it hard to deal with my father, a man whose convictions and character were fully as strong as his own, and who belonged to a totally different school. Again, Lord Lawrence was not always fair in his estimate of the motives of others. In giving an account of the differences between him and his brother Henry, Mr. Bosworth Smith observes that one of Henry Lawrence's weak points, as it appears to him, "was an inability at times to distinguish between honest disagreement and personal or interested antagonism." This, if true of one brother, was, as it appears to me, at least equally true of the other.

I do not mean to say that in every instance of disagreement between my father and Lord Lawrence the fault was entirely on Lord Lawrence's side. But assuredly it was not, as Lord Lawrence's biographer would make it appear, entirely on my father's. It is possible that he may at times have been too fiery in his language, and too "unbending" in his opposition to the Governor-General's views; but he was wholly incapable of factious obstruction; and on the other hand Lord Lawrence was undoubtedly too intolerant of any opposition or criticism at all. This failing embittered for him the period of his viceroyalty; and it accounts for the manner in which he wrote of my father's action, and for his complaint as to the insufficiency of the Governor-General's powers—a complaint which I do not think other Governors-General have found it necessary to support.

Other matters which occupied his attention during the early part of the year were the armament of our Native troops; the construction of barracks for Europeans; various financial questions, relating to the presidency banks, the imposition of a license tax on trades, and the like; the Abyssinian war; and, finally, an important discussion regarding the location of the Government of India, and the constitution of the Bengal Government, which had been raised by the Secretary of State. I quote the following extracts from his letter written at this time:—

*To Sir Charles Mills, dated 5th January*, 1868.

"We had an important discussion on Friday. After the legislative council was over, Lawrence called the executive council, and the question of the taxation to be imposed was again gone over. The plan Massey proposed was an income tax of 2 per cent., and a very moderate license tax on trades only. The sum, however, that he expected to raise from the license tax was so small, that I suggested it was inexpedient for so small a sum to incur the irritation it must produce. I pointed out that the municipal taxation in many parts of India took the form of a tax on trades, and was already much complained of by the people, so that the addition of an imperial tax of the kind over and above the municipal one was hardly judicious; and said I should prefer regarding the license tax on trades as one to be left for local and municipal purposes to local governments and municipalities, and would rather have a 3 per cent. income tax, or an addition to the salt duty in Madras and Bombay of a moderate amount.

"Massey agreed to a 2 per cent. income tax, and an addition of four annas to the salt duty in Madras and Bombay, and to leave the license tax on trades entirely to local administrations. The increase on the salt is so moderate that Madras and Bombay are not likely to complain much, considering how far more heavily Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab pay; and it will provide what Massey wants in addition to a 2 per cent. income tax. Lawrence preferred this to a 3 per cent. income tax alone. Of course measures may yet be modified, but I think what I have mentioned will be adhered to generally."

*To Lord Stanley, dated 7th January*, 1868.

"By the 10th the last transport conveying the Bengal contingent of the Abyssinian force will be off. As the advance had reached Senafé a month ago, and the Bombay troops were being pushed up as fast as practicable, the congestion at Anesley Bay should be over before the Bengal troops have to disembark. They will land complete and well found, and carry with them two months' shore provisions.

"Lawrence expressed apprehensions about Sir R. Napier's health standing the campaign; but, though Napier had said he was not the man he was ten years ago in China, from all I hear he is in excellent health and spirits, and likely to be quite equal to the campaign physically, as he certainly is so in the matters of mental efficiency and pluck.

"I see the *Saturday Review* hammers away at an expression of mine as to the probable success of the expedition. So anxious am I for the thorough success of your expedition, and so confident that there is nothing in the enterprize beyond the limits of a reasonable probability of success, which is the utmost that can be predicated of ninety-nine out of a hundred military operations, that if by chance Sir R. Napier's health broke down, I should be *quite ready to risk my reputation as an officer in carrying out to the issue the operations he left unfinished.* When it was doubtful whether the force demanded might not be 20,000 men, I distinctly told Lawrence that I would not want more than I had stated in my minute,* and thought that with it I would be in and out of the country by May next, with the business accomplished; for that the fewer the men, consistently with success, the less the embarrassments, and the chances of delay in the country. I don't think the *Saturday Review* treats my views quite fairly, but as usual with that paper the article is a good one."

*To Sir Charles Mills, dated 16th March*, 1868.

Last Wednesday the budget was discussed in the Executive Council. Mansfield and I were strongly opposed, and Maine, too, though not quite so decidedly, to the scheme for 1868-69 as explained by Massey. Lawrence had Taylor, Massey and Strachey with him, and therefore a majority. Mansfield, Maine,

* 7,650 men landed in Abyssinia; 2,250 men in readiness at Aden or in India.

and I have severally recorded minutes which give our reasons for taking exception to what is being done. It is a marvel to me why Massey and Lawrence, at the close of their careers, having a larger surplus than that required by the Secretary of State, a progressively increasing revenue, and the credit of government very high, should prefer throwing upon current revenue the whole of the expenditure for public works extraordinary in order to reverse the policy Massey announced last year, and again impose a license tax to produce a maximum of irritation with a minimum of profit. I told them both plainly that they were acting unadvisedly with regard to their own reputation and interest, and certainly retrogressively with respect to the welfare of India.

"Out of this arose another question, viz., whether members of council in a minority in the executive council are bound to vote in the legislative council with the majority, and against what they think right. Lawrence carries this theory so far as to say that if three weeks ago, when he tried to prevail with the council to have an income tax and found himself without one single supporter, he had acted on his prerogative, and, overruling his council, ordered a bill for an income tax to be introduced, the whole of the council would have been bound to vote for it. Mansfield demurred to this, and said he should have asked leave to absent himself. This discussion arose on the note of the Governor-General of the 12th instant and my reply to it, which he put before a special council. The result is a reference to the Secretary of State, drawn up by Maine, so that we may have the authorative decision of the Secretary of State. . . . . .

"There seems to me a very easy solution, namely, to rule that the minority are not bound to vote or speak in support of bills contrary to what they think right, but may record a neutral vote, that is, may say they do not desire to vote either for or against the bill.

"One of the ablest men in Calcutta writes to me after hearing Massey's budget speech yesterday: 'I am *greatly* vexed to find that notwithstanding such a large assured surplus the license tax or any other tax should be imposed. It is a pity that Sir John has not advisers near him who would speak plainly, and disagreeably it may be, to him. I cannot understand why he and Massey should cast firebrands among the people when both of them towards the end of their Indian career can point to an overflowing surplus, and the credit of government at a very high pitch. Why invite discussion, disunion, and home interference when the

surplus is positively double the sum required by the Secretary of State ?'

"This is not the writing of an official person, but of one of the longest-headed non-official men in Calcutta, or even India. We shall have what boys call 'a jolly howl' I fear; but it is not my fault, at any rate, for I spoke plainly enough, though my friend don't know it."

*To his Daughter, dated 20th April*, 1868.

"Depend upon it that your philosophy based on Christ is worth a hundred of ——'s based on Mill. You could not answer better than by silence, for you could not have argued from any position common to —— and yourself; and of course if you start with thinking Christ the truth, and she start with thinking Mill the truth, you might have talked till crack of doom to no earthly purpose. Women would not gain but lose by such a system as —— contemplates as feasible. God, and nature as God's instrument, have assigned different duties and callings to man and woman; it is no use going against God and nature, we are much too weak to do that. Man's philosophy is sad trash as a rule. He spins cobwebs to catch flies in, and very wonderful cobwebs they are, only they won't stand a puff of common sense. It is not worth a woman's while to waste time in reading the trash. Metaphysics are the cloud land of minds aiming at what is unattainable. Comte's philosophy of positivism is like all other philosophic systems that try to find a foundation independently of revelation and religion. I maintain I could invent a dozen different philosophical systems, all of them starting from points that would entitle them to a respectful investigation; as for theories of education, you may start forty, but you won't make people wiser or better unless you can put out self, and put in God; everything is self in the present day."

*To Lady Durand, dated Calcutta, April*, 1868.

. . . . . "I am sitting alone in my writing room, with the sound of church bells coming in faintly through the shut doors, and my thoughts turned to what you will be doing to-day at Lucknow. I have been thinking how you will have borne this pilgrimage to the 'Sweet Lady's' resting place.* I am sure it would have tried

* His daughter's grave.

myself; and am still more certain that it will have been a re-opening of your grief and sorrow; though probably it may have been accompanied by a deep satisfaction at revisiting the spot, and seeing how the rose-trees flourish, and the sculptor is performing his part. . . . . Though I am painfully sensible that there will be a hundred things, material things, that will probe you to the quick, both at Cawnpore and at Lucknow, the craving you had to see the grave again will be a source of satisfaction when that craving has been met. . . . . .

"My mind rebels at the apparent permanence of material objects when I contrast their stolid existence with the seeming transitoriness of beings loved and taken from us. I almost hate them for outliving the dead; and half resent their unsympathetic stability as a sort of insult given by matter to spirit; the seen and the gross glorying in a way over the unseen, and glorying at the expense of our feelings."

"Whereas that angel face, so lovely in death, must be infinitely more beautiful and lovely in the blaze of the eternal light and love, my pride is hurt by the sort of coarse rebuke which a chair or a sofa can give me, when they say, 'we hold on, but where is your darling?' And all the more hurt that they at times succeed in wringing tears from my human weakness. . . . . .

"During the lightning yesterday evening, I was thinking of the escape she had last year, and how near we all were to a quiet grave together in the Simla burial-ground. Now, she lies at Lucknow; who can say where we shall lie? It don't matter, fortunately. . . . . .

. . . . . "The moral I draw from Hepworth Dixon's 'Spiritual Wives,' which was my homily yesterday, is, that pretty women make fools of young mystically-disposed clergymen, and that in return the men make fools of the women. . . . . A very curious thing comes out in the book, viz., the use made in America of Paul's assertion of his right to have a wife or sister with him. Never was stronger confirmation of a remark I made in a minute when opposing the 'Convert Marriage Bill,' viz., that if criticism of the kind applied was to be allowed, the apostles would find themselves adduced as authority for very strange proceedings. Here we have an example. Paul is quoted as an example of an apostle with a spiritual wife, &c., &c. . . . . . . . . . "What fools men and women become when they are given over to their own devices! In search of transcendental purity they tumble into a mire of fleshly indulgences which con-

trast strangely with the aim of the original start. Better accept one's humanity, and walk humbly in fulfilment of God's purposes, than soar to heights from which men and women fall with clipped wings, all the dirtier for the mud they tumble into. . . . . .

. . . . . "This morning after my breakfast, as I had none of you with me, I opened Jeremy Taylor, and was struck by the passage: 'We use the means of grace to cure us, and we turn them into vices and opportunities of sin!' I thought what a capital motto it would have made for the title page of Hepworth Dixon's book, 'Spiritual Wives.' I must say that I regard the book as a valuable historical analysis of the rise and progress of the views which, starting from Paul's assertion of the liberty of the Christian in his faith and practice, and its freedom from the Mosaic law of conventional ceremonies, &c., land some transcendentalists into Shakerism, Mormonism, free love, polygamy, &c. . . . . .

. . . . . "I send the *Friend of India*. I see an article in it which I am sure is from W.'s pen; on 'unmarried Indian statesmen.' It notes a fact which has struck me very forcibly, viz., that the men of the service, he might have said the military even more than the civilians, do not marry now as they used to do; the fashion leans in India, as it does in England, to men avoiding the cares and the expense of a married state unless they can hit on a lady with 'tin' to keep herself and help them on in the world. The principles of Malthus are getting a practical exemplification in the reluctance of young men to incur the weight of the responsibilities of marriage. They are taking the economist point of view, and would sneer at my old friend Jeremy Taylor's opinion of children, in a passage that I do harm to only by quoting:—'They are so many titles of provision and providence: every new child is a new title of God's care of that family.' The fashion of the present day is to think just the reverse, viz., that every new child is a burthen and a curse rather than a blessing to a family. No two doctrines can be more antagonistic; hardly any doctrine in which faith and political economy come more absolutely into conflict. This same tendency is producing evil fruits in other countries much more than in England; but India was latterly free from it—I mean twenty years back. . . . . God's law and world plan cannot be set aside with impunity. . . . . I think the young men of the present who shape their course and plans of life by simple reference to self carried to an unreasonable degree, will sacrifice the higher to the lower enjoyments of life,

and will degrade themselves morally and mentally, and the nation too. . . . . .

. . . . . "I know I shall miss dreadfully my poor Tiny's morning hammer at the door, and the ceremonial circumambulations of my hats, &c. Ever since you have been all away, I have felt as if my only companion was that little photograph in the frame that you put on my table—the 'Sweet Lady' is always with me. . . . . Adieu letter-writing; for I hope that shortly after this letter I shall be trudging up that weary hill, and thinking what an interminable ascent it is. I very much long for the sight of you all, and the sound of your voices." . . . . .

In the beginning of May, 1868, my father arrived in Simla. Shortly before leaving Calcutta he had been attacked by a swelling of the hands and feet, and a feeling of giddiness, which had caused him considerable annoyance; and a month latter he was startled by suddenly finding himself deaf of the right ear. All efforts to cure this deafness having failed, he was advised, after a period of painful probing and blistering, to try change of air; and towards the end of June he started with his eldest son, who had come out to India in the army not long before, for a fortnight's tour in the northern ranges which lie between Simla and the snows. The trip was restful and enjoyable, and my father brought back some sketches of mountain scenery; but his hearing was little if at all improved, and soon after his return he made up his mind to take a few months' sick leave, and consult the best European aurists.

In the meantime he had placed on record his opinions upon a series of important questions. Amongst other matters the Foreign Department was then at work upon the question of succession to the great Native State of Cashmere, the chief of which was anxious to obtain from the British Government a pledge that in the event of his death without lineal heirs the succession of a collateral would be recognized. My father objected to this arrangement as involving a dangerous precedent, and impairing the value of Lord Canning's famous concession. It is unnecessary to enter into this matter at length; but the principle for which he contended, namely that Lord Canning had provided the Native chiefs of India with a simple and easy mode of continuing their houses and States, and obviating the troubles consequent on a disputed succession, and that it was impolitic to encourage them in any way to neglect this precaution, met with full acknowledgment. Happily the Maharaja is still alive, and there is no prospect

whatever of his dying without lineal heirs. Another matter connected with our feudatory policy which attracted some attention at this time was the question how far the Native States should be pressed by our political officers to carry out within their territories the execution of the decrees of British courts. This involved a consideration of the wider question whether it was possible to take any measures towards the introduction of a system of reciprocity in the execution of civil processes between the Native States and ourselves. A great deal has been written upon these questions, but they remain very much as they were in 1868; and it seems unlikely that any sensible advance can be made for many years to come. My father's view was that for the present reciprocity was impossible, and that on all accounts our political officers should not press for the execution of our decrees unless in very exceptional cases of gross and flagrant fraud on the part of defaulting debtors. This view was accepted; and though at first sight it involves some show of hardship to British tradesmen and others, there is no doubt that under existing circumstances it must be acted upon. The whole matter is interesting and important; and it will acquire further interest and importance as time goes on, and the judicial administration of the native states becomes more efficient and trustworthy.

Among my father's papers of this period I find also minutes on various financial and military questions, such as the condition of the opium revenue, the salt duties, the expediency of an income tax, the system of fortifications in India, and the armies and military commands in Madras and Bombay. The more important of these are reprinted in the second volume of this work.

My father left Simla for Europe on the 21st August; and I quote the following extracts from his letters written to Lady Durand during his voyage, upon which he started in very low spirits, and rather in deference to the views of others than from any wish of his own:—

*Kalka, 22nd August*, 1868. . . . . "I can hardly yet realize the step I am taking. I seem acting mechanically, and with neither heart nor mind in the matter; as if the plaything of blind fate, and with misgivings as to the whole affair. I suppose, as one gets older, hope fades and dies like everything else, at any rate it becomes as faint a faculty as the hearing power of my right ear."

*Allahabad, 25th August*. . . . . "From Colvin I have received a very warm kind welcome, and curiously enough, though quite accidentally, I find myself put up in the self-same house, and the

self-same room, that I occupied in 1858 when Lord Canning sent for me to Allahabad, and General Birch, Colonel Yule, and I lived together." . . . . . .

*Aden, 11th September.*—"I must send you a line to tell you how comfortably I have escaped the coaling and heat of the *Rangoon*, and how hospitably I have been treated by General, now Sir Edward, Russell. Yesterday evening, I went with him to see the catchwater tanks constructed at Aden to catch the rainfall when it chooses to bless them here; but that, unfortunately, is very seldom. . . . . I am out of spirits at this journey and separation. Perhaps the issue may be better than I anticipate. If not, pazienza, pazienza." . . . . . .

*Trieste, 24th September.*—"We arrived at this place at noon to-day, after a very fine voyage on board the *Minerva*, A. L. steamer; fine as to weather, but not as to speed. . . . . The cooking was superb; for the *Minerva* has the pre-eminent good fortune of having the cook that Maximilian took to Mexico! Fortunately for him and the people he cooks for, Juarez neither shot nor detained him. He could not have known his consummate ability, otherwise Juarez would have kept him in Mexico to civilize the community. . . . . The sail past the Greek islands was interesting, and we anchored at Corfu to take in coal. . . . . The view of the town, castle, &c., was picturesque." . . . . . .

*Vienna, 29th September.* . . . . . "There was nothing to keep me at Trieste, so I started by the midnight steamer for Venice. We had a fine night, and made the Lagunes at 6 A.M. The entrance into Venice with the early sun upon its buildings was truly beautiful, and cannot be dealt with in a letter. At 7 A.M. we anchored, and in due course, after a circuitous pull in a gondola through narrow canals, we found ourselves at the back entrance of the Hotel S. Marc, which looks on the Place S. Marc of world-wide renown. All that day we were engaged in visiting churches, palaces, paintings, &c. The 26th we were similarly employed. . . . . Of Venice I can only say that I was not oppressed by the beauty of the Place S. Marc. Many of our large mosques, such as that at Delhi, with its splendid flights of steps, and immense platform or place in front of the mosque, are to my mind more striking. The beauty of Venice is in the glorious picturesqueness of its palaces, churches, &c., rising out of the water. . . . . .

"The weather has been mild and beautiful, so I have led an out-of-door life as the Vienna people do. They are a good-natured

people, happily disposed, and I have not seen as yet a single instance of even rudeness. . . . . The manner of the women to their children is so full of gentleness and affection that I am certain the Vienna women, high and low, must be very lovable creatures. This affectionate tender manner with their children has no ostentation in it, and it is returned by the children. I see many instances both in the hotel, where many families come to dine and sup, and also in other places. A little girl about Ethel's age waiting for their dinner to be brought to them, passed the time in kissing her mother's hand as it lay on the table, and was evidently quite in full heart-happiness whilst doing so. I observe many lovable traits among the women and children, much bonhomie amongst the men. I think I should like the Austrians exceedingly if I stayed among them and spoke German well." *

At Vienna my father was joined by one of his daughters, who was finishing her education in Germany; and he remained there a fortnight, very happy in having her with him. His deafness was not sufficiently troublesome to mar his enjoyment of good music, which had always been a delight to him, and his stay in the Austrian capital was in many ways exceedingly pleasant. It was, however, clouded by the inability of the Austrian aurists to hold out to him any definite prospect of cure. Before he left Vienna they had come to the conclusion that the hearing of his right ear, though improved, would never be as good as it had been, and that in the course of a few years the left ear was also likely to be affected. He left Vienna, therefore, with gloomy anticipations for the future, and much depressed in spirits.

On the 19th of October, after a short visit to Dresden, he reached England. My brother and myself were at the time reading for the Indian Civil Service with Mr. John Le Fleming, of Tonbridge, who very kindly placed a room at my father's disposal; and during the remainder of his stay in England he made Tonbridge his head-quarters. His first act on arrival was characteristic of him. He had come up unexpectedly one morning by the early mail from Dover, and had reached the house before any one was up to receive

* As a fact my father spoke German exceedingly well for a foreigner. A German fellow-passenger on this voyage had remarked that the correctness of his idiom and pronunciation were very unusual, and the same remark had been made to him before. He used to exercise himself, when he had time, by reading German poetry aloud, a practice which he thought useful in forming the pronunciation, and giving freedom in the use of the language.

him. There was no man-servant at hand to help him with his boxes; and when I had dressed and come over from the adjoining house in which we slept, I found the house-maids standing at the foot of the steep staircase which led to his bedroom, much concerned because he had insisted upon carrying up by himself a couple of heavy trunks which he would not allow them to touch. His thoughtful courtesy to women, of every class, was a point in his character which could not fail to strike one; it was something more than outward courtesy; and it brought him an amount of love and confidence which was very remarkable.

The month which followed was a pleasant one for us, and he seemed to enjoy his visit. I had never realized until then the depth and extent of his reading; nor, perhaps, fully understood the many qualities of heart and head which so much endeared him to all who knew him well. At fifty-six years of age, when most men who have led an active life are getting more or less "rusty" in the knowledge of their youth, he seemed to have lost nothing. I can well remember the surprise, not unmixed with humiliation, with which he impressed me when one evening, a day or two after his arrival, he quietly put me through my facings in the several subjects which I was about to take up for the Indian civil service examination. Without a vestige of ostentation or assumption of superiority, he made me feel in the course of half an hour's conversation about my books that I had not a tithe of his knowledge in any single branch of learning. He seemed equally at home in everything—mathematics, classics, history, English and French literature,—and my heart sank within me as his pregnant questions and remarks brought home to me more and more clearly the conviction that I had spent my school years, and his hard-earned money, to exceedingly little purpose. At the same time there was no harshness or appearance of catechising about the thing. He did not allow a single expression of surprise or disappointment to escape him; but talked on cheerily, as he would have talked to a man who was his equal, evidently wishing to avoid anything that could bring self-reproach or discouragement. That he was disappointed I have little doubt, for he had set his heart on our both passing for the Civil Service, and the examination was not an easy one; but he thought I was doing my best, and beyond the fact that after our conversation ended he sat for some time silent in front of the fire with his strong shapely hands crossed over his knees, and a rather weary look on his face, I never saw an indication of his being dissatisfied. He could not have chosen a better course than

his kindness of heart made him choose, for the memory of that evening never left me.

Often during the remainder of his stay in Tonbridge, when I was leaving him after dinner to set to work, I have seen him take down from the large book-shelf, which lined one wall of the room set apart for us, a mathematical work or a volume of Greek or Latin, and sit down to read it quietly over the fire. He had a great fondness for Greek; and I think I can hear him now as his deep voice rose half unconsciously over some familiar passage of the Iliad, or the chorus of a Greek play, rolling out the musical lines with an irrepressible enjoyment, while his foot beat time to the cadence. Though he warned his children not to drink too deep of the "wine of demons," he loved poetry himself; and to more than one of us some of his favourite passages are resonant still with the sound of his voice.

Later in the evening, when work was over, he used to come down to the room in which we were sitting, and join in a "smoke" before going to bed. It was a horrid habit, he said, laughingly, quoting King James, to "make chimneys of our mouths," but the Calcutta doctors had advised him to try it as a cure for sleeplessness, and he found it did him good; so he used to spend an hour or two at night in the smoking room, talking, if we could get him to do it, of his campaigns in Afghanistan and the Punjab, his keen sense of fun lighting up the conversation and making it wonderfully enjoyable, till he broke up the party with a glance at his watch and an exclamation of dismay. But it was comparatively seldom that we could get him to go back to old times. He had a feeling that young men were bored by the reminiscences of their elders; and he preferred to set us going, and listen to our stories of town rows and football scrimmages, evidently enjoying the change after the eternal "shop" of India, and entering into it all as if he were forty years younger.

Nevertheless, his visit to England was, on the whole, a sad one. The English aurists gave him no better hopes than those whom he had consulted in Vienna; several of his best friends were gone; and the state in which he found his blind boys had caused him most bitter grief. The day before he left England he wrote to his old friend Thomson of the Engineers:—

"I am off to-morrow on my return to India, and leave England with the heavy regret that I have not been able to see many of my old and dear friends. Towards none is this regret more poig-

nant than with respect to yourself, for I feel as if this may be my last Sunday in old England; and that worn with cares and anxieties it is well on the cards that I should die in harness in India, especially if instead of returning in 1870, I should have to take up the Punjab when Macleod's time is out. Your handwriting is so exactly what it always was, that I have no misgivings as to your being to the fore if I return in 1870; and I shall live in the hope of once again meeting, for few things would give me greater pleasure than once again to shake hands with you. . . . . The aurist at Vienna may try to stop me *en route* in order to do a little more tinkering of my right ear, the only point on which I was sent home, being otherwise in most perfect health, and the sudden blow to the right ear being ascribed by a clever medical man to a plethora of health. I tell my children it is the beginning of the end, and to look out for the *coup de grace*. . . . . .

"I have been heart-broken, so far as a man of my hard disposition can be so, by the small progress made by my two blind boys . . . . . It has effectually poisoned what small pleasure I might have had in my visit to England; for it is more and more a hopeless and crushing calamity. Old Dr. Murray, who sent me home thinking that my right ear was due to overwork "at those infernal boxes of papers," had little idea that what I should find here would be far more harassing mentally . . . . . Often and often I wish that you had had to bury me shot through the head at Ghuzni . . . . . it would have saved myself and others a world of misery, and I never was readier to go than then.

"Ever yours affectionately,

"H. M. DURAND."

On the following evening, after a long afternoon walk through the fields by the Medway I said good-bye to my father at the Tonbridge railway station. It was the last time I saw him, for his anticipations of "dying in harness" were only too soon to be realized. He reached India in the middle of December, and after a short stay with Sir Seymour Fitzgerald at Bombay started again for Simla, where his family had remained. His eldest daughter was about to be married, and though pleased at her engagement, the news of which had reached him in England, he felt her loss very keenly. He was always careful to show no partiality among his children, and indeed his love for every one of us was such as few children receive; but his eldest daughter had been especially his companion, and it was with a heavy heart that he gave her

up. Immediately before leaving England he had written to her: "I have every confidence in your own discrimination of character, as well as in your high principle and sense of duty, combined with warmth of affection. The latter, your affection to myself, has always been one of the greatest blessings of my life, and some counterpoise to many of its trials. I need hardly say that I shall feel your loss dreadfully, but not so selfishly as to regret your prospect of happiness and utility as the wife of an able and honourable man. You have always proved so loving and transparently truthful a character as a daughter that I have no doubt at all but that you will prove to your husband what your noble-hearted and noble-minded mother was to myself, the very light and joy of my life. . . . . May God bless you, darling child, and lay as much of happiness and as little of trial upon you as can fall to the lot of a wife . . . . . ."

A few days after her marriage he left Simla, and early in January, 1869, he was again in Calcutta, where Lord Mayo was about to take over the reins from Sir John Lawrence.

His first official act during this year, as in 1866, was connected with the proposed establishment of a Government newspaper. This project had again attracted attention during his absence from India, and on his return he found it necessary once more to protest against any measure of the kind. Referring to his former minute on the subject, he now wrote: "All that has taken place in relation to, or connection with, the Press during the last two years has confirmed, and indeed intensified, the conviction that the minute in question underrates the evils and dangers inseparable from the institution of a Government of India *Moniteur*, however entitled or managed, whether subsidised or entirely the property of Government. Whatever the scheme under which Government, in a way more or less veiled, is to sound its own praise, it is synonymous with the eventual humiliation of Government; with its loss of self-respect and dignity; with rampant discord among the servants of the State, high and low; and with practical ridicule as well as defeat of the very object sought to be attained. The Government of India can, in my opinion, afford to rely on the justice of the British people, and may reasonably trust the fair play of a free press in its comments on its measures. At any rate confidence in these, even admitting that both the public and the press may, and do, err occasionally, is to my mind a far nobler course than any reliance on minor arts hardly compatible with the position and dignity of an Imperial Government."

It is unnecessary to add that the Government of India has never committed itself to the establishment of a *Moniteur*, and it is to be hoped that we have got beyond the stage when such a proposal was possible.

On the 12th of January, 1869, Lord Mayo was sworn in as Governor-General, and from this time my father's duties, always sufficiently heavy, became much increased. Lord Mayo had apparently formed, when they met a few months before in England, a high opinion of his abilities and character, and at the beginning of the new Viceroy's rule his influence in the Council Chamber was paramount. Having a very much longer and more varied experience of India than any other member of the Government, he was able to offer Lord Mayo well-considered and weighty advice on almost every question that came up for discussion; and Lord Mayo, who was able to appreciate decided views and plain speaking, attached the highest value to his knowledge and practical sagacity. In Foreign Office matters especially the Viceroy trusted greatly to his judgment, and his special work was overlaid by an incessant stream of references on Foreign Office questions which threatened at times to swamp him altogether.

At this moment the approaching visit to India of the Ameer Shere Ali, and the policy to be adopted towards Afghanistan, were the prevailing topics of discussion. After years of dubious conflict, and many alternations of victory and defeat, Shere Ali seemed at last to have beaten down his enemies, and to have fairly earned some more substantial proof of our good-will than the strict neutrality we had hitherto observed. There was now an established Government in Afghanistan; and for all reasons it was desirable to recognize and strengthen that Government, and to preserve the country, if possible, from further disorder and bloodshed. Towards the end of March the Governor-General left Calcutta for the great durbar at Umballa, at which the Ameer was to be received. It is unnecessary here to enter into any detailed account of the ceremonies and negotiations which followed. Shere Ali was treated with honour, and received money and arms and something like a promise of more; and he departed apparently well pleased, though the Viceroy had avoided committing the British Government to one measure which the Ameer had at heart, the recognition, namely, of his youngest and favourite son as heir to the Cabul throne. I quote from my father's letters to Lady Durand his brief account of the durbar and his opinion of the policy pursued:

*Calcutta, March*, 1869 . . . . . "I shall grudge the ceremonials at Umballa, but the meeting is an historical one; and considering that I was with Lord Ellenborough at the durbar when Dost Mahomed was allowed to return to Afghanistan, and that Shere Ali, his son, was one of those present, it is not without some special as well as general interest to myself. Shere Ali and I must have met some six or seven-and-twenty years ago. How much has swept over us both since that time! Well, the wheel of fortune goes round, and he is on its upward turn." . . . . .

*Umballa, 28th March* . . . . . "The durbar was well enough managed in all but that they allowed Lord Mayo to come out, take his stand on the daïs, and wait for a quarter of an hour before Shere Ali appeared . . . . . Shere Ali is a shortish man with very Jewish features, but more a Persian than an Afghan in appearance . . . . . His son is a fair, fat-faced boy, with thick lips, and an animal sort of expression rather than any promise of higher faculties. His attendants were all very plainly dressed, like the Ameer: and there was no display of jewellery or kincaub. Brown chogahs and lambskin caps are not very magnificent alongside a Viceroy's gold-bedizened coat and the smart uniforms of all around." . . . . .

*29th*.—"The return visit was paid this morning early; and, whilst I am writing, the Ameer is having his private interview with the Governor-General. We had a levee this morning, and after the levee I had to stay in camp to see and talk with Lord Mayo . . . . . The Ameer seems very well pleased with his reception, and will return, I should hope, quite satisfied with the result of his long trip to meet Lord Mayo. We have done all it was either right or good policy to do; and I trust the Secretary of State and people at home will be satisfied with our proceedings. Lord Mayo has throughout shown admirable good sense; and I think the Home Government, though his political enemies, will be candid enough to say he has done well . . . . . ."

". . . . . The Ameer will probably be off by Saturday, for he is anxious to start, and the sun is getting hot. I had a long talk with him at the last reception about the old Cabul country and people . . . . . The reception was fully attended, and I had the great pleasure of hearing Colonel Hume and Colonel Macbean sing that favourite duet of mine out of the 'Puritani,' the air of which is the same as the March. Spite of being in a tent, which kills the voice, they, with their fine strong voices, overcame the

disadvantage. They were loudly applauded. It was a real treat . . . . . ."

"I shall be anxious to see how the press and the ministry in England regard what has been done here. The Secretary of State is sure to be questioned in Parliament; and as we telegraph what has been done, he will be able to answer; and no doubt he will allow us to promulgate; but meanwhile it is secret, and must remain so until permission reach us to make public what has really been the issue of this visit of the Ameer's. He goes away after a farewell interview; and the camps break up and march off."

Lord Mayo's treatment of Shere Ali on this occasion evoked an outburst of criticism in England; and the views of the party which condemned his action will be found embodied in Wyllie's Essay on "Mischievous Activity." In the present day there can hardly be a doubt that Lord Mayo did what it was desirable to do, and nothing more.

Early in April my father arrived in Simla, and the routine of duty recommenced. Nothing appears to be more deeply rooted in the mind of a great portion of the Indian public, official and non-official, than the idea that Government officers in Simla have little or nothing to do. It may not, therefore, be altogether superfluous if I quote here an extract from my father's journal of May, 1869, which will give some idea of the constant stream of office work which fell upon a member of the Viceroy's Council; "I find," he writes, "that in the week from 3rd May to 9th, inclusive, I went through 44 boxes containing 209 cases or sets of papers; week from 10th May to 16th, inclusive, 51 boxes and 187 cases, which gives for a fortnight 95 boxes and 396 sets of papers. This, however, gives no idea of the minutes written, or of references from the Governor-General, which have occupied much time." As no case is, or ought to be, brought before a member of Council unless of some importance, and therefore probably requiring some thought and care for its disposal, and as his time on one day of the week at least is chiefly taken up by the Council meetings, it may be readily understood that during his tenure of the appointment my father's life was one of steady labour at the desk, only broken by a short walk in the early morning, and a walk or ride before dinner when the bulk of the day's work was over. He rose early, and generally went out for a few minutes before setting to work. This he found necessary to keep him in health. From about seven o'clock, or earlier, he remained at his papers, except for short breaks at breakfast and

lunch time, until near sunset, often returning to work in the evening. He thought after-dinner work in India a mistake if it could be avoided, and he always tried to keep his Sundays clear; this not only because he had a conscientious objection to any unnecessary labour on Sunday, but because he thought that for a continuance the one day's rest improved the week's out-turn.

After dinner, if he was at home and without guests, he read for an hour or two, picking out the scientific and other interesting articles from the reviews, or running through any new work which he had lately received. He was always a great buyer of books, and he left at his death a library consisting of many hundreds of volumes. At this period of his life he rarely touched light literature—not that he did not enjoy it, but that he could not spare the time. What to most men would have been very dry reading, if comprehensible, his retentive memory and keen interest in the scientific and philosophic progress of the age made a more thorough relaxation to him than a lighter class of reading would have been, and he felt, moreover, that he was not losing his evenings.

Besides reading, he found unceasing pleasure in music. He never tired of listening to good playing or singing, though at times a favourite piece or song affected him almost painfully. Music, and an occasional hour at his sketch-book, were, at this time, his only *délassements*. Cards had always wearied him, and in later life he never touched them.

The principal matters before the Government of India during 1869 were more or less directly connected with the question of our financial position. From one cause or another the financial outlook was then far from favourable, and there was a general call for reduction of expenditure, more particularly, of course, in the army. My father had to take up this question with much care, and he advocated a variety of measures of reform by which saving might be effected, among others the abolition of the separate commands in Bombay and Madras. On one point he entirely differed from Lord Mayo and the majority of the council. It had been resolved in Lord Lawrence's time to incur an expenditure of ten or eleven millions on barracks and connected buildings, which was to be spread over five years; and the intention had been to raise money for this purpose by loans. In the last year of Lord Lawrence's rule the Government of India changed its mind and determined to meet the charge from current revenues. This led to an income-tax, with its inevitable extortion and un-

popularity; and, notwithstanding the income-tax, to a deficit. My father regarded the change of policy as a retrograde and unjustifiable measure, which crippled the Government of India most seriously in undertaking works of great public utility, and caused much waste and loss by the stoppage of works already in full swing. A great deal was written upon this question, both as regards the necessity for the new barracks and as regards the manner in which such charges should be met. My father's contention, which did not commend itself to Lord Mayo, was in favour of liberal expenditure upon the comfort of our troops, and of borrowing the money.

Other matters of special importance at this time were the working of the Punjab Tenancy Act, and the scheme of financial decentralization which was about to be introduced by Sir John Strachey. As regards the former point, Sir John Lawrence had succeeded in passing through the legislative council during the autumn of 1868 an Act which defined the powers of landowners in the Punjab, and greatly extended tenant right. My father had been in England when the measure passed, but he had viewed it from the first with strong suspicion, as a following up of Sir John Lawrence's policy in Oudh; and he now believed it to have been in great measure mistaken and injurious. The question created much excitement in the Indian press at the time. As to the second question, the principle and advantages of financial decentralization in India have been very fully stated in a recent work* by its able originators, Sir John and General Strachey. My father was opposed to the scheme, and wrote against it; but with reference to this point also Lord Mayo took a view contrary to his; and the measure was carried into operation. Later in the year my father opposed also, as at least premature, a proposal for the formation of a separate Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce, which Lord Mayo wished to establish. The new department came into being, was abolished a few years later, and has now been re-established on a somewhat different footing.

The bulk of my father's minutes on these and other questions will be found in the second volume of this work. The following are extracts from his letters written during the year:—

* "The Finances and Public Works of India."

*To Colonel O. T. Burne,* dated 6th May*, 1869.

"The proper and inevitable remedy for the inconveniences mentioned . . . . . is to annex Oudh to the North-West Provinces. I lately, in a minute on the proposals of Mr. Strachey for increased employment of natives in Oudh, adverted to this inevitable measure.

"Bengal needs no alteration whatever as to its boundary on the west.

"It may be a question whether Assam should be made a chief commissionership. I am very doubtful even of that; for if a Lieutenant-Governor took up Assam warmly, he would effect more, and in a shorter time, than a Chief Commissioner, and all difficulties are obviated as to promotion, field of selection, &c.

"I have always held very strongly that the whole of Scinde should be part of the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab. It is a political and a military necessity. Bombay might be recompensed for the loss of Scinde by the annexation of the Central Provinces to that presidency. This would practically make the Nerbudda its northern boundary. It would keep Kutch as its westernmost province.

"Great cry has been made about the progress of the Central Provinces. The only difference I could perceive was an enormous increase of civil expenditure under the chief commissionership; and under one pretence or another the Financial Department was prevented from giving me what I called for, *viz.*, a comparative statement of the cost of the administration under the former and by Sir John Lawrence the existing system.

"The fact is that the civil service are greatly interested in the creation and maintenance of chief commissionerships; but they are costly, and inconvenient from forming too narrow a field for separate branches of the civil service.

"I could never make out why Delhi was thrown under the Punjab. What is called the Western Jumna Canal is about the natural boundary of the North-Western Provinces, and was in effect the old boundary when the Punjab was a Sikh Government, and the Cis-Sutledge States were under the Agent of the Governor-General."

* Colonel Burne, now Sir Owen Burne, K.C.S.I., was then Private Secretary to the Governor-General.

*To Colonel Daly,* dated 12th June*, 1869.

"Many thanks for yours of the 4th June. I return you a certificate of my own opinion of Jan Ali Khan, when I knew him and he served under me. In retrospect I have always thought of him as an instance of what an upright character the Moslem faith can produce. He was, without pretence or obtrusiveness, earnest in his own creed, and tried to work up to a higher standard of principle than it ordinarily produces. I hope you may succeed in obtaining some suitable pension for him."

*To Lord Napier of Magdala, dated 27th July*, 1869.

"As I am uncertain when you leave Bombay, I write to wish you a happy and satisfactory visit to England, and a return in March as Commander-in-Chief. I wish you were here now, for I am having a fight in which I stand alone in opposition to Lord Mayo and Sir W. Mansfield and the rest of the council, all bent on a large reduction of barrack accommodation, and retrogression. In fact, Mansfield argued the other day that the 'palaces' in which we now put our European soldiers are neither so cool or comfortable as the low, cutcha, thatched, temporary buildings we used to place them in!! What Florence Nightingale would have said if she had heard some of our late discussions I don't know; the good woman would have stared; it even rather astonished me. However, I shall fight alone, and leave the issue to the common sense of the Duke of Argyll. We have to thank Lawrence for it all, inasmuch as he threw barrack expenditure on revenue instead of a loan; and of course as an annual charge on revenue a couple of millions is financially a burthen his successor would be glad to be rid of or largely diminish. It is very disagreeable to have what has been maturely considered and settled thus opened up again."

*To Sir Robert Vivian, dated 10th June*, 1869.

"By this mail go home two despatches of importance, one the despatch about our marine requirements, and the other about the state of affairs at Muscat, in the Gulf of Persia, and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan and Kelat.

"The political despatch is of importance, and points to a great

* Governor-General's Agent in Central India.

defect in our existing relations with Persia. I don't know what Alison is about there; but nothing can, as a rule, be worse than the information sent by his subordinates from Meshed and other frontier positions. Evidently Alison don't trouble himself much about the relations of Persia and India, though these are the important points in connection with our costly mission at Teheran."

*To Sir Robert Vivian, dated 17th June*, 1869.

"I am sorry that the Duke of Argyll could not carry his bill without the amendment proposed by the Marquis of Salisbury and supported by Lord Lawrence. I could understand Lawrence voting as he did. . . . . But Lord Salisbury is of a different stamp. I should have supposed he would have approved of the principle of election of part of the council by its members.

"I regret the change, for it opens the door to party having more to do with appointments to the Council than has hitherto been the case. You have now a Secretary of State of ability and weight, both in and out of the Cabinet, but a weak one with strong party subserviency might fill the Council with indifferent men; and, after all, say what they will of the India Council, it is the regulator fly-wheel of the machinery of administration for one of the finest but most dangerous empires on the face of the earth. It is a council where you ought to have the best men you can get, and not grudge either their £1,200 a year or their pension, which is, I see, lopped off."

*To the Duke of Northumberland, dated 24th June*, 1869.

"I must say that I admire the strong, clear, good sense of the Duke of Argyll in his despatches, and in his mastery of India Office questions. Even his admiration for Lawrence does not prevent his exercising an independent and sound judgment, and as a rule he hits the right nail on the head. He has shown a remarkable instance of this lately in dealing with a conflict between the New Bank of Bombay, a shaky offspring of the old one now so notorious, and the Bank of Bengal. Northcote had been rather bamboozled by Bombay. The Duke of Argyll swept away the cobwebs of interested manœuvre and clamour. I am afraid, however, that Gladstone and Bright got alarmed by the utterly erroneous report of the Umballa conference first sent to England by

the *Times'* correspondent who was in camp. . . . . No doubt too, the Russian Foreign Office must have been deceived by such confident and quasi-authoritative announcements, and may have pressed the London Foreign Office. Lawrence, too, took the opportunity in his maiden speech in the House of Lords to take all the credit to himself and left Lord Mayo none. These combined causes have, I think, operated in a way which has led to Lord Mayo receiving hardly any credit for a conference which was very successful, committed the Government to nothing, and satisfied Shere Ali.

"Lord Mayo showed great firmness and good sense, and resisted some very strong pressure put upon him to pursue a less guarded and moderate course. Of course he is not a political ally of the Cabinet, and therefore cannot expect the same cordial support as if he were one of their supporters; but I do not know that such a status is unfavourable to greater care and vigilance on his part. They are both popular out here—Lord and Lady Mayo I mean.

"I hope they won't 'cave in' to American bullying and pretension. Far better have war than such degradation. Though no one hates war more than I, no one can be more convinced than myself that we are not going the right way either to keep off war, or to be prepared for it when it overtakes us. The telegraph announces five years as the period of service for our soldiers, and no special force for India. This, if correct, will be frightfully costly for India, and we shall be perpetually having a large force afloat in course of transport. It will be difficult to work under such arrangements with anything like economy, and there will be practical difficulties of detail besides the expenditure of life and money; but here again I must wait for the particulars of the scheme."

*To Dr. Duff, dated 15th July,* 1869.

"Yours of the 17th of last month was in my hands on the 12th of this month. I could not help thinking what a change that one fact was for India as compared with 1830-31. I need hardly say that I was very glad to get your kind letter. I had been reading your speech at the General Assembly, in which you defended the China missionary against the attack of the Duke of Somerset; and as an address of such length and substance demands both mental and physical strength, I had been rejoiced by this proof, as I took it, of your health and vigour, as well as of

your staunchness in defence of those who had no voice in the House of Lords.

"Lord Mayo will, I hope, make a good Governor-General. He has no want of strength of character or lack of sound common sense. He is very active, and fond of seeing things himself. He has a good amount of caution, which in his position is necessary, both with reference to the Home Government, who are not his political friends, and the party here in power, all Lord Lawrence's friends. Lord Mayo has, I think, more ability than his political opponents were disposed to credit him with. His address is exceedingly taking, and pleases people much. He has, therefore, many elements for making a good Governor-General. He has none of the prejudices which his predecessor had, and he understands home politics better. He is in every way a genial man without derogating from his position and the dignity of his office. This suits the Indian world.

"I have not as yet heard a word about succession to the Punjab. The appointment is Lord Mayo's, but he will probably consult the Duke of Argyll, as it is a post of grave importance at the present time, and one in which a man is required who has the confidence both of the Governor-General and of the Home Government; for this reason I have not canvassed for it either here or at home. If Lord Elgin had lived, I was to have been Lieutenant-Governor after Montgomery. Lord Elgin told me I was wrong when I supported Sir R. Montgomery's application for another year . . . . . and so it proved so far as my own interests and advancement were concerned. I hope I have not been useless in this council. My rule has been a plain one, however short, very far short, I may have fallen of fulfilling it in my career. 'And what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?' If that could be honestly put on my grave, I shall not have lived wholly in vain. For the rest of my working days, few or many, my family have some claim that I should not seek ease and leisure so long as health and faculties are continued to me, and the infirmities of advancing years do not disqualify me. I should, therefore, accept the Punjab if it were offered me, but I will not canvass for it. About this time next year my five years' period of council is over, so that if I don't go to the Punjab, I shall then be preparing for my return to England. Of course if I went in January to the Punjab, my return to England would be deferred. Now that they have altered the system of appointing men to the council in England, and it

rests with the Secretary of State, not partly by election as formerly, it would be uncertain whether I got a seat in the council if I went home next year. On the election system I was pretty sure, judging from the wish to have me back expressed by several of my old colleagues last year, and that spontaneously on their parts. If I return to England next year, I shall look forward to meeting you with great pleasure, for I shall be pretty sure to be in the north of England visiting, and a run to Edinburgh is easy; but I must not raise castles yet, as all mine are apt to vanish."

*To Sir Robert Vivian, dated 15th July*, 1869.

"The Stud Committee has finished its report, which is now printing and will be sent in Saturday. It is condemnatory of our existing studs, but suggests various measures of radical modification and improvement as well as of economy. They have also had Mr. D. Ross, from Australia, before them, and are to give us a separate report on his suggestions for depending wholly on that country for our supply of horses, a proposal which they don't at all accept. I certainly should object to any such entire dependence on a course of supply which war might any day render unreliable. An empire like this ought to be self-reliant as far as possible in so important a matter as horses for military purposes. An interesting report has come from Madras on the subject of remounts, studs, &c., but they want to raise our rate for walers, which we think quite unnecessary, I only wish we could reduce our stud horse cost to what we pay for walers in the Calcutta market, £60. However, you will in due course receive all this officially.

"How far we are, either in England or India, from having our military establishments on a safe or efficient footing. We shall not amend matters, either here or in England I fear, until some signal catastrophe by its burning humiliation awakes the nation, and then it may chance to be too late."

*To Sir Robert Vivian, dated 19th August*, 1869.

"Lord Mayo has, I think, got a wrong impression, *viz.*, that considerable military reduction can be at once effected. This is impossible with safety to the empire. Whatever can be done will be prospective and involve some very thorough reforms of system.

Lord Mayo is alarmed at the fall of the opium and income tax revenues, which Chapman * aggregates at half a million. They must be more careful at lavishing millions on so-called reproductive works, one of which on an expenditure of seven lakhs I found to yield ·2, decimal two, not mind you two, per cent. on capital. There is a strong tendency to starve all military expenditure, however indispensably necessary. Now as the Military Department has been far more rigidly economical than any other, this is a great mistake. Both the Commander-in-Chief and myself have been stringently tight as to military expenditure. It will be long before two pull together so well again that way. But Mansfield, on the point of laying down his command, is, I think, disposed to make recommendations of reduction of force which far outstrip, judging from what I inferred from Lord Mayo, the limits of safety. I have not, however, seen his memorandum.

"Having seen the empire once nearly lost, and experienced what it cost to recover it, I shall not be swayed by either Lord Mayo or Sir W. Mansfield in recording my views on possible reduction."

*To Sir Robert Vivian, dated 9th September*, 1869.

"You will see that I propose a heavy reduction of horse artillery batteries, not of field batteries. The horse artillery is the most costly arm we have, and really so seldom useful that there is no reason for maintaining such an amount of it. In the great actions, such as Maharajpore, Chillianwala, Goojerat, I never saw horse artillery do anything that horse field batteries cannot do. I once compared notes with W. Napier, the historian, on this very subject, and he and I were of one mind. I have not in the present minute suggested it; but if the Duke of Argyll adopted the proposal for the reduction of horse artillery, he might couple it with an increase of a very moderate amount to the *privates* of the field batteries, so that in case of emergency we could by adding two guns to each field battery add one-fourth to our strength of guns with little additional cost. In action the best things I have seen done were done by field batteries, not by horse artillery. Now that both horse artillery and field batteries are to have the 9-pounder rifled gun, there ceases to be any reason for the more costly branch; a couple more horses to a gun would enable a field battery, if you were in want of it or part of it to act with cavalry, to do so just

* Mr. Chapman of the Civil Service, Secretary to Government in the Financial Department.

as well as horse artillery. I always found cavalry delayed by having to wait for the horse artillery, and sometimes thus losing the opportune moment for doing what cavalry is intended to perform. I am confident that what I propose to keep of that expensive branch, *viz.*, one brigade of six batteries, is all that we want, and more than we shall use. But do not reduce the field batteries or the heavy batteries; if you do anything, strengthen both these, which you can do at small cost, and remember that our heavy batteries are really field batteries, for our elephant draught makes them as movable as infantry, and no troops in the world could stand their pounding in the open."

*To Sir Robert Vivian, dated 15th September*, 1869.

"I have seen more fighting than Mansfield or Adye, and never saw the horse artillery in action do anything which the field batteries could not do; in fact the best things I have seen done were done by the field batteries, which when properly horsed, as they now are, can do everything that is needed.

"I have allowed fully as much horse artillery as we could want in days when cavalry must be handled differently from what it has hitherto been—cannot be exposed in line of battle, must be put where least seen, and yet be ready to act with extreme rapidity at the right moment. Of course the less it depends on, or is delayed by, horse artillery the better; and the less artillery has to be paralyzed by remaining with cavalry, the better. I know there will be stiff opposition to the reduction I propose in that pet and showy branch; but I hope the Duke of Argyll will not shrink from this, the most important saving. I send you the concluding part of my minute which I could not despatch by last mail."

*To Lord Napier of Magdala, dated 27th September*, 1869.

"You will doubtless hear that Temple's surplus of £52,000 has been metamorphosed by the wand of our financial harlequin into a deficit of 2⅔ millions sterling. If India had been on fire, we could not have had more special councils and precipitate action. Of course it produces an exaggerated alarm everywhere, and the effect is already great in disturbing the minds of the officers of the army, who know that the only resource of financiers is, as a rule, army reduction. The civil service of course know they are quite secure, and that a parade of parings will be made which really don't cost that branch any sacrifice. In fact, even the civil

paring manages to hit the army officers employed with the police much more than any one else. A number of these are to be struck off the police to reduce the civil estimates."

*To Sir Robert Vivian, dated 18th October*, 1869.

"You will receive by this mail a despatch proposing artillery reductions. The council has recommended Sir W. Mansfield's proposals in preference to mine. I am convinced they fall into a costly error.

"I told you before that W. Napier, the historian, and I once compared notes, and were of the same mind as to horse artillery. Since his death the reasons are fifty-fold stronger against wasting an enormous power of artillery, as well as of money, in maintaining an arm that will have to be just as much taken care of as to exposure in line of battle as the cavalry with which it is to act. I do hope that the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Cardwell will make a stand against any surplusage of this most costly and most seldom useful branch of the artillery.

"For the reasons I have set forth, both as to paucity of our European infantry, and badness of our Native armies, when suddenly augmented for war on their present organization, I look on our field batteries as essential elements of strength in the support and confidence they can give to raw levies. Napoleon's maxim founded on the experience of the French armies is sound. The raw battalions need more artillery than veteran infantry. If true of French troops, it is far more so of Native troops, especially when they are deprived of the backbone of European officers in command of companies, which was always the secret of their fighting powers. I do not undervalue the difference between smooth-bore and rifled ordnance, far from it; *but that difference does not compensate for the radical weakness of the existing system*, though it may be some security against the disgraceful collapse under strain of war, which hardly an officer conceals that he expects. I have been very guarded in my official minute on this head, but there is no gain to a Government in ignoring a known weakness.

"As usual, work is being crammed on just as the Governor-General leaves, and I always feel that haste is not real despatch of business, but it is inevitable on these periodical emigrations. Lord Mayo starts to-morrow for Nynee Tal and Raneekhet. I shall leave at the end of the month."

*To Sir George Clerk, dated 30th November*, 1869.

"The sight of your handwriting was refreshing, and I was glad to have yours of the 16th October on many accounts. I read your railway minute carefully, and with not the less interest that I found it harmonized with my own views and opinions. I am, and always have been, confident that Government can in India construct railways advantageously, more so than through the agency of companies.

"I am anxious on the railway administration question, for I was opposed always to the costly mode of construction through companies, and had a main hand in supporting the introduction of the system now sanctioned by the Secretary of State; but then I should at once have organized the railway department as a separate one under a special secretary to Government of its own. Whilst the Americans have 42,000 miles of railway, we have only 5,000; and since their civil war they open lines at the rate of over 2,000 miles a year, we hardly 200; so that the United States, who are providing for the interests of thirty-five millions, have done and are doing ten times as much as we for 200 millions of population.

"In the matter of military reductions, and the recovery of an equilibrium between receipts and expenditure, you will have seen the recommendations, and probably my minutes. I was not in favour of any reduction of fighting strength, that is I would not have a European musket, sabre, or gunner less than we now have, nor would I have the Native army reduced in Bengal. We have not a man too many, but I have shown how material reduction may be made without damage to fighting strength. I made some remarks about civil expenditure rather in the same way that your letter touches, and you will observe how ill they were received. The *only civil* reduction made has been to throw back on the Military Department a number of military officers for whom the Commander-in-Chief will say he has no employment, but who must, of course, be paid and borne on the military budget.

"Of course the moment any financial difficulty takes place the resource of English financiers is always the army and navy. Accordingly, here the moment the deficit came out, it was discovered that we were building palaces for our European soldiers, &c., &c., and actually the assertion was made that the old ground floor temporary barracks, now fallen and falling to pieces, were better, cooler, more healthy, &c., for the men! The whole cry against so-

called 'palatial barracks' was based on the usual grudging spirit of all far-sighted expenditure in favour of our European troops. I have some hope that a petticoat may stand by the soldier in the shape of Florence Nightingale. Where should we be but for our European soldier? And as for 'palatial structures' let these gentlemen pass a night in, or even walk through, the dormitories at twelve or one at night, and then say if there is too much sweet air or room.

"I have unfortunately for myself, and for one who was dearer to me than a hundred selves, known the hour when I would have given *all* miserable pelf for fifty English sabres or muskets, to secure a partial and turn it into a complete and abiding success that would have saved us much in Central India. Those fifty sabres would have been worth all their weight in gold, infinitely of more value than much on which we spend millions to no purpose. It may be so again some day, and meanwhile the English soldier shall not, so far as lies in my power, be grudged reasonable attention to what is essential to his health and comfort.

"During the move from Simla to Calcutta, Mansfield has issued the order which was passed in England, because a private at Aldershot or some English camp shot a sergeant or officer. Just conceive the effect of this with the Native soldiery. As they none of them either hear or care for what happened at Aldershot, they will, of course, consider that the care of their arms and ammunition is taken away from them through mistrust. The order was issued without the previous sanction of the Government, and is a rare instance of the expediency of adopting Horse Guards orders as necessarily applicable to India. The life of our European regiments now depends on the magazine guard, and you know what the vigilance in ordinary times of our over-careless English soldier is. I have insisted that on the Peshawur frontier, at Gwalior, Mhow, &c., the order shall not be applied."

*To Lord Mayo, dated 21st July*, 1869.

"I have no fear of Russia, none of the Afghans, still less of the Bokhara crumbling power, and I *know* we could vindicate our honour if Forsyth's* throat and those of his Russian friends were cut; but it would be a long and a costly job, and the people of

* Mr. Forsyth of the Civil Service, now Sir Douglas Forsyth, K.C.S.I., had at this time some idea of joining certain Russian officers in a rather adventurous journey in Central Asia.

England, if they like to run the risk, had better do so on the authority and responsibility of Her Majesty's Government rather than that of the Indian Government; for a good many of Her Majesty's regiments might, before they had done, find campaigning to the west of the Indus furnish them with rough occupation for a considerable period.

"I feel that we can never again enter Afghanistan to withdraw from it. That, with Russia on the Oxus, is now utterly impossible. Therefore, except on the distinct responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, I am not in favour of any step the result of which may entail sending troops into Afghanistan."

*To Lord Mayo, dated 4th August*, 1869.

"I do not partake of Kaye's jealousy of the Secretary of State's council, who are infinitely more reliable than he, with his entourage, . . . . . is ever likely to be. The whole bureaucracy of the India Office are more or less jealous of the council, and would prefer having the Secretary of State in their own hands without any such check; but my own experience of them was that it would be an evil day for India, and the Secretary of State too, when that took place, and that no one in the India Office needed it half so much as Kaye. I had to cut and alter his drafts more than those of any other Secretary at the India Office. Therefore, so far as throwing affairs more completely into his hands is concerned, it is as a general rule most inexpedient, for he is a prejudiced, one-sided man.

"Strictly speaking, no difficulty could arise if Kaye did his duty and was present to open the despatches himself. But he has so many literary irons in the fire that he is a great deal absent from the India Office, and then his subordinates have the handling of the mails when they arrive.

"But there is another point of view from which the question has to be viewed.

"In matters of political moment the council are not babblers, on the contrary they are much more close than Kaye and others in alliance with the press. But the council are much less under party influences than any Secretary can well be, whose weight in the cabinet is very uncertain, and whom I have known overridden against his own convictions by the Cabinet. Now the more affairs are kept out of the cognizance of the council, the greater the chance of mere party policy and views having effect on Indian

affairs, which cannot be kept too free, whether as to persons or measures, from the perversion due to seeing everything, as is done in England, through party spectacles. The stronger a Cabinet and the weaker in that body a Secretary of State for India, the greater the safety to a Governor-General and to the Government of India from the action of the council of the Secretary of State as a fly wheel to regulate and check the action of the home machine both as regards the Governor-General himself and his measures. Therefore it is not his interest, whatever his party, to throw affairs into the hands of the subservient bureaucracy of the India Office rather than into that of the council. If of a different party from the Cabinet, this reasoning has more weight. The support of the council, as may be that of the press, is then practically of some, and often of very real, importance."

*To Lord Mayo, dated 14th August*, 1869.

"I am so accustomed to financial alarms that nine times out of ten prove erroneous, and have so little confidence in the statements that issue at this period of the year from the Financial Department, that it would require a very close scrutiny of the data on which their calculations are based to convince me that the revenue returns from opium and the income tax are to be half a million below last year. Of course, where opium is concerned it is possible, but hardly probable. However, quite independently of the financial prospects of the year, the duty of economy seems to me a permanent one, and not one to fluctuate with the alarms of the Financial Department. Our financial position is not, in my opinion, at all calculated to warrant any extreme view either of confidence or the reverse; and I certainly do not think that the policy of a government of this magnitude should oscillate according to financial barometrical readings with regard to any particular item of revenue at this time of the year. Your Excellency, however, is a better judge than I am, who have not seen them, of the value of the financial data put forward.

"I think the Government has been launching on undertakings which indicated a confidence in its financial position which it will be perilous to discredit without good cause; but certainly I should overhaul very unscrupulously a multifarious class of civil expenditure on works, and general administration, before compromising the strength of the army necessary for safety, or the welfare and efficiency of that army.

*To Lord Mayo, dated 10th November*, 1869.

"I return with many thanks the accompanying letters from ——. I am interested by his account of Persia, which, I believe, is in the main correct, and by a remark of his regretting that during the Russian war Russia was not driven back from the Caucasus as she easily might have been. Russian military writers have noted the same thing; and it was not my fault that at the right time this was not done, and the southern shore of the Caspian freed from Russian domination to boot. Had this been done as I proposed, and when I proposed, it would have paralyzed Russian advance and aggression in Central Asia; but our English statesmen, leaning on France, and indifferent to India, entirely lost an opportunity never to be retrieved.

"Russia has a fixed aim and policy; we have none; or what is worse, a sort of merry-go-round change of views with every change of Foreign and Indian Secretaries."

Before leaving my father's correspondence of 1869, I quote two further passages from private letters which are, I think, indicative of certain points in his character. Mingled with his unfeigned humility towards the God whom he had worshipped with a single heart from the beginning to the end of his career, there was always in him a sturdy consciousness that he had done his duty to his country, and he held it false modesty to pretend that he thought otherwise. "I have done the State some service, and they know it," he was once heard to quote. In this sense he writes to one of his near relatives in June, 1869: "It is all very well being spoken of by the Duke of Argyll in the way to which you allude, and as I don't know him, the compliment was the more disinterested on his part; but what I am surprised at is that it should be left to him, a stranger, to make the first honourable mention of my name in the House of Lords, when others whom I had served, and served well, never took the opportunities which occurred to say a word. I do not care at my time of life much for any praise from men; and I can go on to the end, which cannot be far off, and may be near, trying to hold to my rule of life, to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with the Lord my God, to whose care and protection I commend you both."

The other passage to which I have referred was an extract from a letter to his eldest daughter, written a few weeks later. He was often blamed by his opponents for the uncompromising direct-

ness of his speech in official life; and certainly at times, when he thought he had come upon anything like dishonesty or injustice, he did not measure his words by ordinary rule. The result was occasionally a sharp passage of arms, and some said of him, as had been said of his old friend George Broadfoot, that he was "fond of fighting for fighting sake." I quote the extract to show that he was fully alive to the inexpediency of unnecessary friction:

"Don't overestimate my character. You must remember that I have had from my very boyhood a trying life, and that circumstances have often brought me into dangerous conflict with powers high and low. After a while one gets accustomed to anything, conflict as well as all else; but conflict should be avoided where it honestly can be, for it always impedes work, and angers people. St. Paul was all things to all men in the spirit of Christian charity, and striving for their welfare, but never a flincher from the truth when conflict was unavoidable. There was a deep wisdom in the balance of intellectual might and a somewhat weak physique and presence, but alive with mental energy. For I dare say it softened the man's fire of thought and speech."

The close of 1869 was signalised by the visit of the Duke of Edinburgh to India, and its accompanying festivities. The following are extracts from some letters written by my father to Lady Durand at this time:—

*Calcutta, 23rd December* . . . . . "The Prince landed yesterday . . . . . Lord Mayo received him on the platform in front of Prinsep's Ghaut, where the Prince landed from his own cutter. . . . . I rode your horse in the procession, and thought of the time when you used to let him poke his head over Lord Elgin's shoulder, and wished you were as well and strong as you were then. Meade I put on the old cape; Aitchison on my own horse; so my stud came into use yesterday . . . . . The procession was from Prinsep's Ghaut round the point where you nearly came to grief with the telegraph wire; and then straight down on Government House by the Ellenborough course. To-day is the levee, and fireworks, illumination, &c.

*25th.*—"The drawing-room last night was crowded . . . . . A number of natives were present, besides the five great chiefs. I asked Scindia how long it would be before their ladies attended, or had such 'lady durbars?' He shook his head and said frankly, 'kabhee nay, kabhee nay!' as if the thought was abhorrent, and almost an insult. It was very indicative of the effect of these

displays of ladies on Native feeling and prejudices; it hardens the latter considerably, and makes them more obdurate against what they think the license of our manners . . . . . I encouraged the idea of the chiefs seeing the *Galatea* beat to quarters and open fire, as that would interest Scindia, Jeypore, and the others, more than anything else . . . . . .

. . . . . "I took the Shah Jehan Begum of Bhopal to the great people, who all took much notice of her; and, Prince included, exchanges of photograph portraits are to take place. Poor little lady, she seems to regard me as her 'Má báp,' as natives say, and had hold of my hand all through the crowds as we passed down the concert-room and stairs to the supper-room . . . . . .

. . . . . "At Government House, the aides-de-camp rather 'chaff' me, for the way in which the Shah Jehan rushes at me as an old friend. I confess to liking this spirit of confidence, as it shows that they continue to regard me as a fast friend of their family . . . . . .

*December* 31*st*.—"The installation went off as well yesterday as good arrangements could make a ceremony of the kind go off. The only failure was a blast of trumpets when the banner was unfurled and waved over the Prince's head. The trumpets were a miserably squeaky production, of a penny-trumpet plaything kind, and the banner was so adroitly handled as either to stick the staff-point in the canopy or to wipe the hair and face of His Royal Highness . . . . . The natives thought it a fine sowaree;* but Scindia said to some one, he did not care for this 'zenana ka kam:' a queer idea of a knighthood ceremony certainly, to call it a 'zenana ka kam!'† I think the effect on the European mind was, how unsuitable to the present day such ceremonies, even when well managed, are; on the Native mind, some admiration of the cavalcade, and wonder what all the rest of the robing, &c., &c., was. There was something funereal in our march up to and back from the durbar tent. I expected every moment to hear the dead march in Saul. The anthems were well sung, and that to me was the best part of the ceremony. I rode your horse, who chose to caper a little at every 'present arms;' but behaved like an angel, or as a knight's horse ought. The old cape carried Colonel Meade . . . . . .

1*st January*, 1870 . . . . . "Well, we are launched on 1870.

* Cavalcade.

† It is difficult to give the exact sense of the remark in English. Perhaps "woman's work" would be as good a translation as any.

It may be an eventful year to us; for you go home in March, and as yet I don't know whether I follow you in August or remain in the country . . . . . It will soon be forty years since I landed in India, a youth seventeen and a half years old. In November, if I reach it, I shall be fifty-eight; a time of life when separations are not met with the confidence of a younger age; but I shall hope for the best." . . . . . .

A few days later he wrote to Lord Ellenborough :—

"I have no doubt that you will receive from the papers full particulars of the festivities and ceremonials which marked the Prince's reception in Calcutta. I shall not therefore enter upon these further than to say that Lord Mayo deserves great credit for the completeness of all the arrangements, and the regal manner in which he treated the Prince and his other visitors. It will have cost Lord Mayo a large sum, but it has been an entirely successful reception.

"The Duke of Edinburgh has made a very favourable impression here. His bearing has throughout been that of a gentleman of sense and delicacy, equally removed from hauteur and from familiarity. He is, I think, sure of a cordial reception, wherever he travels in India, from the civil and military services; and the Native chiefs are equally bent on doing him honour; but he has wisely written a very sensible letter on the subject of presents, restricting these in an unobjectionable manner. I anticipate that both Her Majesty and the young Prince himself will look back with satisfaction on the issue of this visit to India. Its political effect will be salutary to chiefs and people, as giving a visible reality to the dominion of the Crown. Hitherto it has lacked personality in India, and been more ideal than sensuous. The *bona fide* visit and sight of a *shahzada** supplies the missing element, and satisfies an Eastern craving. It should not, however, be repeated for some time to come; otherwise the effect will deteriorate. There is not much chance of any early repetition, however; though of course the opening of the Suez Canal and the greater facility of visits to India in their own yachts may encourage princely visitors of all nations.

"The effect of the Umballa meeting has been to strengthen Shere Ali, and to enable him to consolidate his power and secure his position. At the same time it has given weight to our influence and counsel against aggressive measures on Shere Ali's part on

* Prince of royal birth.

the Oxus, which might give umbrage. The Russian Government shows every disposition to exercise similar restraint over the King of Bokhara. Complications on the Oxus promise thus to be avoided by the influence of the Russian Government over the Bokhara ruler, and ours over the Afghan ruler.

"I have not gone with the rest of my colleagues on their view of what is termed our financial crisis. The fall in opium and customs returns would not have been productive of serious embarrassment if it had not been for a sudden reversal of financial policy by Sir J. Lawrence in 1868, when he threw upon ordinary revenue the cost of the permanent military works, forts, barracks, and hospitals, which were to have been met by terminable loans of twenty or thirty years periods. He did this when things were in full swing under his own urgent pressure; and of course five or six millions, thus suddenly thrown on revenue, have artifically intensified into a financial crisis what would have otherwise assumed a much less formidable and discreditable aspect.

"I do not know what the Horse Guards and War Office may do, but my own recommendations for military reduction involved no diminution of fighting strength, for we have none to spare in my opinion.

"To save money the Government is now running amuck against barrack expenditure; but I regard this as transparently false economy. The European soldier is worthy the best shelter the State can give him." . . . . .

Shortly after writing this letter my father sent in his name to the Duke of Argyll as a candidate for the Secretary of State's Council. He was at the time generally regarded and designated by the Indian public, official and non-official, as the fittest successor to Sir Donald Macleod in the Punjab; but he had been too often disappointed in the course of his career to retain any very sanguine hopes of advancement, and he shared the opinion held by some of those who were supposed to possess good information, that the rule of our great frontier province, the most important charge in India, would be entrusted to Sir Richard Temple. During the remainder of the Calcutta season he had no reason to change his opinion, for until he left Calcutta for Simla, Lord Mayo had said nothing; and after parting in February with Lady Durand and his two youngest children, my father began to make preparations, not without some feeling of pleasure, for following them in the course of the summer.

In the meantime he had found occasion to put upon record one

or two minutes on military and financial affairs, and upon the still unsettled question of a new Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce. He stood up stoutly at this time for Sir Richard Temple, whose reputation as a financier was being very fiercely assailed. Sir Richard had, he believed, been selected for the lieutenant-governorship of the Punjab in preference to himself, and he had always been a steady opponent of Sir Richard's financial policy; but with regard to the budget of 1870 he was of opinion that the financial member was subjected to much unjust blame, and he lost no opportunity of saying so. The spirit of "fair play" which he showed was pointedly acknowledged by Sir Richard Temple in the course of the budget discussions.

Before going on to speak of my father's final severance from the Viceroy's Council, I quote some further extracts from his correspondence:—

*To Lord Mayo, dated 2nd February*, 1870.

"I quite agree with you that the Somnath gates had better remain where they are, along with all other flags or trophies, in the great hall at Agra. There must always be some conservancy of the fine old buildings in the Agra fort, so that the trophies would have as much looking after as they require, and would help to prevent the desecration of the noble hall; otherwise the next time any one enter it they may find it utilized as a convict factory, or some other equally appropriate use.

"India had much to do with the first Chinese war, and I think the flags taken from the celestials which are hung up at Agra were probably brought by our own troops. Why should these go to Woolwich any more than the hem-worked flag of the volunteer cavalry of 1857? 'The red-bristled barbarians madly careering over the celestial waters' carried off quite enough to England. Woolwich is all very well in its way, but it is not a good place for an imperial depository of trophies.

"The evacuation of the Agra fort buildings by the magazine is a fitting opportunity for the issue of an order as to the conservancy of the buildings in future. It would, I venture to think, be far better received by the British and Indian publics, as a sentiment of respect towards the past imperial dynasties, than would any exhibition of sentiment towards Woolwich by the transfer of trophies to the laboratory museum. The effect of such an order would be favourable among Mahomedans as well

as Hindus; for the Motee Musjid they may certainly be proud of as a gem in architecture, and the palace itself is full of associations with the fate and history of some of the Moslem emperors. Any indication of respect for the architectural relics of the Moslem emperors will touch a chord in the pride and feelings of every educated Mahomedan in, and even out of, the country."

*To Lady Durand.*

*March*, 1870.—"As usual, I am writing on a Sunday morning, for I always begin my letters to you on that day, and finish them on the mail day, Tuesday. My sermon has been a curious one; yet I hardly know where I could in some respects have found a better. Among Montaigne's essays is one which he entitles 'Apologie de Raymond Sebond.' This author, whom at his father's request he translated, . . . . . is a mere peg on which to hang a general review of ancient philosophy, and modern too, that is of Montaigne's day; which in ours has ceased to be modern, except that the Christian religion is the same as it was in his day . . . . . I could with difficulty instance any review of the discussions of philosophers and even divines on the attributes of God and of man, which is more remarkable than this said essay, which shows boldly the futility of man's reasoning powers in his search after God and His nature; the absurdities and contradictions into which man falls when he tries to measure God; and the self-idolatry which is at the bottom of man's lucubrations. Montaigne, after arriving at conclusions which might have exposed him to the charge of being an extreme free-thinker, always takes refuge in the necessity of a revelation such as God has himself given us to rectify our otherwise wandering and presumptuous ignorance. I think Montaigne does this in good faith, and not merely to keep on terms with the Roman Church; but I can quite understand the French classing him among their free-thinkers, and regarding such passages as expedient compromises with a power then too strong for Montaigne to beard.

*April*, 1870.—"I am rather disposed to think that Babu Keshava Chunder Sen will consider that he has made a convert of you, and will enrol you as a leading member of the Brahmo Somaj! . . . . . What a pity we never thought of hearing him in Calcutta. Curious that you should learn more of him and his sect, and be more alive to its merits in a few days on board the *Mooltan*, when leaving India, than you have been during all these years of resi-

dence in India. Does not this show how little we mix with the natives around us, or know what they are doing? If you have been doing Brahmo Somaj, I have been doing synagogue. I went yesterday to my Jew acquaintance, Mr. ——, and he and I walked from his house to the synagogue, which is close by. I went through the service, and was much struck with various things and habits, which at once showed me how unchanged these Eastern Jews are in their customs—the reverence with which the 'law' and 'prophets' were brought out of the sanctum and carried to the reading place; old and young touched the cases with hand or forehead or lips, and seemed proud to bear them. The form of the cases, too, evidently was old. Then every Jew had a veil which he wore during the service. The Hebrew was read with a peculiar chanting cadence, and in parts all joined . . . . . I took off my hat in the synagogue; but they prayed covered and veiled, as a mark of reverence to God . . . . . The ladies were in a gallery above, and all had a white 'chuddur,' as we should call it, but not with the face covered, or those eye-slits you see in Egypt, Persia, and Khorassan . . . . . "

"On Thursday we had an Engineer dinner at the club, and as my health was proposed, I had to make a speech, quite unprepared; but as I told them I was sure they would keep up the old character of the corps in war and peace—being the first in, and the last out, when fighting is going on, and taking a like lead in peace, in all civil employments—I do not suppose I offended them in bidding them what all felt was a farewell."

*Umballa*, 15*th*.—"This is Good Friday, and so far all has gone well on our trip from Calcutta. On the 12th, Colonel Barrow drove me to Isabel's grave. I found it in good order . . . . . Barrow was kind enough to say that he would occasionally visit the cemetery. On our way back he drove through the residency grounds, and pointing to your room, said he had occasionally accompanied you from your room to the hospital, where he said many a man owed his life to your care.

"On the 18th I returned to Cawnpore, and put up in the old room in which you and Isabel slept. I chose it, walking straight into it when they wished to place me elsewhere. From 6 to 7½ P.M. I sat out on the semi-circular *chabutrah*, thinking, as you may suppose, of your long and sadly ending trial here, and of the sweet lady who used to say, 'papa, papa,' and be carried about in my arms of a morning whilst you were dressing; thought of the end of so many prayers that that beautiful child might be spared for

your sake, and how they were answered by finding her lovely in in death, but dead, and yourself worn to a skeleton. The old rooms, couches, furniture, just the same. Material objects always rebuke, by their comparative permanence, the vicissitudes of man; they seem so lasting, he so fugitive. I am glad I went to Noor Mahomed's again; and had, after more than two years have passed since Isabel was called away from us, another calm survey of the place . . . . . The talk of the party took off my thoughts somewhat from the past, for I could not avoid listening; but how often had you and I sat down at that table, hoping, hoping that which was not to be . . . . . ."

On the 18th of April, 1870, my father arrived in Simla, and found awaiting him a letter from Lord Mayo which seemed finally to set at rest any question as to his remaining longer in India.

Lord Mayo had from the beginning of his rule been impressed with the conviction that the organization of our relations with the feudatory States left much to be desired; and in 1870 his views took shape in a project for the amalgamation under one head of the two great agencies of Central India and Rajputana. He proposed to appoint an agent-in-chief, who was to have charge of all the Native States comprised within the limits of the two agencies, besides the administration of the outlying British district of Ajmere, which is an enclave surrounded by Native territory. The agent-in-chief would, he thought, require "rarer qualities than those which would enable a man to be a successful Governor or Lieutenant-Governor," and in my father he believed he had found those qualities. "Of all men in India," he wrote, "the most likely to exercise influence of a powerful, and at the same time persuasive character, is Sir Henry Durand. He has great experience of the best mode of dealing with these men; he knows most of them personally; he has a thorough knowledge of the history of modern Indian diplomacy, and a fine appreciation of that mixture of firmness and kindness which is so essential. . . . . He would carry with him to Central India and Rajputana all the authority which five years' attendance at council has given him; and if he would accept the office I have little doubt that in a very short time the effects of his influence would be felt and seen in better administration and improved policy in Central India and Rajputana. Sir Henry Durand is greatly esteemed and somewhat feared. He is a thoroughly honest and most upright man, very laborious, and possesses great and wide experience. I have had the misfortune

to differ with him on several occasions, especially on barrack expenditure and other matters of smaller importance; but nevertheless I have always done so with regret, for his views are always well stated and dictated by honest purpose. I think his great forte is political work, and he possesses the qualities which enable him to govern and direct men by personal influence, which are much more rare than administrative or judicial talent."

Accordingly the proposed appointment was offered to my father, with the intimation that the rank and pay would be the same as those of a lieutenant-governorship. "I believe," Lord Mayo added, "that the duties which you will be called on to perform would be at this moment superior in importance to those entrusted to any of the officers of the Government of India." The offer is an instructive comment upon the opinions of Sir John Kaye and one or two other writers of his school, who have stigmatised my father as wanting in sympathy, and as a bad political officer. He had been appointed nine years before by Lord Canning to the charge of the Foreign Office, the office which transacts all our dealings with the Native chiefs; and Lord Mayo had now selected him as the man in all India best fitted to re-organise and directly control the political service. As I have remarked elsewhere, Lord Canning and Lord Mayo are perhaps of all the viceroys of India the two who were most popular with Native chiefs.

The offer was however declined. My father did not consider that any great advantage was likely to result from the introduction of the proposed measure, which involved many practical difficulties. It was certain, moreover, to be unpopular with the great chiefs, who attach the highest value to direct dealings with the Government of India. But putting aside the principle of the scheme, he was not disposed to accept the appointment himself, and he so informed Lord Mayo. After pointing out in the first place that his doing so would be unfair to Colonel Meade, then the most distinguished officer in the political service, who looked forward to the post if it were created, and had received a clear assurance that my father would not stand in his way, the letter went on as follows:—"But I cannot conceal from myself the effect that my acceptance of the offer would have on the public and the services. Rightly or wrongly my name has been associated for some time past with the Punjab, without any movement of my own to encourage such association. . . . . Whatever your lordship may think of the importance of the new office to be created, whether designated agent-in-chief or lieutenant-governor, the

public, the services, and the Native chiefs have their own measure of the relative importance and distinction of such posts; and it would be unanimously considered a mark of the lowered estimation in which I am held by the Government if, after being more than once named for the lieutenant-governorship of the Punjab, I were relegated to what would be regarded as a very inferior position. . . . . It would be said that the appointment was merely made in order to shelve me at the expense of other meritorious officers. . .

"To revert from the personal to the general question, *I* should recommend avoiding recourse to a very high salary for the proposed appointment, and also should advise avoiding the five years' limitation. This may be advisable if the amalgamated agencies are held by a lieutenant-governor, on the emoluments of a lieutenant-governor, who comes from the council of the Governor-General; but where an impression is to be made on such a country as Rajputana, and its races, five-yearly changes are not advantageous. They are checks to progress if they remove good men. Let the agent-in-chief be liberally paid, but do not lay down an imperative rule of removal every five years. Where the engrained habits of centuries of misrule have to be modified, a five years picking at them by one man with one set of ideas, and five years by another with probably different ideas, has a very small effect. Transitory at best it must be, but it is this transitory character of our rule which is its curse and bane; and there is no necessity to stereotype the rule of ever-recurring changes a jot more than may be necessary. The limitations of age prescribed by the rules of the service are quite enough, and hard work and sickness enforce change frequently enough too.

"If your lordship turn to Colonel Hervey's last report on the operations of his department* in Central India and Rajputana, you will find a picture of the state of Rajputana which is, I have no doubt, in the main correct, but which will demand long years of exertion, and that systematic exertion, to amend."

This letter, which was accompanied by a distinct intimation that my father did not care to remain in India except for the lieutenant-governorship of the Punjab or a military command, called forth, not unnaturally perhaps, an indignant rejoinder from

* The Thuggee and Dacoitee Department, established for the purpose of suppressing systematic murder and gang robbery in Native States. The operations of this Department have provoked much criticism; but in some respects, when carefully directed by experienced hands, it has proved a valuable political engine.

Lord Mayo. He was "much hurt," he said, at the suggestion that the appointment had been offered as a means of "shelving" my father at the expense of others; and his letter from beginning to end showed that he felt the remark keenly, and was angered by it. The letter was nevertheless a very straightforward and generous one, and it closed with the offer of the Punjab. Lord Mayo remarked, however, that this was a lower appointment than the proposed agency, which he regarded as the "greatest prize in the service." He added that he should carry out his measure, though he regretted having to do so without my father's assistance, and that at no distant day the office would be second in importance only to that of Viceroy or Governor of a Presidency. This prediction, it may be observed, was not verified. Either the objections brought against the principle of the scheme afterwards dissuaded Lord Mayo from pursuing it, or a fitting man could not in his opinion be found; for the amalgamation of the agencies was never carried into effect. The scheme was revived some years later under the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, and was again dropped, though its practical difficulties are yearly diminishing with the improvement of our communications.

I have said that Lord Mayo was hurt at the tone of my father's letter; and it was certainly plain spoken, and perhaps at first sight ungracious. But there is no doubt that the Indian public would have regarded the appointment in the light in which he placed it.

Lord Mayo's offer of the lieutenant-governship reached my father on the 5th of May, and was accepted by telegram. The great importance of the Punjab, and the long uncertainty as to the selection of a successor, had combined to create throughout India a very unusual amount of interest on the subject. This feeling was probably heightened by the fact that my father's character and circumstances were peculiar. He had been in opposition almost all his life; and was known to be at this time opposed to some of Lord Mayo's favourite views. His interests and his friends were to a great extent outside the official circle, a circumstance which in India is remarkably unusual among officials of any standing. He was moreover a soldier—the leading representative at that time of our great school of soldier statesmen—and the Lieutenant-Governorship had hitherto been the monopoly of the civil service. Altogether it was felt that Lord Mayo's decision in this instance was one of exceptional importance, and it was awaited with exceptional interest. On the evening of the 5th May, Lord Mayo gave out my father's name at Lahore, at a farewell banquet to Sir Donald Mac-

leod, adding that his hearers would find their new Governor "firm and fearless, honest and brave," and the speech was cut short by a sudden storm of cheering, the purport of which was not to be misunderstood. The audience sprang to their feet with one accord, and again and again Lord Mayo's efforts to continue were drowned by a renewed outburst. He was evidently taken aback at the excitement which his words had called forth, and his face showed it.

"It had a *meaning*," to use the words of one of those present, "which I daresay he now understands if he did not understand it then." But Lord Mayo understood well enough. "Well," he afterwards remarked, "men often say what they don't mean, but they don't cheer like that if they don't mean it." And he telegraphed to my father that the reception of his name had been "enthusiastic." That reception was only an index of the general feeling. He had fairly conquered popularity; and the few months he had to live were cheered by the knowledge that his selection for the most important post in India had been approved without a dissentient voice. The army, the civil service, and the non-official public, equally poured in congratulations upon him, and the press was unanimous. One feeling especially was prominent in almost all these expressions of satisfaction, the feeling that "at last" something like justice had been done to him. So unusual was the excitement on the subject, for as a rule the succession to a lieutenant-governorship is taken very quietly in India, that it attracted much attention, and aroused much comment, at home. It was felt there, as it had been felt by Lord Mayo, that the thing "had a meaning."

It need not be said that my father was pleased to see the estimation in which his services and character were universally held. But his pleasure was not unmixed with surprise, and with a sense that men said of him much more than he deserved. I quote from a letter written years afterwards, by one of his children who was with him at the time, a passage which shows the spirit in which he took his success. "It was," she writes, "in the midst of congratulations pouring in from all sides that standing facing her father in his room, he put his hand on a packet of letters and telegrams beside him, and said, 'Ah child, far from elating me these make me very humbled. I fear they all expect too much and will be disappointed.'" Soon afterwards he wrote to one of his friends: "Your cordial congratulations were very acceptable. I never would express a wish on the subject, as you say, when you spoke to me about the Punjab, because I really was content what-

ever the issue. It comes late in life, and after forty years of hard work such as few have had to go through, let alone the trials that fell upon me during my career. I therefore contemplate the issue with the equanimity which forty years of work give." Indeed he said and felt that the news which reached him at this time of one of his sons having passed the competitive examination for the Indian civil service, was a greater pleasure than his own success.

A few days later my father left Simla to take up his new appointment. As he walked away from his house, Lord Napier rode up to say good-bye. They had known one another intimately for forty years, since the days that they were cadets together at Addiscombe, and he was touched by his old friend's farewell. It was so like Napier, he afterwards said, to take the trouble to come over. His eldest daughter walked down with him to the turn of the road, and he spoke to her of a public dinner which had taken place the night before, reproaching himself for not having alluded, as he had intended to do, to the members of the civil service, his old opponents, whose hearty congratulations had greatly pleased him. In the course of his speech the matter had escaped his memory, and he was vexed at an omission which, he thought might seem ungracious. "I remember," she afterwards wrote, "feeling so happy at his having got the Punjab, as we walked along, he and I —too happy to have any forebodings—and holding up my face to be kissed and watching him with a smile as he turned to look back and then swung striding down the hill. The last time I saw him on earth." A few months later his life had been suddenly cut short, and the loving companionship which had been one of its greatest blessings was at an end for ever.

## CHAPTER XII.

The Punjab—Uneasiness on the Frontier—Relations with Native Chiefs—Visit to Cashmere—Colonel Gardener—The Franco-German War—Railway Gauges—Correspondence with Lady Durand—Donald Macnabb—Tour on the Frontier—Agrore Valley—Peshawur—Kohat—Bunnoo—Tank—Accident and Death—Character.

THE Punjab, to the Government of which my father had now been called, was described by a well known writer* in the year that he took charge, as having "the same extent and about two-thirds as great a population as the kingdom of Italy."

The importance of the province, however, did not lie entirely or indeed mainly in its size, or in the amount of its population; for in both these respects it was inferior to other divisions of the great Indian continent. But its position on the north-western extremity of our dominions, and the martial character of its inhabitants and of the tribes situated upon its borders, made the charge an exceptional one. We have met no enemies in Asia equal to the armies of the Sikhs; and along the whole western frontier of the Punjab, for several hundred miles, the belt of mountainous country lying between India and Afghanistan is held by powerful Mahomedan tribes, whose numbers and fanaticism have more than once proved exceedingly formidable. These tribes are watched and kept in check by a local army of excellent troops† under the direct orders of the Lieutenant-Governor; and the regular garrison of the province, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India, is also very considerable. The Punjab is in fact, the most military province in India, even its civil administration being to a great extent carried on by officers of the army. The Lieutenant-Governor is also charged with the control of several large and important Native States within our frontier; and at the time when my father took up the appointment, the great external State of Cashmere was also in direct relation with the Punjab Government.

* Chesney, Indian Polity.

† The Punjab Frontier Force.

At that time, moreover, the special attention of the Government of India was being directed to our frontier province and to the regions lying beyond it. "I do not stop to enquire," Lord Mayo wrote to my father shortly after his transfer to the Punjab, "whether in respect especially to our frontier relations we have changed our policy: but I fully admit that we have done things that might have been impossible a year or two ago, and that we have endeavoured to take advantage of the altered state of politics in Central Asia. In countries where events march so fast it is pedantry to lay down fixed rules of policy. We desire peace and non-interference, but at the same time we wish to maintain over our neighbours that moral influence which is inseparable from the true interests of the strongest power in Asia. England cannot maintain a Thibetan policy in the East. It has been tried and has failed. It is a policy that must eventually have led to war. With Asiatics a bold front is the first element of success; and a bold front can, I firmly believe, be well maintained without agression, oppression, or injustice, without foreign conquest or domestic tyranny." In accordance with these views Lord Mayo had entered into closer relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan; he had set to work personally to inspect the north-western frontier, then unusually disturbed by fanatical excitement, and to master its local politics; and he had formed projects for the encouragement of Central Asian trade, the highways of which lay through the land of the five rivers. With this view he had resolved to despatch a mission to the northern principality of Yarkand, which as yet was free from Chinese domination. In all respects our interest in the countries to the north and west of India was awakening, and our action was beginning insensibly to take new form and colour.

My father came to the lieutenant-governorship with a thorough understanding of Lord Mayo's views, and a general concurrence in their justice. He brought also to the performance of his new duties a special knowledge of Central Asian politics, the course of which he had carefully studied for many years past, and no inconsiderable knowledge of the Punjab itself, where a good many years of his life had been spent. Moreover, his soldier's training, and his innate sense of respect for a brave enemy, had always inclined him to sympathise especially with the races of the Punjab. "I go to that province," he had said in his farewell speech at Simla, "with all the stronger affection towards its people, because I have had the honour of fighting against them;" and he

had paid a warm tribute to the courage and firmness of the Khalsa soldiery, "men who fought us like men." Altogether, he could hardly have been placed in a situation more congenial to himself, or more suited to his character and experience.

On the 1st of June, 1870, he was "sworn in" at Murree, the summer head-quarters of the Punjab Government, where he remained for the greater part of the hot weather. At this time, as I have said, there was much uneasiness upon the frontier; and he set to work at once to enquire very carefully into the causes and extent of the feeling, and to devise, if possible, measures for allaying it. During the ensuing cold season he intended to march down the border from end to end; but in the meantime he summoned to Murree such of the local officers as could be spared from their charges, and spent a considerable portion of his time in personally sifting and comparing their opinions. Pollock, Cavagnari, and others whose names were well known in our trans-Indus districts, were among those whom he consulted; and he obtained in this way a considerable stock of local information, and some personal knowledge of his subordinates. It was his view that the head of a district or province should work as much as possible by personal communication, seeing everybody and everything for himself, and not relying too much upon official papers. Though necessarily tied to his writing table for some hours every day he always found some time to spare for his visitors, European or Native; and those who had anything to say found in him an attentive listener. There was nothing he thought more injurious to a man's usefulness than the tendency to become immersed in routine work, and to regard every interruption as a nuisance. Some of his daily interviews, no doubt, proved unprofitable enough; but he accepted this inevitable drawback with patience, and adhered to his principle however hard worked. It stood him in good stead; and I have often been struck, in conversation with natives of India who had known him, by the way in which almost all of them referred to his accessibility as a distinctive trait. He was never too busy to see them, they said, and never seemed to think conversation a trouble. The inclination to cut oneself off from conversation with natives is perhaps caused as often by want of acquaintance with the native languages as by hard work, and in this particular he had an advantage over most men, for his long residence in India and close study of its languages enabled him to join in familiar conversation with ease and pleasure to himself, and to travel somewhat out of the beaten

track. But in the main his accessibility to natives, high and low, arose from a heart-felt sympathy and interest in their welfare, and they knew it well.

Nevertheless, there were not wanting some in England to attack his reputation upon this very point—his behaviour towards the natives of India—and one of the earliest letters which I find in his Punjab letter books is a reply to a friend who had written to him on the subject. The following is an extract from this letter:—

"I am very glad you mentioned what my critics are pleased to allege, viz., my incapacity for concealing the little respect I entertain for the Native grandees, and that it is likely to make me unpopular. I know pretty well the clique from whom this emanates, and who instil it into those whom they can influence. . . . . The best proof of the degree of truth in the allegation is that precisely for a contrary reason Lord Mayo wished to create me Lieutenant-Governor over all the chiefs of Central India and Rajputana, and was much put out because I would not accept the charge, which he thought no one else could undertake with an equal chance of success. . . . . I think the way the young Begum of Bhopal writes to me is in itself a good comment on this allegation. She has taken to writing to me in English, and addresses me as 'My dear Father,' and speaks of my daughters as her sisters. Her daughter does the same, except that she promotes me to an honour to which I have not attained, *viz.*, grandfather, and my daughters are designated her aunts. . . . . With men like —— and —— I was not popular, because I would not be humbugged or lend myself to absurd pretensions and claims; but all the mass of the chiefs, great and small, from Scindia and Bhopal downwards, look to me as their old friend and protector. I have no fear of the chiefs' feelings here towards me. Puttiala and Jheend have repeatedly come to me, not only as their own friend, but as that of their fathers; and there is not one of them in India who does not look upon me as the representative of Lord Canning's policy, and sent for by him partly on that account to be his foreign secretary. I have a very persistent enemy in the head and leader of the clique, Sir Robert Hamilton, who has the ear of some of the officials at the India Office, notedly that of Kaye, the political secretary; and Hamilton is always trying to 'earwig' the council and even the Secretary of State, but is, I imagine, not likely to be very successful with the Duke of Argyll. Good, loyal chiefs and I are, and always have been, cordial friends. The bad ones fear me, and it is the best compliment

they can pay me; but even the bad ones, when in difficulty, come with confidence to me, knowing that I am, after all, their best friend." . . . . . .

It may be added that one of my father's first acts in the Punjab was to place the greater Sikh feudatories in direct communication with the Punjab Government, and to bring to an end the former system by which they had been, in his opinion, subjected to a too minute and annoying interference on the part of subordinate officers. In a similar spirit of friendship to the Native chiefs, he protected and defended the Maharaja of Cashmere to an extent which called forth the most grateful acknowledgments, against what he conceived to be the unfair aspersions of the Indian press. But as a matter of fact the charge brought against him was one which arose entirely from the quarter he had indicated.* It is true that my father was by no means disposed to encourage pretensions among the Native chiefs which were inconsistent with the supremacy of the British Crown, and with their position as feudatories; but he was, of all officials in India, the one to whom the Native chiefs looked as their friend and advocate, and the chiefs of the Punjab had, before his nomination, shown their wishes in the matter in a way which was not to be mistaken. "The Punjab chiefs will rejoice," was the burden of more than one of his letters of congratulation from men who had good opportunities of forming an opinion. Throughout his career the views of Henry Lawrence, rather than those of John Lawrence, had been the views to which he inclined. He had stood up for the rights of the old Indian aristocracies in Central India, in Oudh, in the Punjab; and he held that the "North-West system" of Bird and Thomason had been carried to a pernicious length. It is significant that the one doubt which found vent in the Indian press regarding his fitness for the Lieutenant-Governorship was a doubt raised by his well-known opinions on this head. A very able, though closely critical, article which appeared in a leading Indian paper at the time of his appointment, and struck the only jarring note in the general chorus of approval, ended with the following passage:—"There will always be two views with regard to the position of the mass of the Indian people to the proprietary body. Sir Henry Durand has very conscientiously and very firmly advocated what we believe to be the wrong one. His experience had

* It was a charge of an intangible character, easy to make and hard to rebut, and particularly adapted to do harm with a certain class of the English public. The weapon, therefore, was well chosen.

lain among the chiefs rather than among the people. No man knew better the intricacies of a Native court, or sympathised more intelligently with the position of a Native prince. . . . . He will manage the frontier chiefs as no other man now living would be able to manage them. But we implore him to be merciful to the people. Not merely merciful as a Governor, but merciful in the higher sense, as one who is placed equally above the peasant and the prince, and whose function is to mediate between the two, to sympathise with the necessities of each, and to do justice to both." I do not believe that the warning was needed, or hold with the writer of this article that in the Oudh controversy my father's opponents "understood the wants of the labouring masses as only civilians can understand and appreciate them;" but the tone of the article, evidently written by a member of the civil service, clearly shows that in India a want of respect for Native chiefs was the last defect likely to be imputed to him.

My father's correspondence at this time was, as ever, very copious, and several large volumes of letters written during 1870, are among the papers which he left behind him. From these volumes I quote the following extracts :—

*To the Duke of Argyll*, 22*nd June*, 1870.

"I feel both obliged, and encouraged in the task before me in the government of this frontier province, by your kind note of congratulation of the 20th of last month.

"I have purposely avoided making special inquiries at present about the working of the Punjab Tenancy Act. Any such inquiries at starting might have been open to misconstruction, and I wished to watch the action of the courts, and any exhibition of feeling favourable or unfavourable which the working of the Act might elicit, in ordinary course, without any stimulus on my own part that could be construed as *pro* or *contra* in spirit. I am determined that the Act shall have fair play at all hands.

"I have made up my mind to recommend that the leading Sikh chiefs, viz., Puttiala, Jheend, Nabha, and Kuppoorthulla, shall like Cashmere and Bahawalpore be, in future, in direct communication with the Punjab Government, and not under the commissioner at Umballa.

"It is a very important change, in unison with the status given to the chiefs by Lord Canning's policy, sunnuds, and subsidiary official engagements. I have reason to believe it will accord with

Lord Mayo's views, and my excuse for mentioning it at such length is that the measure is one of real moment to these loyal and powerful feudatories, and will be popular with them.

"I regret to say that at Bunnoo the Mahomed Kheyl Wuzeerees waylaid the relief marching to the Koorum post on the 13th. The Wuzeerees, about 120 strong, concealed themselves in the ruins of the old dismantled post of Koorum, by which the road runs. They killed six of the infantry, wounded one, and afterwards wounded three of the cavalry who pursued them.

"In Eusofzye some of our villagers in the Loondkwar valley have emigrated bodily, bag and baggage, into the Bamyze territory beyond our border. The reason they assign is the dread of settlement operations. The commissioner ascribes the exode to other causes connected with the investigation of a murder case, and not to the settlement work, which has been going on for some time past. Be this as it may, as some villages have shown discontent and dread of the result of the settlement operations, I have warned the commissioner to watch carefully the whole area of frontier, from the Peshawur posts round by the Eusofzye country to the Indus, in case there be any feeling, real or assumed, based on the settlement operations. I shall not inflict such a length of letter I hope again, but it was important that your Grace should know that I do not find the frontier quite as content and quiet as I had hoped and wished."

*To Lord Mayo, dated 6th July*, 1870.

"I have been reading a report by Captain Wace, dated June, 1869, on the Hazara jageers. It is very well drawn up, but on one point he has, I think, been misled by what I consider a very narrow, rigidly technical decision of the chief court. As the frittering away of service jageers, on each succession, by allowing the Mahomedan law to have its ordinary operation, would entirely defeat the whole object of these grants, it is clear that even if the chief court's view were right, some remedy must be found. Their decision is based on the fact that in some of the service jageer grants the Government has neglected to restrict succession to a single successor, and has not reserved to itself the power of selection. I hold that the condition of a service jageer implies, whether so stated or not in the grant, the customary rights and powers of the suzerain remaining intact. The remedy, however, to this doubt seems easy under the Agrore Act. And a rule can be framed as to

service jageer successions which will secure the object of Government in making grants from being defeated by a side wind. The question shall, of course, be submitted to your lordship officially, for it is an important one."

*To his Daughter, dated 3rd July*, 1870.

"I am rather proud to find the *Times* come round to my own view of the financial policy, and advocating what I strenuously advised. It would have given Lord Mayo a very different five years from what he will have, and India would have been spared income tax and unfinished works.

"Macmurdo told me a fact yesterday that shows that Lord Clyde's friend, General Vinoy, to whom he left £500, was a resolute officer. He stormed and took the Malakoff with his French division, but after having carried the work and driven out the enemy, except those taken prisoners, he saw Russian columns, some 30,000 strong, forming to attack and recover the work. His troops had expended their ammunition, and the spare ammunition was not up, so the moment was critical. Seven Russian officers, prisoners, were brought up to Vinoy. He cocked his pistol, and told the first to show the magazine, or he would shoot him, the officer refused and was instantly shot, the second the same, the third showed them the magazine, the cartridges fitted the French muskets, and Vinoy repulsed the attack and held the Malakoff."

Shortly after this letter was written, my father started for a short visit to Cashmere across the mountains with the view of meeting the Maharaja, and discussing personally some matters of interest which were at the time attracting the attention of the Governor-General. I quote from his letters to Lady Durand a short account of this visit, which he found very interesting and enjoyable:—

"*Camp, Sindursee, July*, 1870 . . . . . I started yesterday at 11 A.M. . . . . At 4 P.M. I reached the Jhelum at Kohala, and crossed it by a rope suspension bridge, supported on the masonry piers that are to bear an iron suspension bridge. Yesterday the Jhelum was not in flood, though a mill-stream torrent in its most placid mood. The boats crossed all safe enough, and at 4½ P.M. I was ascending to Dunna; such a steep, tedious ascent, I have seldom had. I stuck to my 'hen-coup,' as I call a bamboo-framed jampan, originally devised and constructed by

Montgomery. I wanted to try it . . . . . The end of the march was by torch-light; and as I was now in Cashmere territory, I found a guard of honour to see me turn out of my hen-coop"! . . . . . .

"10*th*.—The weather cleared, and I started at 1 P.M. Got a salute from the Churkar fort as I passed it; and reached Hatteau at 4 P.M., a hot ride of steep ascents and descents as you would wish to see; but these ponies have a wonderful knack of going up and down them, and hardly ever treat me to a stumble . . . . I made an early start this morning, and had the most beautiful march I have yet had. From Oorai to Nowshera is a march worth seeing . . . . . Scenery on both banks of Jhelum very fine, especially on the left bank, where we skirted the base of splendid precipices. I thought often how much I wished you were in the 'hen-coop,' I by you on the pony. That may come some day: meanwhile I can't describe you this march; nor an old temple we came suddenly on at Boonyar. It was a lovely march. This afternoon I go on to Baramoola, where a boat awaits me, and we are then fairly in the valley of Cashmere. As yet we have only been approaching by following the windings of the Jhelum."

"*Srinuggur*, 14*th July*.—I came to this place yesterday . . . . . The heir-apparent and the Maharaja met me as usual. It certainly is a most picturesque city on both banks the Jhelum. . . . . A queer sort of Venice after Venice the incomparable; still very picturesque, though the houses of two and three stories look like candidates for a tumble into the river. The Maharaja explained that Cashmere is at times subject to a month of continual earthquakes, and that experience has taught them that wood framework, and masonry only to fill in and form the walls, stands best these paroxysms of earth-throes . . . . . How I wish you were with me! But, as that cannot be, I hope to bag a few sketches for your book, a sort of memorandum that you have been ideally at my side . . . . . Will you ever be here with me? . . . . . "

"15*th*.—Yesterday I paid my first complimentary visit to the Maharaja at his palace on the river bank. We rowed there, and had to ascend from the water by a long, very stiff flight of wooden steps. We had all the usual ceremonials; but some interesting talk about his father, himself, and his officials . . . . . Early this morning I went to two shawl-working establishments; and a greater contrast than exists between the fineness of the fabric and the roughness of the looms, can be hardly conceived. I saw the whole process from first to last. It is work for women, not

for men; but 30,000 men are thus employed. Boys are the best workers; and they are allowed to come at five years old to look on, be about, and get a taste for the work. At eight or nine they commence, and it is a regular course they go through, before being admitted to join the fine workers. As they get old men, both sight and touch loses its fineness; and I only saw two old grey-beards. They had begun at nine years old, poor old men! . . . . . In winter they work at night, by chiraghs;* no wonder sight fails them as they grow old. The trade is waning, I am sorry to say . . . . . ."

"16*th*.—The Maharaja paid me a return visit yesterday; and when he left, I had to dress for a dinner at the Shalimar Gardens, two hours and a half of steady pull from where I am. On the way, as we had time, I visited the Nishaf Garden, a fine old Moslem one, just such as you have seen elsewhere in India, but with a pure mountain stream to feed its seven terraces of garden and water spouts, &c. Our dining place, the Shalimar Garden, was a little beyond, and there the Maharaja had lit all up; so that really, as I had expected, the prettiest part of the entertainment fell on him . . . . . For our return, we had a fine moonlight night; and, avoiding the heavy boat, I got into the *Perindah*, the 'winged,' lent me by the Maharaja, and with Mr. Beresford as my companion we beat all the boats . . . . . It was a pleasant enough return; and I was glad to be clear of the ladies, to tell you the truth, being disposed to a sleepy enjoyment of the soft air and moonlight on water and mountain, without any compulsion to make conversation . . . . . ."

"17*th*.—I had a long, private, quiet talk with the Maharaja yesterday on affairs of importance on which I wanted his advice and views; after that we went to the boat-races . . . . . We hurried home to dress, and proceeded, at near 8 P.M., to the palace to dine. He received us in an open place on the roof of a lower storey, where, whilst the "sahib-log," some fifty odd, were assembling, we had on one hand an illumination on boats in the river, which was very pretty, and nautch girls dancing.

". . . . . When all the sahibs were assembled, dinner was announced, and the Raja took me by the hand and led me to the door of the Sheeshmuhul, the large room, most gaily ornamented, in which I paid my first visit. He left me at the door; the

* The Indian chiragh or lamp is ordinarily a shallow saucer of earthenware or brass, filled with oil. A rough wick of twisted cotton hangs over the edge of the saucer, and gives a feeble uncertain light.

sahibs all poured in, and seated themselves where they pleased. A fire of champagne and beer soon commenced, and they all seemed to fare well. As the important part of appeasing thirst and hunger was got through pretty rapidly, I called silence, made a short speech, and proposed the health of the Maharaja. The speech was well received, and his health was drunk with hearty and long cheers.

". . . . . Knowing that the Maharaja would not dine until we were all gone, I went off at a quarter to ten. Their meals are twelve hours apart, viz., at 11 A.M. and from 10 to 11 P.M.

"I am just off to church, held in a bungalow, at 11 A.M. . . . ."

"*Johpoor*, 23*rd July*.—I left Srinuggur at 10 P.M. last night, slept in the boat whilst it pulled down to Manas Bul, and just as at daylight I was starting to have a look at the Manas Bul lake, the packet of the dâk was given me. After rowing, or rather paddling, into that pretty little lake, I returned to the river and the big boat, and came on to this place to breakfast. On the way I read my European letters,—a very kind one from Dr. Duff; the same from Colonel G. Thomson, with whom, thirty-one years ago, I was before Ghuzni; one from Vincent Eyre, of like tenor and heartiness. . . . . The frontier is in a very unsatisfactory state, and I am anxious to be back at Murree. . . . . I wonder if you will ever be in Cashmere with me? I have a dream of your being with me in the Nishaf Bagh, in May or June, 1872; but who can foresee so far? It certainly is a most beautiful country, and charming climate. . . . . I think my visit to Cashmere will prove beneficial. The Maharaja took it as a great compliment my coming. He says others waited till their last year, but I came as soon as I took charge to make his acquaintance. By coming without a retinue, guards, and camp, I have cost him little—not a hundredth of what others have done. I don't think he cares very much on that head, still it is something. At a review of his troops last Sunday, the powder-pouches of one front rank of a square caught fire; 34 men were burnt, and the square dispersed as if under fire of rounds of grape. The men, I am happy to say, are all doing well.* . . . I can't say I was smitten

* This incident reminds me of a point to which I have not hitherto referred, my father's readiness to open his purse for the relief of distress. Directly after the accident he sent a considerable sum of money for distribution among the wounded men and their families, and the act was characteristic. Though he was a man of simple tastes, and disapproved of useless extravagan e, he was generous to a fault; and throughout his life his expenditure in helping others was such as materially to reduce his income.

by the Cashmere nautch women. The women one sees in boats, paddling with their lords and masters, are, some of them, good-looking, but I have seen nothing to bear out the fame of Cashmere beauty—nothing to compare with the beauty of the common fish-women of Venice." . . . . . .

"*Murree*, 31*st July*.

"I arrived here on the 28th, having been, on the whole, fortunate in my weather for the hard marching. I succeeded in making a coloured sketch of the old temple of Boonyar. It is, I think, an old Buddhist temple, built of granite, and a good two thousand years of age, planted at the foot of fine precipices of rocks, capped with deodar;—that is to say, it is on the plain, formerly an old bed of the Jhelum, but now raised above it several hundred feet. It is thus between the precipices and the river, which cascades along, a wild torrent, from Nowshera to Oorai. The sketch, though only penned with the ground colours, so as to ensure correct colouring, took me about four or five hours' steady work, penning in carefully the details of the architecture. Fortunately, the granite was so hard a material to work with, that the builders did not attempt carving ornamentation, except very plain along one cornice. My sketching labour was, therefore, all the more simple. I have brought away two or three other sketches, but see no prospect of touching any,—my official work being so heavy and constant as to leave no leisure.

"Twice after leaving the vale of Cashmere we had rain at night, and on one occasion it rendered the march dangerous and unpleasant—so slippery that riding and walking were equally out of the question; and then I saw the immense value to the Cashmere porters of the grass shoes, of which they always carry a spare pair or two tied at their waist and back. They carried me in my hen-coop over places that were dangerous enough in themselves, but in the state of grease of the path, such as it was, vastly more dangerous.

. . . . . "Yesterday, I telegraphed to London, ordering the *Times* newspaper for the Maharaja of Cashmere; so you see the world is moving in India. In Europe, this war will throw all back. . . . . Whether or not we shall ever visit Naples and its islands, and all Italy together, God only knows. . . . . I have been made to feel how easy it is for a strong man like myself to be knocked over.

"I have sometimes regretted having embarked on a five years'

pull at the oar here; but it is good for others, if not for the chance that was left me of some little enjoyment of life. I should now have been on my way home, if I had not come here." . . . . .

On the 20th of July he writes to Lord Mayo:—

"I have not liked the news from the frontier since I have been here. Pollock* very properly forbade any burning of our own villages, and I sent an express some days ago, directing him to restrain —— from any such measure. If the two Eusofzye villages choose to migrate, burning the deserted villages looks more like weak spite than wise conduct. However, all this hurries me back by the same route that I came, which is the shortest to Murree, instead, as I had purposed, by Mozufferabad to Abbottabad and thence to Murree. My stay here has been sufficient to enable me to renew my acquaintance with the Maharaja, and to have several conversations with him.

* * * * * *

"There are several other matters upon which I shall have to write to your lordship in connection with this visit to Cashmere, but I am told it is well taken by the Dogras my coming among them without retinue or escort, and I hope that the Maharajah is not sorry either. He expresses himself extremely gratified. . . . . I think he really feels one thing, as the result of my visit, viz., that he can open himself to me much more freely than would have been the case if we had not met. My asking his opinion as one of the oldest and most experienced chiefs of the Punjab as to the tribal feeling on the fontier, as to the capacity as a ruler of the Nabha chief, and on a minor point or two, put him at his ease. He himself told me he wished to speak to me privately about the misrepresentations of the newspapers.

"He is anxious to give a full explanation and reply to what he considers calumnies. I told him to make his mind easy as to calumnies, but to give me the exact truth and facts; that for nine or ten of the best years of my life, I had been about the best abused man in India; and as I was sure that, like his father, he was too much of a soldier to have ordered war to be made on women and children, I hoped to find the wheel come round in his case, and to see him as much praised as he had lately been abused, and, I was sure, caluminated."

* The Commissioner of Peshawur.

*To Lord Mayo, dated 21st July, 1870.*

"I have just received your letter of the 15th instant, and shall at once write to Murree to ascertain how the memorandum which your lordship sends, an excerpt from the *Pioneer*, came to be communicated to that paper. It was intended as a general instruction. I may not have put 'confidential' at the head of the memorandum, for I reserve that word for very exceptional use.

"I lately received a report from Captain Cavagnari, forwarded through Colonel Pollock, in which a sketch is given of the orders passed, long previously to my arrival, to the frontier settlement officers. They are certainly subversive of the system which your lordship designates as patriarchal, and to this some weight as a grievance is attached by the tribes. You may remember that from the first, when the frontier officers made light of the settlement as any cause of grievance, I enjoined on Colonel Pollock the necessity of looking very carefully into this point, which appeared to me to agitate the frontier more or less from the vicinity of Michnee round by the Eusofzyes to the Indus.

"I was, in fact, not at all convinced that the frontier officers were right in considering the settlement as a mere excuse, veiling the real motives of discontent. A considerable change has come over the feelings of the frontier officers in this respect since their failure to prevent the emigration of our two Eusofzye villages. It appears to have been explained to these villagers that the settlement officers would hear all they had to say on the system to which they attach importance; but, in the face of the instructions under which they are acting, the local officers did not go the length of saying that the patriarchal system was compatible with the scheme of settlement operations, for their instructions were practically to discontinue the patriarchal system for obvious reasons. I have ordered this whole matter to be carefully gone into, and brought up before me on my return from Murree. I have had several conversations with Mr. Egerton,* the financial commissioner, a gentleman of experience and sound judgment, quite free from the sort of animosity naturally enough produced among the local frontier officers by what seems to them the unreasonable conduct of the recusant villages. I have had some thoughts of deputing him to enquire and to report how far the settlement operations were really a source of discontent from

* Afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

being on principle in opposition with the local customs of the tribes of the frontier. On my return, and after a careful review of the instructions issued by my predecessors for the guidance of the frontier settlement officers, also after an equally careful consideration of late events in the Loondkyar valley, to which 50 more sabres and 50 more rifles have been sent, I shall decide whether Mr. Egerton's deputation be advisable or not."

By the end of July my father was back at Murree. Before leaving Cashmere territory he had made the acquaintance of an English adventurer in the Maharajah's service, of the name of Gardner; and had spent some hours in listening to the old man's story, which was a remarkable one, and in taking notes of it. Shortly after his return to Murree he sent these notes to one of the Indian journals; and the story will be found in the second volume of this work with my father's review articles. It is not entirely his own writing, for he had not time to work up his notes —but the facts and framework are his, and as it is in itself curious and interesting, I have inserted it.

In the meantime war had broken out between France and Germany, and during the remainder of his stay at Murree my father followed with close interest the movements of the contending armies. His great anxiety in the matter was lest England should be drawn unprepared into the vortex of war—and his letters are full of apprehension on this point. "Over and over again," he writes in August, 1870, "have I pressed that we in India should be prepared for a sudden outbreak of war in Europe. You may remember the 9-inch rifled guns I got sent out. Alas! no Moncrieff carriages have come for them yet. My Torpedo Committee was made light of and grudged everything. Now in Calcutta they look upon it as a main element of their safety. Much as I repeated that India should be self-reliant as far as possible, and that all our powder and other military factories should be complete and in working order, very little heed was paid to my preaching; and a very short-sighted economy prevailed over proper preparation. Money could be flung away by millions on what are called 'reproductive works,' but every penny was grudged on military factories. . . . . England is everywhere ill-prepared for the eventualities of war. . . . . Poor France! and it will some day be poor England! if our Government are not warned by passing events for what may come upon us at any hour."

I quote also from his letter books the following passages, written before he left the Himalayas for his frontier tour:—

*To Colonel Thomson, C.B., dated 3rd August*, 1870.

"Your very kind letter of the 22nd June reached me on the 23rd July, the Ghuzni day, and I read it as I crossed the Woollar lake of Cashmere on my return to Murree.

"I had left Srinuggur, the capital of Cashmere, about 10 at night, dropped down the Jhelum to Manas Bul, a small, pretty land-locked lake, so as to reach it at daybreak, and was starting up the narrow stream that leads to it when the dâk was put into my hands. After a pull into the small lake, I returned to the large boat, put off for the Woollar lake, and in crossing it read all my letters. It was a strange sort of coincidence that yours should reach me on the 23rd July, and it brought back old days very forcibly. How much have I gone through since the 23rd July, 1839, when I really did not care whether I lived or died.

"The Woollar lake is a beautiful sheet of water backed by a semicircle of fine mountains, and occasionally we were pulling through fields of lotus plants in flower. I could understand the Afghan love for Cashmere, and that of the emperors, for it was their own country improved by abundance of lake and water. I dreamed away of Ghuzni, Cabul, &c., until we were across the lake and on the Jhelum again. You may depend upon my claiming acquaintance with C——— if the 89th come anywhere into the Punjab. I must learn its destination, and shall be glad if it prove to be the Punjab, for then I may be able to see something of C——— and her husband. You may be sure she would always be dear to me for your sake. If I had not got the Punjab, I should now have been on my way home, just started from Bombay. I am not sure that I would have taken the post had I known that it would cost me about £6,000 to take it up. However, now I am in for it, and must work out my destiny. I hardly look forward to much enjoyment of life if I remain at work till 1875 and then get home, for much more has been taken out of me since 1861 than previously. Still I cannot complain; in going to and returning from Srinuggur I was good for three marches a day, and few even younger men can last on foot or in saddle better than myself.

"Whilst at Srinuggur the news of the declaration of war reached me. It instantly affected the shawl trade, some eight lakhs* going annually to Paris in ordinary times. I see by telegram that Cardwell says the army was never in finer state since Waterloo,

* £80,000 worth.

and Gladstone won't have armed neutrality. I hope the nation will force them to be prepared for any eventuality, and won't be humbugged by words when it may at any moment be forced by aggression to defend its neutrality. It will be a sad war any way; I shall be thankful if England can keep out of it, but her best chance of doing so is by being strong on land and sea."

*To Sir Donald Macleod, dated 8th August*, 1870.

"I have had yours of the 30th for some days by me, being really puzzled what to advise about the application of the 25,000 rupees in yaddasht * presented by Kuppoorthulla. You are much more *au fait* at the wants of the province than I am, and therefore I feel it presumptuous to offer my opinion. The fact is it is rather difficult to hit upon anything in which Kuppoorthulla's name and your own can be combined in a suitable object. Three things presented themselves to my mind, two as subjects in which you have taken great interest, one that I mark as terribly deficient not only in the Punjab, but everywhere else in India. In the system of Native hakeems † and in female education you have taken great interest. In either of these socially beneficial measures the application of the Macleod-Kuppoorthulla fund might prove useful and encouraging. The other point was the encouragement of the study and pursuit of science in its European form and progress. I have seen nothing anywhere indicative of, or encouraging to, originality of thought and labour in that great field of thought and experiment, the only one in which real advancement is made; yet that in which India stands wofully stationary, asphyxic in fact. I had written thus far when T——— came in, and I told him the three facts which had occurred to me. He made a proposal which I think good, viz., that the Macleod-Kuppoorthulla fund should be devoted to one annual prize for some vernacular paper, original or translated, in connection with the third point, *viz.*, real progress in the physical sciences; and that you should sketch out a scheme and rules for this, which the Punjab Government or trustees, official or non-official, should see carried out. . . . . When I think of the advance in the study of light, and the revelations of the spectrum analysis, and how admirably in India such studies might be pursued; when I think of the treasures, botanical and physiological, of Indian plants; when I think of our unworked and as yet unexplored field of paleontology in

* Remembrance. † Physicians.

connection with geology; and a hundred other subjects; . . . . . I feel that in starting such a prize, your name would be associated with what no one has as yet done, and that T———'s idea is an improvement on mine. It is a question for you to balance between the social and the scientific."

*To Sir William Baker, dated 17th August*, 1870.

"Many thanks for your kind congratulations. . . . . .

"I have never liked the narrow-gauge break for the trunk rail in this province. I think it a mistake, but Lord Mayo thinks that the difference of cost between the 3′ 6″ and the 5′ 6″ gauge is enormous, and that the Government could not afford to continue the 5′ 6″ gauge. Meanwhile the Government lines are standing still, and little or nothing is being done. Instead of all being pushed on rapidly, as might have been the case, we are awaiting the decision as to the gauge. The system is not at all satisfactory. We are expected to control, &c., without authority, and with the Government of India perpetually interfering and directing. I very much wish the Government of India would take the whole management of the railways themselves, for local governments are placed in a false position at present. They had better keep the whole thing in their own hands. Nothing will be worse in a military sense than a break of gauge.

"After all, it has been proved that I was not so far wrong when I expressed no confidence in the discoveries of enormous deficits. One day a million and a quarter, two days after two and a half millions. People are very sore that, after all the panic, it turns out that there is a surplus, and no need for the income tax. The war, too, having paralyzed trade, just as it was mending and business beginning to look up, all the mercantile community are extra grumpy. I think Lord Mayo's gallop over the frontier will have done more harm than good, for all the frontier officers are telegraphing and corresponding direct with the Governor-General, and the result is an exaggerated alarm about the frontier. There is doubtless an uneasy feeling arising from various causes, but it is no more than constantly crops out; and I am surprised at the disproportionate importance which is attached to events that are rather of chronic occurrence, and are not significant of any combination against us.

"I am watching all closely. Matters won't be improved by minute meddling from a distance under the stimulus of alarm.

They have just sent me an order by which every murder, raid, or outrage on the frontier would involve six telegram messages and six reports in writing, quite independently of all police reports and judicial proceedings, &c."

*To Lord Mayo, dated 1st September*, 1870.

"I fully intended visiting the frontier posts, commencing with Abbottabad and the Agrore Valley, and proceeding through Yusufzai to Peshawur, from thence by Kohat along the Derajat posts to the southern extremity of the province. It was my intention to intimate to Sir W. Merewether* the time I expected to reach the frontier of Scinde, and to ask him if it would be convenient to himself to arrange to meet me.

"Your Lordship's note of the 28th August is therefore quite in accordance with what was planned. From the Scinde frontier I shall march up the Muzzufarghur district and cross Ooch and Bahawulpore; and from that country cross back to Mooltan, and from thence to Lahore. A visit to Peshawur is the more necessary, as I am anxious to see how the police may, by that time, be working. Hitherto our picked police officers there had been doing nothing, and were thrown away. It is also desirable to ascertain on the spot a variety of questions, as the working of the settlement and manifold other administrative points have to be looked into."

*To Sir Bartle Frere, dated 4th September*, 1870.

"Many thanks for your kind congratulations, and for the printed paper on the traction-engine which seems so well reported of. I still entertain a faint hope that we shall not commit the blunder of a break of gauge in our Indus valley and Punjab lines. I was always opposed to it, and only gave way because Lord Mayo would have thrown up the whole thing on a plea of economy. Rather than that I would tolerate anything, even a break of gauge. But when one remembers that all the inconveniences of a break of gauge from 5′ 6″ to 3′ 6″ only gives a saving in construction of one-tenth; and how dire and costly those inconveniences will be in time of peace, and how ruinous they may prove in time of war; I confess that I think the one-tenth of present saving but short-sighted economy.

* The Commissioner in Scinde.

"I am very sorry for this war, not that I care for either the Emperor or Bismarck, but I do feel for the French people and France, which was advancing apace in prosperity, and will now be thrown back twenty years. I am anxious too for England, admirably unprepared for war in the matter of men, of an easy and rapid increase to her ranks. I doubt, if the war continue, that England can keep clear long. Yet, as far as our army is concerned, whatever has been done in other respects, the army tinkering has not been successful on the part of Conservatives or Whigs. The measures have been quite puny; and wholly disproportionate to the public requirements of the country. During my whole time in the Governor-General's Council, as military member, I tried hard to have India made self-reliant in a military sense, and ever sought to impress on the Government that a European war might break out at any time, and that we should be prepared and able to meet the contingencies which such a war might bring upon India. Small was my success. I got some 9-inch guns, but no Moncrieff carriages as yet for them; established a torpedo committee, but it was grudged everything; showed the state of our small arms reserves in magazine, but left the Council without seeing provision made for an ordinary, let alone a severe war."

*To Lady Durand, August*, 1870.

"I cannot say that I look forward with pleasure to the march along the frontier. It will be a wearisome march from Peshawur down to Kohat and Bunnoo, and the Scinde frontier; but it is advisable, for many reasons, that I should accomplish it . . . . . I am glad to have a capital season in the Punjab; for twelve years they have not had such a favourable season. I hope it may be the commencement of a series of good years; for then the people will be happy and content, and crime will be less.

. . . . . "I am anxious, for the sake of our family, to hold on through my five years . . . . . But I feel that I might be struck down before that easily enough, though so strong and vigorous in many respects. However, a vessel may make a long and stout fight, even after a shot or two 'twixt wind and water." . . . . .

"*September* . . . . . Napoleon must have been 'ill in mind' when he joined the army, for it has been very ill managed, whilst the Prussian army has been well managed. An old Sikh, Sir Nihal Sing, observed to me that such wars were sent by God for the punishment of the nations; and remarked that he had observed,

in the course of his life,—which was concurrent with all the vicissitudes of the old Sikh rule,—that the evil-hearted met with their deserts in this life; for that retributive justice, under the hand of God, always in the end overtook them . . . . Very thankful I shall be if this new French Republic can effect peace without first lighting up a general war. I doubt it; and wish that the way here may be as open to you in 1871 as it is now . . . . . .

"I anticipate an agreeable six weeks before going into camp; but a trying, dreary three and a half months along the frontier in camp . . . . . Our march begins the first week in November . . . . . It will not be a pleasure trip, for several very difficult questions have to be looked into and settled *en route* . . . . .

"*October* . . . . . I am sorry for both Germans and French; and think we want a few Cromwells * to keep emperors and kings and Bismarcks in order. My sympathies go with the people; not with the emperors and kings."

"On Friday I had to give prizes at the Lawrence Asylum, and gave the boys and girls, and band, a feed there. To-morrow come some 130 boys and girls from the depôts to a feed here, and a Christmas-tree . . . . . The weather here is most exquisite . . . . . I quite regret the thoughts of leaving the place for a dreary march, full of toil and work, and barren of pleasure . . . . . I have very little time for reading; work is so heavy; none for drawing, though to-day I took part of the morning to make a small sketch, which I may, perhaps, send you. It is a bit of a view from the hill-top, above our house . . . . . I begin to think it a possibility that you may be out next cold weather; but who knows what may happen before then?" . . . . . .

"*6th November* . . . . . One fact is a pleasure to learn, *viz.*, Charlie's love for Reggie. I do hope it is reciprocal; poor boys! it may prove a ray of joy, though not of light, in their lives, so dark and dreary. Their fate has clouded my life most effectually. However, I am fifty-eight to-day, and, in ordinary course, have not very long to endure this calamity; but it will darken death's hour, when that comes, unless it be sharp and sudden. What fine boys both might have been; but it was God's will, and answers, I suppose, some good purpose."

Shortly afterwards my father wrote to inform Lord Mayo that

* My father had always the strongest admiration for Cromwell. The feeling was doubtless due in great measure to Cromwell's genius as a soldier; but there was more in it than this.

he had appointed a member of the Indian Civil Service to the Commissionership of Peshawur. This was an important post, for the line of frontier controlled by the Commissioner was specially strong and dangerous, and he was, moreover, the ordinary channel of communication with the Ameer of Cabul. Until my father's time it had been a recognized rule that no one but a military man should be appointed to the charge; and he knew that his nomination would be closely criticized. Even Lord Lawrence, whose bias was much in the opposite direction, had held and expressed a strong opinion against the selection of any one but a military man for Peshawur. I have referred to the point, because it seemed to me to illustrate my father's freedom from conventional prejudice in these matters. A soldier himself, he could see soldierly qualities elsewhere than under a red coat, and he attached very little value to mere military rank unaccompanied by military aptitude or experience. Donald Macnabb amply justified his choice. A straight, capable, independent man, he has left on the frontier a name which will not quickly be forgotten; and though his views and his manner of expressing them were such as to debar him from the hope of high employment during the time of the "forward policy" in Afghanistan, the Indian service has rarely lost a better officer, even from the ranks of the Punjab Commission, than when he retired, disabled by ill-health, a couple of years ago.

The autumn of 1870 was signalized for the Punjab Government by the return of Forsyth's mission from Yarkund; and the murder of the traveller Hayward in the wild Mahomedan country beyond Cashmere. It is unnecessary to go into these matters at length; but I may remark that, with regard to both of them, my father set his face against any hasty and unfounded suspicion being thrown on the Cashmere chief. The mission, which started from Cashmere territory, had not met with cordial co-operation from some of the outlying officials of the State; and Mr. Hayward's expressed condemnation of the Cashmere durbar rendered it probable that their feeling towards him was the reverse of friendly; so that there were some *primâ facie* grounds for the doubts expressed. But my father considered that these doubts rested on no solid foundation, and he lost no opportunity of saying so.

Throughout the month of October my father was retained in Murree by a painful illness, which, though it did not incapacitate him from work, caused him for the time much suffering. The attack, however, passed off, and on the 7th of November he started

for his proposed tour along the frontier. One of his last acts before leaving Murree was to order the regular trial of a frontier officer who had unintentionally killed a native by a blow. It was proposed to appoint a military court of inquiry, but this he at once refused to permit. The case, he said, must proceed exactly as it would have done under ordinary circumstances, and the officer concerned must stand his trial.

On the 9th of November he was at Abbottabad, in the most northerly district of his charge. From this point, he paid a visit to the Agrore Valley, and the skirts of the Black Mountain, one of the most difficult and troublesome parts of the border, and famous for the abortive expedition of 1858 and subsequent military operations. Returning to Abbottabad he then crossed the Indus and marched by Nawa Kila to Murdan, and thence to the frontier posts of Abazai and Shabkuddur. On the 27th of November he writes to Lady Durand from his camp at Jelala . . . . . "As there was something to see at Jukti Bhaee, I marched to-day, stopping to breakfast and sketch at Jukti Bhaee, which is half-way. On a high detached group of hills stand the remains of an old Buddhist monastery. These Buddhist remains are frequent in Eusofzye, and are invariably upon hill-tops or sides, skirting the great open level plain between the hills and the Cabul river. They betoken a far more populous and richer state of country than this plain now shows; for Buddhist priests live by alms, and the villages on which they depended must have been numerous. The mounds, which are sites of old villages, corroborate this deduction; for they are frequent—much more so than are the existing Pathan villages. It was curious to observe the caution with which pickets occupied commanding points right and left of our breakfast pic-nic above the old Buddhist ruins; evidently the rule here in Eusofzye is always to be on the alert, and ready for an attack. I enjoyed my day's rest from work, and got a good sketch, with a fine background of mountains; but unluckily the snowy range, which we ought to have seen, would not show, for the day was hazy and cloudy towards the distant ranges. . . . . What a curse idle men are! Here, as soon as they have nothing to do, they begin to pay off old blood feuds—it's the amusement after the harvest is in, and agricultural operations cease. Murders are plentiful, and often atrocious, yet seldom brought home to people and punished, for the clannish feeling prevails . . . . . A common prayer of mine is that the necessary faculties and

strength for work may be continued to me so long as necessary for the interests of those dependent upon me; but whether or not I shall be able to hold out at such a grind till 1875 is doubtful indeed. . . . . ."

On the 2nd of December he arrived at Peshawur, where he remained ten days. From this point he writes again:—

*To Lady Durand, Camp Peshawur, 4th December,* 1870.

"It seems an age already since the 15th February, and that wretched drive to the 'Mooltan'; yet it is only near ten months . . . . . We reached this place on the 2nd, and I shall remain here all the week, as there is much to do. Thirty years ago I was here on my return from Afghanistan with Lord Keane—really thirty-one years ago. The house in which Avitabile entertained us is now the tehseel, but has lost its third story. The groves are not ornamented as they then were with men hanging in chains in tiers—two or three tiers one over the other. If he hung too freely, we perhaps hang too few; murders and robbery are rife; but any way we cannot do as he did—impose a tribute of fifty Afreedi heads a year from one petty chief! What would be thought of such a mode of administration with us? When Avitabile entertained us, he, after dinner, led us into the large upper room which then existed, where we found the room entirely encircled with nautch girls. I never saw such a number together in my life, and of all ages, from mere girls of nine or ten upwards. Reading Wolff's 'Memoirs,' I found Wolff noted having passed a day with Avitabile somewhere, either in Persia or the Punjab, and that he took Wolff to show him his guardian angels—paintings of nautch girls on the walls of his room. We are to have dinners and balls instead of Avitabile's display of guardian angels. I own that of the two displays, a nautch or a ball, I think the nautch the more decorous, though of course there is no comparison in the purity of our English ladies and nautch women; but as for the mere dance of nautch women, it is to my mind less objectionable than a waltz.

". . . . . Clouds are forming, and I hope the rain may come before we march. It will intensify the cold. I shall be glad to have this frontier march over before you join, so as to keep you out of such marching . . . . . Of course, I may be passed away before that time, and enough for the day is the evil thereof; but our evil is your absence in search of health and strength."

"*Peshawur*, 11*th* . . . . . I have been very busy all the week here, and it would hardly interest you to detail how I have been busy; but many questions of moment have to be settled, and the week has been spent in visits to the debouches of the Swat, the Cabul, and the Bara rivers, in connection with canals for irrigation and water supply; in inspection of the fort, our present magazine, city, cantonments, mission school, &c.; besides the large and serious question of the revenue settlement of these combustible frontier districts. As all official work, and semi-official letters with Lord Mayo, are going on at the same time, you may fancy my leisure is small; and really the letter to yourself, and one to Marion on a Sunday, are my chief recreation in the week, except always the receipt of your letter, which is the event of the week. I feel that this is a letter containing about a tenth of what I have to tell you, but I am both worried and pressed with business; . . . . . and I am interrupted by the perpetual packing and unpacking of a march, and the loss of time, &c. Still it is necessary, and must be got through, for the frontier is the ticklish part of the charge, and I must see and know it and its officers, civil and military . . . . . ."

*To the Duke of Argyll*, 5*th December*, 1870.

"I have found all right in the Agrore Valley, and a like tranquillity along the Yusofzye border to this place; moreover, the Ameer's arrangements for keeping open the Khyber Pass are answering, and even flocks of Afghan sheep have come down for sale in the Peshawur plain. At present, therefore, matters are here in a more quiescent state than they were in June and July last. The settlement operations throughout the Yusofzye, Hushtnuggur, and the Peshawur plains have reached the point of completion of village demarcation of boundaries and measurements; the actual revenue settlement has to be fixed. I hope to be able to organize a system which will work well for the order of these districts, and at the same time maintain an effective hold and control over our border villages. The main features are:—1st. A belt of frontier villages exempted from their full assessment, and subject only to the payment of a part of the full assessment, in consideration of feudal service for border protection. Misconduct to render them liable to the loss in part, or in whole, of the very light assessment status, and to the imposition of the higher or even full assessment. 2nd. Arms to be carried only by those

having licenses, and the headmen of villages to be specially responsible for the men to whom licenses are granted. 3rd. The police, which has been introduced and begun to work, to be improved in men and functions. 4th. An officer to have special charge of the frontier band of lightly assessed villages, and of their relations with the independent tribes touching our border.

"The above is a mere outline of the scheme. Mr. Egerton, the Financial Commissioner, has instructions to consult with the local authorities, and is with me engaged on this duty. In Colonel Pollock, Mr. Macnabb, Captain Waterfield, and Captain Hastings, Mr. Egerton is in communication with men conversant with the people and country, and whatever I may decide upon will be the result of mature consideration. After carefully looking into the settlement inquiries of Captain Wace and Captain Hastings, it is a matter to me of great satisfaction that I took this tour, and have been able on the spot to ascertain the peculiarities of Pathan tenures and distribution of land.

"The debouche of the Swat river into our territory is singularly favourable for the construction of the head-regulating works of a canal for the irrigation of the Hushtnuggur plain, an expanse of fine culturable land; and I hope the project will be entertained.

"A very gratifying feature of a local character is the confidence with which all our dispensaries are attended by men of independent tribes from beyond our frontier.

"Her Majesty's 38th, 5th, and artillery are still suffering from fever, though it is now abating."

From Peshawur my father marched on through the Kohat Pass, reaching Kohat on the 14th December. On the 17th he writes to his eldest daughter:—

"I am writing late at night to thank you for yours of the 11th, and shall not write at great length. The march here was curious, for the Kohat Pass is historical. It is not so stern or difficult as some I have known,* but it is peculiar. The dip down to Kohat itself from the top of the Kotul is pretty . . . . . No rain yet, so we may reach Bunnoo without it. People both here and at Peshawur have been most civil and kind. Certainly the frontier people have more real friendly feeling among each other than one

* Captain Waterfield, one of the frontier officers, drove a carriage on this occasion through almost the whole length of the pass, a feat never performed before.

meets elsewhere; and it is more free from the conventionality of other parts of India . . . . . .

"I always miss you . . . . . but I miss you most when I have much to say to you, and have to knock you off with a shabby scratch. One thing I must note. . . . . To-day I saw a rifle factory on the Armstrong coil principle that would surprise our gunsmiths in London. All so simple, yet the manipulation so dexterous, and the weapon apparently so strong and serviceable. I was surprised—mean to have one tested, and expect to find a strong reason for better arms to our native troops. These factories turn out about 400 rifles a year, and all go to the tribes around. The curious thing is that eighty years ago this art of manufacture was introduced from Persia. Here it has remained. A long description would be interesting; but I have not time to say more than that I have been thoroughly surprised" . . . . . .

Leaving Kohat on the 19th of December my father marched towards Bunnoo, whence he writes to Lady Durand:—

"*Camp Bunnoo, 24th December*, 1870.

"I begin a letter on Christmas eve, but shall finish it to-morrow. We had an interesting march from Kohat to this place, for I had never seen rock-salt *in situ*; and on this side of Bahadoor Kheyl we passed the salt strata, where they cut out the salt in blocks, and despatch it on camels for sale in Afghanistan. We drove over the salt strata; and the bed of the dry channel which drains the range was covered with the white efflorescence, so that it looked like snow.

"*25th.*—I wish your Christmas as mild a one as ours, and that you may all have a pleasant day. Sweet Ethel and Muriel, how I should like to see them. Please God, this time next year we may be all together. We reached this place on the 23rd, and that evening were given a dinner by the station. . . . . Last night I had a dinner . . . . . We had singing, but a tent drowns the voice—still it was good of its kind, and made the evening pass. In the day they had hunting, cricket, and bets on two horses clearing 15 feet of water in a ditch; so the Bunnooites had their fun. I was at work all day, and in the morning visited the Koorum post, where they cut off the party in July, sent in ordinary relief. The Mahomed Kheyl, who committed this act of treachery, are now suffering severely; being wanderers kept out of their lands until they give up the instigators and leaders. I

have had sundry sensational modes of petition, *e.g.*, two or three women howling in the middle of the road, and laying a child in front of the carriage to stop it and force me to hear their plaint. . . . . To-morrow we resume marching towards Dehra Ismael Khan. At Dehra Ghazi Khan, I am to meet Sir W. Merewether, to discuss Scinde frontier policy. We have had no rain as yet and shall probably be caught by it when in the Dehra Ismael Khan district. . . . . Arrange for your voyage from Suez to Bombay in good time, so as to secure berths; but start for your trip on the Continent in such time as to have no reason to hurry over places and things you wish to see. Some day you may then pilot me over the same on my return from India, if I live to get away, and have any enjoyment of life left in me."

On the 26th he was again on the march, and I quote a couple of extracts from his last letters to Lord Mayo, which were written in camp between Bunnoo and Tank:—

"*27th December*, 1870.

"I have been long expecting what now is threatening, and what England is, as usual, very ill-prepared for. Had she been in a position when Prussia threatened Luxembourg, and Russia the treaty of 1856, to throw 200,000 men into Belgium in 48 hours and to have them in 60 hours more on the Prussian line of communications south of Luxembourg, she would have finished the war and brought Prussia and Russia to reason; but a critical month has passed and nothing been done but empty talk, and pelting diplomatic notes."

"*28th December*, 1870.

"In Sir J. Lawrence's time, I was not in favour of Mr. Forsyth's views, in which he ridiculed the idea that a political meaning would certainly be attached to any mission in which European officers were employed. I am just as strongly of opinion as I ever was, that not a soul in Central Asia has believed, or will believe, in purely trade missions headed by a man like Mr. Forsyth."

On the 31st of December the camp reached the small frontier town of Tank, where my father's life was destined to be brought to a sudden and tragical end. Throughout the year he had been haunted by a presentiment that he had not much longer to live;

and more than once he had given expression to this feeling, traces of which are to be found in many of his letters to Lady Durand. He was sure, he said, that he should "lay his bones on that frontier." On this, the last day of his life, however, he seems to have had no special sense of impending danger. He had ridden in to Tank in the morning, and had greatly enjoyed the view of the mountain ranges to the westward, which were covered with new-fallen snow. The day was spent in work connected with recent occurrences in Afghanistan, and in writing letters. I find in his books of copies three letters bearing date the 31st December, the first addressed to Sir Robert Montgomery, one of his predecessors in the Government of the Punjab, the second to his old friend, the Begum of Bhopal, and the third to another native noble, the Maharaja of Benares. These letters were as follows:—

*To Sir Robert Montgomery, dated 31st December*, 1870.

"As soon as your son was appointed to the commission, I had him put under Saunders at Jullunder, because, on enquiry, he was spoken of as the Deputy Commissioner who would be likely the best to help and train your son to his work.

"I have been much surprised to find the settlement work in Huzara and in Yusofzye, Peshawur, &c., bring to light a far more complex system of land division and tenures than I had expected. The marvel to me is, how, considering the absolute ignorance of the courts and officers, they kept clear of adjudicating on vital questions without perpetrating most serious blunders. I suspect they often did more or less blunder seriously. The Peshawur and Yusofzye plains have now gone through all the settlement operations which are preliminary to actually fixing the assessment; that alone remains to be done. My scheme is, to assess the villages in ordinary course at a generally light assessment as compared with cis-Indus districts; but to have a belt of villages touching the frontier, and therefore exposed to trans-frontier tribal action, let off a part of this assessment on the condition of helping to maintain good order on the boundary; the Mulliks to be responsible for the issue of licenses to carry arms to reliable men, and for the conduct of the men thus entrusted with the means of defensive action.

"The belt of villages would thus find themselves privileged both in a much lighter assessment than the villages within the belt and less exposed, and also in the feudal condition of service

when necessary. They would have a motive for support of order; and dereliction from their duty would be fairly punishable by fine, or more or less augmented assessment up to the range of the ordinary full assessment. The system of issuing licenses to carry arms is being gradually introduced on the Peshawur plain; and contemporaneously with the process of carefully organizing this system on the frontier belt may proceed that of gradually restricting the issue of licenses to the villages within the belt.

"Crime will not be controlled or diminished trans-Indus until the police are improved, and the people gradually disarmed. The process of improving the police is steadily going on, though slowly; and the system of the issue of licenses to carry arms is forging the means for slowly securing a practical disarmament of the murdering classes, and a limitation of the privilege of carrying weapons to the better and more respectable classes. This is a mere sketch; and time alone can act on these Pathan habits."

*To the Begum of Bhopal, dated 31st December, 1870.*

"You must not suppose that there has been any neglect on my part, because I have not thanked your Highness for your kind letters written in October and November, and find myself now indebted to you for the last. The fact is, that during my tour along the frontier, what with marching and having to see people and to transact much business, I have had so little leisure that even my own family have had reason to complain of my failure as a correspondent. But as in your Highness's instance, my seldom writing has not arisen from any diminution of interest in their welfare, any more than in your own. We are now at the close of the year 1870, and we enter to-morrow on the year 1871. I write a few lines to express a sincere hope that the new year may be full of happiness and success to your Highness.

"Please present to her Highness the Sultan Jehan Begum my cordial good wishes for her welfare and happiness also. My daughters who are with me join in the same wishes, and if Lady Durand were here, I am certain that she would do the same. The war between Prussia and France still continues, and will prove very injurious to the welfare of both nations. There seems small hope of peace at present, and the war is assuming a more savage character daily. I am often inclined to think that ladies make better rulers than men, because they are less disposed to plunge into war than men are. At the same time they can show much

judgment and firmness when necessary, as your Highness's mother displayed in 1857. I shall be marching till I reach Lahore in February. We have cold weather here, and the Takht-i-Soliman is covered with snow. As Tank is surrounded with palm trees, we have the unusual sight of a foreground of palm and date trees with a background of snow-covered mountain ranges."

*To the Maharaja of Benares, dated 31st December, 1870.*

"I have to thank you for your kind Christmas congratulations and the good wishes with which you accompany them. Allow me in return to express the hope that the new year on which we are about to enter may be a year of health and happiness to yourself, and those in whom you are interested."

This letter was the last my father ever wrote. About five o'clock in the afternoon of the 31st December he left his camp to visit the outpost, garden, and town of Tank. Having inspected the outpost on foot, he mounted an elephant, and with the Tank chief seated beside him, went on to the garden. The entrance from the garden into the town consists, to quote the official report, "of an outer gateway leading into a covered square enclosure, out of which a second gateway, at right angles to the first, leads into the main street. Both gateways are flat-topped with wooden lintels. The outer gateway is of sufficient height to allow an elephant and howdah to pass, but the second gateway is considerably lower, and from the outer to the inner gateway the ground rises." Towards this passage, as it was growing dusk, my father's elephant was turned. He was of course ignorant of the ground, and the "mahout" who drove the animal equally so, for it was one of the camp elephants, the Tank chief having none of his own. They passed in safety through the first gateway, when it seems to have occurred to the mahout that the second was too low, and he raised his driving iron to measure the height. The iron struck against a beam overhead, and my father called out to the man to take care, but it was too late. As the mahout tried to turn the elephant, it started forward, frightened apparently by the noise overhead and by the darkness; and the howdah crashed into the roof. The Tank chief, though stunned by the blow, was found lying on the broken howdah when the elephant had cleared the gateway; but my father, a man of great height, was forced backwards from his seat and fell to the ground,

his head and shoulders striking against a hard mud wall. When the officers in attendance came up, he was lying on his face just beyond the inner gateway, bleeding and insensible. He was carried back to camp, and it was then found that he was partly paralyzed by a severe injury to the spine. At first there was some hope that he might survive the shock, for towards morning he had fully recovered consciousness, and was able to take some nourishment. He was then cheerful, and apparently unaware of the imminence of the danger; only concerned at giving "so much trouble" to those about him. As the day wore on, the medical men saw that recovery was impossible, and about four o'clock in the afternoon he was told that he could not live many hours. He met the announcement with perfect calmness. "What a little thing," he was heard to say to himself; "it will be a warning." His first thought was for his work, and calling for an officer of the Punjab secretariat he gave orders that a telegram should be despatched at once to inform the Government of India. Then he sent for those of his children who were with him in camp; and after explaining to them where they would find all important papers, and entrusting them with some messages for others, he spoke a few words of farewell. He told them he was dying; that his life had been a hard and bitter one; and that the only thing which had borne him through it had been the love and fear of God. He begged them as his last advice to look to Christ in all things, to do justice, and to love the right. A few hours later he passed quietly away, and it seemed to some of those about him that "he was glad to go."

So ended, by a miserable accident, my father's long and varied career. In the main, so far as he was concerned, it had been an unsuccessful one. He had landed in India forty years before full of soldierly pride and aspirations, and conscious that he had it in him to win honour in the field. To the last, this feeling remained with him. Shortly before his death, talking as he sometimes talked, rather sadly and wearily, to one of his children, he had referred to his lifelong passion. He had always, he said, felt "the power of the sword," and known that he could wield men. When young and undistinguished, he had in fact done much to guide and influence important military operations. But for one reason or another ambition had been crushed out of him, "doubtless to some good." He had had only one chance, in 1857, and then he had made a small force do the work of a large one, but otherwise his life had been a misfire. "Now it was too late." It was, in

fact, too late. His personal gallantry and coolness were conspicuously shown on more than one occasion, and the Malwa campaign proved that he had military ability of a very high order. But he never had the good fortune to be placed in a position where he could make for himself a name as a great commander, and he cared little for any other success. His life, as he told his children, had been a hard and bitter one, full of conflict and opposition and failure, full also of wearing grief and anxiety.

Nevertheless, I think he did not live in vain. It is no small thing to have set before others such an example as his career affords—the example of a man who held unswervingly to the path of duty, flinching from no danger and stooping to no meanness, and in the end forcing his way to the front by sheer weight of character and ability. If his lifelong struggle to do right brought to himself little of success or happiness, it was at least full of benefit to all around him, and unless I have wholly failed in my task, the benefit will not end with the lives of those who knew him personally.

It would be useless for me to attempt any general description of my father's character. All men seem small to me compared with him. But others have described him as he appeared to their eyes, and I think I cannot do better than quote here what was written of him not long ago by one who learnt to know him during the last five years of his life.*

"I had made your father's acquaintance some years before I was brought into official contact with him. We were fellow-passengers in the *Nubia* in January, 1858; when I was a lad fresh from England, and he, I think, was coming round from Central India by Bombay and Galle (where he joined us) to Calcutta. I remember his being pointed out to me as a distinguished Indian officer, and being struck by the contrast of his courtesy and gentle manner with the stern cast of his features. The next time I came into contact with him was when I walked into his room in the Foreign Office at Calcutta, and announced myself to him as his under-secretary. This was early in 1865. Soon after that, he became a member of Lord Lawrence's council.

"Of the three-fold aspect of his character, the soldier, the statesman, and the private gentleman, I saw only the two latter; of these again, most of the last. He left the Foreign Office two or three months after I joined it. In those days, too, the work in the Foreign Office had been cut down to a minimum, Lord Law-

* Sir Auckland Colvin.

rence objecting to receive note or comment with the papers daily forwarded for his orders. Then, again, I was too young a man to form any definite judgment on his views as to public questions. I could appreciate the habitual breadth of his opinions, the great extent of his information, and his large experience, and the solid careful reasoning by which he built up his conclusions. His deference for the opinions of experienced men on points which lay outside the immediate sphere of his own experience contrasted with much that I had seen elsewhere; and was in keeping with his patient kindly attention to any one, no matter who, who had any, the smallest, knowledge of a subject before him. Every one could see that he held strong opinions, and that, when he had made up his mind, he expressed his conclusions in language as strong as the views he professed. But I do not think those who knew him only as a man of decided convictions were aware what patience, labour, study, and impartiality he had brought to the forming of his views. He seemed to me in discussion on public affairs eminently a man of sense (a quality much rarer than is known); and next to sense, of probity, which is inseparable from sense. You could not talk to him five minutes on public affairs without feeling that it was not a mere official, however able, but a statesman you were listening to. His experience of our relations with Native States had led him to take a deep interest in questions of international jurisprudence; and he was more versed in questions of this kind, so far as civil administration is concerned, in 'political' subjects as the Indian phrase goes, than in matters connected with the interior administration of our own dominions. His training would have led one to expect this; but while other men were more posted in details of internal civil government, there were none who better understood the strength and weakness of our position in India, who had studied more deeply the nature of our relations with the feudatories of the Crown, or who had a firmer grasp of those liberal but prudent maxims of policy which he had received from the teachings of the first men of a former day, and which he adopted as the rule of his own public life. The last paper he ever showed me was a minute he had written in February, 1866, on a proposal then before Council, to start an official journal like the *Moniteur*. He was of course against it; he had no taste for official milk for babes, and the project was ultimately dropped. I remember, when I read the minute, thinking that we were not likely to see an Indian *Moniteur* for some time to come.

"Of the third aspect of his character, the man in private life, others can speak far better than I. But none who knew him well can speak otherwise than with deep love of him. The combination of extreme strength and tenderness in him was to me his chief charm. I do not know which predominated. I think there was no end to either. Tears would rise to his eyes at a tale of distress; his manner to those who were in any way objects of pity was the very beauty of gentleness; his habitual kindness and *bonhomie* to the younger men about him were the flower of his own generous heart. Yet, with all this, he was a man of iron; his will, like his frame, was cast in an heroic mould. Of course a man so open to sympathy might, without great difficulty, be imposed upon. I dare say he sometimes was, but he must have been a dangerous man to trifle with . . . . . To those who deserved his confidence he was without reserve. His long experience, his wide reading, his culture, his natural cheeriness and fun, made him, to younger men especially, a delightful companion; and I remember once getting into no slight scrape about a dinner-party by forgetting my hour and my man while I walked up and down the Foreign Office verandah with him one wet February evening, listening to him and laughing with him, and meeting him as he loved to have one meet him, on equal terms of talk.

"Finally, as in most really great men, there was nothing of the unapproachable 'swell' about him. He would talk to a shoe-black as he talked to his Excellency in Council; only, I think, he would have been most courteous to the shoe-black. He had strongly the fascinating 'camaraderie' of the soldier; I have only seen it once in a nearly equal degree, and that in a very different man, but also a very distinguished soldier, the late Sir Henry Tombs. If he had enemies, a man of his strong views, and his contempt for what he thought selfish or unjust, was sure to have them. Small wits sometimes hinted that he was at times ponderous, but they took good care to keep out of the risk of proving his weight. He spoke sometimes, too, in public with a warmth which seemed to justify the complaint of those who characterized him as 'bitter.' Warmth was of the essence of his character. But I have often been struck by the manner in which he weighed his words, and spoke as if protesting to himself, on the rare occasions when in private conversation he disparaged any of those about him in public life. I am amazed, looking back, to remember how often I heard him criticized, and how rarely I heard him criticize others."

Private letters written at the time of my father's death, the official notices of his career, the comments of the press in India and in England, were all couched in the same tone. All alike bore witness to his worth in terms which are not often used. "It has never yet seemed true to me," wrote one of his friends, "I with the memory of his kind face and cheery genial voice am very far from taking in the cruel truth. What your feelings must be I dare not think. But it will be some comfort to you to know how loyally he is mourned. There is one point which strikes me much. While all in different ways mourn him, there is one way in which every one mourns him. The greatness of his character and the gentleness by which it was accompanied are the qualities which we feel have gone for the present from among us . . . . Personally to me his death has been a keen sorrow. I loved him, simply, as men love those whom they recognize as noble, but yet not inaccessible in their great power. He has been of immense aid to me. His example has given me strength and encouragement time after time. The best part of me, such as it is, I gained from him. To aim at high things, to put personal considerations aside, to be generous, gentle, but untiring and unsparing in the sternest and most sustained self-sacrifice—these are the lessons he taught to those who were admitted to his intimacy.

"Long after he has gone these lessons will sustain and cheer weaker men labouring in the same track. I count it one of the great privileges of my life that I knew him well, and if my life should prove in any measure useful, I shall always feel that it was he who led me to a right use of it.

> "'The dearest friend to me, the kindest man,
> The best conditioned and unwearied spirit,
> In doing courtesies; and one in whom
> The ancient Roman honour more appeared
> Than any that drew breath.'"

From the Council chamber in Calcutta Lord Mayo publicly announced his death "with feelings of the deepest sorrow."

"By this unhappy event," he said, "Her Majesty has lost a true and faithful servant; the Viceroy an able and experienced comrade; the Punjab a just and energetic ruler; and the Indian service one of its brightest ornaments. His Excellency in Council feels assured that the sad intelligence of Sir H. M. Durand's untimely end will be received in every part of the empire with feelings of the keenest regret, not only among his brethren of the services and his many friends, but by thousands of his Native fellow-subjects, whose

interests and whose welfare it was the main object of his life to promote."

The Duke of Argyll, as Secretary of State for India, expressed in equally high terms the sense which Her Majesty's Government entertained of my father's services. After referring to his "gallantry in the field" and to the "ability and independence of character" by which his career had been distinguished, the official despatch acknowledging the receipt of the news closed as follows:— "The life of such a man is an example to the service, and Her Majesty's Government deeply deplore his death."

I have now finished my task. I hope that these pages, however hastily and imperfectly written, may serve to revive in the minds of those who knew him the remembrance of my father's character; and that to some who did not know him the story of his life may be of interest and advantage. If not, the fault is in the telling, for assuredly a truer and braver life has rarely ended on Indian soil, where noble English lives have not been few.

My father lies on our far western frontier, where he had foretold that he would lie. For a time his grave, the first English grave in the lonely cemetery of Dera Ismail Khan, was marked only by his country's flag. A simple block of marble now covers his resting-place, and on it are graven the words which he had made his rule in life: "He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God."

END OF VOL. I.

# APPENDIX I.

—o—

## LORD ELLENBOROUGH AND SIR JOHN KAYE.

I HAVE mentioned in the body of this work the charges brought against Lord Ellenborough by Sir John Kaye in his "History of the War in Afghanistan." It will not, perhaps, be out of place in writing a memoir of Lord Ellenborough's Private Secretary, if some further notice is taken of one or two points in the indictment. This opens with Lord Ellenborough's landing in India. An account of the new Governor-General's measures fills a good many pages of the history; and from the beginning his action is held up to censure.

In the first place the historian more than hints that Lord Ellenborough's earliest letter of instructions to his generals was the work of his Council in Calcutta. This letter "was a calm and able review of the circumstances attending our position beyond the Indus, and as free from feebleness and indecision on the one side as from haste and intemperance on the other." But, Sir John Kaye says, this letter bears the signatures of the members of Council. "Nothing like it was ever written afterwards." A month later, when removed from his Council, Lord Ellenborough's views had entirely changed, and he "could hardly write a sentence suggestive of anything else but withdrawal and evacuation." Now, as a matter of fact, the letter of the 15th March, which Sir John Kaye justly praises, was entirely Lord Ellenborough's writing; and the orders of which the Indian Council were contemplating the issue when he arrived in Calcutta were to the effect that General Nott should retire from Candahar, sacrificing guns, stores, and followers, and trusting for the salvation of his force to the food which his men could carry in their havresacks. My father was urged, and indignantly refused, to press this course upon the new Governor-General. And it is also a fact that Lord Ellenborough's subsequent suggestions of "withdrawal and evacuation" were in entire accordance with the policy sketched out by his first letter. In an article previously mentioned, which Kaye contributed to the *Calcutta Review* shortly after Lord Ellenborough's recall, he wrote—"In this paper we find the first rough, but very faithful sketch of the course which was subsequently adopted." In truth Lord Ellenborough came out to this

country thoroughly opposed to the policy of the Afghan war, and determined to withdraw from and evacuate Afghanistan as soon as possible. When he heard of the disasters which had befallen our troops, his resolve to evacuate Afghanistan was overlaid by the hope of striking before retirement some signal and decisive blow; and this hope he never abandoned, though the want of supplies and means of movement possessed by his generals at times almost destroyed it. But from first to last he intended to withdraw our troops within our own frontiers, and to leave the Afghans to rule their country for themselves.

Secondly, Kaye makes a point of the fact that in the letter mentioned above Lord Ellenborough writes—"In war, reputation is strength;" while in a later letter he expresses a doubt whether it would be justifiable again to push our armies forward for "no other object than that of re-establishing our military character." What Lord Ellenborough wrote in his first letter was—"In war, reputation is strength, but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory." It would have been fairer to let Lord Ellenborough finish this sentence, and also to remember the circumstances under which his second letter, which Kaye does not quote accurately, was written. His generals, crippled by want of transport, and conscious of discouragement among their troops, were at times more than doubtful of their ability to advance with reference only to the armed strength of Afghanistan. Lord Ellenborough knew, and was bound to give full weight to the consideration, that behind Nott lay the army of the Sind Ameers, and behind Pollock the army of the Sikhs. The slightest cause might bring about the rise of those armies, both of which were constantly on the verge of an outbreak, and both of which, as a fact, opposed us in bloody battles shortly after the evacuation of Afghanistan. Their rise in 1842 would have meant the destruction of every British soldier beyond the Indus. The military position was an utterly false one,* and Lord Ellenborough knew it, and knew also the probable effect upon our own subjects of another reverse. The massacre of Elphinstone's division had already shaken to its foundations the confidence and loyalty of our native army. "You must feel as I do," he afterwards wrote to Nott, when authorizing his march upon Cabul, "that the loss of another army, from whatever cause it might arise, might be fatal to our Government in India. I do not undervalue the aid which our Government in India would receive from the successful execution by your army of a march through Ghazni and Cabul over the scene of our late disasters. I know all the effect which it would have upon the minds of our soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition which no one more than myself would

* As Pollock remarked:—"What a situation ours would be, with detachments all over their country, and I with four rivers in my rear, none fordable, and at the mercy of the Sikhs for boats."

rejoice to see effected, but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin."

In the same strain he wrote to the Secret Committee: –

"Some risk I deem it justifiable to incur . . . . . but I consider the preservation of the army in Afghanistan essential to the preservation of our empire in India; and however the world might forgive or applaud me, I should never forgive myself if I exposed that army to any material and serious danger for the possible accomplishment of any object now to be obtained in Afghanistan."

Kaye also throws in Lord Ellenborough's teeth the fact that when he contemplated a retirement there were English prisoners to be rescued; and later, in discussing the famous proclamation of the 1st of October, 1842, which announced the termination of the Afghan war, and the inauguration of a new policy, the historian remarks that when this proclamation was signed, Lord Ellenborough knew the British ensign was floating over the Bala Hissar of Cabul, but "did not know the British prisoners had been released from captivity." Now, as to the first point, there was no certainty that an advance upon Cabul would result in the release of the prisoners. It was quite as likely to lead to their ill-treatment, to their removal in the direction of Herat or the Oxus, even to their murder.* That any movement of our unwieldly troops could effect their forcible rescue was the wildest of dreams. And in regard to the proclamation of the 1st of October, the historian has been unfair, apparently with deliberate intention. In the review article above alluded to, when discussing the same point, Kaye wrote as follows:—

"It must not, however, be too hastily assumed that the abandonment of the prisoners was an event ever contemplated by the Governor-General after it had been finally resolved to push on the armies to Cabul. There are repeated indications in his public despatches that the recovery of the prisoners, though in the eyes of the statesman a secondary object, was an event to the realization of which he looked forward with no culpable unconcern. It was at least one of the cherished objects of the campaign, though it held not the highest place; and when he issued the proclamation of the 1st of October, he believed that it had been accomplished. The Governor-General, it is true, received intelligence of the recovery of 'all the prisoners except Captain Bygrave' not before the evening of the 4th of October. But it must never be forgotten that General Pollock, in his letter of the 16th, which the Governor-General had received before the 1st, mentioned that some of the prisoners had come in, and that 'unless some very unforeseen circumstances occur he expected to obtain possession of the whole,' Captain Bygrave excepted, 'in the course of eight or ten days;' and in the notification of September 30th, announcing the arrival of the two divisions of the army at Cabul, and the planting of the

* When Pollock advanced they were, in fact, removed to Bameean, and orders were issued for their further journey to Kulm. The fate of Lieutenant Maclaine in the late war will not soon be forgotten, nor I suppose the Well of Cawnpore.

British ensign on the Bala Hissar, the Governor-General had announced that the report of General Pollock 'led him to expect' that 'long before this day all the British prisoners taken by the Afghans will have been brought into the general's camp.' It may be said, therefore, that he issued the manifesto of the 1st of October in anticipation of an event, or rather the receipt of intelligence of an event, which he believed to be almost inevitable."

Surely Sir John Kaye would have done well to remember this when publishing his History. The fact is, that throughout no one was more anxious than Lord Ellenborough for the release of our prisoners, but he was bound to keep other objects in view, and he felt that in all probability this object could not be gained by the advance of our armies. There was no strong central government in Afghanistan capable of being intimidated into their surrender, and, as I have said before, their forcible rescue was out of the question. Against any attempt of that kind he had been specially warned by the Duke of Wellington, whose experience of Eastern warfare enabled him clearly to realise its dangers. Considering, therefore, the crippled state of Pollock and Nott,* and their utterly hopeless position if Sind and the Punjab rose, Lord Ellenborough may well have been justified in doubting whether he could properly attempt to push forward their troops on the slender chance of effecting the release of the prisoners, whose surrender was quite as likely to be effected by means of exchange, the Ameer Dost Mahomed and other Afghan Sirdars being in our hands. To charge Lord Ellenborough on this account with indifference as to their fate is wholly unfair. He had pressed upon his generals the importance of effecting "the release of the last sepoy" in Afghan hands; and the hope of setting free our unfortunate people was constantly in his thoughts. But he felt bound not to expose our armies in Afghanistan to "material and serious danger;" and considering the issues involved it would be hard to show that he was wrong. Though he does not seem to have grasped at any time the full difficulty of the situation, Kaye himself writes in his review article—"By many the recovery of the captives had been regarded as the main object of the second invasion of Afghanistan. It was natural, and it was commendable that the best feelings of humanity should, in such a conjuncture, have exercised a more potent influence over the judgments of men than considerations of general policy; but it would be unjust to revile the statesman who took a cooler, but more enlarged view of the question, and hesitated to risk the lives of many for the salvation of a few." Yet in his History Kaye does not shrink from committing this injustice. He commits, indeed, a far greater injustice, for there was far more at stake than "the lives of many."

Again, Sir John Kaye pours much sarcasm upon Lord Ellenborough's orders authorizing General Nott to select his own "line of retirement,"

* Nott had about 9,000 fighting men at Candahar, and his means of transport consisted of 265 camels and 148 bullocks. Pollock had 1,900 men in hospital, and "no heart" among the sepoys, who had lately been repulsed from the Khyber.

and to withdraw from Afghanistan, if the state of his supplies and transport permitted, by way of Ghazni, Cabul, and Jellalabad. Such a movement, the historian says, is like "the case of a man wishing to retire from Reigate to London, and taking Dover and Canterbury in his way." It would be difficult to conceive a more inaccurate illustration. The circle by Dover and Canterbury to London would, calculating roughly from the map, be about seven times as long as the direct route from Reigate. General Nott's route by Ghazni and Cabul to the Sutlej, for be it remembered the Sutlej, and not the Indus, was then our frontier, was actually shorter than his alternative line by Quetta and Shikarpore.* Lord Ellenborough was determined to withdraw our armies from Afghanistan, and he did so. He was anxious before withdrawing them to strike a blow at the Afghans, and he authorized Nott, if he felt himself strong enough, to retire by the shorter route, beating down opposition on his way and occupying the capital, rather than by the longer route where serious opposition, from the Afghans at all events, was less to be apprehended. Nott, a keen and forward soldier, felt strong enough to choose the more dangerous course, and chose it.

At the risk of some repetition I would ask my readers to consider as a whole, with the aid of the map prefixed to the third chapter of this work, the position of affairs during the first months of Lord Ellenborough's rule. The Afghans had risen and annihilated one of our divisions; while the other bodies of British troops in Afghanistan were isolated from one another, and badly off for supplies and carriage, and surrounded by greatly superior forces. Pollock was at Peshawur, on the Afghan frontier, with a small relieving column; but his troops were sickly and dispirited by an unsuccessful attempt to force the defiles of the Khyber. Between the Afghan frontier and the British provinces lay the broad plains of Sind and the Punjab, States known to be hostile in feeling, and capable of putting into the field against us not much less than a hundred thousand good fighting men. At the same time we were engaged in a troublesome war with China; the native States in and around India were restless and disturbed; the reserve available for further operations beyond our frontier was small; and, worse than all, our Native army had shown signs of disaffection. A fresh defeat in Afghanistan would almost cer-

* This is a simple question of figures. According to the last returns in the Indian Quartermaster-General's office the distance from Candahar to our old frontier post at Ferozepore by way of Sukkur is 890 miles. From Candahar to Ferozepore by way of Cabul and Peshawur the distance is 816 miles. The routes in 1842 were slightly different from what they are now; but the Cabul route was then, as now, considerably the shorter of the two. Kaye appears to have forgotten that Sind and the Punjab were not British territory, and that barely six months after Nott's march from Candahar our infantry had "staggered back in amazement" from the "forest of swords" at Meánee. Throughout his work the historian fails to realize this essential difficulty of the position; and the value of the history as a truthful record of facts is much decreased thereby.

tainly have brought upon us a fearful accumulation of disasters. Happily no fresh defeat occurred, and the dangers which then threatened us came upon us later, and singly, so that we were able to deal with them one by one. Sind rose first, then Gwalior, then the Sikhs, and finally, years afterwards, our Native army. But in 1842 it is no wonder that Lord Ellenborough should have been anxious to avoid any rash and hasty measure in Afghanistan which might act as a spark to fire the whole train. Our Indian Empire was never in greater peril.

That Lord Ellenborough knew how to arouse the enthusiasm and win the love of the Indian army is beyond dispute. It is doubtless true that his orders to his Generals in the field did not always escape criticism from the more forward spirits in camp, who, not knowing all that he knew and was bound to consider, chafed at anything savouring of caution, and longed for an advance at all hazards. This must be the case in nearly every war. But it is fair to look at the other side of the picture. The following is an extract from a letter written to my father, after the relief of Jellalabad, by George Broadfoot, as fine a soldier as ever lived, and the real hero, as everyone now knows, of the "illustrious garrison":—

"Lord Ellenborough's order has produced an extraordinary sensation. Rely on it this is the way to manage soldiers, who black or white are *not* mercenaries. Honour, distinction, approbation of superiors, above all of superiors able to judge, these are the incentives that guide even the masses . . . . . It is *Wellesleian*, nothing like it since the great Marquis . . . . . Lord Hastings was equally cordial, equally spoke to the heart, but there is the discrimination here that he wanted . . . . . The appreciation of General Pollock's difficulties has greatly delighted him, and done good to his force. Already the grumblers are silent, and the rest rejoicing that no kind of merit is likely to be overlooked. The order was read this morning to our garrison, but I had before told the men of the sappers of it in their barrack-yards, and their delight was enthusiastic." In a similar tone Sir Charles Napier wrote a year later:—"The army was degraded, vilified, run down, till it really began to be affected with a bad opinion of itself. When I arrived at Poonah I saw and heard such things that I had no difficulty in accounting for our misfortunes. I felt ashamed of my profession; the military spirit seemed to have gone! At this time Lord Ellenborough arrived . . . . . and I chiefly attribute my own good fortune to the spirit infused into the military by Lord Ellenborough, and to those admirable general arrangements which enabled me to apply that spirit with effect."

It would be easy to quote further testimony of the same kind, and one instance of Lord Ellenborough's thoughtfulness and care in such matters may be cited as characteristic. In the beginning of October, 1842, it was notified that certain medals and other honours would be conferred upon the troops engaged in the Afghan war. On the 17th of December Sir Robert Sale crossed the British frontier at the head of the Jellalabad garrison. Three days earlier the Governor-General's military secretary

and one of his aides-de-camp had conveyed the Jellalabad medals to Sale's camp under an escort of the body-guard; and to quote the official notification "all the officers and soldiers of the garrison passed the bridge of the Sutlej wearing the honour they have so justly won." Lord Ellenborough understood that in such cases he gives twice who gives soon, and it might be well if the lesson were generally learnt. Delay in the distribution of honours deadens the interest with which men receive them, and sensibly detracts from their value.

One more criticism upon Sir John Kay's account of Lord Ellenborough's measures may not here be out of place. The historian remarks that the Governor-General "seems to have set his face very strenuously against the political officers, no matter what their services. With all his admiration of the illustrious garrison Lord Ellenborough slighted MacGregor, who was its very life and soul, and with all his appreciation of gallantry he seemed unable to appreciate the services of Eldred Pottinger." Now as to MacGregor it is quite clear from Sir John Kaye's own account of the Jellalabad siege that from first to last MacGregor did his utmost to induce the illustrious garrison to capitulate, and march out of Afghanistan under the "escort" of an Afghan force. The life and soul of that garrison, which became "illustrious" because it refused to capitulate, was not the political officer, but George Broadfoot. Alone among those who surrounded Sale he had from the beginning raised his voice against all dealings with the enemy, "had viewed with horror and detestation the proposal to capitulate, and flung the paper of terms indignantly to the ground." Though ridiculed and overborne by numbers his spirit never sank, and at last the constancy of one man, and he nearly the youngest in all Sale's council of war, preserved his country's honour from another disgraceful blow. No one has impugned, or could wish to impugn, the personal courage of MacGregor, but no one can read the story of the councils of war in Jellalabad without feeling his blood stirred by the recital, and without confessing that the noblest heart in that garrison was the fiery heart of Broadfoot. Lord Ellenborough may have improperly slighted MacGregor, but if he only slighted him by ascribing to a soldier the chief honour of the defence of Jellalabad, assuredly he was not to be blamed for so doing.

With regard to the general question, it is possible that Lord Ellenborough may not have been sufficiently sensible of the services of the political officers as a body, and especially of Pottinger. Almost his first act on arriving in India was to subordinate all political officers in Afghanistan to the military commanders, and he certainly never extended to them the same measure of favour and authority as they had enjoyed under Lord Auckland. But in the first place it must be remembered that the measures of Macnaughten and his political staff had been to a great extent the cause of our disasters, and further that when Lord Ellenborough landed in India the "great game" was practically at an end. At any time and under any circumstances it must be desirable in a country like Afghanistan, where the conditions of warfare are wholly

different from those obtaining in Europe, to concentrate in the hands of one man, if he is capable of exercising it, supreme control, both political and military, and that man must of necessity be the general commanding. If the general commanding is not capable of exercising political power, it may become necessary to place at his side an independent political authority. But such an arrangement is at best a makeshift, and contains innumerable elements of discord and weakness. When there are no political objects to be gained, and the operations of our armies are to be guided solely by military considerations, which was the case in 1842, the necessity for thus fettering the military chief wholly disappears. Lord Ellenborough cannot therefore be blamed for reversing Lord Auckland's arrangements in this particular. Whether he was unjust in his estimate of the work done by our political agents is another matter. I think he was willing enough to acknowledge that all were not unworthy of credit. Certainly this was my father's view. "They have been much blamed," he writes in his History of the War, "but the system rather than the agents was at fault; and some of them were not only very able men, but did important service in the line prescribed for their exertions."

# APPENDIX II.

—o—

## THE MUTINY IN CENTRAL INDIA.

In 1876 Sir John Kaye published the third volume of his "History of the Sepoy War," and this work contained a vehement attack upon my father's proceedings at Indore during the mutiny. That it did so was, without doubt, mainly due to the influence of a man who has frequently been mentioned in these pages—Sir Robert Hamilton. In the preface to his first volume, Sir John Kaye states that he has obtained from Hamilton "much valuable matter in elucidation of the history of the Central Indian campaign," and it would have been reasonable to suppose that the historian was indebted to the same authority for more valuable matter in elucidation of my father's character and conduct. But this point is not left uncertain, for in 1864 Sir John Kaye wrote to my father on the subject, asking him to send home any papers relating to the events of the mutiny in Central India which he might wish Kaye to see, or, better still, a narrative of those events. "This," Kaye wrote, "appears to me to be the more essential because Sir Robert Hamilton is an intimate personal friend of my own, and I am in constant communication with him." In reply my father sent a memorandum of his operations in Western Malwa, which, however, did not enter into much detail, and could in any case have availed very little against the constant personal explanation and influence of an intimate friend. Sir Robert Hamilton's feelings towards my father, thus clearly indicated by Kaye, were, as I have before shown, the reverse of friendly. And from the year 1857 Hamilton lost no opportunity of impugning, officially or otherwise, my father's proceedings. Therefore, in accepting Sir Robert Hamilton's account of affairs in Central India, Kaye was accepting an account which would be as hostile as possible. A well-known political officer who was in Central India in 1857, and who afterwards rose to high office under the Government of India, thus put the matter to me six years ago: "Your father's whole Central India career must be looked upon as a controversy, or I might almost say a contest, in which he is on one side, and Sir Robert Hamilton, his relations, and Holkar are on the other. It is evident that Kaye has distinctly taken the side of the latter party."

That the Maharaja Holkar should have joined in attacking my father is comprehensible. He knew that my father entertained doubts as to his loyalty; and he attributed to my father's influence the refusal of the British Government to grant him a territorial reward for his services during the mutiny. Ever since 1857 the Maharaja has pressed his claims, always unsuccessfully, upon Viceroy after Viceroy; and being possessed of an untiring advocate in Sir Robert Hamilton, and of great wealth and much tenacity of purpose, he has at the same time succeeded in keeping up a certain amount of chronic agitation on the subject in England. All this has failed; and each successive refusal has embittered His Highness against the memory of the man whom he believes to have stood in his way. To such an extent has this feeling carried him, that not many years ago the Governor-General was forced to return one of his memorials as containing remarks regarding my father and Lord Canning which were positively intolerable.

As might be expected under the circumstances, Kaye's account of the mutiny in Central India is singularly one-sided and incomplete. He ignores altogether the position of the Agency, the objects which my father had in view, and the difficulties which beset him, discussing my father's conduct almost entirely with reference to Holkar and Holkar's behaviour on the particular occasion of the Indore outbreak. The whole chapter reads far more like an elaborate justification of Holkar, and glorification of Hamilton, than an attempt to narrate the facts of the mutiny in Central India. Kaye's views may be stated in a few words. Holkar, "carefully trained under the guidance of Sir Robert Hamilton," was "thoroughly true to the British Government," and from first to last did his duty boldly and well. Unfortunately my father was not capable of appreciating the young chief's merits. He had "an antipathy" for Holkar from the first. He was "not tolerant." He "wanted imagination" and "could not orientalise himself." Lacking sympathy, he "could not make allowances, and expected a Mahratta chief to be as leal as a Percy or a Campbell." This caused him to leap hastily to conclusions. On the 1st July, when Holkar's troops attacked the residency, he leaped hastily to the conclusion that Holkar was faithless, simply because Holkar was as much "bewildered" as himself, and had not sent any message during the cannonade. Thus easily convinced of Holkar's disloyalty he "fled, without good cause, from Indore," and disappeared into space, leaving his political functions to be assumed, and the British Government to be "saved," by a stout-hearted artilleryman at Mhow, who if my father had only held on "a few hours" longer, would have rattled up with his battery, dissipated the enemy, and crushed the revolt. Afterwards, as this "precipitate retreat" could only be justified by "proving the consummate treachery of Holkar," my father laid himself out to prove it. He did not succeed; but his influence was sufficient to keep Holkar "more or less a suspect," and to prevent his obtaining what he most coveted, the grant of a territorial reward. "There can be no question that Holkar was sacrificed to the justification of Durand."

Such are the views put forward by Sir John Kaye. Shortly after his volume appeared I prepared for the *Calcutta Review*, from such materials as were then in my possession, an article defending my father's action. This article was republished in England in pamphlet form, and at the same time General Travers, who, though he had been in command of the troops at Indore on the 1st of July, 1857, was in no way attacked by Kaye, also published in England a pamphlet controverting many of the historian's statements. It is possible that Sir John Kaye, had he lived, might have found in these papers reason to modify his account of the affair; but he died soon afterwards, and his book remains on record as originally published. The controversy was then taken up by Mr. John Dickinson, in a work entitled the "Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor," which contained a violent attack upon my pamphlet and that of General Travers. Mr. Dickinson died before this was published, but the work was edited by Major Evans Bell. Finally Colonel Malleson, who took up and finished the history of the Indian mutiny, treated the subject at some length in his first volume. This was contemporary with the third volume of Kaye's work, which had met with a chorus of adverse criticism. Colonel Malleson went into the matter carefully, with an evident desire to do justice to both sides, and his conclusion was, as regards the retirement from Indore, entirely in my father's favour. He described the charges brought against my father as "baseless," and recorded a warm eulogy of his services and character. His testimony is the more valuable from the fact that it was wholly unprejudiced, Colonel Malleson having held no communication on the subject with myself or any member of my father's family before the volume appeared. As regards Holkar, Colonel Malleson was of opinion that His Highness was free from complicity with the mutineers, but that the circumstances of the case could not but seem suspicious to my father at the time, and that he was justified in acting as he did. In a later volume Colonel Malleson describes and does full justice to the Western Malwa campaign of 1857, which Kaye had not mentioned, and again expresses in the strongest terms his sense of my father's services. For this generous and spontaneous defence of a dead man's memory against calumny and neglect Colonel Malleson has earned the gratitude of my father's family and friends, and there is now hardly room for further misrepresentation on the subject.

Nevertheless it appears to me to be necessary to add a few words in order that the misrepresentations already made should be met and exposed once for all; and that some points which did not fall within the scope of Colonel Malleson's work may be briefly touched upon.

First as regards Sir John Kaye. I have stated above the view which he has seen fit to take upon the question, and I have indicated the source from which this view was derived. His line of reasoning is based throughout on what appears to me to be a patent fallacy: that the retreat from Indore was made in consequence of political considerations. He puts the case as follows: "Durand . . . . . hastily condemned Holkar

and by his flight from Indore brought matters to this issue, that either the Maharaja was a traitor, or that the British Agent had fled without good cause from Indore." If it were necessary to accept this issue, it would be possible to do so with a certain amount of encouragement from Sir John Kaye himself. His own words, used with regard to Sindia, are as follows: "It was not to be expected that being a man and a Mahratta he should not when assailed by the fierce temptation sometimes have wavered in his allegiance, and for a little while yielded inwardly to the allurements that beset him. Perhaps, indeed, there was not a Native chief in India who was not sometimes minded to wait and watch at the outset of the great convulsion." Holkar also was a man and a Mahratta; and if he waited and watched while his guns were cannonading the residency, he was not "thoroughly true to the British Government." In other words, he was a "traitor." But in point of fact Kaye's issue is altogether beside the mark. He has failed to see that my father's retreat from the residency, and his treatment of Holkar, were two entirely separate matters. The retreat from the residency was a purely military operation, to be justified or condemned solely on military grounds. No one seems to have realized more clearly than Sir John Kaye the fact that Holkar was entirely powerless, that he neither had nor pretended to have the smallest remnant of control when his troops rose.* He could not punish or keep under restraint the leader of the attack, who came to him in his palace and openly boasted of having "wounded a sahib."† For three days after the mutiny he could not even bury our dead. Until the 4th of July, when the Maharaja visited the residency and conversed with the mutineers who were in possession, the bodies of the men and women murdered by his soldiery lay on the ground where they had fallen. According to Sir John Kaye he was himself subjected to insolence and threats. This being the case, what conceivable difference could it have made if, when my father saw Holkar's troops gathering round the residency, he had been absolutely confident of the personal loyalty of Holkar himself? He "fled" not from Holkar, but from Holkar's guns and sabres and muskets. An inkling of the distinction seems to dawn upon Sir John Kaye's mind when he writes: "But admitting that the sudden retreat was justifiable or even commendable, I can see nothing

* One of our native adherents found his way to Holkar's palace on the 1st of July. He wrote to my father in favour of the Maharaja, who he said treated him kindly. His letter contains the following account of their meeting:—"His Highness spoke kindly, and said that if I and the others liked we could live with him in the palace. While with him for about a quarter of an hour I found him much agitated. He told me that almost all his troops were in open mutiny. All the gates of the palace were closed, and only a small window left open guarded by his adherents."

† According to Malleson this was "before nine o'clock," that is a few minutes after the attack, and at least an hour and a half before the residency was evacuated.

to justify the after treatment of Holkar by the acting resident at Indore." It need hardly be pointed out that the possibility of such an admission, coupled with the assertion of the Maharaja's innocence, is incompatible with the issue stated above, "either the Maharaja was a traitor, or the British Agent fled without good cause from Indore." As I have said, that issue is wholly beside the mark. The retreat from the residency was one matter, the after treatment of Holkar another, and the two must be dealt with separately.

As regards the retreat, it is hardly necessary to say much. Sir John Kaye contends that it was "precipitate" and groundless, that my father ought to have held on "a few hours" longer; that if he had done so the Maharaja would have had time to "declare himself on our side;" the European battery would have come up; the revolt at Indore would "most probably have been suppressed;" and "there would have been no combination of Holkar's troops with the Mhow mutineers." Now, I have already shown that my father's fighting men consisted of fourteen gunners, who were beginning to desert their guns, and five Sikh troopers, of the Bhopal Contingent cavalry. Besides these he had 270 Bheels, who could not be induced to discharge their pieces even from the residency windows, 150 troopers who could not be formed, and nearly 500 contingent infantry who were threatening to shoot their officers. With this force he held his ground for nearly two hours, and retreated only when the last show of strength was about to be taken from him by the flight of the cavalry; when the attack, at first hesitating and tentative, had become organized and overwhelming, and he found "Holkar's horse and foot with additional guns crowding down to support the attack."

But Sir John Kaye's contention is that he ought to have held on, notwithstanding, until the arrival of the European battery from Mhow. There are several circumstances which militate against this view. In the first place, even supposing the call for the battery had reached Mhow, which was exceedingly doubtful, it was very far from certain that Hungerford would be able to obey it. Mhow had always been the point from which danger was apprehended. As Sir John Kaye himself remarks: "It is scarcely to be doubted that the sepoys of our own regiments at Mhow contaminated Holkar's troops at Indore." This was precisely my father's view, and the natural conclusion was that the rising was a concerted one; that Hungerford was hard at work on his own account, if not already overwhelmed by the rush of an infantry regiment and a wing of cavalry upon his unsupported battery. That this apprehension was not unfounded was afterwards shown. In a letter written in January, 1858, certainly with no view of justifying my father, Sir Robert Hamilton gives a lucid account of the progress of disaffection at Indore. After describing how "the Durbar troops became associated with the contingents and the Mutineers at Mhow," Sir Robert goes on as follows: —"This was the position of the Indore plotters when news came of the Neemuch rising. About that time a detachment had come from Mhow

for treasure, and it seems to have been arranged that the morning of the 1st of July should be the day on which the Mhow and Indore troops should simultaneously rise. To test the sincerity of Holkar's troops it was decided that they should commence early, at eight o'clock on the morning of the 1st. At the time appointed Buns Gopal with the men of the Maharaj and Bujrung pultans with their guns commenced the attack." So my father can hardly be blamed for supposing that help from Mhow was very doubtful. As a fact the treacherous regulars waited to see the result of their machinations before committing themselves, and Hungerford was able to obey orders. But it was impossible to count on this, and after Holkar's troops had begun to cut off the retreat there was no time left to wait and see.

Supposing, however, that my father had resolved to await the battery and stake all on the chance of its arrival, what would have been the position? Hungerford could hardly come up before half-past twelve or one o'clock. How was the defence to be maintained until then against the increasing masses of the enemy? It afterwards transpired that Hungerford did not leave Mhow till noon, and that he came forward at a slow trot. At this rate he would not have been at Indore till much later in the afternoon. Meanwhile Holkar's numerous guns, choosing their own position, and getting their range with perfect impunity, would have been pouring a concentrated fire on the residency building,* and a rush on the part of the mutinous contingents or Holkar's infantry must at any moment have overwhelmed the fourteen faithful gunners, and put an end to the defence. But even supposing that the residency had still been intact and occupied when Hungerford's leisurely advance was completed, what could the battery have done? Holkar's troops occupied the enclosures and buildings in front of the residency. "No field artillery," writes General Travers, "could drive the enemy from such a position . . . . . infantry alone could do this" And there was no infantry. Therefore if the battery reached the little garrison it could at best only help to cover a perilous retreat. For it was impossible to advance; and to remain in the residency, without cover for the guns or horses, almost within pistol range of a numerous enemy, was to court destruction. Finally, if it were not rapidly destroyed by the sword the garrison would before long have perished of hunger and thirst; for there was no possibility of procuring food or forage, and the only well within reach was fully exposed to the enemy's fire at close range.

The overwhelming strength of the enemy's force on this occasion has never, I think, been fully realized. General Travers in his pamphlet speaks of the "overwhelming numbers" against us; but he further describes the force as follows:—"Three field guns, one more or less damaged, nine or ten companies of infantry, and an increasing armed

* The residency was a stone building, standing in an open space, and pierced in the lower story by some five-and-twenty or thirty glass and venetian doors, "incapable," according to Colonel Malleson, "of resisting even a kick."

crowd from the direction of the city." Similarly Colonel Malleson writes of "six hundred trained sepoys, swelled by the constantly augmenting rabble of the city." As for Kaye, he writes with his usual poetical vagueness, and does not take the trouble to examine the military position at all. There is, therefore, nothing to show that the mutineers were in fact being reinforced by large bodies of Durbar troops. This, however, was the case. I have already quoted the words of my father's official report—"Holkar's horse and foot, with additional guns, came crowding down to support the attack." I now extract the following passages from a letter written by my father to Lord Ellenborough some weeks later, which sets the point at rest, and shows clearly the composition of the force*:—

"Holkar denies any participation in the conduct of his troops; and he has done what lay in his power to aid the officers and artillery which took to the fort on the 1st of July; to rescue Christians; to recover Lieutenant Hutchinson out of the hands of the Amjhera chief; and to aid Colonel Stuart's column in its advance; but of course all his mutinous troops, except the small portion which accompanied the Mhow mutineers towards Agra, are still at Indore, and his control over them and the people is nominal. The force here may therefore be regarded as in observation of some 30 guns of sorts, 1,400 or 1,500 horse, and some five or six battalions of infantry, all compromised to a man by their participation in the attack on the residency. The deputation sent by Holkar to meet me on the Nerbudda, one of whom was the commander of his troops, told me that not a man remained in the lines that morning, and that they were powerless, and in the hands of the revolted troops and of the insurgent people of the city. The vakeel of Holkar made a most naïve confession. Holkar himself had gone into the palace, and the vakeel was outside on his horse, about to return to his own house, when he was stopped by the column of infantry pouring along the street towards the residency. He spoke to some of them, and told them not to march without Holkar's orders; upon which some muskets were levelled at him, and there was a shout of 'What have you to say?' His reply was 'Oh, only that you should take plenty of ammunition.' The muskets were then lowered, and he was told, 'Aye, that's all right,' and the mass moved on and he escaped . . . . . I was amused with the naïveté and the thorough Mahratta quickness of Ganesh Shastri, and thought the fact so characteristic of the time and people that I have given it you in full."

As this point has never been clearly brought out before, and as I have been accused of wilfully exaggerating in my pamphlet the strength of the enemy, this letter is worth reproducing. It shows what the European

* The letter is a further indication, if any were wanted, of the fact that my father did not regard the Maharaja with the hostility which has been constantly imputed to him. Lord Ellenborough was a private friend, to whom my father was writing freely, but there is not a word against Holkar in the letter.

battery would have had to meet if it had come up; and when one remembers that its only supports would have been 270 Bheels, who declined to discharge their muskets, and that some hundreds of mutinous contingent troops were inside the residency lines, the value of Sir John Kaye's contention becomes sufficiently apparent.*

At page 344 and 345 of his book, having propounded his views on the subject, Kaye quotes what purports to be my father's "answer." This is a letter to Lord Canning's private secretary, in which my father animadverts on certain incorrect statements published by the *Friend of India*. After stating that the call for help reached Mhow at a quarter to ten, and describing the slowness of Hungerford's advance, my father says:—"It would have been 4 P.M. at least before he reached the residency, for they did not canter out. I retired from the residency after a two hours cannonade about half-past ten." Upon this Sir John Kaye, abruptly breaking short my father's "answer," proceeds to make the following point:—"That is three-quarters of an hour after the call for the battery reached Mhow. Now the battery could not have been equipped, mounted, and brought down to Indore at full gallop in three-quarters of an hour. So it is clear that Colonel Durand did not await even the possibility of an arrival, under the most favourable circumstances, of Hungerford and his guns." Sir John Kaye's argument would have been fairer, I had almost said more honest, if he had allowed my father to finish his sentence. It runs as follows:—"As none of our men would fight except the two Bhopal guns, the support of our guns and the defence of the residency for five and a half hours would, had I tried to hold it longer, have depended upon the officers and European non-commissioned officers present, in all, telegraphic signallers included, from sixteen to twenty† in number." My father's "answer" was not that he awaited the battery, and that it did not come, but that he knew it could not arrive much before one o'clock, if it arrived at all; that as a fact it would not have arrived till four; that he had little chance of holding the residency even up to the earlier hour, owing to the rapid turn out of Holkar's troops, and the misconduct of his own; and that he must certainly, as matters went, have been overwhelmed if he had attempted to do so. It might be added that though the battery could not have come up in three-quarters of an hour, a horseman sent on in advance on receipt of the note might have done so.

Finally, it is necessary to remark that Colonel Travers, who was in

* In calling upon the Maharaja for an explanation of the circumstances connected with the outbreak, my father mentioned what he had been told by the commander of Holkar's troops, and the Maharaja in no way denied it. On the contrary, he based his defence on the very ground that he had been "deserted by the troops," and was "helpless."

† There were actually seventeen, according to Malleson—"eight combatant officers, two doctors, two sergeants, and five Europeans of the Telegraph Department." The telegraph men were too much shaken to aid in the defence. Though armed they did not fire a shot.

actual command of the troops, and senior to my father in military rank, though his junior in service, never hinted at the possibility of prolonging the defence. This was unquestionably his duty if he thought the retreat premature, for the question was a purely military one; but as a fact he thought exactly the contrary. "I had carefully reviewed our position," he writes, "and was turning to inform Durand I considered it was hopeless, and that I could do no more, when he came and gave me his opinion, which was identical with my own, and as I afterwards learnt, with that of every officer present." General Travers wears the Victoria Cross which he earned among Holkar's gunners, and he enjoys deservedly a high reputation for courage and soldierly qualities. Not a word has ever been said against him by Kaye, or anyone else, in connection with the retreat from Indore. And the reason is plain.

Further comment with regard to the propriety of the retreat would be superfluous; but there is one connected point in Kaye's narrative which deserves notice. At page 334 of his book Kaye describes how Hungerford's advance was stopped midway by the arrival of a trooper of the Bhopal cavalry, who brought the news that my father had evacuated the residency. "The trooper added that Colonel Durand had not gone to Mhow because the cantonment was in Holkar's dominion, and an attack on our cantonments was meditated in the course of the night." This sentence is calculated to leave a wrong impression on the mind of the reader. My father's memorandum upon his operations, to which Kaye refers, shows clearly that the retreating force was not diverted from Mhow by the reasons here given. As I have already noticed, my father did at first order a retreat in that direction, but was unable to carry it out.

To turn now to the political aspect of the question. Sir John Kaye "can see nothing to justify the after treatment of Holkar by the Acting Resident at Indore." It may be pointed out, in the first place, that Kaye evidently has no clear notion what that treatment was. He writes as if from the day of the outbreak my father had done all he could to discredit and injure the Maharaja, and had partially succeeded. I have shown* that far from this being the case, my father wrote in Holkar's favour to Lord Canning, and was inclined to the opinion that the Maharaja was sincere in his protestations of innocence. Nothing surely can be less inimical or indicative of the "antipathy" which Kaye most unjustly attributes to my father than the tone of the letters already cited. To begin with, he certainly imagined that Holkar had thrown in his lot against us, but directly Holkar disclaimed all such intention he accepted and favourably noticed the Maharaja's explanations. He was not entirely convinced of the Maharaja's loyalty; and as time went on his doubts became strengthened; but they amounted to nothing more than this, that at the beginning of the outbreak Holkar was playing a waiting game. Considering that Sir John Kaye expresses the same doubt regarding all

* Chapter VIII.

the Native chiefs in India, he is hardly justified in blaming my father for expressing it in regard to one. Nor is it reasonable to attribute to a "prejudice," born of my father's influence, the refusal of a territorial reward. Holkar had a steady advocate in Sir Robert Hamilton, and he had perfectly impartial judges. Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo during my father's life, Lord Northbrook and Lord Lytton after his death, and the various Secretaries of State concerned, were surely capable of forming an opinion for themselves. No misrepresentations on my father's part would have kept Holkar out of his due. I do not wish to discuss the question of the Maharaja's loyalty, and there is no necessity for doing so; but this allegation is too extravagant to be passed over.

I have already referred, in passing, to Sir John Kaye's account of what occurred at Indore and Mhow immediately after my father had been driven out of the residency. But that account is so misleading that it is necessary to examine it a little more in detail. On page 336 *et seq.* of Kaye's book will be found a vivid description of the behaviour of Captain Hungerford after the outbreak. The writer tells how Hungerford, being the senior officer at Mhow, which by the way was not the case, assumed the command of the garrison; how he wrote to Holkar expressing his disbelief in the story of the Maharaja's disloyalty;* how he was satisfied and assured by the Maharaja's answer; how he proceeded to take upon himself the diplomatic as well as the military control of affairs; to prepare himself for a month's siege at Mhow; to "establish himself as representative of the Governor-General in Holkar's dominion." The description winds up with the following sentences:—"He did what he had 'no right to do,' and he was afterwards severely rebuked by Durand. But History, rising above all official formalities, must pronounce that the men who did what they had 'no right to do' were the men who saved the British Government in India." Now I have no wish unnecessarily to say anything against Hungerford's reputation. His battery did good service afterwards with the column in Western Malwa, and my father spoke in his favour for brevet rank. But when such extravagant laudation is bestowed upon him by "History," at my father's expense, it is necessary to look at the facts. Hungerford was not strong before the outbreak when a rise of the Mhow troops was expected; on the contrary, he was an alarmist and increased the alarm of others. He was not ready during the outbreak either on the morning or the evening of the 1st July; and his bat-

* This is an admirable example of the nonsense which Sir J. Kaye occasionally allowed himself to present to the public. "His first impression was that Holkar might be leagued with the mutineers. Ominous reports reached him, which he did not over-hastily accept, but for a little space they enfeebled his former strong faith in the Maharaja." Hungerford was an English captain of artillery commanding an English battery in cantonments. No one who knows anything of India will maintain that an officer in his position could possibly have had any opinion of his own as to the loyalty of a neighbouring native chief. He had no more opportunity of forming such an opinion than if he had been at Woolwich.

tery, which my father had left intact at Mhow, when the loan of a couple of English guns would have been very acceptable at the residency, did nothing to check or punish the mutineers.* Finally, he was very injudicious after the outbreak. It is unnecessary even to go beyond Sir John Kaye's glowing pages in order to recognize the extravagance of his remarks. If they be examined it will be seen that Hungerford's contribution towards the salvation of India consisted in firing a few rounds of grape through the darkness at the Native lines, on the chance of an enemy being in them; in holding for a month a fort which never was threatened; and in writing a series of letters to and about a suspected Native chief of whose loyalty he was in no position to judge.

A little further on Sir John Kaye proceeds to describe how Lieutenant Hutchinson was driven out of Bhopawar by the Amjhera mutineers; how Hungerford "promptly took upon himself the political responsibility" of allowing Holkar to rescue the party; and how Hutchinson "had such implicit faith in Holkar's friendship" that he did not hesitate to place himself "under the protection of his troops." And thus "was Hungerford relieved from the political responsibility which he had undertaken with so much promptitude, and acquitted himself of with so much address." Thus the artilleryman who unable to stir out of Mhow, and wholly ignorant of Holkar's character and conduct before the rising, had "established himself as the representative for the Governor-General in Holkar's dominion," handed over the charge to an equally ignorant political assistant who was a fugitive in Holkar's hands. It would be interesting to know what these gentlemen would have done if while they were acquitting themselves so much to their own and Holkar's satisfaction, the man whom they were endeavouring to supplant had let the barrier of the Nerbudda drop behind them, and allowed Woodburn to march off to Nagpore.

Kaye further endeavours to make out that my father had disappeared from his charge, "no one seemed to know whither," and that he did not answer Hungerford's letters. This is untrue. The force from the residency retired at a walk, and passed Holkar's "chokees," or roadside posts on the march towards Bhopal. The Durbar knew perfectly well in what direction it had retired; and that my father was within the limits of his charge, for Bhopal was as much a part of his charge as Indore. He was throughout within two days' post, and he answered all letters sent to him.

There is one more question taken up by Sir John Kaye which requires a passing notice. He refers to my father's "argument, persistently repeated, that a Native prince is responsible for the conduct of his troops;" and he cites the case of Dhar to show how "unjust and impolitic" such

* When my father reached Mhow he went to see where Platt, Fagan and Harris had been buried. An artilleryman on sentry said to him as he stood there, "Ah! if Colonel Platt had not been killed he would have followed up the mutineers with our battery, and would not have let them go as they did."

an argument was. Now, in point of fact, what my father persistently argued was the necessity of holding Native chiefs *primâ facie* responsible, which is something widely different. A chief, whose troops had broken away from his control, could easily produce evidence to rebut the presumption in his own case. Holkar himself, for example, produced such evidence, and it was immediately received with favour. But the presumption in itself is surely a reasonable one. The nominal Government of a State must be *primâ facie* responsible for the acts of its troops. The distinction between the view attributed to my father by Sir John Kaye, and the view my father actually held is brought out by the very case cited, that of Dhar. My father urged the sequestration of the State, not simply on the ground that the Dhar Durbar was responsible for the excesses of its mercenary troops, but because the Durbar had, as a fact, thrown in its lot with the mutinous soldiery and encouraged rebellion against the British power. The case has already been the subject of much discussion. As Sir John Kaye has thought fit to bring it up again, it may be as well to supplement his account by a short statement of the facts. Just after the news of the Meerut and Delhi tragedies reached Central India, the Dhar Rajah died. He had adopted his younger brother, Anund Rao Puar, then about thirteen years of age. The boy was acknowledged as Rajah, and choose for his dewan or minister one Ramchunder Bapojee, who had a thorough knowledge of English, had associated much with English officers, and was supposed to be in favour of our interests. Contrary to the well-known and repeated instructions of the British Government, this man commenced his career by enlisting large numbers of foreign mercenaries. As soon as the news of the Indore rising reached Dhar, a party of these mercenaries, joining with those of the Raja of Amjhera, plundered the stations of Bhopawar and Sirdarpore, and burned the hospitals over the heads of the sick and wounded. Returning to Dhar with their plunder, they were met and honourably entertained by the young Rajah's uncle; and on the 31st of August they were in possession of the fort. Six weeks later Captain Hutchinson, the political officer in charge, reported that there was strong reason to believe that the Raja's mother and uncle and other members of the Durbar were the instigators of the rebellion. The Durbar agent gave him no trustworthy information, and had purposely deceived him as to the nature of the negotiations with the mutinous mercenaries, and the number of such men who had been enlisted. And the Durbar had received with attention and civility emissaries from Mundesore, which was the centre of the Mussulman rising. On receipt of this intelligence my father dismissed the Dhar agent who was in attendance upon him, with a message to the Durbar that they would be held responsible for what had occurred. Then followed the march upon Dhar, and the occupation of the fort. After the capture my father ordered the fort to be demolished, the State to be attached, pending the orders of Government, and charges to be prepared against the leaders and instigators of the rebellion. Consideration was to be shown to the Rajah on account of his youth, and to

the Ranee on account of her sex. But the Dewan Ramchunder Bapojee, the Raja's uncle, Bheem Rao Bhonsla, and others, were carried prisoners to Mhow, and were to be tried for their lives. Shortly afterwards Sir Robert Hamilton returned from England and resumed charge of his office as agent of the Governor-General. To his negligence and that of his son-in-law, Captain Hutchinson, who had undertaken the preparation of the charges,* is attributable the escape of these men from the punishment they had merited. They were never brought to trial; beyond a summary and unofficial inquiry nothing was done; and, on the 29th of November, 1858, without the knowledge of the Supreme Government, and, in spite of the orders issued for their trial, of which Government had approved, they were permitted quietly to return to Dhar.

Three years later, when Sir Robert Hamilton had been relieved by the late Sir Richmond Shakespear, this disobedience of orders was brought to light. Government could not then, of course, press any charges against the Durbar, and if it had desired to do so, there was little chance of evidence being procured. The record of the summary inquiry made in 1858 had been lost.

But the complicity of the Durbar in the rebellion was never questioned by any one in India, not even by Sir R. Hamilton, the champion of Dhar, till the 5th of July, 1858. It may be noticed that the offence of Dhar was precisely the same as that of Amjhera. The troops of both States conjointly plundered Bhopawar and Sirdarpore. The Raja of Amjhera was hanged, and his territory incorporated with Sindia's dominions. No one has ever questioned the justice of his fate.

Such were the facts of the Dhar case, which Sir John Kaye quotes as an exponent of my father's mischievous views upon the responsibility of Native princes. The action of the Home Government is well known. The despatch of the Court of Directors cited by Sir John Kaye, which prevented the "unjust and impolitic" sequestration of the principality, was based on imperfect information. When the facts of the case were more fully reported by Lord Canning, after personal inquiry during his great progress through the Upper Provinces, which clearly established the

* Throughout the Dhar controversy one argument constantly used is that on Sir Robert Hamilton's arrival at Indore he found that the accused persons had never been tried, and that no charges even had been framed against them. Between the fall of Dhar and Sir Robert's arrival at Indore just six weeks elapsed, during the whole of which time my father was in the field at a distance from Dhar, engaged in very critical military operations. He had therefore no opportunity of trying these men himself. Moreover, the proper person to prepare the charges and conduct the case was the Political Agent, Captain Hutchinson, and accordingly on the 3rd of November, before marching for Mundesore, my father ordered him to undertake the duty. A few days later he reported that he was about to begin framing the charges, and that he would either try the prisoners himself or send them in for trial to the "First Assistant" at Indore. It is evident, therefore, that my father did all that t was possible for him to do in the matter, and of this Sir Robert Hamilton must have been fully aware.

complicity of the Dhar Durbar in the rebellion, the Home Government entirely concurred in the justice of the confiscation, but from "merciful consideration" to the youth and apparent innocence of the young Raja himself, decided to forego the extreme penalty. An outlying portion of the State was, however, sequestrated and handed over to the Begum of Bhopal, as a reward for her faithful services. Her Majesty's Government being of opinion that it was "not right, nor expedient, that the principality of Dhar should wholly escape all penalties for the misconduct of those who directed its counsels and forces during the late events." Sir John Kaye must have been well aware of these facts, for he was connected with the India Office until long afterwards. He states in his History that he drafted the first despatch on the subject; and in all probability he drafted the second. But he makes no mention of a decision so destructive to his argument.

It would be impossible for me to notice at length the many other defective or erroneous statements advanced by Sir John Kaye in this short chapter of his history: that Lord Elphinstone "with all the facts before him" condemned my father's retreat from Indore; that my father had from the first an "antipathy,' for Holkar, and so on. It appears from letters quoted by Sir John Kaye that very shortly after the outbreak, when Lord Elphinstone had *not* all the facts before him, he wrote to my father and others asserting Holkar's innocence. But this was no slur on my father, as Lord Elphinstone afterwards proved by personal assurances. I have already pointed out that the question of Holkar's loyalty and the question of the retirement from Indore are entirely separate. As to the alleged antipathy, my father had been under three months at Indore when the troops rose, and had seen Holkar only twice. There is not a word in any of the letters of this period in my possession which shows antipathy to Holkar, or even an unfavourable estimate of his character, though in after years he certainly did not think well of the Maharaja. But I have not space to notice every point of this kind.*

Nor would it serve any practical purpose to criticise Sir John Kaye's imputations on my father's character as a political officer, his intolerance, and his want of consideration for the "down-trodden Native princes and chiefs of India." Certain it is that I have received no warmer tributes to my father's memory than from these very princes and chiefs. General Travers writes in connection with this point: "A residence in Central India from 1843 to 1866, mixing constantly with natives of every degree, enables me without hesitation to declare that Durand, though not demonstrative, was far from wanting in sympathy with them, as they speedily learnt to discern. They held him then, as they still hold his memory, in exceptionally high respect." And it is a significant fact that Lord Canning and Lord Mayo, probably of all the Viceroys of India the two

* In an article upon "Central India under British Supremacy," written some years earlier, which will be found in the second volume of this work, my father expresses a particularly favourable opinion of Holkar.

who were most popular with Native chiefs, specially selected my father for his possession of the very qualities which Sir John Kaye denies him. Lord Canning made him Foreign Secretary, thus charging him with the conduct of all work connected with the Native States; and Lord Mayo some years later wished to make one great political charge of all the States of Central India and Rajputana and to entrust it to my father. "Of all men in India," he wrote, "the most likely to exercise influence of a powerful, and at the same time persuasive character, is Sir Henry Durand. . . . I think his great forte is political work." But the fact is that in this matter Kaye was unfitted for arriving at a sound opinion. He had to decide between my father and Sir Robert Hamilton. The two men were, as he remarks, "extremely dissimilar." "They had different characters and different opinions." No one who knew them both, or who knows the reputation they bear in the Native States, will be likely to dispute the assertion. Having to decide between the two, Kaye came to the conclusion that Sir Robert Hamilton was altogether right, and my father altogether wrong. It was natural that he should do so; in the first place because Hamilton was his "intimate personal friend," and in the second place because he himself belonged to a school of enthusiasts who have done and will do much harm in India, the school which regards all the Native chiefs of India as "down trodden," and holds the "predominant theory" that all our troubles came upon us "because we were too English." My father "could not orientalise himself;" therefore he was a bad political officer. Wherever Sir John Kaye is not writing about anything connected with Sir Robert Hamilton, or the defects of our national character, he can be just and even generous to my father's memory. But where Sir Robert Hamilton and the "predominant theory" are concerned, he can be neither the one nor the other. Fired by an enthusiastic desire to right what he conceives to be Holkar's wrongs, and imagining without reason that the justification of Holkar implies my father's condemnation, he allows himself to be carried away into a good deal of inconsistency and bad taste. He accuses "a man brave in battle" of making a groundless and precipitate retreat, and a "high-minded conscientious English gentleman" of justifying an act of poltroonery by a course of systematic misrepresentation. The accusation is not on the face of it a probable one, and I think I have shown that it is not borne out by facts.

It might be thought from Sir John Kaye's narrative that Holkar had been cruelly slighted and wronged by the Government of India. In reality, as everyone knows who has had any acquaintance with the affairs of Central India, the whole story of our dealings with the Holkar State since 1857 is a record of claims on the part of the State and concessions on the part of the British Government. The Maharaja has been created a Councillor of the Empress and a Knight of the Star of India; he has been allowed great advantages in his exchanges of territory with the British Government; he has received by a 'rectification of frontier' in Candeish a large tract of land which he coveted; and in every

way he has been treated with honour and distinction. The only thing which he has been denied is a recognition that his behaviour and services during the mutiny were so pre-eminently meritorious as to entitle him to the very exceptional reward of a formal grant of territory.

Besides Sir John Kaye, Holkar has found a vehement advocate, and my father a vehement adversary, in Mr. John Dickinson, whose posthumous work, the "Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor," I have already noticed. Mr. Dickinson is dead, and I do not wish to speak of him in the tone which he permitted himself to adopt towards my father and myself, but I am bound to say that the book is a tissue of untruth from beginning to end. It is charitable to suppose that Mr. Dickinson believed what he wrote, but he has not taken the pains to verify his assertions, and he has therefore laid himself open to very severe treatment. I did not answer the book when it appeared, though much tempted to do so, because I was assured that a work of so violent and acrimonious a nature would certainly die a natural death. For the same reason I do not propose to follow Mr. Dickinson now. The refutation of a string of misstatements, however clear and easy to expose, takes up a good deal of space; and as the majority of those who read these pages have probably never heard of Mr. Dickinson or his pamphlets the labour would be wasted.

Woodfall & Kinder, Printers, Milford Lane, Strand, London, W.C.

00026385

Digitized with financial assistance from

HT Parekh FOUNDATION

An Initiative by HDFC

WITH YOU, RIGHT THROUGH

on 28 December, 2018